60 California opinions name it 4 courts 1987–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Farrar v. Hobbygreen2 sentences2019After all, where the only reasonable fee is no fee, an award of fees would be unjust; conversely, where a fee award would be unjust, the reasonable fee is no fee at all." ( Farrar, supra , 506 U.S. at p. 118 , 113 S.Ct. 566 (conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.).) In contrast to prevailing plaintiffs, prevailing civil rights defendants "can recover attorney fees only where the court also finds that the civil rights claim was objectively ' "frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." ' " ( Choate v. County of Orange (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 2019After all, where the only reasonable fee is no fee, an award of fees would be unjust; conversely, where a fee award would be unjust, the reasonable fee is no fee at all." ( Farrar, supra , 506 U.S. at p. 118 , 113 S.Ct. 566 (conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.).) In contrast to prevailing plaintiffs, prevailing civil rights defendants "can recover attorney fees only where the court also finds that the civil rights claim was objectively ' "frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." ' " ( Choate v. County of Orange (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th | 3 | 5 |
Robert Reese, Jr. v. County of Sacramentogreen2 sentences2018(Reese v. County of Sacramento (9th Cir. 2018) 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (Reese).) In concluding there was “no ‘convincing evidence that the [California] supreme court likely would not follow’ Cornell,” the appeals court observed, “Cornell correctly notes that the plain language of Section 52.1 gives no indication that the ‘threat, intimidation, or coercion’ must be independent from the constitutional violation.” (Reese, at p. 1043.) Conversely, “the specific intent requirement articulated in Cornell is consistent with the language of Section 52.1, which requires interference with rights by ‘threat, 2018(Reese v. County of Sacramento (9th Cir. 2018) 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (Reese).) In concluding there was “no ‘convincing evidence that the [California] supreme court likely would not follow’ Cornell,” the appeals court observed, “Cornell correctly notes that the plain language of Section 52.1 gives no indication that the ‘threat, intimidation, or coercion’ must be independent from the constitutional violation.” (Reese, at p. 1043.) Conversely, “the specific intent requirement articulated in Cornell is consistent with the language of Section 52.1, which requires interference with rights by ‘threat, | 3 | 3 |
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.green2 sentences2025LEXIS 719 ; 2023 WL 24218 , at pp. *1, *3].) The complaint alleged unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment and section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code (42 USC 1983) (Claim 1); Monell claims2 under 42 USC 1983 (Claims 2 and 3) against City and the County of Tulare; state tort claims against defendants Henry, Canto, and Alvarez, including claims for negligence (Claim 4), false arrest (Claim 7), battery (Claim 8), and intentional infliction of emotional 2 Under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York (1978) 436 U.S. 658 , local governments may be sued directly under 2025LEXIS 719 ; 2023 WL 24218 , at pp. *1, *3].) The complaint alleged unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment and section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code (42 USC 1983) (Claim 1); Monell claims2 under 42 USC 1983 (Claims 2 and 3) against City and the County of Tulare; state tort claims against defendants Henry, Canto, and Alvarez, including claims for negligence (Claim 4), false arrest (Claim 7), battery (Claim 8), and intentional infliction of emotional 2 Under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York (1978) 436 U.S. 658 , local governments may be sued directly under | 2 | 5 |
Choate v. County of Orangegreen2 sentences2019After all, where the only reasonable fee is no fee, an award of fees would be unjust; conversely, where a fee award would be unjust, the reasonable fee is no fee at all." ( Farrar, supra , 506 U.S. at p. 118 , 113 S.Ct. 566 (conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.).) In contrast to prevailing plaintiffs, prevailing civil rights defendants "can recover attorney fees only where the court also finds that the civil rights claim was objectively ' "frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." ' " ( Choate v. County of Orange (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 2019After all, where the only reasonable fee is no fee, an award of fees would be unjust; conversely, where a fee award would be unjust, the reasonable fee is no fee at all." ( Farrar, supra , 506 U.S. at p. 118 , 113 S.Ct. 566 (conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.).) In contrast to prevailing plaintiffs, prevailing civil rights defendants "can recover attorney fees only where the court also finds that the civil rights claim was objectively ' "frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." ' " ( Choate v. County of Orange (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th | 2 | 3 |
