apparent authority doctrine in Pennsylvania

2022Therefore, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that the third-party driver lacked actual authority to consent to the warrantless search of the black backpack. - 17 - J-S35005-21 Concerning apparent authority to consent, our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Strader, 931 A.2d 630 (Pa. 2007) described the apparent authority exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement as follows: A third party with apparent authority over the area to be searched may provide police with consent to search.

2020See Commonwealth v. Strader, 931 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2007) (stating that “the apparent authority exception turns on whether the facts available to police at that moment would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe the consenting third party had authority over the premises.”); see also Basking, 970 A.2d at 1191 (concluding that a reasonable person would believe that the appellant’s mother had apparent authority to consent to search, where mother told police that the appellant stayed on the third floor of the house; the door leading to the third floor was unlocked; and mother stated that

2020See Commonwealth v. Strader, 931 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2007) (stating that “the apparent authority exception turns on whether the facts available to police at that moment would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe the consenting third party had authority over the premises.”); see also Basking, 970 A.2d at 1191 (concluding that a reasonable person would believe that the appellant’s mother had apparent authority to consent to search, where mother told police that the appellant stayed on the third floor of the house; the door leading to the third floor was unlocked; and mother stated that

2016ST 9 (Sept. 5, 2014). . 43Basking, 970 A.2d at 1188 ; citing: Commonwealth v. Gutierrez, 750A2d 906, 910 (Pa.Super.2000). 44 MT 24 -25. 45 MT 25 . 17 The Basking Court explained the apparent authority doctrine: Third party consent is valid when police reasonably believe a third party has authority to consent.

2020See Commonwealth v. Strader, 931 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2007) (stating that “the apparent authority exception turns on whether the facts available to police at that moment would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe the consenting third party had authority over the premises.”); see also Basking, 970 A.2d at 1191 (concluding that a reasonable person would believe that the appellant’s mother had apparent authority to consent to search, where mother told police that the appellant stayed on the third floor of the house; the door leading to the third floor was unlocked; and mother stated that

2016One such exception is a consensual search, which a third party can provide to police, [Commonwealth v.] Hughes, [ 836 A.2d 893 ,] 900 [(Pa. 2003)], known as the apparent authority exception.

2016Prothonotary Date: 2/9/2016 ____________________________________________ 7 Further, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that, “even if the [police] did not have actual authority to enter the [second-floor entryway or hallway,] the [police] would have been able to enter under the apparent authority rule enunciated under Commonwealth v. Blair, 575 A.2d 593 (Pa. Super. 1990).” Trial Court Opinion, 4/14/15, at 6 n.4. - 17 -

2014In Commonwealth v. Blair, 394 Pa.Super. 207 , 575 A.2d 593, 598 (1990), we elucidated the narrow confines of the apparent authority exception. [W]e are not allowing carte blanche consent entries into residences with the police officer being able to ratify his entry at a later date suppression hearing by merely stating that he was mistaken as to the actual authority of the consenting party.

2009See State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243 (Minn.2003); People v. Hopkins, 870 P.2d 478 (Colo.1994); State v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299 , 627 A.2d 1066 (1993).

2009See State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243 (Minn.2003); People v. Hopkins, 870 P.2d 478 (Colo.1994); State v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299 , 627 A.2d 1066 (1993).

2009In Lee v. State, 849 N.E.2d 602, 610 (Ind.2006), the Supreme Court of Indiana expressed a willingness to adopt the apparent authority doctrine as being consistent with Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana State Constitution. ¶ 35 In State v. Sawyer, 147 N.H. 191 , 784 A.2d 1208, 1212 (2001), and State v. McCaughey, 127 Idaho 669 , 904 P.2d 939, 943-44 (1995), the Supreme Courts of New Hampshire and Idaho conducted a state constitutional analysis and concluded that the apparent authority exception did not violate the state constitutions of New Hampshire and Idaho.

