otherwise valid claim in California

2015(Green v. Laibco, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 441, 453-454 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 ]; Mike Davidov Co., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 609-610.) Likewise, a plaintiff’s “lack of diligence and preparation in failing to raise this discovery issue until the eve of the punitive damages phase of trial” may fatally undermine an otherwise valid claim for punitive damages. ( I-CA, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 282, 284; see Kelly v. Haag (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 910, 919-920 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 126 ] (Kelly).) Our Supreme Court has not prescribed a rigid standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay.

2015(Green v. Laibco, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 441, 453-454 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 ]; Mike Davidov Co., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 609-610.) Likewise, a plaintiff’s “lack of diligence and preparation in failing to raise this discovery issue until the eve of the punitive damages phase of trial” may fatally undermine an otherwise valid claim for punitive damages. ( I-CA, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 282, 284; see Kelly v. Haag (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 910, 919-920 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 126 ] (Kelly).) Our Supreme Court has not prescribed a rigid standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay.

2024(Jones, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 241 [A trial court “ ‘must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses.’ ”]; People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1039 [trial court has discretion to “rejec[t] defendant’s offer to waive [a] conflict” and instead disqualify counsel].) Thus, even assuming without deciding that petitioner’s claims coul

2024(Jones, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 241 [A trial court “ ‘must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses.’ ”]; People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1039 [trial court has discretion to “rejec[t] defendant’s offer to waive [a] conflict” and instead disqualify counsel].) Thus, even assuming without deciding that petitioner’s claims coul

2024(Jones, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 241 [A trial court “ ‘must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses.’ ”]; People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1039 [trial court has discretion to “rejec[t] defendant’s offer to waive [a] conflict” and instead disqualify counsel].) Thus, even assuming without deciding that petitioner’s claims coul

2024(Jones, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 241 [A trial court “ ‘must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses.’ ”]; People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1039 [trial court has discretion to “rejec[t] defendant’s offer to waive [a] conflict” and instead disqualify counsel].) Thus, even assuming without deciding that petitioner’s claims coul

2022Appeals Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1214 [“failure to file a fictitious business name statement was a mere technical defect which should not deprive [business] of an otherwise valid claim”].) Although the requirement for a fictitious business statement ordinarily applies to bar a plaintiff from maintaining an action on a contract in the name of a fictitious business, the requirement similarly applies to motions to compel arbitration because “[a] proceeding to compel arbitration is in essence a suit 12 in equity to compel specific performance of a contract.” (Freeman v. State Farm Mut.

2022Appeals Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1204, 1214 [“failure to file a fictitious business name statement was a mere technical defect which should not deprive [business] of an otherwise valid claim”].) Although the requirement for a fictitious business statement ordinarily applies to bar a plaintiff from maintaining an action on a contract in the name of a fictitious business, the requirement similarly applies to motions to compel arbitration because “[a] proceeding to compel arbitration is in essence a suit 12 in equity to compel specific performance of a contract.” (Freeman v. State Farm Mut.

2023As explained in Haywood, “where, as here, an employee is fired for cause and the discharge is neither the ultimate result of a disabling medical condition nor preemptive of an otherwise valid claim for disability retirement, the termination of the employment relationship renders the employee ineligible for disability retirement . . . .” 1 All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. 6 (Haywood, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307 .) “Nor are disability retirement laws intended as a means by which an unwilling [-to-faithfully-and-competently-perform] employee can

2009Haywood is instructive, however, in explaining that “[WJhere, as here, an employee is fired for cause and the discharge is neither the ultimate result of a disabling medical condition nor preemptive of an otherwise valid claim for disability retirement, the termination of the employment relationship renders the employee ineligible for disability retirement regardless of whether a timely application is filed.” (Haywood, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307 .) The problem in the instant case is that the record indicates the county may have terminated Fauth for cause based on an underlying mental dis

2015(Pfeifer, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 1308 , citing Adams, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p.116, fn. 7.) Accordingly, there is no one particular type of financial evidence a plaintiff must obtain or introduce to satisfy its burden of demonstrating the defendant’s financial condition.