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.green2 sentences2007In Taylor , the court looked to a line of United States Supreme Court cases which “held that findings made during a labor arbitration are not binding in an employee lawsuit asserting federal statutory causes of action designed to protect workers: a discrimination claim under title VII of the Civil Rights Act in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974) 415 U.S. 36 , 44—56 [ 39 L.Ed.2d 147 , 94 S.Ct. 1011 ] (Alexander), a minimum wage violation under the Fair Labor Standards Act in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. (1981) 450 U.S. 728, 738-741 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 641 , 101 S.Ct. 1437 ] (Ba 2007In Taylor , the court looked to a line of United States Supreme Court cases which “held that findings made during a labor arbitration are not binding in an employee lawsuit asserting federal statutory causes of action designed to protect workers: a discrimination claim under title VII of the Civil Rights Act in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974) 415 U.S. 36 , 44—56 [ 39 L.Ed.2d 147 , 94 S.Ct. 1011 ] (Alexander), a minimum wage violation under the Fair Labor Standards Act in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. (1981) 450 U.S. 728, 738-741 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 641 , 101 S.Ct. 1437 ] (Ba | 2 | 2 |
McDonald v. City of West Branchgreen2 sentences2007In Taylor , the court looked to a line of United States Supreme Court cases which “held that findings made during a labor arbitration are not binding in an employee lawsuit asserting federal statutory causes of action designed to protect workers: a discrimination claim under title VII of the Civil Rights Act in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974) 415 U.S. 36 , 44—56 [ 39 L.Ed.2d 147 , 94 S.Ct. 1011 ] (Alexander), a minimum wage violation under the Fair Labor Standards Act in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. (1981) 450 U.S. 728, 738-741 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 641 , 101 S.Ct. 1437 ] (Ba 2007In Taylor , the court looked to a line of United States Supreme Court cases which “held that findings made during a labor arbitration are not binding in an employee lawsuit asserting federal statutory causes of action designed to protect workers: a discrimination claim under title VII of the Civil Rights Act in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974) 415 U.S. 36 , 44—56 [ 39 L.Ed.2d 147 , 94 S.Ct. 1011 ] (Alexander), a minimum wage violation under the Fair Labor Standards Act in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. (1981) 450 U.S. 728, 738-741 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 641 , 101 S.Ct. 1437 ] (Ba | 2 | 2 |
Lucas v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2009The court in Lucas did not, as plaintiffs assert, broadly hold that "[r]easonable conduct under a [federal] civil rights violation is different from a negligence action because a civil rights violation `describes a state of mind more blameworthy.'" Rather, the Lucas court reached the far narrower conclusion that the particular constitutional violation there alleged as the basis for the section 1983 claimfailing to render medical care to an inmaterequired proof of "deliberate indifference," and that "this standard. . . describes a state of mind more blameworthy" than "[m]ere negligence." ( Lu 2009The court in Lucas did not, as plaintiffs assert, broadly hold that “[Reasonable conduct under a [federal] civil rights violation is different from a negligence action because a civil rights violation ‘describes a state of mind more blameworthy.’ ” Rather, the Lucas court reached the far narrower conclusion that the particular constitutional violation there alleged as the basis for the section 1983 claim—failing to render medical care to an inmate—required proof of “deliberate indifference,” and that “this standard . . . describes a state of mind more blameworthy” than “[m]ere negligence.” (Lu | 1 | 2 |
