conducted hearing in New Jersey

2018This hearing occurred nearly three months before the Supreme Court decided State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009). 4 A-2478-15T1 I had given to the police.

2015In denying that motion, the court followed the template set forth in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 , 966 A.2d 461 (2009), which addresses whether a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea even when it is supported by an adequate factual basis.

2026Id. at 212 .

2024In its written decision denying M.P. relief, the trial court applied the standard we set forth in K.B., 304 N.J.

2021Ibid.

2020Our review of the transcripts in which the court conducted its inquiry reveals that, although defendant provided responses to the court's questioning, those responses were A-1480-18T1 19 general and superficial and did not evidence appreciation for the "fundamental legal rights and issues that will be affected by his decision." Reddish, 181 N.J. at 592 .

2020After hearing the evidence, the court determined that the statement was admissible because defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, 1 Arizona v. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2020A considered review of the transcripts of both proceedings in which the court conducted its inquiry reveals that although defendant provided responses to the court's questioning, those responses were general and superficial and did not evidence that he appreciated the "fundamental legal rights and issues that will be affected by his decision." Ibid.

2019Id. at 68 .

2015Id. at 207, 821 A.2d 1157 .

2013Following the Supreme Court's decision in Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 206 N.J. 209 (2011), the court heard re-argument and issued a written decision finding that plaintiff did not qualify as a newsperson under the Act.

2012Prior to defendant’s first trial, the trial court conducted a hearing pursuant to State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127 , 386 A.2d 378 (1978), to determine whether defendant’s prior convictions would be admissible to, impeach his credibility in the event that he testified.

2012Prior to defendant’s first trial, the trial court conducted a hearing pursuant to State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127 , 386 A.2d 378 (1978), to determine whether defendant’s prior convictions would be admissible to, impeach his credibility in the event that he testified.

2011However, in State v. Taylor, 298 S.W. 3d 482 (Mo.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3323 , 176 L.Ed. 2d 1226 (2010), the trial court conducted a hearing pursuant to Frye and found the test admissible, a determination that was affirmed on appeal. [3] This description is taken from the State Police website, and can be accessed at http:// www.state.nj.us/njsp/divorg/invest/ criminalistics.html. [4] This material can be accessed at http:// www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/pr/16088_unit_2.pdf.

2011However, in State v. Taylor, 298 S.W. 3d 482 (Mo.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3323 , 176 L.Ed. 2d 1226 (2010), the trial court conducted a hearing pursuant to Frye and found the test admissible, a determination that was affirmed on appeal. [3] This description is taken from the State Police website, and can be accessed at http:// www.state.nj.us/njsp/divorg/invest/ criminalistics.html. [4] This material can be accessed at http:// www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/pr/16088_unit_2.pdf.

2011However, in State v. Taylor, 298 S.W. 3d 482 (Mo.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3323 , 176 L.Ed. 2d 1226 (2010), the trial court conducted a hearing pursuant to Frye and found the test admissible, a determination that was affirmed on appeal. [3] This description is taken from the State Police website, and can be accessed at http:// www.state.nj.us/njsp/divorg/invest/ criminalistics.html. [4] This material can be accessed at http:// www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/pr/16088_unit_2.pdf.

2006"When a person accused of a crime is acquitted by reason of insanity, the accused may be held in continued confinement if the person is a danger to self or others and is in need of medical treatment." In re Commitment of W.K., 159 N.J. 1, 2 , 731 A. 2d 482 (1999).

2006"When a person accused of a crime is acquitted by reason of insanity, the accused may be held in continued confinement if the person is a danger to self or others and is in need of medical treatment." In re Commitment of W.K., 159 N.J. 1, 2 , 731 A. 2d 482 (1999).

2003The court appears to have decided the admissibility of prior sexual conduct evidence using a blend of the current standard and the less restrictive, pre-1994 Budis test, stating, “[w]hen applying the Rape Shield Statute a court must ‘review [...] whether the evidence [is] relevant and highly material to the defense and whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.’ State v. Cloumey, 299 N.J.Super. 1, 15 , 690 A.2d 612 [ (App.Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 77 , 697 A.2d 549 (1997) ], citing State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519, 532 , 593 A.2d 784 (1991).” After evaluating defendant’s p

2003The court appears to have decided the admissibility of prior sexual conduct evidence using a blend of the current standard and the less restrictive, pre-1994 Budis test, stating, “[w]hen applying the Rape Shield Statute a court must ‘review [...] whether the evidence [is] relevant and highly material to the defense and whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.’ State v. Cloumey, 299 N.J.Super. 1, 15 , 690 A.2d 612 [ (App.Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 77 , 697 A.2d 549 (1997) ], citing State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519, 532 , 593 A.2d 784 (1991).” After evaluating defendant’s p

