civil rights violation in Illinois

2022Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 517 (1994). ¶ 12 We conclude that the plaintiff’s common law wrongful termination claim of retaliatory discharge, based upon her reporting alleged criminal stalking, is not inextricably linked with a civil rights violation since the “plaintiff can establish the necessary elements of the tort independent of any legal duties created by the [Act].” See Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 177 Ill. 2d 511, 519 (1997) (plaintiff’s common law tort claims of assault, battery and false imprisonment were not inextricably linked with claims of sexual harassment

2016See Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 177 Ill. 2d 511, 518 (1997) (“An action to redress a civil rights violation has a purpose distinct from a common law tort action,” and each type of claim must be separately proved.); see also Yount v. Hesston Corp., 124 Ill.

2021See North Community Bank v. -5- No. 1-20-1125 17011 South Park Ave., LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 133672 , ¶ 14 (reviewing merits of the appeal despite appellant’s numerous violations of Supreme Court Rule 341(h)). ¶ 11 It is a civil rights violation under the Act for an employer to refuse to hire a prospective employee on the basis of unlawful discrimination. 775 ILCS 5/2-102(A) (West 2016).

2021See North Community Bank v. 17011 South Park Ave., LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 133672, ¶ 14 (reviewing merits of the appeal despite appellant’s numerous violations of Supreme Court Rule 341(h)). - 10 - No. 1-20-0785 ¶ 22 It is a civil rights violation under the Act to alter the terms, conditions or privileges of a real estate transaction or in the furnishing of facilities or services in connection therewith based on unlawful discrimination. 775 ILCS 5/3-102(B) (West 2018).

2026App. 3d 509 , 511 (2001) (finding meaningful review was not precluded, as merits of appeal could be ascertained from record). ¶ 22 When a charge alleging a civil rights violation under the Act is filed, the IDHR must investigate the allegations and may dismiss a charge if there is no “substantial evidence” supporting the charge. 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(C), (D)(3) (West 2022). “[S]ubstantial evidence” is defined as “evidence which a reasonable mind accepts as sufficient to support a particular conclusion and which consists of more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.”

2026App. 3d 509, 511 (2001) (meaningful review was not precluded, as merits of appeal could be ascertained from record). ¶ 21 When a charge alleging a civil rights violation under the Act is filed, the IDHR investigates the allegations and may dismiss a charge if it finds no “substantial evidence” supporting the charge. 775 ILCS 5/7A-102(C), (D)(3) (West 2022). “[S]ubstantial evidence” is defined as “evidence which a reasonable mind accepts as sufficient to support a particular conclusion and which consists of more than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Id. § 7A-102(

2022Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 517 (1994). ¶ 12 We conclude that the plaintiff’s common law wrongful termination claim of retaliatory discharge, based upon her reporting alleged criminal stalking, is not inextricably linked with a civil rights violation since the “plaintiff can establish the necessary elements of the tort independent of any legal duties created by the [Act].” See Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 177 Ill. 2d 511, 519 (1997) (plaintiff’s common law tort claims of assault, battery and false imprisonment were not inextricably linked with claims of sexual harassment

1998Mein v. Masonite Corp ., 109 Ill. 2d 1, 7 , 485 N.E.2d 312 (1985); see also Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc. , 159 Ill. 2d 507, 516 , 639 N.E.2d 1273 (1994) (claim for sexual harassment is a civil rights violation within the meaning of the Illinois Human Rights Act and governed thereby); Dilley , 129 Ill.

2021The Act is the “exclusive source for redress of civil rights violations.” Village of Maywood Board of Fire & Police Commissioners v. Department of Human Rights, 296 Ill.

2020The Act is the “exclusive source for redress of civil rights violations” (Village of Maywood Board of Fire & Police Commissioners v. Department of Human Rights, 296 Ill.

2020Village of Bellwood Board of Fire and Police Commissioners v. Human Rights Comm'n, 184 Ill.

2003Village of Bellwood Board of Fire & Police Commissioners v. Human Rights Comm'n, 184 Ill.App.3d 339, 347 , 133 Ill.Dec. 810 , 541 N.E.2d 1248, 1254 (1989).

