definitive test in Illinois

2021However, in Barker, our supreme court found that “[g]ood practice requires that there be a definitive standard by which a knowing and understanding waiver of counsel in a probation revocation proceeding may be determined.” Barker, 62 Ill. 2d at 59 .

2021The Barker court then set forth requirements largely paralleling the requirements of Rule 401(a): “The circuit court should not permit the offender to waive counsel unless it determines, by addressing him in open court, that the offender understands: (1) the purpose of the revocation proceeding and the nature of the violation of the condition of probation upon which it is based; (2) that he has the right of confrontation, cross-examination and representation by counsel and that if he is indigent he has the right to appointed counsel; [and] (3) the minimum and maximum sentence which may be impo

2015App. 2014) (finding “Williams does not provide a definitive test for determining when a statement is to be deemed testimonial” and, accordingly, applying pre-Williams confrontation clause law); State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2014) (finding Williams provides little guidance and is of uncertain precedential value); State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d 648, 666 (N.J. 2014) (finding “Williams’s force, as precedent, at best unclear” and, accordingly, applying pre-Williams confrontation clause law); Jenkins v. United States, 75 A.3d 174, 184 (D.C. 2013) (noting that Williams “has not provided any clarit

2015App. 2014) (finding “Williams does not provide a definitive test for determining when a statement is to be deemed testimonial” and, accordingly, applying pre-Williams confrontation clause law); State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2014) (finding Williams provides little guidance and is of uncertain precedential value); State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d 648, 666 (N.J. 2014) (finding “Williams’s force, as precedent, at best unclear” and, accordingly, applying pre-Williams confrontation clause law); Jenkins v. United States, 75 A.3d 174, 184 (D.C. 2013) (noting that Williams “has not provided any clarit

2015App. 2014) (finding “Williams does not provide a definitive test for determining when a statement is to be deemed testimonial” and, accordingly, applying pre-Williams confrontation clause law); State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2014) (finding Williams provides little guidance and is of uncertain precedential value); State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d 648, 666 (N.J. 2014) (finding “Williams’s force, as precedent, at best unclear” and, accordingly, applying pre-Williams confrontation clause law); Jenkins v. United States, 75 A.3d 174, 184 (D.C. 2013) (noting that Williams “has not provided any clarit

2015App. 2014) (finding “Williams does not provide a definitive test for determining when a statement is to be deemed testimonial” and, accordingly, applying pre-Williams confrontation clause law); State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2014) (finding Williams provides little guidance and is of uncertain precedential value); State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d 648, 666 (N.J. 2014) (finding “Williams’s force, as precedent, at best unclear” and, accordingly, applying pre-Williams confrontation clause law); Jenkins v. United States, 75 A.3d 174, 184 (D.C. 2013) (noting that Williams “has not provided any clarit

1975In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419, 430 , 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2614 , the United States Supreme Court established a definitive test for State regulation of pornography.

1975In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 , 37 L.Ed.2d 419, 430 , 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2614 , the United States Supreme Court established a definitive test for State regulation of pornography.

2012Id.

2012App. 3d 207 , 887 N.E.2d 451 (2008), where we stated as follows: “Long-standing authority in Illinois has held that a common carrier is ‘one who undertakes for the public to transport from place to place such persons or the goods of such as choose to employ him for hire.’ [Citations.] A common carrier ‘undertakes for hire to carry all persons indifferently who may apply for passage so long as there is room and there is no legal excuse for refusal.’ [Citations.] The definitive test to be employed to determine if a carrier is a common carrier is whether the carrier serves all of the public alike

2012App. 3d 207 , 887 N.E.2d 451 (2008), where we stated as follows: “Long-standing authority in Illinois has held that a common carrier is ‘one who undertakes for the public to transport from place to place such persons or the goods of such as choose to employ him for hire.’ [Citations.] A common carrier ‘undertakes for hire to carry all persons indifferently who may apply for passage so long as there is room and there is no legal excuse for refusal.’ [Citations.] The definitive test to be employed to determine if a carrier is a common carrier is whether the carrier serves all of the public alike

2011This test was used by a unanimous court as the definitive analysis under section 6(a) in Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 176 (1992), Village of Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois, 158 Ill. 2d 133, 139 (1994), and Schillerstrom Homes, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 198 Ill. 2d 281, 290 (2001).

