conducted hearing in California

2025Applicable Law and Standard of Review Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a criminal defendant has a “constitutional right to conduct his own defense.” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 836 .) The right to self-representation is independent of the guarantees of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments “that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment.” (Id. at p. 807.) However, “the right of self-representation is not absolute.” (Indiana v. Edwar

2024(Johnsen, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1169 ; People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 506 .) 12 the situation, without . . . a request for a hearing regarding the other jurors’ ability to continue on the case, further supports our conclusion that a hearing was not warranted.”]; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1349 [“Defense counsel’s observation concerning the juror, made without a concomitant assertion of juror misconduct or request for a hearing on the subject [citation], further indicates that the juror’s conduct had not warranted such a hearing.”].) In his opening brief, Barajas conte

2025Applicable Law and Standard of Review Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a criminal defendant has a “constitutional right to conduct his own defense.” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 836 .) The right to self-representation is independent of the guarantees of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments “that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment.” (Id. at p. 807.) However, “the right of self-representation is not absolute.” (Indiana v. Edwar

2016(See People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 103 .) Those factors include “the quality of counsel’s representation of the defendant, the defendant’s prior proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay which might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a motion.” (Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128 ; accord, People v. Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 722, fn. 10 .) The trial court conducted the inquiry required by Windham and based its denial of Wills’s motion on a balancing of the Windham factors

2019Under section 594, subdivision (a), the 15 days' notice requirement if the party does not appear for trial is "mandatory and jurisdictional; a judgment entered following a trial conducted in violation of the requirement is void. [Citations.]" ( Urethane Foam Experts, Inc. v. Latimer (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 763 , 767, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 404 .) *847 "Proceeding to judgment in the absence of a party is an extraordinary and disfavored practice in Anglo-American jurisprudence: '[T]he policy of the law is to have every litigated case tried upon its merits ....' [Citations.]" ( Au-Yang v. Barton (1999) 21

2019Under section 594, subdivision (a), the 15 days' notice requirement if the party does not appear for trial is "mandatory and jurisdictional; a judgment entered following a trial conducted in violation of the requirement is void. [Citations.]" ( Urethane Foam Experts, Inc. v. Latimer (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 763 , 767, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 404 .) *847 "Proceeding to judgment in the absence of a party is an extraordinary and disfavored practice in Anglo-American jurisprudence: '[T]he policy of the law is to have every litigated case tried upon its merits ....' [Citations.]" ( Au-Yang v. Barton (1999) 21

2019Under section 594, subdivision (a), the 15 days’ notice requirement if the party does not appear for trial is “mandatory and jurisdictional; a judgment entered following a trial conducted in violation of the requirement is void. [Citations.]” (Urethane Foam Experts, Inc. v. Latimer (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 763, 767 .) “Proceeding to judgment in the absence of a party is an extraordinary and disfavored practice in Anglo-American jurisprudence: ‘[T]he policy of the law is to have every litigated case tried upon its merits . . . .’ [Citations.]” (Au-Yang v. Barton (1999) 21 Cal.4th 958, 963 (Au-Yang

2019Under section 594, subdivision (a), the 15 days' notice requirement if the party does not appear for trial is "mandatory and jurisdictional; a judgment entered following a trial conducted in violation of the requirement is void. [Citations.]" ( Urethane Foam Experts, Inc. v. Latimer (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 763 , 767, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 404 .) *847 "Proceeding to judgment in the absence of a party is an extraordinary and disfavored practice in Anglo-American jurisprudence: '[T]he policy of the law is to have every litigated case tried upon its merits ....' [Citations.]" ( Au-Yang v. Barton (1999) 21

2016Code, § 4502, subd. (b); Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1008, fn. 1 .) No disrespect in intended. 2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated. 2 On remand, however, the Harbor Regional Center requested to dismiss its petition before the trial court conducted a hearing.

2016Code, § 4502, subd. (b); Conservatorship of Susan T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1005, 1008, fn. 1 .) No disrespect in intended. 2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated. 2 On remand, however, the Harbor Regional Center requested to dismiss its petition before the trial court conducted a hearing.

2015(See People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1232 .) The trial court conducted the hearing properly, describing the nature of all the officer complaints. 3.

2015(See People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1232 .) The trial court conducted the hearing properly, describing the nature of all the complaints against the officer.5 5 Ortiz asks us “to determine if the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to order discovery of all the requested information from the personnel files of Officers Shortle, Castruita, and Quiroz.” As to Shortle, Ortiz failed to explain, either in the Pitchess motion or on appeal, how this officer was involved in Ortiz’s arrest, and we have not been able to find this officer’s name in the record.

