Young claim in Washington

2010App. 431, 439 , 878 P.2d 1241 (1994)). ¶11 When Savidge examined Young and recommended and installed the crown, he engaged in “health care.” Thus, Young’s claim that Savidge failed to inform her of the use of nickel chromium in the crown and its attendant risks, causing her to suffer adverse symptoms, falls under RCW 7.70.050 and its concomitant statute of limitations in former RCW 4.16.350 (1998).

2010RCW 7.70.030(3) specifically defines "[an] injury result[ing] from health care to which the patient or his representative did not consent" as a basis for which a plaintiff could recover damages. "`[H]ealth care'" means "`the process in which [a physician is] utilizing the skills which he had been taught in examining, diagnosing, treating or caring for the plaintiff as his patient.'" Branom v. State, 94 Wash. App. 964, 969-70 , 974 P.2d 335 (1999) (one alteration in original) (quoting Estate of Sly v. Linville, 75 Wash.App. 431, 439 , 878 P.2d 1241 (1994)). ¶ 11 When Savidge examined Young and

2008The State cites to Mead School District No. 354 v. Mead Education Ass’n, 85 Wn.2d 278, 280 , 534 P.2d 561 (1975), in noting that where jurisdiction is proper, even if the underlying order was wrongly entered, a party refusing to obey that order may be liable for contempt.

2008The State cites to Mead School District No. 354 v. Mead Education Ass’n, 85 Wn.2d 278, 280 , 534 P.2d 561 (1975), in noting that where jurisdiction is proper, even if the underlying order was wrongly entered, a party refusing to obey that order may be liable for contempt.

2007This court has previously recognized that, "[f]or purposes of the excited utterance exception, . . . it is the event's effect on the declarant that must be focused upon." Chapin, 118 Wash.2d at 687 , 826 P.2d 194 (citing State v. Carlson, 311 Or. 201, 216 , 808 P.2d 1002 (1991)). ¶ 31 Young's rule would require the proponent of excited utterance evidence to proffer independent corroborating proof that a startling event occurred simply to put one piece of evidence-the excited utterance-before the trier of fact. [8] Such a requirement not only overemphasizes the role that the startling event pla

2007This court has previously recognized that, “[flor purposes of the excited utterance exception,... it is the event’s effect on the declarant that must be focused upon.” Chapin, 118 Wn.2d at 687 (citing State v. Carlson, 311 Or. 201, 216 , 808 P.2d 1002 (1991)). ¶34 Young’s rule would require the proponent of excited utterance evidence to proffer independent corroborating proof that a startling event occurred simply to put one piece of evidence — the excited utterance — before the trier of fact. 8 Such a requirement not only overemphasizes the role that the startling event plays in lending an ex

2007This court has previously recognized that, “[flor purposes of the excited utterance exception,... it is the event’s effect on the declarant that must be focused upon.” Chapin, 118 Wn.2d at 687 (citing State v. Carlson, 311 Or. 201, 216 , 808 P.2d 1002 (1991)). ¶34 Young’s rule would require the proponent of excited utterance evidence to proffer independent corroborating proof that a startling event occurred simply to put one piece of evidence — the excited utterance — before the trier of fact. 8 Such a requirement not only overemphasizes the role that the startling event plays in lending an ex

2007This court has previously recognized that, “[flor purposes of the excited utterance exception,... it is the event’s effect on the declarant that must be focused upon.” Chapin, 118 Wn.2d at 687 (citing State v. Carlson, 311 Or. 201, 216 , 808 P.2d 1002 (1991)). ¶34 Young’s rule would require the proponent of excited utterance evidence to proffer independent corroborating proof that a startling event occurred simply to put one piece of evidence — the excited utterance — before the trier of fact. 8 Such a requirement not only overemphasizes the role that the startling event plays in lending an ex

1998The cases of Morrison v. Hulbert, 44 Wash.2d 171 , 266 P.2d 338 (1954) and Belancsik v. Overlake Mem'l Hosp., 80 Wash.2d 111 , 492 P.2d 219 (1971) that have been cited by Young and WSTLA are of no assistance in resolving the issue before us.

1998The cases of Morrison v. Hulbert, 44 Wash.2d 171 , 266 P.2d 338 (1954) and Belancsik v. Overlake Mem'l Hosp., 80 Wash.2d 111 , 492 P.2d 219 (1971) that have been cited by Young and WSTLA are of no assistance in resolving the issue before us.

