retaliation claim in Tennessee

2010Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999).

2000In Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (1999), the Court stated: A retaliation claim essentially entails three elements: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements one and two – that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff’s protected conduct.

2011Tennessee Human Rights Act Claim for Retaliatory Discharge Mr. Sykes and Mr. Greene also each brought an action under the THRA, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-21-301, which provides that it is a discriminatory practice to “[rjetaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person because such person has opposed a practice declared discriminatory by this chapter or because such person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under this chapter.” In Allen v. McPhee, 240 S.W.3d 803, 820 (Tenn.2007) (ab

2011Tennessee Human Rights Act Claim for Retaliatory Discharge Mr. Sykes and Mr. Greene also each brought an action under the THRA, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-21-301, which provides that it is a discriminatory practice to “[r]etaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person because such person has opposed a practice declared discriminatory by this chapter or because such person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under this chapter.” In Allen v. McPhee, 240 S.W.3d 803, 820 (Tenn. 2007) (a

2015Ferguson, 451 S.W.3d at 382 n. 3 *439 (citing Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir.2000); Canitia v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1066 (6th Cir.1990)). 13 .

2014Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir.2000); Canitia v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1066 (6th Cir.1990). 4 .

2015Ferguson, 451 S.W.3d at 382 n. 3 *439 (citing Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir.2000); Canitia v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1066 (6th Cir.1990)). 13 .

2014Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir.2000); Canitia v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1066 (6th Cir.1990). 4 .

2011Tennessee Human Rights Act Claim for Retaliatory Discharge Mr. Sykes and Mr. Greene also each brought an action under the THRA, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-21-301, which provides that it is a discriminatory practice to “[rjetaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person because such person has opposed a practice declared discriminatory by this chapter or because such person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under this chapter.” In Allen v. McPhee, 240 S.W.3d 803, 820 (Tenn.2007) (ab

2011Tennessee Human Rights Act Claim for Retaliatory Discharge Mr. Sykes and Mr. Greene also each brought an action under the THRA, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-21-301, which provides that it is a discriminatory practice to “[r]etaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person because such person has opposed a practice declared discriminatory by this chapter or because such person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under this chapter.” In Allen v. McPhee, 240 S.W.3d 803, 820 (Tenn. 2007) (a

2015Sykes, 343 S.W.3d at 29 (quoting Allen, 240 S.W.3d at 820 ).

2014Sykes, 343 S.W.3d at 29 (brackets in original) (quoting Allen v. McPhee, 240 S.W.3d 803, 820 (Tenn. 2007) (abrogated on other grounds by Gossett, 320 S.W.3d at 783-84)).

2012Our resolution of this issue necessarily begins with Burlington Northern, in which the United States Supreme Court clarified both the scope of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision and the standard for determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied the “adverse action” element of a retaliation claim. 9 The Burlington Northern Court first held that the scope of Title VII’s “antiretaliation provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.” 548 U.S. at 64 , 126 S.Ct. 2405 . 10 While the Court broadly interpret

2012Our resolution of this issue necessarily begins with Burlington Northern, in which the United States Supreme Court clarified both the scope of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision and the standard for determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied the “adverse action” element of a retaliation claim. 9 The Burlington Northern Court first held that the scope of Title VII’s “antiretaliation provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.” 548 U.S. at 64 , 126 S.Ct. 2405 . 10 While the Court broadly interpret

2016We adopted the standard set forth in Barnes v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d 698, 707 (Tenn. 2000), applicable to suits brought under the Tennessee Handicap Discrimination Act, that this element of a retaliation claim requires a ―material and adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.‖ 38 reprimand was warranted and that the warning was not a material adverse action.

2015Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. -, -, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2528, 2533 , 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013); see also Van Horn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 526 F.3d 1144, 1148 (8th Cir.2008) (“To make out a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show that the protected conduct was a ‘determinative — not merely a motivating — factor’ in the employer’s adverse employment decision.” (quoting Carrington v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 481 F.3d 1046, 1053 (8th Cir.2007))).

2015Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. -, -, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2528, 2533 , 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013); see also Van Horn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 526 F.3d 1144, 1148 (8th Cir.2008) (“To make out a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show that the protected conduct was a ‘determinative — not merely a motivating — factor’ in the employer’s adverse employment decision.” (quoting Carrington v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 481 F.3d 1046, 1053 (8th Cir.2007))).

2015Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. -, -, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2528, 2533 , 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013); see also Van Horn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 526 F.3d 1144, 1148 (8th Cir.2008) (“To make out a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show that the protected conduct was a ‘determinative — not merely a motivating — factor’ in the employer’s adverse employment decision.” (quoting Carrington v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 481 F.3d 1046, 1053 (8th Cir.2007))).

2015Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. -, -, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2528, 2533 , 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013); see also Van Horn v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 526 F.3d 1144, 1148 (8th Cir.2008) (“To make out a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show that the protected conduct was a ‘determinative — not merely a motivating — factor’ in the employer’s adverse employment decision.” (quoting Carrington v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, 481 F.3d 1046, 1053 (8th Cir.2007))).

2015See E.E.O.C. v. New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057, 1076 (6th Cir.2015) (finding that a retaliation instruction with “because of’ and “causal connection” language sufficiently articulated the but-for causation standard required by Nassar).

2013See Perkins v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 380 S.W.3d 73, 81 (Tenn. 2012).

2007Bryant v. Brownlee, 265 F.Supp.2d 52, 67 (D.D.C.2003) (observing that most circuits recognize that allegations of harassment or hostile work environment may form the basis of a retaliation claim against an employer).

2006The elements to prove a retaliation claim under Title VII are the same elements required under the THRA, including the requirement that a plaintiff show that he or she has been subjected to an adverse employment action.5 Miller v. City of Murfreesboro, 122 S.W.3d 766, 775 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003); Austin, 3 S.W.3d at 480 ; Newsom, 924 S.W.2d at 96 .

2006In Moore, we noted that “only certain retaliatory conduct violates the THRA.” 72 S.W.3d at 653, 656 (“general grievances which are not related to discrimination cannot be the basis of a retaliation claim under the THRA.”) Here, even if MEA retaliated against Sawyer for the filing of union grievances, that discrimination or retaliation would not be prohibited under the Tennessee Human Rights Act.

2000See, e.g., Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998); Lewis v. ACB Bus.

2000See Irwin v. Binkley, 577 S.W.2d 677 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); Tops Bar-B-Q, Inc. v. Stringer, 582 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977).