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.green2 sentences2007In Taylor , the court looked to a line of United States Supreme Court cases which “held that findings made during a labor arbitration are not binding in an employee lawsuit asserting federal statutory causes of action designed to protect workers: a discrimination claim under title VII of the Civil Rights Act in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974) 415 U.S. 36 , 44—56 [ 39 L.Ed.2d 147 , 94 S.Ct. 1011 ] (Alexander), a minimum wage violation under the Fair Labor Standards Act in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. (1981) 450 U.S. 728, 738-741 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 641 , 101 S.Ct. 1437 ] (Ba 2007In Taylor , the court looked to a line of United States Supreme Court cases which “held that findings made during a labor arbitration are not binding in an employee lawsuit asserting federal statutory causes of action designed to protect workers: a discrimination claim under title VII of the Civil Rights Act in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (1974) 415 U.S. 36 , 44—56 [ 39 L.Ed.2d 147 , 94 S.Ct. 1011 ] (Alexander), a minimum wage violation under the Fair Labor Standards Act in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. (1981) 450 U.S. 728, 738-741 [ 67 L.Ed.2d 641 , 101 S.Ct. 1437 ] (Ba | 1 | 2 |
Diana Spirt v. Teachers Insurance And Annuity Associationgreen1 sentence2023The court said: “Just as ‘delegation of responsibility for employee benefits 24 RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. cannot insulate a discriminatory [retirement benefits] plan from attack under Title VII,’ Spirt, 691 F.2d at 1063, neither can it insulate a discriminatory health benefits plan under Title I of the ADA.” ( Carparts, supra, 37 F.3d at pp. 17–18.) Similarly, in Williams, the court considered whether the agent performed functions, typical of the employer, that might give rise to a civil rights violation. | 1 | 1 |
| Simmons v. Superior Court of San Diego Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brosseau v. Haugengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Morrison v. Vineyard Creek L.P.green | 1 | 1 |
| Arizonans for Official English v. Arizonagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Melican v. Regents of the University of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Filipino Accountants' Ass'n v. State Board of Accountancygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Badie v. Bank of Americagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gatto v. County of Sonomagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cummings v. Benco Building Servicesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thomas v. City Of Tacomagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hartman v. Mooregreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Houston v. Hillgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Mattson v. City of Costa Mesagreen | 1 | 1 |
| West Shield Investigations & Security Consultants v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Del Rio v. Jettongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hughes v. Rowegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences2018Nonetheless, despite the fact that "coercion is inherent" in an unreasonable custodial search ( Shoyoye, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 959 , 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 839 ), the Simmons court did not require evidence of coercion independent of the civil rights violation, as the complained-of conduct was "necessarily intentional." ( Simmons, at p. 1127, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 884 , italics omitted.) See footnote *, ante . 2018Nonetheless, despite the fact that "coercion is inherent" in an unreasonable custodial search ( Shoyoye, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 959 , 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 839 ), the Simmons court did not require evidence of coercion independent of the civil rights violation, as the complained-of conduct was "necessarily intentional." ( Simmons, at p. 1127, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 884 , italics omitted.) See footnote *, ante . | 4 | 2018–2018 |
Cornell v. City & Cnty. of S.F.
green
2 sentences2018(Ibid., italics omitted.) The Cornell court suggested the “better approach” was to “focus directly on the level of scienter required to support a Section 52.1 claim.” (Cornell, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 799 .) 58 Thus, the court held that, where a civil rights violation has been “properly pleaded and proved, the egregiousness required by Section 52.1 is tested by whether the circumstances indicate the [defendant] had a specific intent to violate the [plaintiff’s civil rights], not by whether the evidence shows something beyond the coercion ‘inherent’ in the [violation].” (Cornell, at pp. 801 2018(Ibid., italics omitted.) The Cornell court suggested the “better approach” was to “focus directly on the level of scienter required to support a Section 52.1 claim.” (Cornell, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 799 .) 58 Thus, the court held that, where a civil rights violation has been “properly pleaded and proved, the egregiousness required by Section 52.1 is tested by whether the circumstances indicate the [defendant] had a specific intent to violate the [plaintiff’s civil rights], not by whether the evidence shows something beyond the coercion ‘inherent’ in the [violation].” (Cornell, at pp. 801 | 3 | 2018–2018 |
Green v. Rancho Santa Margarita Mortgage Co.
