Young motion in Georgia

2021Cf. Champ, 310 Ga. at 834-848 (2) (a, b, and c) (remanding where the trial court had not ruled on the defendant’s acquiescence in counsel’s waiver).

2021Cf. Champ, 310 Ga. at 834-848 (2) (a, b, and c) (remanding where the trial court had not ruled on the defendant’s acquiescence in counsel’s waiver).

2021Williams, 287 Ga. at 738 (2) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 276 Ga. 158, 162 (1) (c) ( 575 SE2d 462 ) (2003)). 15 (ii) Young’s challenge to his grand jury source list also included an allegation of an underrepresentation of Hispanic persons.

2021Williams, 287 Ga. at 738 (2) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 276 Ga. 158, 162 (1) (c) ( 575 SE2d 462 ) (2003)). 15 (ii) Young’s challenge to his grand jury source list also included an allegation of an underrepresentation of Hispanic persons.

2021See Martin, 298 Ga. at 278-279 (6) (d); Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 887 (8) (c) ( 708 SE2d 362 ) (2011). 21.

2021See Martin, 298 Ga. at 278-279 (6) (d); Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 887 (8) (c) ( 708 SE2d 362 ) (2011). 21.

2021See Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (III) ( 87 SCt 824 , 17 LE2d 705) (1967) (holding that, in general, constitutional violations require reversal unless found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

2021See Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (III) ( 87 SCt 824 , 17 LE2d 705) (1967) (holding that, in general, constitutional violations require reversal unless found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

2021See Martin, 298 Ga. at 278-279 (6) (d).

2021See Martin, 298 Ga. at 278-279 (6) (d); Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 887 (8) (c) ( 708 SE2d 362 ) (2011). 21.

2021Williams, 287 Ga. at 738 (2) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 276 Ga. 158, 162 (1) (c) ( 575 SE2d 462 ) (2003)). 15 (ii) Young’s challenge to his grand jury source list also included an allegation of an underrepresentation of Hispanic persons.

2021Williams, 287 Ga. at 738 (2) (quoting Ramirez v. State, 276 Ga. 158, 162 (1) (c) ( 575 SE2d 462 ) (2003)). 15 (ii) Young’s challenge to his grand jury source list also included an allegation of an underrepresentation of Hispanic persons.

2021See Sims v. State, 266 Ga. 417, 419-420 (3) ( 467 SE2d 574 ) (1996). 96 (b) We also agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the statements by the juror in question, which regarded matters that were discussed at length by him in his voir dire, did not warrant a new trial.

2021See Sims v. State, 266 Ga. 417, 419-420 (3) ( 467 SE2d 574 ) (1996). 96 (b) We also agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the statements by the juror in question, which regarded matters that were discussed at length by him in his voir dire, did not warrant a new trial.

2021See Crozier v. State, 263 Ga. 866, 867 (2) ( 440 SE2d 635 ) (1994) (“Any evidence is relevant which logically tends to prove or to disprove a material fact which is at issue in the case, and every act or circumstance serving to elucidate or to throw light upon a material issue or issues is relevant. . . .

2021See Crozier v. State, 263 Ga. 866, 867 (2) ( 440 SE2d 635 ) (1994) (“Any evidence is relevant which logically tends to prove or to disprove a material fact which is at issue in the case, and every act or circumstance serving to elucidate or to throw light upon a material issue or issues is relevant. . . .

2014See Defrancisco v. State, 289 Ga. App. 115, 119 (1) (e) ( 656 SE2d 238 ) (2008) (rejecting contention that trial counsel failed to advise defendant of consequences of jury trial waiver where counsel testified that he discussed the issue with defendant several times); Wroge v. State, 278 Ga. App. 753, 755 (2) ( 629 SE2d 596 ) (2006) (rejecting ineffectiveness claim where counsel testified that he and defendant several times discussed advantages and disadvantages of jury trial and potential for juror bias in defendant’s case). 2.

2014See Defrancisco v. State, 289 Ga. App. 115, 119 (1) (e) ( 656 SE2d 238 ) (2008) (rejecting contention that trial counsel failed to advise defendant of consequences of jury trial waiver where counsel testified that he discussed the issue with defendant several times); Wroge v. State, 278 Ga. App. 753, 755 (2) ( 629 SE2d 596 ) (2006) (rejecting ineffectiveness claim where counsel testified that he and defendant several times discussed advantages and disadvantages of jury trial and potential for juror bias in defendant’s case). 2.

2014See Defrancisco v. State, 289 Ga. App. 115, 119 (1) (e) ( 656 SE2d 238 ) (2008) (rejecting contention that trial counsel failed to advise defendant of consequences of jury trial waiver where counsel testified that he discussed the issue with defendant several times); Wroge v. State, 278 Ga. App. 753, 755 (2) ( 629 SE2d 596 ) (2006) (rejecting ineffectiveness claim where counsel testified that he and defendant several times discussed advantages and disadvantages of jury trial and potential for juror bias in defendant’s case). 2.

