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23 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Stateyellow2 sentences2021Williams, 287 Ga. at 738 (2) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 276 Ga. 158, 162 (1) (c) ( 575 SE2d 462 ) (2003)). 15 (ii) Young’s challenge to his grand jury source list also included an allegation of an underrepresentation of Hispanic persons. 2021Williams, 287 Ga. at 738 (2) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 276 Ga. 158, 162 (1) (c) ( 575 SE2d 462 ) (2003)). 15 (ii) Young’s challenge to his grand jury source list also included an allegation of an underrepresentation of Hispanic persons. | 3 | 3 |
Champ v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Cf. Champ, 310 Ga. at 834-848 (2) (a, b, and c) (remanding where the trial court had not ruled on the defendant’s acquiescence in counsel’s waiver). 2021Cf. Champ, 310 Ga. at 834-848 (2) (a, b, and c) (remanding where the trial court had not ruled on the defendant’s acquiescence in counsel’s waiver). | 3 | 3 |
Bryant v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See Martin, 298 Ga. at 278-279 (6) (d); Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 887 (8) (c) ( 708 SE2d 362 ) (2011). 21. 2021See Martin, 298 Ga. at 278-279 (6) (d); Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 887 (8) (c) ( 708 SE2d 362 ) (2011). 21. | 3 | 3 |
Ramirez v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Williams, 287 Ga. at 738 (2) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 276 Ga. 158, 162 (1) (c) ( 575 SE2d 462 ) (2003)). 15 (ii) Young’s challenge to his grand jury source list also included an allegation of an underrepresentation of Hispanic persons. 2021Williams, 287 Ga. at 738 (2) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 276 Ga. 158, 162 (1) (c) ( 575 SE2d 462 ) (2003)). 15 (ii) Young’s challenge to his grand jury source list also included an allegation of an underrepresentation of Hispanic persons. | 3 | 3 |
Chapman v. Californiayellow2 sentences2021See Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (III) ( 87 SCt 824 , 17 LE2d 705) (1967) (holding that, in general, constitutional violations require reversal unless found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 2021See Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (III) ( 87 SCt 824 , 17 LE2d 705) (1967) (holding that, in general, constitutional violations require reversal unless found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). | 3 | 3 |
Crozier v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See Crozier v. State, 263 Ga. 866, 867 (2) ( 440 SE2d 635 ) (1994) (“Any evidence is relevant which logically tends to prove or to disprove a material fact which is at issue in the case, and every act or circumstance serving to elucidate or to throw light upon a material issue or issues is relevant. . . . 2021See Crozier v. State, 263 Ga. 866, 867 (2) ( 440 SE2d 635 ) (1994) (“Any evidence is relevant which logically tends to prove or to disprove a material fact which is at issue in the case, and every act or circumstance serving to elucidate or to throw light upon a material issue or issues is relevant. . . . | 3 | 3 |
Sims v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See Sims v. State, 266 Ga. 417, 419-420 (3) ( 467 SE2d 574 ) (1996). 96 (b) We also agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the statements by the juror in question, which regarded matters that were discussed at length by him in his voir dire, did not warrant a new trial. 2021See Sims v. State, 266 Ga. 417, 419-420 (3) ( 467 SE2d 574 ) (1996). 96 (b) We also agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the statements by the juror in question, which regarded matters that were discussed at length by him in his voir dire, did not warrant a new trial. | 3 | 3 |
Martin v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See Martin, 298 Ga. at 278-279 (6) (d); Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 887 (8) (c) ( 708 SE2d 362 ) (2011). 21. 2021See Martin, 298 Ga. at 278-279 (6) (d). | 3 | 3 |
Sledge v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Sledge v. State, 312 Ga. App. 97, 104 (2) (b) ( 717 SE2d 682 ) (2011). 2014Sledge v. State, 312 Ga. App. 97, 104 (2) (b) ( 717 SE2d 682 ) (2011). | 2 | 2 |