2009In Lee v. State, 849 N.E.2d 602, 610 (Ind.2006), the Supreme Court of Indiana expressed a willingness to adopt the apparent authority doctrine as being consistent with Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana State Constitution. ¶ 35 In State v. Sawyer, 147 N.H. 191 , 784 A.2d 1208, 1212 (2001), and State v. McCaughey, 127 Idaho 669 , 904 P.2d 939, 943-44 (1995), the Supreme Courts of New Hampshire and Idaho conducted a state constitutional analysis and concluded that the apparent authority exception did not violate the state constitutions of New Hampshire and Idaho.

2009State v. Peterson, 525 S.W.2d 599, 608-09 (Mo.App.1975) (finding that father did not have common authority to consent to search of son’s room because the son paid rent and the evidence established that the room was “exclusively” the son’s area and that “no one else had a right to be there.”); see United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1330-31 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that in a parent-child relationship, the presumption that a parent controls the premises can be rebutted by evidence that the defendant paid rent or entered into an agreement with the parents that they may not enter the child’s ro

2009Our Supreme Court has instructed this Court to apply prevailing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence “where our own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard.” Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 558 Pa. 517, 738 A.2d 427, 431-32 (1999), accord Common wealth v. Glass, 562 Pa. 187 , 754 A.2d 655, 660 (2000). ¶ 80 In Hughes , a plurality of our Supreme Court concluded that the apparent authority exception to the warrant requirement, as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez , did not encroach upon the rights secured under Article I, Section 8.

2009Our Supreme Court has instructed this Court to apply prevailing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence “where our own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard.” Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 558 Pa. 517, 738 A.2d 427, 431-32 (1999), accord Common wealth v. Glass, 562 Pa. 187 , 754 A.2d 655, 660 (2000). ¶ 80 In Hughes , a plurality of our Supreme Court concluded that the apparent authority exception to the warrant requirement, as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez , did not encroach upon the rights secured under Article I, Section 8.

2009Commonwealth v. Moore, 928 A.2d 1092, 1099 (Pa.Super.2007).

2009Recently, in Commonwealth v. Graham, 949 A.2d 939, 943 (Pa.Super.2008), a panel of this Court applied the apparent authority doctrine to dispose of the defendant’s claims under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8, concluding that the officer in that case reasonably believed that a roommate had the apparent authority to consent to a search of a vehicle. ¶ 32 In short, Basking has failed to point to any Pennsylvania case law (and we cannot discover any) interpreting either Article 1, Section 8 or the Fourth Amendment, before or after Rodriguez , that suggests the apparent authorit

2009Recently, in Commonwealth v. Graham, 949 A.2d 939, 943 (Pa.Super.2008), a panel of this Court applied the apparent authority doctrine to dispose of the defendant’s claims under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8, concluding that the officer in that case reasonably believed that a roommate had the apparent authority to consent to a search of a vehicle. ¶ 32 In short, Basking has failed to point to any Pennsylvania case law (and we cannot discover any) interpreting either Article 1, Section 8 or the Fourth Amendment, before or after Rodriguez , that suggests the apparent authorit

2009See State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243 (Minn.2003); People v. Hopkins, 870 P.2d 478 (Colo.1994); State v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299 , 627 A.2d 1066 (1993).

2009See State v. Licari, 659 N.W.2d 243 (Minn.2003); People v. Hopkins, 870 P.2d 478 (Colo.1994); State v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299 , 627 A.2d 1066 (1993).

2009In Lee v. State, 849 N.E.2d 602, 610 (Ind.2006), the Supreme Court of Indiana expressed a willingness to adopt the apparent authority doctrine as being consistent with Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana State Constitution. ¶ 35 In State v. Sawyer, 147 N.H. 191 , 784 A.2d 1208, 1212 (2001), and State v. McCaughey, 127 Idaho 669 , 904 P.2d 939, 943-44 (1995), the Supreme Courts of New Hampshire and Idaho conducted a state constitutional analysis and concluded that the apparent authority exception did not violate the state constitutions of New Hampshire and Idaho.