2016It provides that it is a civil rights violation “[f]or any employer, employee, agent of any employer, employment agency or labor organization to engage in sexual harassment; provided, that an employer shall be responsible for sexual harassment of the employer’s employees by nonemployees or nonmanagerial and nonsupervisory employees only if the employer becomes aware of the conduct and fails to take reasonable corrective measures.” 775 ILCS 5/2-102(D) (West 2014); see also Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department v. Human Rights Comm’n, 233 Ill. 2d 125, 138-41 (2009) (employers are strictly liable

2016It provides that it is a civil rights violation “[f]or any employer, employee, agent of any employer, employment agency or labor organization to engage in sexual harassment; provided, that an employer shall be responsible for sexual harassment of the employer’s employees by nonemployees or - 11 - 2016 IL App (2d) 150493 nonmanagerial and nonsupervisory employees only if the employer becomes aware of the conduct and fails to take reasonable corrective measures.” 775 ILCS 5/2-102(D) (West 2014); see also Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department v. Human Rights Comm’n, 233 Ill. 2d 125, 138-41 (2009)

2019First, the “opposition clause” of section 6-101(A) states that it is a civil rights violation to “[r]etaliate against a person because he or she has opposed that which he or she reasonably and in good faith believes to be *** sexual harassment in employment or sexual harassment in elementary, secondary, and higher education.” Id. -9- ¶ 29 Second, the “participation clause” of section 6-101(A) states that it is a civil rights violation to “[r]etaliate against a person *** because he or she has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding

2019First, the “opposition clause” of section 6-101(A) states that it is a civil rights violation to “[r]etaliate against a person because he or she has opposed that which he or she reasonably and in good faith believes to be *** sexual harassment in employment or sexual harassment in elementary, secondary, and higher education.” Id. -9- ¶ 29 Second, the “participation clause” of section 6-101(A) states that it is a civil rights violation to “[r]etaliate against a person *** because he or she has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding

2023“Unlawful discrimination” includes “discrimination against a person because of his or her actual or perceived: race *** [or] age.” 775 ILCS 5/1-103(Q) (West 2020). ¶ 38 When an employee alleges a violation of the Act based on unlawful discrimination by an employer, we generally apply the three-prong test set forth in Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 131 Ill. 2d 172 (1989), which is based on the framework employed by federal courts in employment discrimination cases.

2017Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 131 Ill. 2d 172, 178 , 545 N.E.2d 684, 687 (1989). -5- ¶ 31 Having set forth some of the pertinent aspects of the Act, we now turn to the standard of review. ¶ 32 B.

2022See id. at 322 ; Cruz v. Department of Human Rights, 2022 IL App (1st) 211276-U , ¶ 27 (Department’s role is investigative, while Commission’s is adjudicative). 9 No. 1-21-0694 ¶ 36 The Act is the exclusive source for redress of civil rights violations; except for limited exceptions not relevant here, the Commission is vested with exclusive authority, at least initially, over the subject of an alleged civil-rights violation.

2020App. 3d 570, 581 (1998)) and, except for limited exceptions not relevant to the disposition of this case, the Commission is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over the subject of alleged civil rights violations (see Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 322 (1989); 775 ILCS 5/8-111(C) (West 2016)). ¶ 21 Section 7A-102(A)(1) of the Act fixes the time within which a charge of a civil rights violation may be filed with the Department.

2016See Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 177 Ill. 2d 511, 518 (1997) (“An action to redress a civil rights violation has a purpose distinct from a common law tort action,” and each type of claim must be separately proved.); see also Yount v. Hesston Corp., 124 Ill.

2016See Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 177 Ill. 2d 511, 518 (1997) (“An action to redress a civil rights violation has a purpose distinct from a common law tort action,” and each type of claim must be separately proved); see also Yount v. Hesston Corp., 124 Ill.

2024De novo review means that we perform the same analysis as the ALJ who resolved the motions for summary decision. - 15 - No. 1-23-2466 See Platinum Partners Value Arbitrage Fund, Limited Partnership v. Chicago Board Options Exchange, 2018 IL App (1st) 171316 , ¶ 41. ¶ 50 The Act provides that it is a civil rights violation for an employer to refuse to hire an applicant based on unlawful discrimination, including age discrimination. 775 ILCS 5/1-102, 2- 102(A) (West 2016); Owens v. Department of Human Rights, 403 Ill.