Wroge v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Defrancisco v. State, 289 Ga. App. 115, 119 (1) (e) ( 656 SE2d 238 ) (2008) (rejecting contention that trial counsel failed to advise defendant of consequences of jury trial waiver where counsel testified that he discussed the issue with defendant several times); Wroge v. State, 278 Ga. App. 753, 755 (2) ( 629 SE2d 596 ) (2006) (rejecting ineffectiveness claim where counsel testified that he and defendant several times discussed advantages and disadvantages of jury trial and potential for juror bias in defendant’s case). 2. 2014See Defrancisco v. State, 289 Ga. App. 115, 119 (1) (e) ( 656 SE2d 238 ) (2008) (rejecting contention that trial counsel failed to advise defendant of consequences of jury trial waiver where counsel testified that he discussed the issue with defendant several times); Wroge v. State, 278 Ga. App. 753, 755 (2) ( 629 SE2d 596 ) (2006) (rejecting ineffectiveness claim where counsel testified that he and defendant several times discussed advantages and disadvantages of jury trial and potential for juror bias in defendant’s case). 2. | 2 | 2 |
Defrancisco v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Defrancisco v. State, 289 Ga. App. 115, 119 (1) (e) ( 656 SE2d 238 ) (2008) (rejecting contention that trial counsel failed to advise defendant of consequences of jury trial waiver where counsel testified that he discussed the issue with defendant several times); Wroge v. State, 278 Ga. App. 753, 755 (2) ( 629 SE2d 596 ) (2006) (rejecting ineffectiveness claim where counsel testified that he and defendant several times discussed advantages and disadvantages of jury trial and potential for juror bias in defendant’s case). 2. 2014See Defrancisco v. State, 289 Ga. App. 115, 119 (1) (e) ( 656 SE2d 238 ) (2008) (rejecting contention that trial counsel failed to advise defendant of consequences of jury trial waiver where counsel testified that he discussed the issue with defendant several times); Wroge v. State, 278 Ga. App. 753, 755 (2) ( 629 SE2d 596 ) (2006) (rejecting ineffectiveness claim where counsel testified that he and defendant several times discussed advantages and disadvantages of jury trial and potential for juror bias in defendant’s case). 2. | 2 | 2 |
Ward v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Although "we are unable to verify [Young's] assertions, as secrecy is maintained with regard to grand jury proceedings," Ward v. State , 288 Ga. 641 , 643 (2), 706 S.E.2d 430 (2011), we find no grounds for reversal. [W]here a competent witness is sworn properly and testifies before the grand jury, and where the defendant is thereafter found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a trial jury, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the indictment is not open to question. 2019Although "we are unable to verify [Young's] assertions, as secrecy is maintained with regard to grand jury proceedings," Ward v. State , 288 Ga. 641 , 643 (2), 706 S.E.2d 430 (2011), we find no grounds for reversal. [W]here a competent witness is sworn properly and testifies before the grand jury, and where the defendant is thereafter found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a trial jury, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the indictment is not open to question. | 1 | 2 |
Powell v. Stategreen1 sentence2026See Powell, 309 Ga. at 525 (1)(explaining that when “the evidence at issue is in conflict, the credibility of witnesses is for the [trial] court to determine”); Earley, 310 Ga. App. at 113 (2)(a) (holding trial court was authorized to credit the testimony of defendant’s plea counsel, and its factual findings and credibility determinations will be accepted unless clearly erroneous). 11 not abuse its discretion in denying Young’s motion to withdraw his plea on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance.24 3. | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2026See Jones v. State, 321 Ga. 137, 145 (2)(a)(ii) ( 913 SE2d 700 ) (2025) (quoting Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 410 (IV) ( 138 SCt 1518 , 200 LE2d 805) (2018), in explaining that “Fourth Amendment standing is a useful shorthand for capturing the idea that a person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in the place searched before seeking relief for an unconstitutional search” (quotation marks omitted)). 