Young claim in Utah

2026As noted, the jury convicted Young, meaning that it found that Young’s conduct included a threat accompanied by “a show of immediate force or violence.” Because the jury was not given an affirmative defense instruction, its analysis stopped there. 20240307-CA 19 2026 UT App 64 State v. Young ¶45 As noted, however, Young’s defense at trial was that he did not point the shotgun at Contractor, but that he had instead simply (and reasonably) grabbed it so that he could defend himself and his house while he ascertained Contractor’s true purpose.

2024Moreover, where the parties fail to define “prevailing party,” district courts are “afforded discretion” regarding “prevailing party determinations based on contractual attorney fee provisions.” Id. ¶ 8 n.2. 20220003-CA 10 2024 UT App 10 Young H2ORE v. J&M Transmission ANALYSIS ¶27 We first address Young’s challenge to the district court’s summary judgment ruling dismissing its first two causes of action.

2024We also vacate the court’s fee award in light of our ruling vacating the underlying substantive rulings, but we offer some guidance that we hope will be useful as the court reassesses the attorney fees question following reevaluation of the underlying issues. 20220003-CA 2 2024 UT App 10 Young H2ORE v. J&M Transmission BACKGROUND ¶6 Prior to November 2019, J&M operated a transmission shop on property that it leased from Young.

2024Moreover, where the parties fail to define “prevailing party,” district courts are “afforded discretion” regarding “prevailing party determinations based on contractual attorney fee provisions.” Id. ¶ 8 n.2. 20220003-CA 10 2024 UT App 10 Young H2ORE v. J&M Transmission ANALYSIS ¶27 We first address Young’s challenge to the district court’s summary judgment ruling dismissing its first two causes of action.

2023When finally filed, the motion asserted that the search of the trailer had been “illegal” and that Young’s plea was not knowingly entered “because he had not signed [any] [p]robation [a]greement” in the Juab County Case and “was never advised of the terms of his [p]robation in that case.” The motion was relatively brief—containing only three paragraphs of legal argument—and came unaccompanied by any affidavits, declarations, or other attachments. 20210540-CA 4 2023 UT App 26 State v. Young ¶9 The court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion.

2023Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Young’s motion to withdraw. ¶21 Affirmed. 20210540-CA 12 2023 UT App 26

2023STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶15 Granite argues that the district court erred when it granted Young’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. “[A] district court’s dismissal of . . . claims under rule[] 12(b)(1) . . . of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure . . . presents a question of law that we review for correctness.” Salt Lake Cnty. v. State, 2020 UT 27, ¶ 14 , 466 P.3d 158 (cleaned up).

2023STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶15 Granite argues that the district court erred when it granted Young’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. “[A] district court’s dismissal of . . . claims under rule[] 12(b)(1) . . . of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure . . . presents a question of law that we review for correctness.” Salt Lake Cnty. v. State, 2020 UT 27, ¶ 14 , 466 P.3d 158 (cleaned up).

2020Moreover, Segota’s belated opposition was filed on the morning of the day on which oral argument on both defendants’ motions was scheduled; due to Segota’s late filing, Young did not have the chance to file a reply brief. ¶8 After oral argument, the court denied Segota’s motions to extend the deadlines for completion of fact discovery and for 20190253-CA 3 2020 UT App 105 Segota v. Young Chrysler responding to the defendants’ summary judgment motions. 1 In addition, the court determined that Segota’s initial disclosures “were provided too late to allow for meaningful discovery”; as a consequen

2019The judicial power to appoint a person to a hybrid governmental body, in other words, would have to be rooted in some established, historical understanding of judicial power, not in the mere notion that such power would not encroach on the powers of the executive branch. do its job of administering justice.”); Zylstra v. Piva, 539 P.2d 823, 827 (Wash. 1975) (en banc) (“[T]he ultimate power to administer the courts clearly rests with the judiciary.”). 109 See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 , 397–99 (1879) (recognizing that the appointment power is not incompatible with the judicial power); Ex p

2019The judicial power to appoint a person to a hybrid governmental body, in other words, would have to be rooted in some established, historical understanding of judicial power, not in the mere notion that such power would not encroach on the powers of the executive branch. do its job of administering justice.”); Zylstra v. Piva, 539 P.2d 823, 827 (Wash. 1975) (en banc) (“[T]he ultimate power to administer the courts clearly rests with the judiciary.”). 109 See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 , 397–99 (1879) (recognizing that the appointment power is not incompatible with the judicial power); Ex p

2019And if issuing advisory opinions is not an essential legislative or executive function, the Young analysis ends and the statutory directive to the courts would be deemed constitutional. ¶161 That conclusion would be deeply unsettling. “[W]e have unequivocally declared that ‘courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory opinions.’” Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ¶ 19 , 289 P.3d 582 (quoting Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978)).

