Young motion in Texas

2019See Rankin, 46 S.W.3d at 901–02; Young, 8 S.W.3d at 667 .

2019See Rankin, 46 S.W.3d at 901–02; Young, 8 S.W.3d at 667 .

2015See id. at 581-82 ; see also Emerald Oil & Gas, 348 S.W.3d at 219 (“Therefore, if the evidence shows only that Exxon made material misrepresentations in its plugging reports to the Railroad Commission and knew that lessors and operators in the future may rely on the filings, such evidence would fail as a matter of law . . . .”).

2011See Ernst & Young, 51 S.W.3d at 581-82 .

2013Deyon, 2010 WL 1077847 , at *2 (citing Martinez v. State, 109 S.W.3d 800, 803 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2003, pet. ref d)); see Jacobs v. State, 80 S.W.3d 631, 632 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2002, no pet.) (applying the Young rule to an alleged due process violation relating to nondisclosure of Brady material prior to guilty plea).

2013Deyon, 2010 WL 1077847 , at *2 (citing Martinez v. State, 109 S.W.3d 800, 803 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2003, pet. ref d)); see Jacobs v. State, 80 S.W.3d 631, 632 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2002, no pet.) (applying the Young rule to an alleged due process violation relating to nondisclosure of Brady material prior to guilty plea).

2002See Jack v. State, 871 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex. Crim.App.1994) (per curiam) (noting that Helms rule did not limit appeal of asserted error “occurring at or after entry of a nonnegotiated guilty plea”); see also Lemons v. State, 953 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.) (recognizing that “[a] voluntary and understanding guilty plea entered without the benefit of a plea bargain waives all nonjurisdic-tional defects that occurred before the entry of the plea.”) (emphasis added).

2001See Jack v. State, 871 S.W.2d 741, 744 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (applying predecessor to Rule 25.2(b)(3)).

2019See Rankin, 46 S.W.3d at 901–02; Young, 8 S.W.3d at 667 .

2002Waiver by guilty plea now occurs only “when the judgment of guilt was rendered independent of, and is not supported by, the error.” Young, 8 S.W.3d at 667 (the “Helms/Young rule”). 9 Appellant contends that his plea was rendered involuntary by changed circumstances between the entry of his guilty plea and the sentencing hearing.

2025Judicial imposition of “mandatory private enforcement” for breaching a stat- ute is “a limitation unheard-of with regard to state legislatures.” Armstrong v. Excep- tional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 326 (2015) (refusing to allow Ex parte Young claim).

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1378 (2015) 191 L.Ed.2d 471 , 83 USLW 4231 , Med & Med GD (CCH) P 305,247 ... [9] Injunction Injunctions against government officials in general In a proper case, injunctive relief may be given in a court of equity to prevent an injurious act by a public officer.

2018See Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 330– 31.

2012Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 328 ; State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

2016In granting relief on Young’s claim that his plea was rendered involuntary as a result of counsel’s misadvice, this Dean - 9 Court explained that, “[a]lthough it is only natural for an individual pleading guilty to a felony to be concerned over his future parole date, where the plea is based upon a promise, such promise may render the plea of guilty involuntary.” Id. at 5 .

2016We agreed with the habeas court’s findings of fact and concluded that counsel’s advice rendered Young’s plea involuntary.4 The Young Court stated, “By implication, from the record, the trial court also labored under this misunderstanding of the law in that he followed the ‘plea bargain’ to not enter an affirmative finding that a deadly weapon was used.” 5 The Court then held that a defendant’s plea may be rendered involuntary if his attorney grossly misinforms him about his parole eligibility date and that misinformation induces him to plead 3 644 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. Crim.

2026See Carson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 489, 496 (Tex. Crim.

2025Agency, 555 S.W.3d 54, 68 (Tex. 2018). 41 See TEX.

2023See 209 U.S. 123, 156 , 128 S. Ct. 441, 452 (1908).

2023See 209 U.S. 123, 156 , 128 S. Ct. 441, 452 (1908).

2021In re Colonial Pipeline Co., 968 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).

2020Young did not re-urge his motion after the State rested. -6- 04-18-00564-CR Applicable Law “When one particular act of sexual assault is alleged in the indictment, and more than one incident of that same act of sexual assault is shown by the evidence, the State must elect the act upon which it would rely for conviction.” Owings v. State, 541 S.W.3d 144, 150 (Tex. Crim.

2020Simply put, the record before us fails to affirmatively demonstrate that no plausible reasons exist to explain why Young’s attorney did not move to suppress 20 Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim.

2016“When the trial court does not specify the grounds for its ruling, as is the case here, a summary judgment must be affirmed if any of the grounds on which judgment is sought are meritorious.” Id. (citing State v. Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars & No Cents in U.S. Currency, 390 S.W.3d 289, 292 (Tex. 2013)).

2016The trial court denied Young’s motion for new trial, and this appeal followed. 2 See 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (addressing right of rescission as to certain transactions). 4 STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review the granting of a motion for summary judgment de novo.” Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013) (citing Buck v. Palmer, 381 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2012)).

2016“When the trial court does not specify the grounds for its ruling, as is the case here, a summary judgment must be affirmed if any of the grounds on which judgment is sought are meritorious.” Id. (citing State v. Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars & No Cents in U.S. Currency, 390 S.W.3d 289, 292 (Tex. 2013)).

2016The trial court denied Young’s motion for new trial, and this appeal followed. 2 See 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (addressing right of rescission as to certain transactions). 4 STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review the granting of a motion for summary judgment de novo.” Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013) (citing Buck v. Palmer, 381 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2012)).

2015See id. at 581-82 ; see also Emerald Oil & Gas, 348 S.W.3d at 219 (“Therefore, if the evidence shows only that Exxon made material misrepresentations in its plugging reports to the Railroad Commission and knew that lessors and operators in the future may rely on the filings, such evidence would fail as a matter of law . . . .”).

2015Counsel, 878 S.W.2d at 600 (cited in Young’s brief) (judicially noticing on appeal a published Public Utility Commission of Texas ratemaking order that was “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to a published record whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned” (emphasis added)); see Lazarides v. Farris, 367 S.W.3d 788, 799 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th] Dist. 2012, no pet.) (judicially noticing on appeal the fact that minutes of a City Council meeting were published on the City’s website, as opposed to the contents of those minutes, because the accuracy of such a fact was not

2015Counsel, 878 S.W.2d at 600 (cited in Young’s brief) (judicially noticing on appeal a published Public Utility Commission of Texas ratemaking order that was “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to a published record whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned” (emphasis added)); see Lazarides v. Farris, 367 S.W.3d 788, 799 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th] Dist. 2012, no pet.) (judicially noticing on appeal the fact that minutes of a City Council meeting were published on the City’s website, as opposed to the contents of those minutes, because the accuracy of such a fact was not