14 standing to challenge the lawfulness of the victim’s sexual-assault examination.29 The trial court did not err, then, in refusing to countenance this frivolous contention or 2026See Jones v. State, 321 Ga. 137, 145 (2)(a)(ii) ( 913 SE2d 700 ) (2025) (quoting Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 410 (IV) ( 138 SCt 1518 , 200 LE2d 805) (2018), in explaining that “Fourth Amendment standing is a useful shorthand for capturing the idea that a person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in the place searched before seeking relief for an unconstitutional search” (quotation marks omitted)). 14 standing to challenge the lawfulness of the victim’s sexual-assault examination.29 The trial court did not err, then, in refusing to countenance this frivolous contention or | 1 | 1 |
Hood v. Stategreen1 sentence2026And the court’s credibility findings, “which it was entitled to make, were not clearly erroneous.”23 As a result, the trial court did 23 Hood, 315 Ga. at 813 (1). | 1 | 1 |
Maurice Young v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Young—still acting pro se—appealed, and in Young v. State,3 we concluded that he properly raised an ineffective-assistance- of-counsel claim at his first opportunity4 and that the court should have treated his motion for new trial as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.5 As a result, we vacated 3 376 Ga. App. 597 ( 920 SE2d 451 ) (2025). 4 See id. at 598-99(1). 5 See id. at 600 (2). 4 the court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with that opinion.6 On remand, the trial court conducted a hearing on what we construed as Young’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 2026Young—still acting pro se—appealed, and in Young v. State,3 we concluded that he properly raised an ineffective-assistance- of-counsel claim at his first opportunity4 and that the court should have treated his motion for new trial as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.5 As a result, we vacated 3 376 Ga. App. 597 ( 920 SE2d 451 ) (2025). 4 See id. at 598-99(1). 5 See id. at 600 (2). 4 the court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with that opinion.6 On remand, the trial court conducted a hearing on what we construed as Young’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. | 1 | 1 |
Byrd v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2026See Jones v. State, 321 Ga. 137, 145 (2)(a)(ii) ( 913 SE2d 700 ) (2025) (quoting Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 410 (IV) ( 138 SCt 1518 , 200 LE2d 805) (2018), in explaining that “Fourth Amendment standing is a useful shorthand for capturing the idea that a person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in the place searched before seeking relief for an unconstitutional search” (quotation marks omitted)). 14 standing to challenge the lawfulness of the victim’s sexual-assault examination.29 The trial court did not err, then, in refusing to countenance this frivolous contention or 2026See Jones v. State, 321 Ga. 137, 145 (2)(a)(ii) ( 913 SE2d 700 ) (2025) (quoting Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 410 (IV) ( 138 SCt 1518 , 200 LE2d 805) (2018), in explaining that “Fourth Amendment standing is a useful shorthand for capturing the idea that a person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in the place searched before seeking relief for an unconstitutional search” (quotation marks omitted)). 14 standing to challenge the lawfulness of the victim’s sexual-assault examination.29 The trial court did not err, then, in refusing to countenance this frivolous contention or | 1 | 1 |
Earley v. Stategreen1 sentence2026See Powell, 309 Ga. at 525 (1)(explaining that when “the evidence at issue is in conflict, the credibility of witnesses is for the [trial] court to determine”); Earley, 310 Ga. App. at 113 (2)(a) (holding trial court was authorized to credit the testimony of defendant’s plea counsel, and its factual findings and credibility determinations will be accepted unless clearly erroneous). 11 not abuse its discretion in denying Young’s motion to withdraw his plea on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance.24 3. | 1 | 1 |
