21 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1912–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2020See State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285, 295 , 641 A.2d 370 (1994). 2020See State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285, 295 , 641 A.2d 370 (1994). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Joynergreen2 sentences1994State v. Stanley, 223 Conn. 674, 689 , 613 A.2d 788 (1992) (refusal to review under state constitution whether state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s confession was voluntary); State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114, 126-28 , 622 A.2d 519 (1993) (defense of extreme emotional disturbance is determined from the viewpoint of a “reasonable” person in the defendant’s situation); State v. Joyner, 225 Conn. 450, 472 , 625 A.2d 791 (1993) (upholding a statute imposing on the defendant in a criminal prosecution the burden of establishing the defense of mental disease or defe 1994State v. Stanley, 223 Conn. 674, 689 , 613 A.2d 788 (1992) (refusal to review under state constitution whether state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s confession was voluntary); State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114, 126-28 , 622 A.2d 519 (1993) (defense of extreme emotional disturbance is determined from the viewpoint of a “reasonable” person in the defendant’s situation); State v. Joyner, 225 Conn. 450, 472 , 625 A.2d 791 (1993) (upholding a statute imposing on the defendant in a criminal prosecution the burden of establishing the defense of mental disease or defe | 1 | 3 |
State v. Ortizgreen2 sentences1994General Statutes § 53a-12 (b) provides: “When a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” The defendant was hospitalized at Whiting from March 2, 1989, until August 1, 1989. “[T]he determination of the reasonableness of the explanation or excuse for the emotional disturbance must be measured from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.” State v. Steiger, supra, 218 Conn. 385 ; see 1994General Statutes § 53a-12 (b) provides: “When a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” The defendant was hospitalized at Whiting from March 2, 1989, until August 1, 1989. “[T]he determination of the reasonableness of the explanation or excuse for the emotional disturbance must be measured from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.” State v. Steiger, supra, 218 Conn. 385 ; see | 1 | 2 |
State v. Zdanisgreen2 sentences2021Paramount among these is that, because insanity is an affirmative defense, the defendant bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that, as a result of his psychotic condition at the time of the offense, he ‘‘lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect . . . to control his conduct within the requirements of the law.’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-13 (a); see also General Statutes § 53a-12 (b) (‘‘[w]hen a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a prep 2021Paramount among these is that, because insanity is an affirmative defense, the defendant bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that, as a result of his psychotic condition at the time of the offense, he ‘‘lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect . . . to control his conduct within the requirements of the law.’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-13 (a); see also General Statutes § 53a-12 (b) (‘‘[w]hen a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a prep | 1 | 1 |
Marshall v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence2021Paramount among these is that, because insanity is an affirmative defense, the defendant bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that, as a result of his psychotic condition at the time of the offense, he ‘‘lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect . . . to control his conduct within the requirements of the law.’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-13 (a); see also General Statutes § 53a-12 (b) (‘‘[w]hen a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a prep | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Overberggreen1 sentence2021Paramount among these is that, because insanity is an affirmative defense, the defendant bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence that, as a result of his psychotic condition at the time of the offense, he ‘‘lacked substantial capacity, as a result of mental disease or defect . . . to control his conduct within the requirements of the law.’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 53a-13 (a); see also General Statutes § 53a-12 (b) (‘‘[w]hen a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a prep | 1 | 1 |
State v. Littlejohngreen2 sentences2000See State v. Littlejohn, 199 Conn. 631, 640 , 508 A.2d 1376 (1986) (concluding that statute of limitation was affirmative defense to crime notwithstanding legislature’s failure expressly to declare it affirmative defense). 2000See State v. Littlejohn, 199 Conn. 631, 640 , 508 A.2d 1376 (1986) (concluding that statute of limitation was affirmative defense to crime notwithstanding legislature’s failure expressly to declare it affirmative defense). | 1 | 1 |
State v. DeJesusgreen2 sentences1996See State v. DeJesus, 194 Conn. 376 , 481 A.2d 1277 (1984). 1996See State v. DeJesus, 194 Conn. 376 , 481 A.2d 1277 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Drskagreen2 sentences1991The court further concluded that the defendant had not sustained the burden of establishing her claim of adverse possession of the land by clear and positive proof as required by law; see Clark v. Drska, 1 Conn. App. 481, 484 , 473 A.2d 325 (1984); and rendered judgment for the plaintiffs. 1991The court further concluded that the defendant had not sustained the burden of establishing her claim of adverse possession of the land by clear and positive proof as required by law; see Clark v. Drska, 1 Conn. App. 481, 484 , 473 A.2d 325 (1984); and rendered judgment for the plaintiffs. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
North Carolina v. Butler
red
