apparent authority doctrine in North Carolina

2016App. 236, 242 , 388 S.E.2d 178, 182 (1990) (“Under the doctrine of apparent authority, a principal’s liability . . . must be determined by what authority the third person . . . was justified in believing that the principal had . . . conferred upon his agent.”); Munn v. Hamount Rehab. & Nursing Ctr., Inc., Biesecker v. Biesecker, 62 N.C.

2010Heath v. Craighill, Rendleman, Ingle & Blythe, 97 N.C.

2014“Under the doctrine of apparent authority, a principal’s liability in any particular case must be determined by what authority the third person in the exercise of reasonable care was justified in believing that the principal had, under the circumstances, conferred upon his agent.” Munn v. Haymount Rehab. & Nursing Ctr., 208 N.C.

2014App. 632, 639 , 704 S.E.2d 290, 295 (2010) (citation omitted). *673 The trial court found that per Jonathan Wilson’s affidavit, he had been retained by Claude A. Verbal, II and that based upon conversations with Claude A. Verbal, II he was led to believe that his mother, Margie H.

2016App. 236, 242 , 388 S.E.2d 178, 182 (1990) (“Under the doctrine of apparent authority, a principal’s liability . . . must be determined by what authority the third person . . . was justified in believing that the principal had . . . conferred upon his agent.”); Munn v. Hamount Rehab. & Nursing Ctr., Inc., Biesecker v. Biesecker, 62 N.C.

2016App. 282, 285 , 302 S.E.2d 826 , 828–29 (1983) (“[A] person signing a written instrument is under a duty to read it for his own protection, and ordinarily is charged with knowledge of its contents.”) (citation omitted). 14.

2012Id. at 225-226 , 250 S.E.2d at 596 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

2012Id. at 225-226 , 250 S.E.2d at 596 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

2012“Pursuant to the doctrine of apparent authority, the principal’s liability is to be determined by what authority a person in the exercise of reasonable care was justified in believing the principal conferred upon his agent.” Branch, 151 N.C.

2012App. at 250 , 565 S.E.2d at 253 (citations omitted).

2006Ct. App. 1992) (allowing, with respect to the provision of anesthesia services, an inference of reliance when a hospital offers a service and the patient has no choice as to who will perform that service); Pamperin v. Trinity Mem’l Hosp., 144 Wis. 2d 188, 210 , 423 N.W.2d 848, 857 (1988) (“[W]e conclude that, if [plaintiff] proves that [the hospital] held itself out as á provider of emergency room care without informing [plaintiff] that the care was provided by independent contractors, [plaintiff] has satisfied the first requirement for proving liability under the doctrine of apparent authorit

2006Ct. App. 1992) (allowing, with respect to the provision of anesthesia services, an inference of reliance when a hospital offers a service and the patient has no choice as to who will perform that service); Pamperin v. Trinity Mem’l Hosp., 144 Wis. 2d 188, 210 , 423 N.W.2d 848, 857 (1988) (“[W]e conclude that, if [plaintiff] proves that [the hospital] held itself out as á provider of emergency room care without informing [plaintiff] that the care was provided by independent contractors, [plaintiff] has satisfied the first requirement for proving liability under the doctrine of apparent authorit

1978See Investment Properties v. Allen, 283 N.C. 277 , 196 S.E. 2d 262 (1973); Commercial Solvents v. Johnson, 235 N.C. 237 , 69 S.E. 2d 716 (1952); Texas Co. v. Stone, 232 N.C. 489 , 61 S.E. 2d 348 (1950).

1978See Investment Properties v. Allen, 283 N.C. 277 , 196 S.E. 2d 262 (1973); Commercial Solvents v. Johnson, 235 N.C. 237 , 69 S.E. 2d 716 (1952); Texas Co. v. Stone, 232 N.C. 489 , 61 S.E. 2d 348 (1950).