definitive standard (Florida) · Go Syfert
← Florida issues

definitive standard in Florida

14 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1959–2025 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

CaseFollowedCited
Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Districtred
cal · 1961 · cited in 3 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1979–1995
2 sentences

1995In addition, however, when the Evangelical test leaves the issue in doubt, we have adopted the framework articulated in Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School District, 55 Cal.2d 224 , 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 , 359 P.2d 465, 467 (1961), for further analysis: Although it may not be possible to set forth a definitive rule which would determine in every instance whether a governmental *914 agency is liable for discretionary acts of its officials, various factors furnish a means of deciding whether the agency in a particular case should have immunity, such as the importance to the public of the function in

1995In addition, however, when the Evangelical test leaves the issue in doubt, we have adopted the framework articulated in Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School District, 55 Cal.2d 224 , 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 , 359 P.2d 465, 467 (1961), for further analysis: Although it may not be possible to set forth a definitive rule which would determine in every instance whether a governmental *914 agency is liable for discretionary acts of its officials, various factors furnish a means of deciding whether the agency in a particular case should have immunity, such as the importance to the public of the function in

23
Miracle House Corporation v. Haigegreen
fla · 1957 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017In other words, the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof, or a claim to, or lien upon, the property or some part thereof, which is the subject of litigation.” Miracle House Corp. v. Haige, 96 So.2d 417, 418 (Fla. 1957) (quoting Morgareidge v. Howey, 75 Fla. 234 , 78 So. 14, 15 (1918)).

11
Smith v. O'Briengreen
fla · 1918 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017In other words, the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof, or a claim to, or lien upon, the property or some part thereof, which is the subject of litigation.” Miracle House Corp. v. Haige, 96 So.2d 417, 418 (Fla. 1957) (quoting Morgareidge v. Howey, 75 Fla. 234 , 78 So. 14, 15 (1918)).

11
Cornelius Cooper v. Southern Companygreen
ca11 · 2004 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
1 sentence

2008While the Court did not adopt a definitive standard for reviewing qualification evidence, it cited with approval Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004), where the court stated that "disparities in qualifications must be of such weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff for the job in question." Other courts have required a plaintiff's qualifications to be "clearly superior" to those of the selected employee.

11
Jones v. Stategreen
fla · 1998 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
1 sentence

2000These statements are in conflict with the definitive standard we set forth in Jones II, in which we held, as stated, that newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it " would probably produce an acquittal on retrial." 709 So.2d at 521 (emphasis added).

11
Carn v. Mooregreen
fla · 1917 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984
2 sentences

1984Smith v. Burbridge, 24 Fla. 112, 130 , 3 So. 869 , 877 (1888), where the Court held that the "disposition and duty of courts are to sustain popular elections whenever they have been free and fair, and it is clear that the voters have not been deprived of their right to vote, and the result has not been changed by irregularity." A more definitive standard was stated in Carn v. Moore, 74 Fla. 77, 88-89 , 76 So. 337, 340 (1917): "Republics regard the elective franchise as sacred, and the courts should not set aside an election because some official has not complied with the law governing election

1984Smith v. Burbridge, 24 Fla. 112, 130 , 3 So. 869 , 877 (1888), where the Court held that the "disposition and duty of courts are to sustain popular elections whenever they have been free and fair, and it is clear that the voters have not been deprived of their right to vote, and the result has not been changed by irregularity." A more definitive standard was stated in Carn v. Moore, 74 Fla. 77, 88-89 , 76 So. 337, 340 (1917): "Republics regard the elective franchise as sacred, and the courts should not set aside an election because some official has not complied with the law governing election

11
Marler v. Board of Public Instruction of Okaloosa County ex rel. South Okaloosa Elementary School Special Tax Districtgreen
fla · 1967 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1984–1984
1 sentence

1984Smith v. Burbridge, 24 Fla. 112, 130 , 3 So. 869 , 877 (1888), where the Court held that the "disposition and duty of courts are to sustain popular elections whenever they have been free and fair, and it is clear that the voters have not been deprived of their right to vote, and the result has not been changed by irregularity." A more definitive standard was stated in Carn v. Moore, 74 Fla. 77, 88-89 , 76 So. 337, 340 (1917): "Republics regard the elective franchise as sacred, and the courts should not set aside an election because some official has not complied with the law governing election

11
Brown v. Stanwick Intern., Inc.green
fladistctapp · 1979 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
1 sentence

1982Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959); 2 accord, Beard v. Shell Oil Co., 606 F.2d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1979); Brown v. Stanwick International, Inc., 367 So.2d 241, 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

11
Beard v. Shell Oil Companygreen
ca5 · 1979 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
1 sentence

1982Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959); 2 accord, Beard v. Shell Oil Co., 606 F.2d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1979); Brown v. Stanwick International, Inc., 367 So.2d 241, 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

11
cluster 248059green
ca5 · 1959 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1982–1982
1 sentence

1982Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959); 2 accord, Beard v. Shell Oil Co., 606 F.2d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1979); Brown v. Stanwick International, Inc., 367 So.2d 241, 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cty. green
fla · 1979
2 sentences

1995Commercial Carrier, 371 So.2d at 1021 . [7] We believe this framework is particularly helpful for resolution of this case.