2015(Pfeifer, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 1308 , citing Adams, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 116, fn. 7 .) Accordingly, there is no one particular type of financial evidence a plaintiff must obtain or introduce to satisfy its burden of demonstrating the defendant’s financial condition.

2015(Green v. Laibco, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 441, 453-454 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 ]; Mike Davidov Co., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 609-610.) Likewise, a plaintiff’s “lack of diligence and preparation in failing to raise this discovery issue until the eve of the punitive damages phase of trial” may fatally undermine an otherwise valid claim for punitive damages. ( I-CA, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 282, 284; see Kelly v. Haag (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 910, 919-920 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 126 ] (Kelly).) Our Supreme Court has not prescribed a rigid standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay.

2015(Green v. Laibco, LLC (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 441, 453-454 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 ]; Mike Davidov Co., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 609-610.) Likewise, a plaintiff’s “lack of diligence and preparation in failing to raise this discovery issue until the eve of the punitive damages phase of trial” may fatally undermine an otherwise valid claim for punitive damages. ( I-CA, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at pp. 282, 284; see Kelly v. Haag (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 910, 919-920 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 126 ] (Kelly).) Our Supreme Court has not prescribed a rigid standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay.

2024(Ibid.) “Evidence of a defendant’s financial condition is a legal precondition to the award of punitive damages.” (Soto, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 195 , citing Mike Davidov Co. v. Issod (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 597, 607 (Mike Davidov).) “[T]here is no one particular type of financial evidence a plaintiff must introduce to satisfy its burden of demonstrating the defendant’s financial condition.” (Id. at p. 194.) Some evidence of a defendant’s actual wealth at the time of trial is necessary, “but the precise character of that evidence may vary with the facts of each case.” (Id. at pp. 194-195.)

2017(See Weaver , supra , 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1072-1074, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 355 , 273 P.3d 546 [rejecting a defendant's argument that the failure to advise him of his right to participate in jury selection necessarily rendered his jury waiver invalid]; U.S. v. DeRobertis (7th Cir.1983) 715 F.2d 1174 , 1186 [finding a knowing and intelligent jury waiver notwithstanding the trial court's failure to advise the defendant of the juror vote necessary to convict]; Rizzo , supra , 31 A.3d at p. 1118 ["this court and others have rejected claims that an otherwise valid waiver of the right to a jury is undermined

2004However, as the plaintiff has correctly *206 attempted to argue throughout the CalPERS proceedings, even if an agency dismisses an employee solely for a cause unrelated to a disabling medical condition, this cannot result in the forfeiture of a matured right to a pension absent express legislative direction to that effect. ( Willens, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 458-459; Skaggs v. City of Los Angeles (1954) 43 Cal.2d 497, 503-504 [ 275 P.2d 9 ]; see Pearson v. County of Los Angeles (1957) 49 Cal.2d 523, 543-544 [ 319 P.2d 624 ].) Thus, if a plaintiff were able to prove that the right to a disabilit

2004However, as the plaintiff has correctly *206 attempted to argue throughout the CalPERS proceedings, even if an agency dismisses an employee solely for a cause unrelated to a disabling medical condition, this cannot result in the forfeiture of a matured right to a pension absent express legislative direction to that effect. ( Willens, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 458-459; Skaggs v. City of Los Angeles (1954) 43 Cal.2d 497, 503-504 [ 275 P.2d 9 ]; see Pearson v. County of Los Angeles (1957) 49 Cal.2d 523, 543-544 [ 319 P.2d 624 ].) Thus, if a plaintiff were able to prove that the right to a disabilit

2004As earlier noted, we repeatedly cautioned that our holding would not apply where the cause for dismissal was the result of a disabling medical condition, or where the dismissal would be “preemptive of an otherwise valid claim for disability retirement.” (Haywood, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307.) This caveat flows from a public agency’s obligation to apply for a disability retirement on behalf of disabled employees rather than seek to dismiss them directly on the basis of the disability (id. at p. 1305 [citing § 21153]) or indirectly through cause based on the disability (Patton v. Governing