Boykin v. Alabamared1 sentence2026See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243 (explaining privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, right to a trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers will not be presumed waived but must be explicitly waived before a guilty plea). 18 Hayes, 344 Ga. App. at 250(1) (punctuation omitted). 8 circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Young’s motion on the ground his plea was not entered into knowingly and voluntarily.19 2. | 1 | 1 |
Espinosa v. Stategreen2 sentences2025It is well settled that, after sentencing, “a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea only to correct a ‘manifest injustice.’” Espinosa v. State, 320 Ga. 98, 102 (2) ( 907 SE2d 691 ) (2024). 2025It is well settled that, after sentencing, “a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea only to correct a ‘manifest injustice.’” Espinosa v. State, 320 Ga. 98, 102 (2) ( 907 SE2d 691 ) (2024). | 1 | 1 |
KING v. the STATE.green1 sentence2025See King, 346 Ga. App. at 369-370 (1); Gaskin, 334 Ga. App. at 765 (1) (b). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Galbreath v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Importantly, “[w]e consider the substance of a motion and not its nomenclature.” Martin v. State, 369 Ga. App. 193 , 196 (2) ( 892 SE2d 826 ) (2023); see also Galbreath v. State, 130 Ga. App. 179 ( 202 SE2d 562 ) (1973) (considering substance of pro se motion). 2025Importantly, “[w]e consider the substance of a motion and not its nomenclature.” Martin v. State, 369 Ga. App. 193 , 196 (2) ( 892 SE2d 826 ) (2023); see also Galbreath v. State, 130 Ga. App. 179 ( 202 SE2d 562 ) (1973) (considering substance of pro se motion). | 1 | 1 |
Gaskin v. the Stategreen1 sentence2025See King, 346 Ga. App. at 369-370 (1); Gaskin, 334 Ga. App. at 765 (1) (b). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Lockhartgreen2 sentences2024See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, 57-59 ( 106 SCt 366 , 88 LE2d 203) (1985). 20 (Citation omitted.) Thornell v. Jones, ___ U. S. ___, ___ (II) ( 144 SCt 1302 , 1310, 218 LE2d 626) (2024). 13 allegation that plea counsel had failed to provide discovery was unsubstantiated.21 Based on this record, the trial court properly denied Young’s motion in this respect. (b) Young also argues that plea counsel was deficient for failing to pursue a motion to suppress her statements. 2024See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, 57-59 ( 106 SCt 366 , 88 LE2d 203) (1985). 20 (Citation omitted.) Thornell v. Jones, ___ U. S. ___, ___ (II) ( 144 SCt 1302 , 1310, 218 LE2d 626) (2024). 13 allegation that plea counsel had failed to provide discovery was unsubstantiated.21 Based on this record, the trial court properly denied Young’s motion in this respect. (b) Young also argues that plea counsel was deficient for failing to pursue a motion to suppress her statements. | 1 | 1 |
Thornell v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2024See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, 57-59 ( 106 SCt 366 , 88 LE2d 203) (1985). 20 (Citation omitted.) Thornell v. Jones, ___ U. S. ___, ___ (II) ( 144 SCt 1302 , 1310, 218 LE2d 626) (2024). 13 allegation that plea counsel had failed to provide discovery was unsubstantiated.21 Based on this record, the trial court properly denied Young’s motion in this respect. (b) Young also argues that plea counsel was deficient for failing to pursue a motion to suppress her statements. | 1 | 1 |
Mahaffey v. Stategreen2 sentences2024At the hearing on Young’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea, plea counsel testified that she made a “huge point” of 7 Mahaffey v. State, 308 Ga. 743, 745 (2) ( 843 SE2d 571 ) (2020), citing OCGA § 17-7-93 (b) (“At any time before judgment is pronounced, the accused person may withdraw the plea of guilty and plead not guilty.”). 8 Blackwell v. State, 299 Ga. 122, 123 ( 786 SE2d 669 ) (2016). 5 explaining this “very specific” waiver to Young and that counsel “did not sense any confusion about that issue.” Young’s assertion that the trial court’s plea colloquy misled her into believing that she 2024At the hearing on Young’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea, plea counsel testified that she made a “huge point” of 7 Mahaffey v. State, 308 Ga. 743, 745 (2) ( 843 SE2d 571 ) (2020), citing OCGA § 17-7-93 (b) (“At any time before judgment is pronounced, the accused person may withdraw the plea of guilty and plead not guilty.”). 8 Blackwell v. State, 299 Ga. 122, 123 ( 786 SE2d 669 ) (2016). 5 explaining this “very specific” waiver to Young and that counsel “did not sense any confusion about that issue.” Young’s assertion that the trial court’s plea colloquy misled her into believing that she | 1 | 1 |