2003The court appears to have decided the admissibility of prior sexual conduct evidence using a blend of the current standard and the less restrictive, pre-1994 Budis test, stating, “[w]hen applying the Rape Shield Statute a court must ‘review [...] whether the evidence [is] relevant and highly material to the defense and whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.’ State v. Cloumey, 299 N.J.Super. 1, 15 , 690 A.2d 612 [ (App.Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 77 , 697 A.2d 549 (1997) ], citing State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519, 532 , 593 A.2d 784 (1991).” After evaluating defendant’s p

2003The court appears to have decided the admissibility of prior sexual conduct evidence using a blend of the current standard and the less restrictive, pre-1994 Budis test, stating, "[w]hen applying the Rape Shield Statute a court must `review [...] whether the evidence [is] relevant and highly material to the defense and whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.' State v. Clowney, 299 N.J.Super. 1, 15 , 690 A. 2d 612 [(App.Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 77 , 697 A. 2d 549 (1997) ], citing State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519, 532 , 593 A. 2d 784 (1991)." After evaluating defendant's

2003The court appears to have decided the admissibility of prior sexual conduct evidence using a blend of the current standard and the less restrictive, pre-1994 Budis test, stating, “[w]hen applying the Rape Shield Statute a court must ‘review [...] whether the evidence [is] relevant and highly material to the defense and whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.’ State v. Cloumey, 299 N.J.Super. 1, 15 , 690 A.2d 612 [ (App.Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 77 , 697 A.2d 549 (1997) ], citing State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519, 532 , 593 A.2d 784 (1991).” After evaluating defendant’s p

2003The court appears to have decided the admissibility of prior sexual conduct evidence using a blend of the current standard and the less restrictive, pre-1994 Budis test, stating, “[w]hen applying the Rape Shield Statute a court must ‘review [...] whether the evidence [is] relevant and highly material to the defense and whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.’ State v. Cloumey, 299 N.J.Super. 1, 15 , 690 A.2d 612 [ (App.Div.), certif. denied, 151 N.J. 77 , 697 A.2d 549 (1997) ], citing State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519, 532 , 593 A.2d 784 (1991).” After evaluating defendant’s p

2002Id. at 244 , 603 A. 2d 162 . [11] This Court conducted a hearing on January 25, 2002 in order to review how, if at all, Great Gorge was prejudiced by the delay between the filing of the complaint and the issuance and eventual service of the summons.

2002Id. at 244 , 603 A. 2d 162 . [11] This Court conducted a hearing on January 25, 2002 in order to review how, if at all, Great Gorge was prejudiced by the delay between the filing of the complaint and the issuance and eventual service of the summons.

2002And they wrote down two reasons for acquitting him: Eric Lewis, the ineffective state's witness, and the lack of physical evidence linking Baker to the killing. [ 310 N.J.Super. at 131 , 708 A. 2d 429 .] The trial court conducted an inquiry to ascertain how the newspaper had obtained access to jury material described as "`records prepared by the jury, lists setting forth the manner in which its deliberations had proceeded and the manner in which they arrived at the conclusion that they arrived at.'" Ibid.

2002And they wrote down two reasons for acquitting him: Eric Lewis, the ineffective state's witness, and the lack of physical evidence linking Baker to the killing. [ 310 N.J.Super. at 131 , 708 A. 2d 429 .] The trial court conducted an inquiry to ascertain how the newspaper had obtained access to jury material described as "`records prepared by the jury, lists setting forth the manner in which its deliberations had proceeded and the manner in which they arrived at the conclusion that they arrived at.'" Ibid.

2002James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 155 N.J. 279, 315-16 , 714 A. 2d 898 (1998).

2002James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 155 N.J. 279, 315-16 , 714 A. 2d 898 (1998).

1998The prosecutor asserted that mentioning defendant's invocation of his right to counsel was necessary to show that there was a logical end to the interview: "Otherwise, the jury thinks, well, you know, why does it end there?" The court conducted a hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104, and relying on State v. Carroll, 256 N.J.Super. 575 , 607 A. 2d 1003 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 18 , 611 A. 2d 656 (1992), and State v. Ruscingno, 217 N.J.Super. 467 , 526 A. 2d 251 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 210 , 528 A. 2d 30 (1987), allowed the reference to defendant's invocation of his right to

1998The prosecutor asserted that mentioning defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel was necessary to show that there was a logical end to the interview: “Otherwisé, the jury thinks, well, you know, why does it end there?” The court conducted a hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104, and relying on State v. Carroll, 256 N.J.Super. 575 , 607 A.2d 1003 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 18 , 611 A.2d 656 (1992), and State v. Ruscingno, 217 N.J.Super. 467 , 526 A.2d 251 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 210 , 528 A.2d 30 (1987), allowed the reference to defendant’s invocation of his right to cou

1998The prosecutor asserted that mentioning defendant's invocation of his right to counsel was necessary to show that there was a logical end to the interview: "Otherwise, the jury thinks, well, you know, why does it end there?" The court conducted a hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104, and relying on State v. Carroll, 256 N.J.Super. 575 , 607 A. 2d 1003 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 18 , 611 A. 2d 656 (1992), and State v. Ruscingno, 217 N.J.Super. 467 , 526 A. 2d 251 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 210 , 528 A. 2d 30 (1987), allowed the reference to defendant's invocation of his right to