2020Owens v. Department of Human - 10 - No. 1-19-1572 Rights, 403 Ill.

2016App. 3d 943, 947-49 (1984) (the Illinois Constitution does not authorize a private right of action to enforce section 19 of article I; thus the plaintiff could not bring a private action under section 19 for employment discrimination based on disability; the Human Rights Act is the exclusive remedy that the plaintiff could have pursued); cf. Melvin v. City of West Frankfort, 93 Ill.

2016App. 3d 943, 947-49 (1984) (the Illinois Constitution does not authorize a private right of action to enforce section 19 of article I; thus the plaintiff could not bring a private action under section 19 for employment discrimination based on disability; the Human Rights Act is the exclusive remedy that the plaintiff could have pursued); cf. Melvin v. City of Frankfort, 93 Ill.

2016Charles v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 395 Ill.

2016Charles v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 395 Ill.

2016See Roby v. McKesson Corp., 219 P.3d 749, 762 (Cal. 2009) (noting the distinction in California’s civil rights statute; discrimination involves explicit changes in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment–changes involving official action taken by the employer; harassment, in contrast, focuses on situations where the workplace’s social environment becomes intolerable because the harassment communicates an offensive message to the harassed employee). ¶ 37 Plaintiff and the Department respond that a disability harassment claim is legally cognizable as a civil rights violation under the

2016See Roby v. McKesson Corp., 219 P.3d 749, 762 (Cal. 2009) (noting the distinction in California’s civil rights statute; discrimination involves explicit changes in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment—changes involving official action taken by the employer; harassment, in contrast, focuses on situations where the workplace’s social environment becomes intolerable because the harassment communicates an offensive message to the harassed employee). ¶ 37 Plaintiff and the Department respond that a disability harassment claim is legally cognizable as a civil rights violation under the

1998Mein v. Masonite Corp ., 109 Ill. 2d 1, 7 , 485 N.E.2d 312 (1985); see also Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc. , 159 Ill. 2d 507, 516 , 639 N.E.2d 1273 (1994) (claim for sexual harassment is a civil rights violation within the meaning of the Illinois Human Rights Act and governed thereby); Dilley , 129 Ill.

1998Mein v. Masonite Corp ., 109 Ill. 2d 1, 7 , 485 N.E.2d 312 (1985); see also Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc. , 159 Ill. 2d 507, 516 , 639 N.E.2d 1273 (1994) (claim for sexual harassment is a civil rights violation within the meaning of the Illinois Human Rights Act and governed thereby); Dilley , 129 Ill.

2022Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 517 (1994). ¶ 12 We conclude that the plaintiff’s common law wrongful termination claim of retaliatory discharge, based upon her reporting alleged criminal stalking, is not inextricably linked with a civil rights violation since the “plaintiff can establish the necessary elements of the tort independent of any legal duties created by the [Act].” See Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 177 Ill. 2d 511, 519 (1997) (plaintiff’s common law tort claims of assault, battery and false imprisonment were not inextricably linked with claims of sexual harassment

2011Blount, 232 Ill. 2d at 313 .

2018In re Andrew B., 237 Ill. 2d 340, 348 (2010). ¶ 12 Section 3-102 of the Act is titled “Civil Rights Violations; Real Estate Transactions” and provides in relevant part as follows: “It is a civil rights violation for an owner or any other person engaging in a real estate transaction, or for a real estate broker or salesman, because of unlawful discrimination or familial status, to (A) Transaction.

2017In re Andrew B. , 237 Ill. 2d 340 , 348, 341 Ill.Dec. 420 , 930 N.E.2d 934 (2010). ¶ 12 Section 3-102 of the Act is titled "Civil Rights Violations; Real Estate Transactions" and provides in relevant part as follows: "It is a civil rights violation for an owner or any other person engaging in a real estate transaction, or for a real estate broker or salesman, because of unlawful discrimination or familial status, to (A) Transaction.

2011In Gusciara v. Lustig, 346 Ill.

2011In Gusciara v. Lustig, 346 Ill.