2 sentences1986The state bears the burden of establishing waiver; North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-73 , 99 S. Ct. 1755 , 60 L. 1986The state bears the burden of establishing waiver; North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-73 , 99 S. Ct. 1755 , 60 L. | 2 | 1986–2015 |
State v. Elliott
green
2 sentences2007“A homicide influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance ... is not one which is necessarily committed in the ‘hot blood’ stage, but rather one that was brought about by a significant mental trauma that caused the defendant to brood for a long period of time and then react violently, seemingly without provocation.” State v. Elliott, 177 Conn. 1, 7-8 , 411 A.2d 3 (1979). 2007“A homicide influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance ... is not one which is necessarily committed in the ‘hot blood’ stage, but rather one that was brought about by a significant mental trauma that caused the defendant to brood for a long period of time and then react violently, seemingly without provocation.” State v. Elliott, 177 Conn. 1, 7-8 , 411 A.2d 3 (1979). | 2 | 1998–2007 |
State v. Rutan
green
2 sentences1994He advocates, therefore, that we abandon the so-called “waiver rule,” announced in State v. Rutan, 194 Conn. 438, 440 , 479 A.2d 1209 (1984), which provides that if the defendant elects to introduce evidence after the trial court denies his motion for a judgment of acquittal, appellate review “encompasses the evidence in toto,” including evidence introduced by the defendant. 1994He advocates, therefore, that we abandon the so-called “waiver rule,” announced in State v. Rutan, 194 Conn. 438, 440 , 479 A.2d 1209 (1984), which provides that if the defendant elects to introduce evidence after the trial court denies his motion for a judgment of acquittal, appellate review “encompasses the evidence in toto,” including evidence introduced by the defendant. | 2 | 1993–1994 |
State v. Stanley
green
2 sentences1994State v. Stanley, 223 Conn. 674, 689 , 613 A.2d 788 (1992) (refusal to review under state constitution whether state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s confession was voluntary); State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114, 126-28 , 622 A.2d 519 (1993) (defense of extreme emotional disturbance is determined from the viewpoint of a “reasonable” person in the defendant’s situation); State v. Joyner, 225 Conn. 450, 472 , 625 A.2d 791 (1993) (upholding a statute imposing on the defendant in a criminal prosecution the burden of establishing the defense of mental disease or defe 1994State v. Stanley, 223 Conn. 674, 689 , 613 A.2d 788 (1992) (refusal to review under state constitution whether state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s confession was voluntary); State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114, 126-28 , 622 A.2d 519 (1993) (defense of extreme emotional disturbance is determined from the viewpoint of a “reasonable” person in the defendant’s situation); State v. Joyner, 225 Conn. 450, 472 , 625 A.2d 791 (1993) (upholding a statute imposing on the defendant in a criminal prosecution the burden of establishing the defense of mental disease or defe | 2 | 1993–1994 |
State v. Raguseo
green
2 sentences1994State v. Stanley, 223 Conn. 674, 689 , 613 A.2d 788 (1992) (refusal to review under state constitution whether state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s confession was voluntary); State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114, 126-28 , 622 A.2d 519 (1993) (defense of extreme emotional disturbance is determined from the viewpoint of a “reasonable” person in the defendant’s situation); State v. Joyner, 225 Conn. 450, 472 , 625 A.2d 791 (1993) (upholding a statute imposing on the defendant in a criminal prosecution the burden of establishing the defense of mental disease or defe 1994State v. Stanley, 223 Conn. 674, 689 , 613 A.2d 788 (1992) (refusal to review under state constitution whether state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s confession was voluntary); State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114, 126-28 , 622 A.2d 519 (1993) (defense of extreme emotional disturbance is determined from the viewpoint of a “reasonable” person in the defendant’s situation); State v. Joyner, 225 Conn. 450, 472 , 625 A.2d 791 (1993) (upholding a statute imposing on the defendant in a criminal prosecution the burden of establishing the defense of mental disease or defe | 2 | 1993–1994 |
State v. Gibson
green
1 sentence2017A homicide influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance ... is not one which is necessarily committed in the hot blood stage, but rather one that was brought about by a significant mental trauma that caused the defendant to brood for a long period of time and then react violently, seemingly without provocation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cannon , 165 Conn.App. 324 , 333-34, 138 A.3d 1139 , cert. denied, 321 Conn. 924 , 138 A.3d 285 (2016). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Doyle Grp. v. Alaskans for Cuddy
green
1 sentence2017A homicide influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance ... is not one which is necessarily committed in the hot blood stage, but rather one that was brought about by a significant mental trauma that caused the defendant to brood for a long period of time and then react violently, seemingly without provocation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cannon , 165 Conn.App. 324 , 333-34, 138 A.3d 1139 , cert. denied, 321 Conn. 924 , 138 A.3d 285 (2016). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Cannon
green