2011This test was used by a unanimous court as the definitive analysis under section 6(a) in Scadron v. City of Des Plaines, 153 Ill. 2d 164, 176 (1992), Village of Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois, 158 Ill. 2d 133, 139 (1994), and Schillerstrom Homes, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 198 Ill. 2d 281, 290 (2001).

1997Beatrice Creamery Co., 291 Ill.

1995App. 3d 310, 315 , 476 N.E.2d 1266, 1270 .) No Illinois court has adopted a definitive test for determining whether an action is collateral.

1994App. 3d 880 , 422 N.E.2d 127 , where two bags of suspected heroin weighing 19.35 grams and 15.32 grams were seized, but the police chemist testified he subjected a portion of the contents of only one bag to a definitive test.

1994Likewise, in People v. Games (1981), 94 Ill.

1990The definitive test on the constitutional doctrine of double jeopardy is stated in Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299 , 76 L.

1990The definitive test on the constitutional doctrine of double jeopardy is stated in Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299 , 76 L.

1990Consider the following portion of the holding in Watt: “Whenever the locus in quo of the offense can be precisely identified, under the provisions of the section of the statute first above quoted, the trial should of course be had in the county where it was committed, but when such is not the case a somewhat different rule must be applied or the offender can not be tried at all. *** If he can not be so tried the law is powerless to punish him.” (Emphasis added.) Watt, 126 Ill. at 17 , 18 N.E. at 343 .

1990Consider the following portion of the holding in Watt: “Whenever the locus in quo of the offense can be precisely identified, under the provisions of the section of the statute first above quoted, the trial should of course be had in the county where it was committed, but when such is not the case a somewhat different rule must be applied or the offender can not be tried at all. *** If he can not be so tried the law is powerless to punish him.” (Emphasis added.) Watt, 126 Ill. at 17 , 18 N.E. at 343 .

1989Cir.1981), 670 F.2d 1051 , a definitive test has been applied to "Exemption 2" regarding personnel rules and practices of an agency.

1989Cir. 1981), 670 F.2d 1051 , a definitive test has been applied to “Exemption 2” regarding personnel rules and practices of an agency.

1989(See Board of Directors, Green Hills Country Club v. Human Rights Comm’n (1987), 162 Ill.

1987Ed. 2d 49 , 106 S. Ct. 2399 , the Supreme Court, while declining to issue a definitive rule on employer liability, rejected the strict liability standard, holding that in “hostile environment” sex discrimination cases it was an error to disregard entirely agency principles and impose strict liability on employers for acts of their supervisors absent knowledge on the part of the employer. 477 U.S. 57, 73 , 91 L.

1987Ed. 2d 49 , 106 S. Ct. 2399 , the Supreme Court, while declining to issue a definitive rule on employer liability, rejected the strict liability standard, holding that in “hostile environment” sex discrimination cases it was an error to disregard entirely agency principles and impose strict liability on employers for acts of their supervisors absent knowledge on the part of the employer. 477 U.S. 57, 73 , 91 L.

1977The circuit court should not permit the offender to waive counsel unless it determines, by addressing him in open court, that the offender understands: (1) the purpose of the revocation proceeding and the nature of the violation of the condition of probation upon which it is based; (2) that he has the right of confrontation, cross-examination and representation by counsel and that if he is indigent he has the right to appointed counsel; (3) the minimum and maximum sentence which may be imposed if the probation is revoked.” ( 62 Ill. 2d 57, 59 , 338 N.E.2d 385, 387 .) The supreme court in Peopl