green
2 sentences2023(Green, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 690 .) When the court denied the latter motion, it ordered the plaintiff to appear for her deposition with the proviso that if she failed to appear, the court would not allow the plaintiffs to sue for professional negligence. 2014Specifically, appellants sought to allege violations of the takings, due process, and equal protection provisions of the United States Constitution; a civil rights violation ( 42 U.S.C. §1983 ); a violation of article XIII C of the California Constitution; conversion and unjust enrichment. ““‘[T]he trial court has wide discretion in allowing the amendment of any pleading [citations], [and] as a matter of policy the ruling of the trial court in such matters will be upheld unless a manifest or gross abuse of discretion is shown. [Citations.]”’ [Citation.] Nevertheless, it is also true that court | 2 | 2014–2023 |
Tichinin v. City of Morgan Hill
green
2 sentences2023In Tichinin v. City of Morgan Hill, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th 1049 , the court found it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether Civil Code section 47 “immunizes conduct from liability for a civil rights violation under the federal statute.” (Tichinin, at p. 1084, fn. 16.) Similarly, in Hagberg, supra, 32 Cal.4th 350 , the Supreme Court found it unnecessary “to resolve the broad legal question whether proof that a business establishment has called for police assistance (or has a policy of calling for police assistance) based on racial or ethnic prejudice could give rise to liability under the Un 2023In Tichinin v. City of Morgan Hill, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th 1049 , the court found it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether Civil Code section 47 “immunizes conduct from liability for a civil rights violation under the federal statute.” (Tichinin, at p. 1084, fn. 16.) Similarly, in Hagberg, supra, 32 Cal.4th 350 , the Supreme Court found it unnecessary “to resolve the broad legal question whether proof that a business establishment has called for police assistance (or has a policy of calling for police assistance) based on racial or ethnic prejudice could give rise to liability under the Un | 2 | 2020–2023 |
Vergos v. McNeal
green
2 sentences2017The civil rights claim against the individual hearing officer expressly rested on her " 'hearing, processing, and deciding the grievances' " ( id. at p. 1391, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 647 ) as well as the allegation the employer and officer had deprived him of a hearing before a " 'fair and impartial hearing officer' " ( id. at p. 1392, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 647 ). 2017The civil rights claim against the individual hearing officer expressly rested on her " 'hearing, processing, and deciding the grievances' " ( id. at p. 1391, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 647 ) as well as the allegation the employer and officer had deprived him of a hearing before a " 'fair and impartial hearing officer' " ( id. at p. 1392, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 647 ). | 2 | 2009–2017 |
City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern
green
1 sentence2025(See City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern (2014) 59 Cal.4th 618, 628 .) The Legislative History In our view, the legislative history of Civil Code section 52.4 confirms what seems plain from the statutory language—that it is a civil rights statute directed at those who perpetrate or threaten violence and are motivated to do 32 so by some discriminatory bias or animus based on the victim’s gender as the term is defined in Civil Code section 51, subdivision (e)(6). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Association of New England, Inc.
