civil rights claim in Florida

2019Appellees rely on Subway Restaurants, Inc. v. Thomas , 860 So.2d 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), and maintain that awarding CalAtlantic attorney's fees would impermissibly expand the scope of the attorney's fees provisions of the Declaration because a breach is required to trigger the entitlement to fees, and here, a breach did not occur. 2 We find that *268 Subway is distinguishable. 3 In Subway , the plaintiff sued a franchisee for eviction, and the franchisee counter-sued for wrongful eviction, a civil rights violation, and breach of contract.

2019Appellees rely on Subway Restaurants, Inc. v. Thomas , 860 So.2d 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), and maintain that awarding CalAtlantic attorney's fees would impermissibly expand the scope of the attorney's fees provisions of the Declaration because a breach is required to trigger the entitlement to fees, and here, a breach did not occur. 2 We find that *268 Subway is distinguishable. 3 In Subway , the plaintiff sued a franchisee for eviction, and the franchisee counter-sued for wrongful eviction, a civil rights violation, and breach of contract.

2017See, e.g., Tindel v. Kessler, 772 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Vermette v. Ludwig, 707 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). 11 and this court is without jurisdiction to review, the trial court’s order denying the motion for summary judgment.

2012The plaintiff sued the officers for a civil rights violation, claiming that the police “should have kept him in custody for his own protection because he was obviously inebriated.” Id.

2012Lindquist v. Woronka, 706 So.2d 358 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), the case which the majority cites as “precedent,” has somewhat similar facts to the instant case but presents a different legal issue. 1 Lindquist was based on a civil rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , and the plaintiff had sought to impose civil liability on the officers individually.

2004Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 , 118 S.Ct. 2257 , 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998), states that sexual harassment is actionable against an employer as a civil rights violation if it results in a "tangible employment action" defined as an action which "constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." We conclude that a tangible employment action is conduct which constitutes a violation of law and is thus prohibite

2004Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 , 118 S.Ct. 2257 , 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998), states that sexual harassment is actionable against an employer as a civil rights violation if it results in a "tangible employment action" defined as an action which "constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." We conclude that a tangible employment action is conduct which constitutes a violation of law and is thus prohibite

2002Because we have appellate jurisdiction to review only those nonfinal orders specified in rule 9.130 and are not authorized to enlarge its terms to extend additional meanings, cf. Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla.1984) (courts lack power to construe unambiguous statute to extend, modify or limit its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications; not court's duty or prerogative to modify or shade clearly expressed legislative intent in order to uphold policy favored by the court), we must therefore lack jurisdiction thereunder to review this nonfinal appeal from the denial of the She

2001But that is not a material issue here because the court did not reduce the award pursuant to this statute. [7] Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 , 121 S.Ct. 1678 , 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001). [8] See Aircraft Service International Inc. v. Jackson, 768 So.2d 1094 (Fla 3d DCA 1995). [9] Nello L.

2001But that is not a material issue here because the court did not reduce the award pursuant to this statute. [7] Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 , 121 S.Ct. 1678 , 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001). [8] See Aircraft Service International Inc. v. Jackson, 768 So.2d 1094 (Fla 3d DCA 1995). [9] Nello L.

2001But that is not a material issue here because the court did not reduce the award pursuant to this statute. [7] Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 , 121 S.Ct. 1678 , 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001). [8] See Aircraft Service International Inc. v. Jackson, 768 So.2d 1094 (Fla 3d DCA 1995). [9] Nello L.

2001Co., 753 So.2d 80 (Fla.2000) (expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other). [6] Pursuant to section 768.71(1), that statute expressly applies to "any action for damages, whether in tort or in contract." As noted above, if the punitive damage award was made based on the civil rights violation, this statute may not be applicable.

1997The trial court then dismissed the civil rights claim as “moot without prejudice.” Sutor’s protected property interest, if any, arose solely as a result of rights created by section 48.021 and did not flow from either the Florida or United States Constitutions. “[Sjtate law based rights constitutionally may be rescinded so long as the elements of procedural—not substantive—due process are observed.” Jacobi v. City of Miami Beach, 678 So.2d 1365, 1367 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (emphasis supplied) (citing McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 , 115

1997The trial court then dismissed the civil rights claim as “moot without prejudice.” Sutor’s protected property interest, if any, arose solely as a result of rights created by section 48.021 and did not flow from either the Florida or United States Constitutions. “[Sjtate law based rights constitutionally may be rescinded so long as the elements of procedural—not substantive—due process are observed.” Jacobi v. City of Miami Beach, 678 So.2d 1365, 1367 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (emphasis supplied) (citing McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 , 115

1997The trial court then dismissed the civil rights claim as “moot without prejudice.” Sutor’s protected property interest, if any, arose solely as a result of rights created by section 48.021 and did not flow from either the Florida or United States Constitutions. “[Sjtate law based rights constitutionally may be rescinded so long as the elements of procedural—not substantive—due process are observed.” Jacobi v. City of Miami Beach, 678 So.2d 1365, 1367 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (emphasis supplied) (citing McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1110 , 115

1996In Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 , 108 S.Ct. 311 , 98 L.Ed.2d 269 (1987), the ninth circuit explained its reasoning for recognizing an independent civil rights claim of a child: We now hold that this constitutional interest in familial companionship and society logically extends to protect children from unwarranted state interference with their relationships with their parents.

1996In Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 , 108 S.Ct. 311 , 98 L.Ed.2d 269 (1987), the ninth circuit explained its reasoning for recognizing an independent civil rights claim of a child: We now hold that this constitutional interest in familial companionship and society logically extends to protect children from unwarranted state interference with their relationships with their parents.

1994The trial court, in its final order of dismissal, cited Chew v. Gates, 744 F.Supp. 952 (C.D.Cal.1990) as authority for dismissal and had heard argument for dismissing the civil rights claim pursuant to a pleading requirement under Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence, 954 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir.1992).

1994The trial court, in its final order of dismissal, cited Chew v. Gates, 744 F.Supp. 952 (C.D.Cal.1990) as authority for dismissal and had heard argument for dismissing the civil rights claim pursuant to a pleading requirement under Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence, 954 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir.1992).

1986NOTES [1] In this regard, see the discussion in Shinholster v. Graham, 527 F. Supp. 1318 (N.D.Fla. 1981).