2009In Lee v. State, 849 N.E.2d 602, 610 (Ind.2006), the Supreme Court of Indiana expressed a willingness to adopt the apparent authority doctrine as being consistent with Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana State Constitution. ¶ 35 In State v. Sawyer, 147 N.H. 191 , 784 A.2d 1208, 1212 (2001), and State v. McCaughey, 127 Idaho 669 , 904 P.2d 939, 943-44 (1995), the Supreme Courts of New Hampshire and Idaho conducted a state constitutional analysis and concluded that the apparent authority exception did not violate the state constitutions of New Hampshire and Idaho.

2009See 619 A.2d at 297 n. 4.

2009See 619 A.2d at 297 n. 4. ¶ 42 In reaching our decision, we note that an officer’s good-faith reliance on a defective search warrant is an exception to the exclusionary rule (a judicially crafted rule of evidence), while an officer’s reliance on a person’s apparent authority to consent is an exception to the waiTant requirement (substantive constitutional law).

2009See People v. Brooks, 277 Ill.App.3d 392 , 214 Ill.Dec. 79 , 660 N.E.2d 270, 276 (1996) (finding that officer reasonably believed that mother possessed apparent authority to consent to search of son’s room where there was no evidence the son had exclusive possession of his bedroom, and the mother did not tell the police that the son paid rent, locked the door in his absence, and had given instructions not to allow anyone to enter); cf. Davis, 743 A.2d at 952 n. 2 (finding that officer could not reasonably believe that a person identified as an “apartment manager” had apparent authority to cons

2009See People v. Brooks, 277 Ill.App.3d 392 , 214 Ill.Dec. 79 , 660 N.E.2d 270, 276 (1996) (finding that officer reasonably believed that mother possessed apparent authority to consent to search of son’s room where there was no evidence the son had exclusive possession of his bedroom, and the mother did not tell the police that the son paid rent, locked the door in his absence, and had given instructions not to allow anyone to enter); cf. Davis, 743 A.2d at 952 n. 2 (finding that officer could not reasonably believe that a person identified as an “apartment manager” had apparent authority to cons

2009State v. Peterson, 525 S.W.2d 599, 608-09 (Mo.App.1975) (finding that father did not have common authority to consent to search of son’s room because the son paid rent and the evidence established that the room was “exclusively” the son’s area and that “no one else had a right to be there.”); see United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1330-31 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that in a parent-child relationship, the presumption that a parent controls the premises can be rebutted by evidence that the defendant paid rent or entered into an agreement with the parents that they may not enter the child’s ro

2009In Lee v. State, 849 N.E.2d 602, 610 (Ind.2006), the Supreme Court of Indiana expressed a willingness to adopt the apparent authority doctrine as being consistent with Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana State Constitution. ¶ 35 In State v. Sawyer, 147 N.H. 191 , 784 A.2d 1208, 1212 (2001), and State v. McCaughey, 127 Idaho 669 , 904 P.2d 939, 943-44 (1995), the Supreme Courts of New Hampshire and Idaho conducted a state constitutional analysis and concluded that the apparent authority exception did not violate the state constitutions of New Hampshire and Idaho.

2009In Lee v. State, 849 N.E.2d 602, 610 (Ind.2006), the Supreme Court of Indiana expressed a willingness to adopt the apparent authority doctrine as being consistent with Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana State Constitution. ¶ 35 In State v. Sawyer, 147 N.H. 191 , 784 A.2d 1208, 1212 (2001), and State v. McCaughey, 127 Idaho 669 , 904 P.2d 939, 943-44 (1995), the Supreme Courts of New Hampshire and Idaho conducted a state constitutional analysis and concluded that the apparent authority exception did not violate the state constitutions of New Hampshire and Idaho.

2009For example, the text of Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution is more encompassing than Article I, Section 8, namely as it pertains to the warrant requirements and exceptions, by stating that: “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” Wash. Const, art. 1, § 7; Morse, 123 P.3d at 836 (“Under this provision, the warrant requirement is especially important as it is the warrant which provides the requisite ‘authority of law.’ ”).