2014See Defrancisco v. State, 289 Ga. App. 115, 119 (1) (e) ( 656 SE2d 238 ) (2008) (rejecting contention that trial counsel failed to advise defendant of consequences of jury trial waiver where counsel testified that he discussed the issue with defendant several times); Wroge v. State, 278 Ga. App. 753, 755 (2) ( 629 SE2d 596 ) (2006) (rejecting ineffectiveness claim where counsel testified that he and defendant several times discussed advantages and disadvantages of jury trial and potential for juror bias in defendant’s case). 2.

2014Sledge v. State, 312 Ga. App. 97, 104 (2) (b) ( 717 SE2d 682 ) (2011).

2014Sledge v. State, 312 Ga. App. 97, 104 (2) (b) ( 717 SE2d 682 ) (2011).

2019Although "we are unable to verify [Young's] assertions, as secrecy is maintained with regard to grand jury proceedings," Ward v. State , 288 Ga. 641 , 643 (2), 706 S.E.2d 430 (2011), we find no grounds for reversal. [W]here a competent witness is sworn properly and testifies before the grand jury, and where the defendant is thereafter found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a trial jury, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the indictment is not open to question.

2019Although "we are unable to verify [Young's] assertions, as secrecy is maintained with regard to grand jury proceedings," Ward v. State , 288 Ga. 641 , 643 (2), 706 S.E.2d 430 (2011), we find no grounds for reversal. [W]here a competent witness is sworn properly and testifies before the grand jury, and where the defendant is thereafter found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a trial jury, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the indictment is not open to question.

2025See King, 346 Ga. App. at 369-370 (1); Gaskin, 334 Ga. App. at 765 (1) (b). 2.

2025See King, 346 Ga. App. at 369-370 (1); Gaskin, 334 Ga. App. at 765 (1) (b). 2.

2025Importantly, “[w]e consider the substance of a motion and not its nomenclature.” Martin v. State, 369 Ga. App. 193 , 196 (2) ( 892 SE2d 826 ) (2023); see also Galbreath v. State, 130 Ga. App. 179 ( 202 SE2d 562 ) (1973) (considering substance of pro se motion).

2025Importantly, “[w]e consider the substance of a motion and not its nomenclature.” Martin v. State, 369 Ga. App. 193 , 196 (2) ( 892 SE2d 826 ) (2023); see also Galbreath v. State, 130 Ga. App. 179 ( 202 SE2d 562 ) (1973) (considering substance of pro se motion).

2025It is well settled that, after sentencing, “a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea only to correct a ‘manifest injustice.’” Espinosa v. State, 320 Ga. 98, 102 (2) ( 907 SE2d 691 ) (2024).

2025It is well settled that, after sentencing, “a defendant may withdraw his guilty plea only to correct a ‘manifest injustice.’” Espinosa v. State, 320 Ga. 98, 102 (2) ( 907 SE2d 691 ) (2024).

2024See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, 57-59 ( 106 SCt 366 , 88 LE2d 203) (1985). 20 (Citation omitted.) Thornell v. Jones, ___ U. S. ___, ___ (II) ( 144 SCt 1302 , 1310, 218 LE2d 626) (2024). 13 allegation that plea counsel had failed to provide discovery was unsubstantiated.21 Based on this record, the trial court properly denied Young’s motion in this respect. (b) Young also argues that plea counsel was deficient for failing to pursue a motion to suppress her statements.

2024See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, 57-59 ( 106 SCt 366 , 88 LE2d 203) (1985). 20 (Citation omitted.) Thornell v. Jones, ___ U. S. ___, ___ (II) ( 144 SCt 1302 , 1310, 218 LE2d 626) (2024). 13 allegation that plea counsel had failed to provide discovery was unsubstantiated.21 Based on this record, the trial court properly denied Young’s motion in this respect. (b) Young also argues that plea counsel was deficient for failing to pursue a motion to suppress her statements.

2024At the hearing on Young’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea, plea counsel testified that she made a “huge point” of 7 Mahaffey v. State, 308 Ga. 743, 745 (2) ( 843 SE2d 571 ) (2020), citing OCGA § 17-7-93 (b) (“At any time before judgment is pronounced, the accused person may withdraw the plea of guilty and plead not guilty.”). 8 Blackwell v. State, 299 Ga. 122, 123 ( 786 SE2d 669 ) (2016). 5 explaining this “very specific” waiver to Young and that counsel “did not sense any confusion about that issue.” Young’s assertion that the trial court’s plea colloquy misled her into believing that she

2024At the hearing on Young’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea, plea counsel testified that she made a “huge point” of 7 Mahaffey v. State, 308 Ga. 743, 745 (2) ( 843 SE2d 571 ) (2020), citing OCGA § 17-7-93 (b) (“At any time before judgment is pronounced, the accused person may withdraw the plea of guilty and plead not guilty.”). 8 Blackwell v. State, 299 Ga. 122, 123 ( 786 SE2d 669 ) (2016). 5 explaining this “very specific” waiver to Young and that counsel “did not sense any confusion about that issue.” Young’s assertion that the trial court’s plea colloquy misled her into believing that she

2024The trial court found that plea counsel was credible in her testimony and that Young’s 19 (Citations omitted.) Berrien, 300 Ga. at 491 (2).