2019Under section 594, subdivision (a), the 15 days' notice requirement if the party does not appear for trial is "mandatory and jurisdictional; a judgment entered following a trial conducted in violation of the requirement is void. [Citations.]" ( Urethane Foam Experts, Inc. v. Latimer (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 763 , 767, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 404 .) *847 "Proceeding to judgment in the absence of a party is an extraordinary and disfavored practice in Anglo-American jurisprudence: '[T]he policy of the law is to have every litigated case tried upon its merits ....' [Citations.]" ( Au-Yang v. Barton (1999) 21

2019Under section 594, subdivision (a), the 15 days' notice requirement if the party does not appear for trial is "mandatory and jurisdictional; a judgment entered following a trial conducted in violation of the requirement is void. [Citations.]" ( Urethane Foam Experts, Inc. v. Latimer (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 763 , 767, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 404 .) *847 "Proceeding to judgment in the absence of a party is an extraordinary and disfavored practice in Anglo-American jurisprudence: '[T]he policy of the law is to have every litigated case tried upon its merits ....' [Citations.]" ( Au-Yang v. Barton (1999) 21

2016Heightened abuse of discretion standard for reviewing a trial court’s decision to excuse a juror While the “manner in which the trial court conducted its inquiry is subject to review for abuse of discretion under the typical standard” (Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 712 ), “an appellate court’s review of the decision to remove a seated juror is not conducted under the typical abuse of discretion standard, but rather under the ‘demonstrable reality’ test.” (Id. at p. 711, italics added.) As explained by our Supreme Court in Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th 622 , “[t]he typical abuse of discretion sta

2016Heightened abuse of discretion standard for reviewing a trial court’s decision to excuse a juror While the “manner in which the trial court conducted its inquiry is subject to review for abuse of discretion under the typical standard” (Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 712 ), “an appellate court’s review of the decision to remove a seated juror is not conducted under the typical abuse of discretion standard, but rather under the ‘demonstrable reality’ test.” (Id. at p. 711, italics added.) As explained by our Supreme Court in Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th 622 , “[t]he typical abuse of discretion sta

2025Applicable Law and Standard of Review Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a criminal defendant has a “constitutional right to conduct his own defense.” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 836 .) The right to self-representation is independent of the guarantees of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments “that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment.” (Id. at p. 807.) However, “the right of self-representation is not absolute.” (Indiana v. Edwar

2016(See People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 103 .) Those factors include “the quality of counsel’s representation of the defendant, the defendant’s prior proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay which might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a motion.” (Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128 ; accord, People v. Lynch, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 722, fn. 10 .) The trial court conducted the inquiry required by Windham and based its denial of Wills’s motion on a balancing of the Windham factors

2024(Johnsen, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1169 ; People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 506 .) 12 the situation, without . . . a request for a hearing regarding the other jurors’ ability to continue on the case, further supports our conclusion that a hearing was not warranted.”]; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1349 [“Defense counsel’s observation concerning the juror, made without a concomitant assertion of juror misconduct or request for a hearing on the subject [citation], further indicates that the juror’s conduct had not warranted such a hearing.”].) In his opening brief, Barajas conte

2024Once on notice of potential cause to remove a juror, the trial court has an independent duty to inquire into potential juror misconduct, “whether or not the defense requests an inquiry, and indeed . . . even if the defendant objects to such an inquiry.” (See People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 506 ; see also People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116 , 1169 (Johnsen).) Contreras acknowledges that the court here conducted an inquiry and does not dispute its adequacy.

2016It requires a showing that the court as trier of fact did rely on evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion that bias was established.’” (Id. at p. 712.) In applying the more stringent demonstrable reality standard of review, we consider “‘not just the evidence itself, but also the record of reasons the court provides.’” (Ibid..) The “heightened” and “more stringent” demonstrable reality standard “more fully reflects an appellate court’s obligation to protect a defendant’s fundamental rights to due process and to a fair trial by an unbiased jury.” (People v. Barnwel

2012The court’s decision that bias was established is subject to somewhat more searching review, but, as we made clear in Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at page 1053, we do not reweigh the evidence that was before the trial court, which is, in essence, what defendant asks us to do.

2000On the basis of the opinion in In re Parker (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1469-1470 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 167 ] (due process requires potential SVP be given opportunity at probable cause hearing to be fully heard, to cross-examine state’s witnesses and to call own witnesses), appellant sought and received a second probable cause hearing which was conducted in July 1998.

2000On the basis of the opinion in In re Parker (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1469-1470 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 167 ] (due process requires potential SVP be given opportunity at probable cause hearing to be fully heard, to cross-examine state’s witnesses and to call own witnesses), appellant sought and received a second probable cause hearing which was conducted in July 1998.

1998(See People v. Huffman (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 63, 80-81 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 264 ].) But even assuming such an obligation exists where, as here, the trial court conducted the hearing in camera, no deficiency appears.

1998(See People v. Huffman (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 63, 80-81 [ 139 Cal.Rptr. 264 ].) But even assuming such an obligation exists where, as here, the trial court conducted the hearing in camera, no deficiency appears.