1982From Johnson we learn that that court's analysis is predicated primarily upon "policy considerations" (see Commercial Carrier, supra, 371 So.2d at 1021 ); that it may not be possible to set forth a definitive rule which will determine in every instance whether a governmental agency is liable for discretionary acts of its officials; but nevertheless, there are various factors which furnish a means of deciding whether the agency in a particular case "should have immunity," such as: The importance to the public of the function involved, the extent to which government liability might impair free e

21982–1995
Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty. green
scotus · 1968
1 sentence

2025Id. at 569 .

12025–2025
Morgareidge v. Howey green
fla · 1918
1 sentence

2017In other words, the interest must be that created by a claim to the demand in suit or some part thereof, or a claim to, or lien upon, the property or some part thereof, which is the subject of litigation.” Miracle House Corp. v. Haige, 96 So.2d 417, 418 (Fla. 1957) (quoting Morgareidge v. Howey, 75 Fla. 234 , 78 So. 14, 15 (1918)).

12017–2017
Jones v. State green
fla · 1991
1 sentence

2000In Jones II, we further explained that to reach the conclusion as to the probable acquittal on retrial, [T]he trial court is required to "consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible" at trial and then evaluate the "weight of both the newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at the trial." [ Jones I, 591 So.2d at 916 .] In considering the second prong, the trial court should initially consider whether the evidence would have been admissible at trial or whether there would have been any evidentiary bars to its admissibility.

12000–2000
Wood v. State green
fladistctapp · 1991
1 sentence

1993Even so, I would remand for resentenc-ing rather than merely strike almost a third of this “object lesson” sentence 1 and direct the trial court to resentence under the principles announced in Wood v. State, 582 So.2d 751 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). .

11993–1993
Harris v. Tyson green
fladistctapp · 1972
1 sentence

1992Id. at 393 .

11992–1992
Faison v. State green
fla · 1983
1 sentence

1987The supreme court in Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963 (Fla. 1983), adopted a definitive test for determining whether the confinement or movement of a victim is sufficient to support a conviction for kidnapping in addition to the primary offense charged.

11987–1987
Faircloth v. Faircloth green
fla · 1976
2 sentences

1985The Florida Supreme Court, in Faircloth v. Faircloth, 339 So.2d 650 (Fla. 1976) established the definitive standard by which the propriety of a contempt finding is to be judged: [A] trial judge must make an affirmative finding that either (1) the petitioner presently has the ability to comply with the order and willfully refuses to do so, or (2) that the petitioner previously had the ability to comply, but divested himself of that ability through his fault or neglect designed to frustrate the intent and purpose of the order.

1985Faircloth, 339 So.2d at 651 .

11985–1985
State ex rel. Smith v. Burbridge neutral
fla · 1888
1 sentence

1984Smith v. Burbridge, 24 Fla. 112, 130 , 3 So. 869 , 877 (1888), where the Court held that the "disposition and duty of courts are to sustain popular elections whenever they have been free and fair, and it is clear that the voters have not been deprived of their right to vote, and the result has not been changed by irregularity." A more definitive standard was stated in Carn v. Moore, 74 Fla. 77, 88-89 , 76 So. 337, 340 (1917): "Republics regard the elective franchise as sacred, and the courts should not set aside an election because some official has not complied with the law governing election

11984–1984
Johnson v. State of California green
cal · 1968
1 sentence

1982Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School District, 55 Cal.2d 224 , 11 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 , 359 P.2d 465, at 467 , quoted in Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d at 357 .

11982–1982
Roth v. United States green
scotus · 1957
2 sentences

1959By way of guide-posts, the court held firmly to the definitive standard approved in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 , 77 S. Ct. 1304 , 1 L.

1959By way of guide-posts, the court held firmly to the definitive standard approved in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 , 77 S. Ct. 1304 , 1 L.

11959–1959

Statutes the citing opinions construe

FL § 768.28 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 58 (1965–2025) NC 32 (1997–2022) IL 21 (1975–2021) TX 21 (1993–2025) PA 18 (1984–2024) MD 17 (1978–2025) MI 15 (1959–2008) FL 14 (1959–2025) WA 11 (1940–2013) OH 10 (1994–2025) AZ 9 (2002–2025) MN 8 (1970–2019) LA 8 (1954–2018) MO 8 (1947–2004) NY 8 (1965–2014) WY 7 (1979–2015) MA 7 (1987–2025) GA 7 (1974–2024) NM 7 (1963–2016) NJ 6 (1956–2025) KS 6 (1976–2024) RI 6 (1986–2022) IA 6 (1974–2017) AL 6 (1957–2023) OR 6 (1970–2013) CO 4 (1994–2020) VT 4 (1995–2016) ID 4 (1956–1967) WI 4 (1986–2014) HI 4 (1946–1996) ND 3 (2011–2022) KY 3 (1955–2022) TN 3 (2013–2015) MT 3 (1973–2018) IN 3 (1977–2010) DE 3 (1979–2015) AK 3 (1990–1999) MS 3 (1979–2019) DC 3 (1985–2024) SD 2 (1996–2023) SC 2 (1991–2009) NE 2 (1956–1995) ME 2 (1996–2013)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check