green
1 sentence2023The court said: “Just as ‘delegation of responsibility for employee benefits 24 RAINES v. U.S. HEALTHWORKS MEDICAL GROUP Opinion of the Court by Jenkins, J. cannot insulate a discriminatory [retirement benefits] plan from attack under Title VII,’ Spirt, 691 F.2d at 1063, neither can it insulate a discriminatory health benefits plan under Title I of the ADA.” ( Carparts, supra, 37 F.3d at pp. 17–18.) Similarly, in Williams, the court considered whether the agent performed functions, typical of the employer, that might give rise to a civil rights violation. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Tate Williams v. The City of Montgomery
green
1 sentence2023The court noted that the personnel board that was acting as the employer’s agent in Williams exercised “ ‘control of some of the employer’s traditional rights, such as hiring or firing.’ ” (Williams, supra, 742 F.2d at p. 589 .) The court further noted the agent’s “power to exercise duties traditionally reserved to the employer: establishing a pay plan, formulating minimum standards for jobs, evaluating employees, and transferring, promoting, or demoting employees.” (Ibid.) Finally, the court commented that “[t]hese functions are traditionally exercised by an employer, but the [employer’s agen | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Hagberg v. California Federal Bank FSB
green
2 sentences2023In Tichinin v. City of Morgan Hill, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th 1049 , the court found it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether Civil Code section 47 “immunizes conduct from liability for a civil rights violation under the federal statute.” (Tichinin, at p. 1084, fn. 16.) Similarly, in Hagberg, supra, 32 Cal.4th 350 , the Supreme Court found it unnecessary “to resolve the broad legal question whether proof that a business establishment has called for police assistance (or has a policy of calling for police assistance) based on racial or ethnic prejudice could give rise to liability under the Un 2023In Tichinin v. City of Morgan Hill, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th 1049 , the court found it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether Civil Code section 47 “immunizes conduct from liability for a civil rights violation under the federal statute.” (Tichinin, at p. 1084, fn. 16.) Similarly, in Hagberg, supra, 32 Cal.4th 350 , the Supreme Court found it unnecessary “to resolve the broad legal question whether proof that a business establishment has called for police assistance (or has a policy of calling for police assistance) based on racial or ethnic prejudice could give rise to liability under the Un | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Kino Bonelli v. Grand Canyon University
green
1 sentence2022“A section 1983 cause of action is subject to the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts. [Citation.] California’s statute of limitations governing a personal injury claim is two years. [Citation.] Federal law governs when a cause of action accrues and when the statute of limitations begins to run on a federal civil rights cause of action.” (Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2021) 11 Cal.5th 842, 847 .) “The general rule is that a civil rights claim accrues under federal law ‘when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.’ ” (Bo | 1 | 2022–2022 |
United States v. Claiborne
green
1 sentence2022(Gibson v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1986) 781 F.2d 1334 , 1340.) “Under this doctrine, ‘[i]njury and damage in a civil conspiracy action flow from the overt acts, not from “the mere continuance of a conspiracy.” ’ ” (Ibid.) An overt act is “ ‘[A]n outward act done in pursuance of the crime and in manifestation of an intent or design, looking toward the accomplishment of the crime.’ ” (People v. Von Villas (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 243 .) The trial court found the section 1985 cause of action was untimely because the applicable statute of limitations was two years, “the actions at issue here occurred in | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Shalabi v. City of Fontana
green
1 sentence2022“A section 1983 cause of action is subject to the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts. [Citation.] California’s statute of limitations governing a personal injury claim is two years. [Citation.] Federal law governs when a cause of action accrues and when the statute of limitations begins to run on a federal civil rights cause of action.” (Shalabi v. City of Fontana (2021) 11 Cal.5th 842, 847 .) “The general rule is that a civil rights claim accrues under federal law ‘when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.’ ” (Bo | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Von Villas
green
1 sentence2022(Gibson v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1986) 781 F.2d 1334 , 1340.) “Under this doctrine, ‘[i]njury and damage in a civil conspiracy action flow from the overt acts, not from “the mere continuance of a conspiracy.” ’ ” (Ibid.) An overt act is “ ‘[A]n outward act done in pursuance of the crime and in manifestation of an intent or design, looking toward the accomplishment of the crime.’ ” (People v. Von Villas (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 175, 243 .) The trial court found the section 1985 cause of action was untimely because the applicable statute of limitations was two years, “the actions at issue here occurred in | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Lukovsky v. City and County of San Francisco
green
1 sentence2022Proc., § 335.1 [two-year statute of limitations applies to personal injury actions].) “Although California law determines the length of the limitations period, federal law determines when a civil rights claim accrues.” (Lukovsky v. City and County of San Francisco (9th Cir. 2008) 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 .) In the Ninth Circuit, a conspiracy claim accrues in accordance with the last overt act doctrine. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Arizona v. Fulminante
