definitive test in Georgia

1997Co. v. Forrester, 230 Ga. 182, 183 ( 196 SE2d 133 ) (1973).

1997Co. v. Forrester, 230 Ga. 182, 183 ( 196 SE2d 133 ) (1973).

1975This is pointed out in Mauldin v. Sheffer, 113 Ga. App. 874, 877 ( 150 SE2d 150 ) where it is said that 'Generally, a mere breach of a valid contract amounting to no more than a failure to perform in accordance with its terms does not constitute a tort. . .’ In discussing the difficulty of formulating a definitive rule workable upon application to all cases, our court there concluded at p. 879 that 'one clear distinction seems to have been made which *663 is indicative of the scope and application of the rule, and that is the distinction between nonfeasance or the mere failure to perform the c

1975This is pointed out in Mauldin v. Sheffer, 113 Ga. App. 874, 877 ( 150 SE2d 150 ) where it is said that 'Generally, a mere breach of a valid contract amounting to no more than a failure to perform in accordance with its terms does not constitute a tort. . .’ In discussing the difficulty of formulating a definitive rule workable upon application to all cases, our court there concluded at p. 879 that 'one clear distinction seems to have been made which *663 is indicative of the scope and application of the rule, and that is the distinction between nonfeasance or the mere failure to perform the c

2024Compare Daddario v. State, 307 Ga. 179, 186 (2) (a) ( 835 SE2d 181 ) (2019) (focusing on “natural and continuous sequence” definition) with Hood v. State, 303 Ga. 420, 422 (1) (b) ( 811 SE2d 392 ) (2018) (focusing on descriptions Jackson sourced from Durden and Jones).

2024Compare Daddario v. State, 307 Ga. 179, 186 (2) (a) ( 835 SE2d 181 ) (2019) (focusing on “natural and continuous sequence” definition) with Hood v. State, 303 Ga. 420, 422 (1) (b) ( 811 SE2d 392 ) (2018) (focusing on descriptions Jackson sourced from Durden and Jones).

2024Compare Daddario v. State, 307 Ga. 179, 186 (2) (a) ( 835 SE2d 181 ) (2019) (focusing on “natural and continuous sequence” definition) with Hood v. State, 303 Ga. 420, 422 (1) (b) ( 811 SE2d 392 ) (2018) (focusing on descriptions Jackson sourced from Durden and Jones).

2008See, e.g., Maryland v. Stouffer, 352 Md. 97 , 721 A.2d 207, 215 (1998); Faison v. Florida, 426 So.2d 963, 965-966 (Fla.1983); Kansas v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203 , 547 P.2d 720, 730-731 (1976). [7] Though we recognize that Garza has not explicitly challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation as to J.M., because we granted certiorari on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation generally, our adoption of a new legal standard for asportation compels a fresh assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence thereof as to J.M.

2008See, e.g., Maryland v. Stouffer, 352 Md. 97 , 721 A.2d 207, 215 (1998); Faison v. Florida, 426 So.2d 963, 965-966 (Fla.1983); Kansas v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203 , 547 P.2d 720, 730-731 (1976). [7] Though we recognize that Garza has not explicitly challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation as to J.M., because we granted certiorari on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation generally, our adoption of a new legal standard for asportation compels a fresh assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence thereof as to J.M.

2008See also Hurd v. Alaska, 22 P.3d 12, 19, n. 27 (Alaska Ct.App.2001) (citing Berry factors favorably); Tennessee v. Cozart, 54 S.W.3d 242, 245 (Tenn.2001) (citing Berry favorably); Colorado v. Bell, 809 P.2d 1026 (V) (Colo. Ct.App.1990) (citing Berry in reversing kidnapping conviction). [5] Though the dissent discounts the Berry test as not having been widely adopted by other federal circuits, we embrace the Berry test, as have other state courts, see note 4, supra, not because it is universally or even predominantly accepted as the definitive test for asportation but rather because we find tha

2008See, e.g., Maryland v. Stouffer, 352 Md. 97 , 721 A.2d 207, 215 (1998); Faison v. Florida, 426 So.2d 963, 965-966 (Fla.1983); Kansas v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203 , 547 P.2d 720, 730-731 (1976). [7] Though we recognize that Garza has not explicitly challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation as to J.M., because we granted certiorari on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation generally, our adoption of a new legal standard for asportation compels a fresh assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence thereof as to J.M.

2008See, e.g., Maryland v. Stouffer, 352 Md. 97 , 721 A.2d 207, 215 (1998); Faison v. Florida, 426 So.2d 963, 965-966 (Fla.1983); Kansas v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203 , 547 P.2d 720, 730-731 (1976). [7] Though we recognize that Garza has not explicitly challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation as to J.M., because we granted certiorari on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation generally, our adoption of a new legal standard for asportation compels a fresh assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence thereof as to J.M.

2008See, e.g., Maryland v. Stouffer, 352 Md. 97 , 721 A.2d 207, 215 (1998); Faison v. Florida, 426 So.2d 963, 965-966 (Fla.1983); Kansas v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203 , 547 P.2d 720, 730-731 (1976). [7] Though we recognize that Garza has not explicitly challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation as to J.M., because we granted certiorari on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence of asportation generally, our adoption of a new legal standard for asportation compels a fresh assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence thereof as to J.M.

2008See also Hurd v. Alaska, 22 P.3d 12, 19, n. 27 (Alaska Ct.App.2001) (citing Berry factors favorably); Tennessee v. Cozart, 54 S.W.3d 242, 245 (Tenn.2001) (citing Berry favorably); Colorado v. Bell, 809 P.2d 1026 (V) (Colo. Ct.App.1990) (citing Berry in reversing kidnapping conviction). [5] Though the dissent discounts the Berry test as not having been widely adopted by other federal circuits, we embrace the Berry test, as have other state courts, see note 4, supra, not because it is universally or even predominantly accepted as the definitive test for asportation but rather because we find tha

1987The definitive test for determining whether an individual is a public figure was established in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (94 SC 2997, 41 LE2d 789); see Hemenway v. Blanchard, 163 Ga. App. 668, 670 (1) ( 294 SE2d 603 ) (1982).

1987The definitive test for determining whether an individual is a public figure was established in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (94 SC 2997, 41 LE2d 789); see Hemenway v. Blanchard, 163 Ga. App. 668, 670 (1) ( 294 SE2d 603 ) (1982).

1975As to the former of these the cases have fairly consistently held that it affords no basis for an action ex delicto, even though the failure to perform may have been characterized as negligent [cits.], while in the latter a cause of action ex delicto may be had. [Cit.]’ ” See also the discussion and citations in Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 293, 294 (2) ( 217 SE2d 602 ).

1975As to the former of these the cases have fairly consistently held that it affords no basis for an action ex delicto, even though the failure to perform may have been characterized as negligent [cits.], while in the latter a cause of action ex delicto may be had. [Cit.]’ ” See also the discussion and citations in Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 293, 294 (2) ( 217 SE2d 602 ).