2024At the hearing on Young’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea, plea counsel testified that she made a “huge point” of 7 Mahaffey v. State, 308 Ga. 743, 745 (2) ( 843 SE2d 571 ) (2020), citing OCGA § 17-7-93 (b) (“At any time before judgment is pronounced, the accused person may withdraw the plea of guilty and plead not guilty.”). 8 Blackwell v. State, 299 Ga. 122, 123 ( 786 SE2d 669 ) (2016). 5 explaining this “very specific” waiver to Young and that counsel “did not sense any confusion about that issue.” Young’s assertion that the trial court’s plea colloquy misled her into believing that she

2024At the hearing on Young’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea, plea counsel testified that she made a “huge point” of 7 Mahaffey v. State, 308 Ga. 743, 745 (2) ( 843 SE2d 571 ) (2020), citing OCGA § 17-7-93 (b) (“At any time before judgment is pronounced, the accused person may withdraw the plea of guilty and plead not guilty.”). 8 Blackwell v. State, 299 Ga. 122, 123 ( 786 SE2d 669 ) (2016). 5 explaining this “very specific” waiver to Young and that counsel “did not sense any confusion about that issue.” Young’s assertion that the trial court’s plea colloquy misled her into believing that she

2022See Renfro, 313 Ga. at 613 (2). 4.

2022See Renfro, 313 Ga. at 613 (2). 4.

2021See Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 588 (1) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015) (citing Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 101). 31 See Martin, 298 Ga. at 278-279 (6) (d).

2021See Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 588 (1) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015) (citing Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 101). 31 See Martin, 298 Ga. at 278-279 (6) (d).

2020A defendant may waive his rights under Miranda, “provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 ( 86 SCt 1602 , 16 LE2d 694) (1966).

2020A defendant may waive his rights under Miranda, “provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 ( 86 SCt 1602 , 16 LE2d 694) (1966).

2014But unlike in Stolte, 291 Ga. at 479-482 (2), and Steele v. Atlanta Maternal-Fetal Medicine, 271 Ga. App. 622, 622-625 (1) ( 610 SE2d 546 ) (2005), overruled in part on other grounds by Smith v. Finch, 285 Ga. 709, 712 (1) ( 681 SE2d 147 ) (2009), which Young cites in support of this argument, here the trial court neither overruled nor sustained Young’s objection.

2014But unlike in Stolte, 291 Ga. at 479-482 (2), and Steele v. Atlanta Maternal-Fetal Medicine, 271 Ga. App. 622, 622-625 (1) ( 610 SE2d 546 ) (2005), overruled in part on other grounds by Smith v. Finch, 285 Ga. 709, 712 (1) ( 681 SE2d 147 ) (2009), which Young cites in support of this argument, here the trial court neither overruled nor sustained Young’s objection.

2014But unlike in Stolte, 291 Ga. at 479-482 (2), and Steele v. Atlanta Maternal-Fetal Medicine, 271 Ga. App. 622, 622-625 (1) ( 610 SE2d 546 ) (2005), overruled in part on other grounds by Smith v. Finch, 285 Ga. 709, 712 (1) ( 681 SE2d 147 ) (2009), which Young cites in support of this argument, here the trial court neither overruled nor sustained Young’s objection.

2014“It is the duty of counsel to obtain a ruling on his motions or objections.” Smith v. Stacey, 281 Ga. 601, 602 (1) ( 642 SE2d 28 ) (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2014“It is the duty of counsel to obtain a ruling on his motions or objections.” Smith v. Stacey, 281 Ga. 601, 602 (1) ( 642 SE2d 28 ) (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2014But unlike in Stolte, 291 Ga. at 479-482 (2), and Steele v. Atlanta Maternal-Fetal Medicine, 271 Ga. App. 622, 622-625 (1) ( 610 SE2d 546 ) (2005), overruled in part on other grounds by Smith v. Finch, 285 Ga. 709, 712 (1) ( 681 SE2d 147 ) (2009), which Young cites in support of this argument, here the trial court neither overruled nor sustained Young’s objection.

2014But unlike in Stolte, 291 Ga. at 479-482 (2), and Steele v. Atlanta Maternal-Fetal Medicine, 271 Ga. App. 622, 622-625 (1) ( 610 SE2d 546 ) (2005), overruled in part on other grounds by Smith v. Finch, 285 Ga. 709, 712 (1) ( 681 SE2d 147 ) (2009), which Young cites in support of this argument, here the trial court neither overruled nor sustained Young’s objection.

2013See Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 57, 62 (4) (a) ( 673 SE2d 249 ) (2009). (b) Young also claims that his trial lawyer should not have allowed the letter written by the jailhouse informant to go out with the jury during its deliberations, which, Young asserts, violated the continuing witness rule.

2013See Wright v. State, 285 Ga. 57, 62 (4) (a) ( 673 SE2d 249 ) (2009). (b) Young also claims that his trial lawyer should not have allowed the letter written by the jailhouse informant to go out with the jury during its deliberations, which, Young asserts, violated the continuing witness rule.