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15 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hughes v. Glaesegreen2 sentences2005Halbe v. Weinberg, 717 N.E.2d 876, 882 (Ind.1999) (citing Hughes v. Glaese, 659 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ind.1995)). 2000See Hughes v. Glaese, 659 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ind.1995). | 3 | 3 |
Garneau v. Bushgreen2 sentences2020We agree. [23] The doctrine of fraudulent concealment is an equitable remedy that bars a defendant from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense if the defendant “prevented a plaintiff from discovering an otherwise valid claim, by violation of duty or deception.” Garneau v. Bush, 838 N.E.2d 1134, 1142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 2019Fraudulent concealment is an equitable doctrine that tolls the statute of limitations when the defendant "has prevented a plaintiff from discovering an otherwise valid claim, by violation of duty or deception." Garneau v. Bush , 838 N.E.2d 1134 , 1142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied . | 1 | 4 |
Boggs v. Tri-State Radiology, Inc.green1 sentence2020Upon a sufficient factual showing, fraudulent concealment may toll the running of the two-year limitation period in medical malpractice cases7 until either (1) the physician-patient relationship is terminated, or (2) the patient discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the physician’s alleged malpractice.8 Id. at 1141 ; see also Ind. Code § 34-11-5-1 (“If a person liable to an action conceals the fact from the knowledge of the person entitled to bring the action, the action may be brought at any time within the period of limitation after the discovery of t | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Elliotgreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 891-92 (8th Cir.2003) ("[A] defendant has the right to appeal an illegal sentence, even though there exists an otherwise valid waiver.”); United States v. Elliott, 264 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir.2001) (recognizing that "[alppellate waivers are subject to certain exceptions” and "a defendant who waives his right to appeal does not subject himself to being sentenced entirely at the whim of the district court”) (citations omitted); People v. Bottenfield, 159 P.3d 643, 645 (Colo.Ct.App.2006) (concluding "a defendant cannot waive the right to challeng | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bottenfieldgreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 891-92 (8th Cir.2003) ("[A] defendant has the right to appeal an illegal sentence, even though there exists an otherwise valid waiver.”); United States v. Elliott, 264 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir.2001) (recognizing that "[alppellate waivers are subject to certain exceptions” and "a defendant who waives his right to appeal does not subject himself to being sentenced entirely at the whim of the district court”) (citations omitted); People v. Bottenfield, 159 P.3d 643, 645 (Colo.Ct.App.2006) (concluding "a defendant cannot waive the right to challeng | 1 | 1 |
United States v. John Robert Andisgreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 891-92 (8th Cir.2003) ("[A] defendant has the right to appeal an illegal sentence, even though there exists an otherwise valid waiver.”); United States v. Elliott, 264 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir.2001) (recognizing that "[alppellate waivers are subject to certain exceptions” and "a defendant who waives his right to appeal does not subject himself to being sentenced entirely at the whim of the district court”) (citations omitted); People v. Bottenfield, 159 P.3d 643, 645 (Colo.Ct.App.2006) (concluding "a defendant cannot waive the right to challeng | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Richeygreen2 sentences2008Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273, 1282 (Ind.1999). 2008Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273, 1282 (Ind.1999). | 1 | 1 |
Halbe v. Weinberggreen1 sentence2005Halbe v. Weinberg, 717 N.E.2d 876, 882 (Ind.1999) (citing Hughes v. Glaese, 659 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ind.1995)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Equicor Development, Inc. v. Westfield-Washington Township Plan Commission
green
2 sentences2008Equicor, 758 N.E.2d at 38-39 . 2003Thus, "past weak enforcement does not invalidate an otherwise valid requirement." Id. at 39 . | 2 | 2003–2008 |
McIntosh v. Melroe Co.
green
1 sentence2019The Court held that with such limitations on available remedies, “the limitation must not be an unreasonable impediment to the exercise of an otherwise valid claim,” id. at 980 , and it is this language that Sendelweck relies on to contend that the dual- filing system under the MMA violates due process. [25] Here, in contrast to McIntosh, the statute at issue is a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose—rather than having no remedy whatsoever for an otherwise valid claim for her alleged injury, Sendelweck had a remedy available, but Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Shenefield v. Barrette
green
1 sentence2019As such, we simply cannot find that, as applied to Sendelweck, the MMA procedure for bringing her claim violated due process under McIntosh. [26] In regards to the nature of the dual-filing system itself, we reiterate the sentiment expressed by this Court in previous cases and “decline to require, or even endorse, the ‘double filing’ . . . due to the potential strategic disadvantages it entails and the duplication of effort and additional expense inherent in the double filing procedure.” Shenefield, 716 N.E.2d at 6 n.4. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Patterson v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2006He cites Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 , 108 S.Ct. 2389 , 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988) and Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) in support of this assertion. 2006He cites Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 , 108 S.Ct. 2389 , 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988) and Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) in support of this assertion. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Michigan v. Jackson
red
2 sentences2006He cites Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 , 108 S.Ct. 2389 , 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988) and Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) in support of this assertion. 2006He cites Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 , 108 S.Ct. 2389 , 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988) and Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) in support of this assertion. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc.
green
2 sentences2000As elaborated in Johnson, 273 Ind. at 396 , 404 N.E.2d at 599 , “[T]he limitation upon patient recoveries is not arbitrary and irrational, but furthers the public purposes of the Act....” In Martin , we also found a requirement that, as applied to the individual case, the limitation must not be an unreasonable impediment to the exercise of an otherwise valid claim. 2000As elaborated in Johnson, 273 Ind. at 396 , 404 N.E.2d at 599 , “[T]he limitation upon patient recoveries is not arbitrary and irrational, but furthers the public purposes of the Act....” In Martin , we also found a requirement that, as applied to the individual case, the limitation must not be an unreasonable impediment to the exercise of an otherwise valid claim. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
McClish v. Niagara MacHine & Tool Works
green
1 sentence1983Moreover, under the traditional analysis of indemnity rights in Indiana, we have no doubt that a "mere" seller under the act can claim indemnity against the previous seller who actually caused the product to be in "a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to any consumer." 7 Our analysis proceeds then in the same manner as that of McClish v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works (D.Ind.1967), 266 F.Supp. 987 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.