1998The prosecutor asserted that mentioning defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel was necessary to show that there was a logical end to the interview: “Otherwisé, the jury thinks, well, you know, why does it end there?” The court conducted a hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104, and relying on State v. Carroll, 256 N.J.Super. 575 , 607 A.2d 1003 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 18 , 611 A.2d 656 (1992), and State v. Ruscingno, 217 N.J.Super. 467 , 526 A.2d 251 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 210 , 528 A.2d 30 (1987), allowed the reference to defendant’s invocation of his right to cou

1998The prosecutor asserted that mentioning defendant's invocation of his right to counsel was necessary to show that there was a logical end to the interview: "Otherwise, the jury thinks, well, you know, why does it end there?" The court conducted a hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104, and relying on State v. Carroll, 256 N.J.Super. 575 , 607 A. 2d 1003 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 18 , 611 A. 2d 656 (1992), and State v. Ruscingno, 217 N.J.Super. 467 , 526 A. 2d 251 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 210 , 528 A. 2d 30 (1987), allowed the reference to defendant's invocation of his right to

1998The prosecutor asserted that mentioning defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel was necessary to show that there was a logical end to the interview: “Otherwisé, the jury thinks, well, you know, why does it end there?” The court conducted a hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104, and relying on State v. Carroll, 256 N.J.Super. 575 , 607 A.2d 1003 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 18 , 611 A.2d 656 (1992), and State v. Ruscingno, 217 N.J.Super. 467 , 526 A.2d 251 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 210 , 528 A.2d 30 (1987), allowed the reference to defendant’s invocation of his right to cou

1998The prosecutor asserted that mentioning defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel was necessary to show that there was a logical end to the interview: “Otherwisé, the jury thinks, well, you know, why does it end there?” The court conducted a hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104, and relying on State v. Carroll, 256 N.J.Super. 575 , 607 A.2d 1003 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 18 , 611 A.2d 656 (1992), and State v. Ruscingno, 217 N.J.Super. 467 , 526 A.2d 251 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 210 , 528 A.2d 30 (1987), allowed the reference to defendant’s invocation of his right to cou

1998The prosecutor asserted that mentioning defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel was necessary to show that there was a logical end to the interview: “Otherwisé, the jury thinks, well, you know, why does it end there?” The court conducted a hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104, and relying on State v. Carroll, 256 N.J.Super. 575 , 607 A.2d 1003 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 18 , 611 A.2d 656 (1992), and State v. Ruscingno, 217 N.J.Super. 467 , 526 A.2d 251 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 210 , 528 A.2d 30 (1987), allowed the reference to defendant’s invocation of his right to cou

1998The prosecutor asserted that mentioning defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel was necessary to show that there was a logical end to the interview: “Otherwisé, the jury thinks, well, you know, why does it end there?” The court conducted a hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104, and relying on State v. Carroll, 256 N.J.Super. 575 , 607 A.2d 1003 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 18 , 611 A.2d 656 (1992), and State v. Ruscingno, 217 N.J.Super. 467 , 526 A.2d 251 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 210 , 528 A.2d 30 (1987), allowed the reference to defendant’s invocation of his right to cou

1998The prosecutor asserted that mentioning defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel was necessary to show that there was a logical end to the interview: “Otherwisé, the jury thinks, well, you know, why does it end there?” The court conducted a hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104, and relying on State v. Carroll, 256 N.J.Super. 575 , 607 A.2d 1003 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 18 , 611 A.2d 656 (1992), and State v. Ruscingno, 217 N.J.Super. 467 , 526 A.2d 251 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 210 , 528 A.2d 30 (1987), allowed the reference to defendant’s invocation of his right to cou

1990Evid.R. 8; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).

1990Evid.R. 8; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).

1990We merely instruct the trial court that on remand Dr. Shuster’s ultimate “[m]edical expert testimony ‘must be couched in terms of reasonable medical certainty or probability; opinions as to possibility are inadmissible.’ ” State v. Freeman, 223 N.J.Super. 92, 116 , 538 A.2d 371 (App.Div.1988) (quoting Johnesee v. Stop & Shop Co., 174 N.J.Super. 426, 431 , 416 A.2d 956 (App.Div.1980)). —D— The trial court conducted a hearing to determine whether the State could impeach defendant’s credibility with a prior conviction.

1990We merely instruct the trial court that on remand Dr. Shuster’s ultimate “[m]edical expert testimony ‘must be couched in terms of reasonable medical certainty or probability; opinions as to possibility are inadmissible.’ ” State v. Freeman, 223 N.J.Super. 92, 116 , 538 A.2d 371 (App.Div.1988) (quoting Johnesee v. Stop & Shop Co., 174 N.J.Super. 426, 431 , 416 A.2d 956 (App.Div.1980)). —D— The trial court conducted a hearing to determine whether the State could impeach defendant’s credibility with a prior conviction.