1998The cases of Morrison v. Hulbert, 44 Wash.2d 171 , 266 P.2d 338 (1954) and Belancsik v. Overlake Mem'l Hosp., 80 Wash.2d 111 , 492 P.2d 219 (1971) that have been cited by Young and WSTLA are of no assistance in resolving the issue before us.

1998The cases of Morrison v. Hulbert, 44 Wash.2d 171 , 266 P.2d 338 (1954) and Belancsik v. Overlake Mem'l Hosp., 80 Wash.2d 111 , 492 P.2d 219 (1971) that have been cited by Young and WSTLA are of no assistance in resolving the issue before us.

2016But the record shows that Young's proposed amendment was futile, that denying Young's motion did not prejudice him, and that the amendment would have caused undue delay. 7 Davis, 140 Wn.

2014Young's claims against Ameritrade are not part of this appeal. 11 CP at 46. 12 CP at 3-4. 13 CP at 15. 14 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 22. 15 RP at 25. 16 CP at 81. 3 No. 70922-4-1 / 4 against Kempf, and awarded Kempf attorney fees and costs totaling $9,271.38.17 The court denied Young's motion for reconsideration on September 3, 2013.18 ANALYSIS Standard of Review We review an order of summary judgment de novo and determine whether the supporting materials, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

2014Young's claims against Ameritrade are not part of this appeal. 11 CP at 46. 12 CP at 3-4. 13 CP at 15. 14 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 22. 15 RP at 25. 16 CP at 81. 3 No. 70922-4-1 / 4 against Kempf, and awarded Kempf attorney fees and costs totaling $9,271.38.17 The court denied Young's motion for reconsideration on September 3, 2013.18 ANALYSIS Standard of Review We review an order of summary judgment de novo and determine whether the supporting materials, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

2010RCW 7.70.030(3) specifically defines "[an] injury result[ing] from health care to which the patient or his representative did not consent" as a basis for which a plaintiff could recover damages. "`[H]ealth care'" means "`the process in which [a physician is] utilizing the skills which he had been taught in examining, diagnosing, treating or caring for the plaintiff as his patient.'" Branom v. State, 94 Wash. App. 964, 969-70 , 974 P.2d 335 (1999) (one alteration in original) (quoting Estate of Sly v. Linville, 75 Wash.App. 431, 439 , 878 P.2d 1241 (1994)). ¶ 11 When Savidge examined Young and

2010RCW 7.70.030(3) specifically defines "[an] injury result[ing] from health care to which the patient or his representative did not consent" as a basis for which a plaintiff could recover damages. "`[H]ealth care'" means "`the process in which [a physician is] utilizing the skills which he had been taught in examining, diagnosing, treating or caring for the plaintiff as his patient.'" Branom v. State, 94 Wash. App. 964, 969-70 , 974 P.2d 335 (1999) (one alteration in original) (quoting Estate of Sly v. Linville, 75 Wash.App. 431, 439 , 878 P.2d 1241 (1994)). ¶ 11 When Savidge examined Young and

2004This treatment appears to be deliberate given a footnote in the opinion stating, "[a]lthough these findings were listed as conclusions of law, it is clear that the trial court was actually making a factual determination, and we treat them as such." Rankin, 108 Wash.App. at 956 n. 16, 33 P.3d 1090 .

2004This treatment appears to be deliberate given a footnote in the opinion stating, "[a]lthough these findings were listed as conclusions of law, it is clear that the trial court was actually making a factual determination, and we treat them as such." Rankin, 108 Wash.App. at 956 n. 16, 33 P.3d 1090 .

2004This treatment appears to be deliberate given a footnote in the opinion stating, "[a]lthough these findings were listed as conclusions of law, it is clear that the trial court was actually making a factual determination, and we treat them as such." Rankin, 108 Wash.App. at 956 n. 16, 33 P.3d 1090 .

2004This treatment appears to be deliberate given a footnote in the opinion stating, "[a]lthough these findings were listed as conclusions of law, it is clear that the trial court was actually making a factual determination, and we treat them as such." Rankin, 108 Wash.App. at 956 n. 16, 33 P.3d 1090 .

1991(Italics ours.) 13 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 , 34 A.L.R. 145 (D.C.

1991(Italics ours.) 13 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 , 34 A.L.R. 145 (D.C.

1991App. 897, 907 , 738 P.2d 295 (1987). 11 Guloy, at 425. 12 Young's brief refers to sticks as merely "an important and prejudicial piece of corroborative evidence".