Young claim in Illinois

2015Leetaru maintains, however, that the officer suit exception is applicable here. ¶ 110 The officer suit exception (in federal courts, the Ex parte Young doctrine), permits an official-capacity lawsuit to enjoin “ ‘a State officer from taking future actions in excess of his delegated authority.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) PHL, Inc., 216 Ill. 2d at 268 (quoting Ellis, 102 Ill. 4 Of note, the Court of Claims, while declining to enter injunctive relief, has stated that it has the power to enter declaratory relief.

2015Leetaru maintains, however, that the officer suit exception is applicable here. ¶ 110 The officer suit exception (in federal courts, the Ex parte Young doctrine), permits an official-capacity lawsuit to enjoin “ ‘a State officer from taking future actions in excess of his delegated authority.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) PHL, Inc., 216 Ill. 2d at 268 (quoting Ellis, 102 Ill. 2d at 395 ).

2007A divided panel of the appellate court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the hospital. 363 Ill.

2007A divided panel of the appellate court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the hospital. 363 Ill.

2025This both confirms that counsel did not act unreasonably in not bringing it and means that Mr. Young’s claim cannot meet the second prong of Strickland. ¶ 38 Sentencing involves a careful evaluation of various factors (People v. Williams, 2017 IL App (1st) 150795, ¶ 44 ) and balancing the seriousness of the offense with the defendant’s rehabilitative potential (People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349 , ¶ 46).

2025This both confirms that counsel did not act unreasonably in not bringing it and means that Mr. Young’s claim cannot meet the second prong of Strickland. ¶ 38 Sentencing involves a careful evaluation of various factors (People v. Williams, 2017 IL App (1st) 150795, ¶ 44 ) and balancing the seriousness of the offense with the defendant’s rehabilitative potential (People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349 , ¶ 46).

2022Thus, because the Young defendant had already been convicted and sentenced, while being represented by counsel, this court concluded it “would have been useless” for the court to comply with the rule since the defendant “already knew everything a Rule 401(a) admonishment would have told him.” Id. ¶ 22 We find Young instructive under the circumstances of the instant case.

2022Like the defendant in Young, defendant here was represented by counsel up until the hearing on his postsentencing motions and was therefore “more likely to understand the workings of the system than a defendant who first appears in court.” Id.

2021Lojek, 2013 IL App (1st) 120679, ¶ 36 .

2021And Ms. Cronin testified that it would have been against protocol for anyone but an evidence technician to handle evidence intended for testing. ¶ 86 Although the parties frame this solely as a chain of custody issue, and the State argues that Mr. Young’s objection was not properly preserved, there are actually two issues and we will assume for purposes of our analysis that Mr. Young made the proper objections in order to preserve both of them. ¶ 87 It is well settled that “[t]he character of the object sought to be introduced into evidence determines the appropriate method of establishing a f

2021Because compounds suspected of containing controlled substances generally are not readily distinguishable from one another, the State “has the burden of establishing a chain of custody as the foundation for the admission of such evidence.” Id.

2015Leetaru maintains, however, that the officer suit exception is applicable here. ¶ 110 The officer suit exception (in federal courts, the Ex parte Young doctrine), permits an official-capacity lawsuit to enjoin “ ‘a State officer from taking future actions in excess of his delegated authority.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) PHL, Inc., 216 Ill. 2d at 268 (quoting Ellis, 102 Ill. 2d at 395 ).

1994In support of this argument, the employer cites Wozniak v. Segal (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 457 , and Diversified Computer Services, Inc. v. Town of York (1982), 104 Ill.

1994In support of this argument, the employer cites Wozniak v. Segal (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 457 , and Diversified Computer Services, Inc. v. Town of York (1982), 104 Ill.

1994In support of this argument, the employer cites Wozniak v. Segal (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 457 , and Diversified Computer Services, Inc. v. Town of York (1982), 104 Ill.

1994In support of this argument, the employer cites Wozniak v. Segal (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 457 , and Diversified Computer Services, Inc. v. Town of York (1982), 104 Ill.

1982An appeal by the State from the suppression order was dismissed by the appellate court, which held it was not an appealable order. ( People v. Young (1979), 76 Ill.

1975(See People v. Simmons, 21 Ill.App.3d 310 , 315 N.E.2d 226 (1974).) The statements of the prosecutor in the case at bar so prejudiced and inflamed the jury against the theory of Young’s defense that he was deprived of a fair trial.

1975(See People v. Simmons, 21 Ill.App.3d 310 , 315 N.E.2d 226 (1974).) The statements of the prosecutor in the case at bar so prejudiced and inflamed the jury against the theory of Young’s defense that he was deprived of a fair trial.