Blackwell v. Stategreen2 sentences2024At the hearing on Young’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea, plea counsel testified that she made a “huge point” of 7 Mahaffey v. State, 308 Ga. 743, 745 (2) ( 843 SE2d 571 ) (2020), citing OCGA § 17-7-93 (b) (“At any time before judgment is pronounced, the accused person may withdraw the plea of guilty and plead not guilty.”). 8 Blackwell v. State, 299 Ga. 122, 123 ( 786 SE2d 669 ) (2016). 5 explaining this “very specific” waiver to Young and that counsel “did not sense any confusion about that issue.” Young’s assertion that the trial court’s plea colloquy misled her into believing that she 2024At the hearing on Young’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea, plea counsel testified that she made a “huge point” of 7 Mahaffey v. State, 308 Ga. 743, 745 (2) ( 843 SE2d 571 ) (2020), citing OCGA § 17-7-93 (b) (“At any time before judgment is pronounced, the accused person may withdraw the plea of guilty and plead not guilty.”). 8 Blackwell v. State, 299 Ga. 122, 123 ( 786 SE2d 669 ) (2016). 5 explaining this “very specific” waiver to Young and that counsel “did not sense any confusion about that issue.” Young’s assertion that the trial court’s plea colloquy misled her into believing that she | 1 | 1 |
Berrien v. Stategreen1 sentence2024The trial court found that plea counsel was credible in her testimony and that Young’s 19 (Citations omitted.) Berrien, 300 Ga. at 491 (2). | 1 | 1 |
| Renfro v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Parker v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miranda v. Arizonagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Staceygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stolte v. Faganyellow | 1 | 1 |
| Steele v. Atlanta Maternal-Fetal Medicine, P.C.green | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Finchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wright v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bakergreen | 1 | 1 |
| McDowell v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Eagle v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nicole Duree Guerra v. State
green
2 sentences2026Under OCGA § 16-6- 1(b), “[a] person convicted of the offense of rape shall be punished by death, by imprisonment for life without parole, by imprisonment for life, or by a split sentence that is a term of imprisonment for not less than 25 years and not exceeding life imprisonment, followed by probation for life.” 21 Guerra v. State, 373 Ga. App. 774 , 782(3) ( 908 SE2d 704 ) (2024) (quotation marks omitted). 2026Under OCGA § 16-6- 1(b), “[a] person convicted of the offense of rape shall be punished by death, by imprisonment for life without parole, by imprisonment for life, or by a split sentence that is a term of imprisonment for not less than 25 years and not exceeding life imprisonment, followed by probation for life.” 21 Guerra v. State, 373 Ga. App. 774 , 782(3) ( 908 SE2d 704 ) (2024) (quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Faretta v. California
green
2 sentences2025Thereafter, Young filed a pro se motion for new trial, arguing, inter alia, that his plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel and the denial of his motion to represent himself.2 1 Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 ( 95 SCt 2525 , 45 LE2d 562) (1975). 2 The record does not contain any order discharging Young’s attorney before Young filed his pro se motion. 2025Thereafter, Young filed a pro se motion for new trial, arguing, inter alia, that his plea was involuntary due to ineffective assistance of counsel and the denial of his motion to represent himself.2 1 Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 ( 95 SCt 2525 , 45 LE2d 562) (1975). 2 The record does not contain any order discharging Young’s attorney before Young filed his pro se motion. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Young v. State green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Harris v. State green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Brooks v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Jackson v. Virginia red | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.