green
1 sentence2021(See Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 310 ; see also People v. Liggins (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 55 , 69 [“Because prejudice is uncontested, the error in admitting the challenged statements requires reversal”].) DISPOSITION Defendant’s conviction for the civil rights violation and the true finding on the hate crime enhancement are reversed and the sentences vacated. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Lewis v. Casey
green
1 sentence2021A. Test for Denial of Access In Lewis v. Casey (1996) 518 U.S. 343 (Lewis), the United States Supreme Court considered what a prisoner must allege to state a civil rights claim based on a denial of the constitutional right of access to the courts. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Ford v. Gouin
green
1 sentence2020Lockyer v. Sun Pacific Farming Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 619, 640 , quoting People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 32 .) Emphasizing that the defendant’s conduct in a negligence case is measured by the objective standard of a reasonable person (Ford v. Gouin (1992) 3 Cal.4th 339, 356 ), defendants maintain that the trial court erroneously rejected their argument that an officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant in a negligence claim. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Southern California Rapid Transit District v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2020There, the court stated in a footnote, without analysis and on a matter not placed at issue by the parties, that the defendants’ termination of plaintiffs’ employment did not impact a property interest for purposes of a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , because at-will employees have no property right to continued employment. ( 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 730 fn. 11.) The court did not consider what might constitute “property” for purposes of extortion under Penal Code section 519. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People Ex Rel. Lockyer v. Sun Pacific Farming Co.
green
1 sentence2020Lockyer v. Sun Pacific Farming Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 619, 640 , quoting People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 32 .) Emphasizing that the defendant’s conduct in a negligence case is measured by the objective standard of a reasonable person (Ford v. Gouin (1992) 3 Cal.4th 339, 356 ), defendants maintain that the trial court erroneously rejected their argument that an officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant in a negligence claim. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. DeJesus green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Hernandez v. City of Pomona
green
1 sentence2020(Id. at p. 505.) Our Supreme Court held the federal judgment collaterally estopped Hernandez’s surviving family members from relitigating the reasonableness of the shooting itself because that question was “ ‘precisely the issue resolved [against them] by the federal jury . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 513.) However, because “state negligence law, which considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding any use of deadly force [citation], is broader than federal Fourth Amendment law, which tends to focus more narrowly on the moment when deadly force is used” (Hayes, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 639 ), | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Hayes v. County of San Diego
green
1 sentence2020(Id. at p. 505.) Our Supreme Court held the federal judgment collaterally estopped Hernandez’s surviving family members from relitigating the reasonableness of the shooting itself because that question was “ ‘precisely the issue resolved [against them] by the federal jury . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 513.) However, because “state negligence law, which considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding any use of deadly force [citation], is broader than federal Fourth Amendment law, which tends to focus more narrowly on the moment when deadly force is used” (Hayes, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 639 ), | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Ketchum v. Moses green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Graham v. Connor green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Tennessee v. Garner green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Flannery v. Prentice green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Estelle v. Gamble green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Williams v. Horvath green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Yount v. City of Sacramento green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Lujano v. County of Santa Barbara green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| City of Hialeah, Florida v. Eterio Rojas green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Weaver v. State of California green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Harman v. City and County of San Francisco green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Mayfield v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co. green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Greenwich Citizens Committee, Inc. v. Counties Of Warren And Washington Industrial Development Agency green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Harris v. Grimes green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Bill Vangilder v. Brian Baker, City of Lafayette, and Lafayette Police Department green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.