2 sentences2017A homicide influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance ... is not one which is necessarily committed in the hot blood stage, but rather one that was brought about by a significant mental trauma that caused the defendant to brood for a long period of time and then react violently, seemingly without provocation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cannon , 165 Conn.App. 324 , 333-34, 138 A.3d 1139 , cert. denied, 321 Conn. 924 , 138 A.3d 285 (2016). 2017A homicide influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance ... is not one which is necessarily committed in the hot blood stage, but rather one that was brought about by a significant mental trauma that caused the defendant to brood for a long period of time and then react violently, seemingly without provocation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Cannon , 165 Conn.App. 324 , 333-34, 138 A.3d 1139 , cert. denied, 321 Conn. 924 , 138 A.3d 285 (2016). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Holloway v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2007As stated previously, pursuant to § 53a-12 (b) “[w]hen a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” The defendant urges us to follow our line of reasoning in State v. Ortiz, 71 Conn. App. 865, 874-77 , 804 A.2d 937 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 942 , 808 A.2d 1136 (2002), in which we held that it was plain error for the court to have failed to instruct on a defense that was written into the criminal statute. 2007Id., 874-77 & 874 n.3. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Ortiz
green
1 sentence2007As stated previously, pursuant to § 53a-12 (b) “[w]hen a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” The defendant urges us to follow our line of reasoning in State v. Ortiz, 71 Conn. App. 865, 874-77 , 804 A.2d 937 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 942 , 808 A.2d 1136 (2002), in which we held that it was plain error for the court to have failed to instruct on a defense that was written into the criminal statute. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Ortiz
green
2 sentences2007As stated previously, pursuant to § 53a-12 (b) “[w]hen a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” The defendant urges us to follow our line of reasoning in State v. Ortiz, 71 Conn. App. 865, 874-77 , 804 A.2d 937 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 942 , 808 A.2d 1136 (2002), in which we held that it was plain error for the court to have failed to instruct on a defense that was written into the criminal statute. 2007As stated previously, pursuant to § 53a-12 (b) “[w]hen a defense declared to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” The defendant urges us to follow our line of reasoning in State v. Ortiz, 71 Conn. App. 865, 874-77 , 804 A.2d 937 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 942 , 808 A.2d 1136 (2002), in which we held that it was plain error for the court to have failed to instruct on a defense that was written into the criminal statute. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Moore v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
green
1 sentence2001Exchange, 111 Ill. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Person
green
2 sentences2000Rather, the text of § 53a-12 (b) logically can be interpreted to mean simply that a “defendant bears the burden of proof of an affirmative defense . . . .” State v. Person, 236 Conn. 342, 353 , 673 A.2d 463 (1996). 2000Rather, the text of § 53a-12 (b) logically can be interpreted to mean simply that a “defendant bears the burden of proof of an affirmative defense . . . .” State v. Person, 236 Conn. 342, 353 , 673 A.2d 463 (1996). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Lopinto v. Haines
green
2 sentences1994The defendant argues that, as a matter of statutory interpretation of § 53a-32, the state must /meet the burden of establishing a violation of probation by the fair preponderance of the evidence pre sented at the revocation hearing. 6 The fair preponderance standard requires that the “evidence induc[e] in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that it is more probable than otherwise that the fact in issue is true.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopinto v. Haines, 185 Conn. 527, 533 , 441 A.2d 151 (1981). 1994The defendant argues that, as a matter of statutory interpretation of § 53a-32, the state must /meet the burden of establishing a violation of probation by the fair preponderance of the evidence pre sented at the revocation hearing. 6 The fair preponderance standard requires that the “evidence induc[e] in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that it is more probable than otherwise that the fact in issue is true.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lopinto v. Haines, 185 Conn. 527, 533 , 441 A.2d 151 (1981). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Pecoraro
green
2 sentences1986Ed. 2d 286 (1979); State v. Pecoraro, 198 Conn. 203, 207-208 , 502 A.2d 396 (1985); State v. Wilson, 183 Conn. 280, 284-86 , 439 A.2d 330 (1981); and we do not believe that the presumption against waiver can be overcome by the showing that a request for counsel was made “without urgency,” or that it was motivated by “military connections” or by any other reason not directly related to a fear of prosecution. 1986Ed. 2d 286 (1979); State v. Pecoraro, 198 Conn. 203, 207-208 , 502 A.2d 396 (1985); State v. Wilson, 183 Conn. 280, 284-86 , 439 A.2d 330 (1981); and we do not believe that the presumption against waiver can be overcome by the showing that a request for counsel was made “without urgency,” or that it was motivated by “military connections” or by any other reason not directly related to a fear of prosecution. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1986Ed. 2d 286 (1979); State v. Pecoraro, 198 Conn. 203, 207-208 , 502 A.2d 396 (1985); State v. Wilson, 183 Conn. 280, 284-86 , 439 A.2d 330 (1981); and we do not believe that the presumption against waiver can be overcome by the showing that a request for counsel was made “without urgency,” or that it was motivated by “military connections” or by any other reason not directly related to a fear of prosecution. 1986Ed. 2d 286 (1979); State v. Pecoraro, 198 Conn. 203, 207-208 , 502 A.2d 396 (1985); State v. Wilson, 183 Conn. 280, 284-86 , 439 A.2d 330 (1981); and we do not believe that the presumption against waiver can be overcome by the showing that a request for counsel was made “without urgency,” or that it was motivated by “military connections” or by any other reason not directly related to a fear of prosecution. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Credit Co. v. Howe Machine Co.
green
2 sentences1912Credit Co. v. Howe Machine Co., 54 Conn. 357, 381 , 8 Atl. 472 . 1912Credit Co. v. Howe Machine Co., 54 Conn. 357, 381 , 8 Atl. 472 . | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.