2004As earlier noted, we repeatedly cautioned that our holding would not apply where the cause for dismissal was the result of a disabling medical condition, or where the dismissal would be “preemptive of an otherwise valid claim for disability retirement.” (Haywood, supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307.) This caveat flows from a public agency’s obligation to apply for a disability retirement on behalf of disabled employees rather than seek to dismiss them directly on the basis of the disability (id. at p. 1305 [citing § 21153]) or indirectly through cause based on the disability (Patton v. Governing

2004However, as the plaintiff has correctly *206 attempted to argue throughout the CalPERS proceedings, even if an agency dismisses an employee solely for a cause unrelated to a disabling medical condition, this cannot result in the forfeiture of a matured right to a pension absent express legislative direction to that effect. ( Willens, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 458-459; Skaggs v. City of Los Angeles (1954) 43 Cal.2d 497, 503-504 [ 275 P.2d 9 ]; see Pearson v. County of Los Angeles (1957) 49 Cal.2d 523, 543-544 [ 319 P.2d 624 ].) Thus, if a plaintiff were able to prove that the right to a disabilit

2004However, as the plaintiff has correctly *206 attempted to argue throughout the CalPERS proceedings, even if an agency dismisses an employee solely for a cause unrelated to a disabling medical condition, this cannot result in the forfeiture of a matured right to a pension absent express legislative direction to that effect. ( Willens, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 458-459; Skaggs v. City of Los Angeles (1954) 43 Cal.2d 497, 503-504 [ 275 P.2d 9 ]; see Pearson v. County of Los Angeles (1957) 49 Cal.2d 523, 543-544 [ 319 P.2d 624 ].) Thus, if a plaintiff were able to prove that the right to a disabilit

2003(Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387, 404 [ 51 L.Ed.2d 424 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 ] [prosecution has burden of establishing valid waiver of fundamental right].) Appellant claims the “close timing between the purported waiver and symptoms of obvious confusion suggests that appellant had already become mentally incompetent before he waived his right to a jury trial.” No authority supports appellant’s argument that the temporal relationship between the waiver and the first evidentiary sign of incompetence alone is sufficient to invalidate an otherwise valid waiver.

2003(Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387, 404 [ 51 L.Ed.2d 424 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 ] [prosecution has burden of establishing valid waiver of fundamental right].) Appellant claims the “close timing between the purported waiver and symptoms of obvious confusion suggests that appellant had already become mentally incompetent before he waived his right to a jury trial.” No authority supports appellant’s argument that the temporal relationship between the waiver and the first evidentiary sign of incompetence alone is sufficient to invalidate an otherwise valid waiver.

1995(See Folden v. Lobrovich *1215 (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 32, 34 [ 314 P.2d 56 ] [failure of plaintiff to file fictitious business name statement is technical defense which must be raised by defendants or is waived].) The WCJ’s order gave HRC 45 days to file a statement.

1995(See Folden v. Lobrovich *1215 (1957) 153 Cal.App.2d 32, 34 [ 314 P.2d 56 ] [failure of plaintiff to file fictitious business name statement is technical defense which must be raised by defendants or is waived].) The WCJ’s order gave HRC 45 days to file a statement.

1987In some circumstances, however, a limiting instruction is an inadequate means of protection. (5) Broadly stated, the rule of Bruton v. United States — which is rooted in the confrontation clause and accordingly governs state as well as federal prosecutions ( Roberts v. Russell (1968) 392 U.S. 293, 294 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 1100, 1102 , 88 S.Ct. 1921 ]) — declares that a nontestifying codefendant's extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant's right of confrontation and cross-examination, eve

1987In some circumstances, however, a limiting instruction is an inadequate means of protection. (5) Broadly stated, the rule of Bruton v. United States — which is rooted in the confrontation clause and accordingly governs state as well as federal prosecutions ( Roberts v. Russell (1968) 392 U.S. 293, 294 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 1100, 1102 , 88 S.Ct. 1921 ]) — declares that a nontestifying codefendant's extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant's right of confrontation and cross-examination, eve