2019And if issuing advisory opinions is not an essential legislative or executive function, the Young analysis ends and the statutory directive to the courts would be deemed constitutional. ¶161 That conclusion would be deeply unsettling. “[W]e have unequivocally declared that ‘courts are not a forum for hearing academic contentions or rendering advisory opinions.’” Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, ¶ 19 , 289 P.3d 582 (quoting Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978)).

2019That inquiry will be informed by an understanding of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches’ respective powers, as Justice Lee recognizes, see infra ¶ 118, but that does not render it inherently circular. 36 Cite as: 2019 UT 40 Pearce, J., concurring capacity, undertake functions appertaining to another.

2019The judicial power to appoint a person to a hybrid governmental body, in other words, would have to be rooted in some established, historical understanding of judicial power, not in the mere notion that such power would not encroach on the powers of the executive branch. do its job of administering justice.”); Zylstra v. Piva, 539 P.2d 823, 827 (Wash. 1975) (en banc) (“[T]he ultimate power to administer the courts clearly rests with the judiciary.”). 109 See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 , 397–99 (1879) (recognizing that the appointment power is not incompatible with the judicial power); Ex p

2019The judicial power to appoint a person to a hybrid governmental body, in other words, would have to be rooted in some established, historical understanding of judicial power, not in the mere notion that such power would not encroach on the powers of the executive branch. do its job of administering justice.”); Zylstra v. Piva, 539 P.2d 823, 827 (Wash. 1975) (en banc) (“[T]he ultimate power to administer the courts clearly rests with the judiciary.”). 109 See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 , 397–99 (1879) (recognizing that the appointment power is not incompatible with the judicial power); Ex p

2011The Supreme Court previously validated the procedure of a circuit court judge acting as a magistrate and making a bindover determination in State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991).

2011The Supreme Court previously validated the procedure of a circuit court judge acting as a magistrate and making a bindover determination in State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991).

2009The two-part test urged by Respondents is distilled from a larger quote from Young : All the cases unite in the doctrine that on gross inadequacy of price, coupled with irregularities attending the sale, especially where such irregularities are not merely formal and technical, but such as have a direct tendency to prevent the realizing of a fair price for the property sold, and are attributable to the purchaser at the sale, it is the duty of the courts to set the sale aside, unless the complaining party is estopped by his own laches. 37 P. at 254 .

2009The two-part test urged by Respondents is distilled from a larger quote from Young : All the cases unite in the doctrine that on gross inadequacy of price, coupled with irregularities attending the sale, especially where such irregularities are not merely formal and technical, but such as have a direct tendency to prevent the realizing of a fair price for the property sold, and are attributable to the purchaser at the sale, it is the duty of the courts to set the sale aside, unless the complaining party is estopped by his own laches. 37 P. at 254 .

1995Therefore, the jury may properly consider these [aggravating] factors in the penalty phase even when the factors were not introduced during the guilt phase of the trial." Id.

1995Therefore, the jury may properly consider these [aggravating] factors in the penalty phase even when the factors were not introduced during the guilt phase of the trial.” Id.

1993Particularly after Brown , it is disingenuous to suggest that the watershed cases in this country's modern capital punishment jurisprudence did not intend at least to preserve a sacred place for sympathetic and merciful responses to a defendant's mitigating evidence. [4] Nevertheless, in rejecting Young's claim that a jury instruction that interferes with a juror's ability to respond sympathetically or mercifully to the mitigating evidence violated his rights, today's lead opinion ignores this history and instead focuses solely on the opinion in the habeas corpus case of Saffle v. Parks, 494 U

1993Particularly after Brown , it is disingenuous to suggest that the watershed cases in this country's modern capital punishment jurisprudence did not intend at least to preserve a sacred place for sympathetic and merciful responses to a defendant's mitigating evidence. [4] Nevertheless, in rejecting Young's claim that a jury instruction that interferes with a juror's ability to respond sympathetically or mercifully to the mitigating evidence violated his rights, today's lead opinion ignores this history and instead focuses solely on the opinion in the habeas corpus case of Saffle v. Parks, 494 U