2009Our Supreme Court has instructed this Court to apply prevailing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence “where our own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard.” Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 558 Pa. 517, 738 A.2d 427, 431-32 (1999), accord Common wealth v. Glass, 562 Pa. 187 , 754 A.2d 655, 660 (2000). ¶ 80 In Hughes , a plurality of our Supreme Court concluded that the apparent authority exception to the warrant requirement, as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez , did not encroach upon the rights secured under Article I, Section 8.

2009Our Supreme Court has instructed this Court to apply prevailing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence “where our own independent state analysis does not suggest a distinct standard.” Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 558 Pa. 517, 738 A.2d 427, 431-32 (1999), accord Common wealth v. Glass, 562 Pa. 187 , 754 A.2d 655, 660 (2000). ¶ 80 In Hughes , a plurality of our Supreme Court concluded that the apparent authority exception to the warrant requirement, as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez , did not encroach upon the rights secured under Article I, Section 8.

2005Ct. Op. at 6 (“Our reading of Hannington reveals that it comports with existing law regarding the doctrine of apparent authority.”); see also Manzitti v. Amsler, 379 Pa.Super. 454 , 550 A.2d 537 (1988) (applying Rothman and concluding that settlement agreement was enforceable where defendant’s insurer had reasonable belief that an oral settlement agreement reached with plaintiffs’ counsel had been expressly authorized by plaintiffs); Covington v. Continental Gen’l Tire, Inc., 381 F.3d 216 , 220 (3d Cir.2004) (“[Questions of agency certainly emanated from the ethers of Rothman ”); Fanis v. JC P

2005Ct. Op. at 6 (“Our reading of Hannington reveals that it comports with existing law regarding the doctrine of apparent authority.”); see also Manzitti v. Amsler, 379 Pa.Super. 454 , 550 A.2d 537 (1988) (applying Rothman and concluding that settlement agreement was enforceable where defendant’s insurer had reasonable belief that an oral settlement agreement reached with plaintiffs’ counsel had been expressly authorized by plaintiffs); Covington v. Continental Gen’l Tire, Inc., 381 F.3d 216 , 220 (3d Cir.2004) (“[Questions of agency certainly emanated from the ethers of Rothman ”); Fanis v. JC P

2005Ct. Op. at 6 ("Our reading of Hannington reveals that it comports with existing law regarding the doctrine of apparent authority."); see also Manzitti v. Amsler, 379 Pa.Super. 454 , 550 A.2d 537 (1988) (applying Rothman and concluding that settlement agreement was enforceable where defendant's insurer had reasonable belief that an oral settlement agreement reached with plaintiffs' counsel had been expressly authorized by plaintiffs); Covington v. Continental Gen'l Tire, Inc., 381 F.3d 216 , 220 (3d Cir.2004) ("[Q]uestions of agency certainly emanated from the ethers of Rothman "); Farris v. JC

2005Ct. Op. at 6 (“Our reading of Hannington reveals that it comports with existing law regarding the doctrine of apparent authority.”); see also Manzitti v. Amsler, 379 Pa.Super. 454 , 550 A.2d 537 (1988) (applying Rothman and concluding that settlement agreement was enforceable where defendant’s insurer had reasonable belief that an oral settlement agreement reached with plaintiffs’ counsel had been expressly authorized by plaintiffs); Covington v. Continental Gen’l Tire, Inc., 381 F.3d 216 , 220 (3d Cir.2004) (“[Questions of agency certainly emanated from the ethers of Rothman ”); Fanis v. JC P

2005Muhammad v. Strassburger, et al, 526 Pa. 541 , 587 A.2d 1346, 1350-51 (1991).

2005Muhammad v. Strassburger, et al, 526 Pa. 541 , 587 A.2d 1346, 1350-51 (1991).

2005Starling, 3 A.2d at 388 (determining that the "necessity of special [express] authority ... not only denies the existence of implied authority, but also of apparent authority of an attorney to bind his client" to a settlement agreement).

2005Starling, 3 A.2d at 388 (determining that the “necessity of special [express] authority ... not only denies the existence of implied authority, but also of apparent authority of an attorney to bind his client” to a settlement agreement). .