definitive inquiry (North Carolina) · Go Syfert
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definitive inquiry in North Carolina

32 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2022 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (15)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Buchanangreen
nc · 2001 · cited in 10 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2001–2009
2 sentences

2009The protections of Miranda and section 7B-2101(a) apply only to custodial interrogations by law enforcement. “ ‘[I]n determining whether a suspect [is] in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’ ” Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338 , 543 S.E.2d at 827 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662 , 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900 , 118 S. Ct. 248 , 139 L.

2009The protections of Miranda and section 7B-2101(a) apply only to custodial interrogations by law enforcement. “ ‘[I]n determining whether a suspect [is] in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’ ” Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338 , 543 S.E.2d at 827 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662 , 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900 , 118 S. Ct. 248 , 139 L.

910
State v. Gainesgreen
nc · 1997 · cited in 21 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1998–2022
2 sentences

2022Ed. 2d 383, 394 (1995). ¶ 12 This State’s Supreme Court summarized the application of Miranda in custodial interrogations as such: “in determining whether a suspect [is] in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662 , 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900 , 139 L.

2022Ed. 2d 383, 394 (1995). ¶ 12 This State’s Supreme Court summarized the application of Miranda in custodial interrogations as such: “in determining whether a suspect [is] in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662 , 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900 , 139 L.

821
Miranda v. Arizonagreen
scotus · 1966 · cited in 3 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009The Supreme Court of North Carolina [has recognized that] `in determining whether *802 a suspect [is] in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'" Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 337, 338 , 543 S.E.2d at 826 , 828 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706 (1966); and State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662 , 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 (1997)). "[U]nder Miranda , whether an

2009The Supreme Court of North Carolina [has recognized that] `in determining whether *802 a suspect [is] in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'" Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 337, 338 , 543 S.E.2d at 826 , 828 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706 (1966); and State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662 , 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 (1997)). "[U]nder Miranda , whether an

33
Stansbury v. Californiagreen
scotus · 1994 · cited in 8 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1997–2016
2 sentences

2016In determining if a suspect is in custody, "the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Gaines, 345 N.C. at 662 , 483 S.E.2d at 405 (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) ).

2016In determining if a suspect is in custody, "the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Gaines, 345 N.C. at 662 , 483 S.E.2d at 405 (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) ).

28
Oregon v. Mathiasongreen
scotus · 1977 · cited in 3 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1999–2010
2 sentences

2010Ed. 2d 714, 719 , 97 S. Ct. 711, 714 (1977). "[I]n determining whether a suspect was in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662 , 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900 , 139 L.

2004A person is not in custody simply because the questioning occurs at the sheriff's department or because the victim has implicated them; "the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Id. (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 , 495, 50 L.

23
State v. Greenegreen
nc · 1992 · cited in 2 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2003–2009
2 sentences

2009This inquiry requires application of "an objective test as to whether a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would believe himself to be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way." State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577 , 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992) (citations omitted).

2009This inquiry requires application of "an objective test as to whether a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would believe himself to be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way." State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577 , 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992) (citations omitted).

22
State v. Sandersgreen
ncctapp · 1996 · cited in 3 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2002–2009
2 sentences

2009This involves “ ‘an objective test as to whether a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would believe himself to be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way.’ ” State v. Sanders, 122 N.C.

2003This requires the trial court to apply "`an objective test as to whether a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would believe himself to be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way.'" State v. Sanders, 122 N.C.App. 691, 693 , 471 S.E.2d 641, 642 (1996) (quoting State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577 , 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992)).

13
State v. Portillogreen
ncctapp · 2016 · cited in 2 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017App. __, __, 787 S.E.2d 822, 828 (2016) (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

2017App. ----, ----, 787 S.E.2d 822 , 828, appeal dismissed , --- N.C. ----, 792 S.E.2d 785 (2016) (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

12
State v. Marrerogreen
ncctapp · 2016 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017App. __, __, 789 S.E.2d 560, 564 (2016) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “[O]ur Supreme Court has held the definitive inquiry in determining whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda is, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Portillo, __ N.C.

11
Thompson v. Keohanegreen
scotus · 1995 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009Accordingly, ... we review the trial court's conclusions of law for legal accuracy and to ensure that those conclusions `reflect[] a correct application of [law] to the facts found.' In doing so, this Court must look first to the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and second to the effect those circumstances would have on a reasonable person." State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 391 , 597 S.E.2d 724, 733 (2004) (quoting State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 409 , 533 S.E.2d 168, 201 (2000)) and citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383, 394 (1995) (internal q

2009Accordingly, ... we review the trial court's conclusions of law for legal accuracy and to ensure that those conclusions `reflect[] a correct application of [law] to the facts found.' In doing so, this Court must look first to the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and second to the effect those circumstances would have on a reasonable person." State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 391 , 597 S.E.2d 724, 733 (2004) (quoting State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 409 , 533 S.E.2d 168, 201 (2000)) and citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383, 394 (1995) (internal q

11
State v. Garciagreen
nc · 2004 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009Accordingly, ... we review the trial court's conclusions of law for legal accuracy and to ensure that those conclusions `reflect[] a correct application of [law] to the facts found.' In doing so, this Court must look first to the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and second to the effect those circumstances would have on a reasonable person." State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 391 , 597 S.E.2d 724, 733 (2004) (quoting State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 409 , 533 S.E.2d 168, 201 (2000)) and citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383, 394 (1995) (internal q

2009Accordingly, ... we review the trial court's conclusions of law for legal accuracy and to ensure that those conclusions `reflect[] a correct application of [law] to the facts found.' In doing so, this Court must look first to the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and second to the effect those circumstances would have on a reasonable person." State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 391 , 597 S.E.2d 724, 733 (2004) (quoting State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 409 , 533 S.E.2d 168, 201 (2000)) and citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383, 394 (1995) (internal q

11
State v. Hippsgreen
nc · 1998 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009“The rule in Miranda applies only when a defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation.” State v. Hipps, 348 N.C. 377, 396 , 501 S.E.2d 625, 637 (1998) (citing State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 661 , 483 S.E.2d 396, 404 (1997)). “[I]n determining whether a suspect is in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 338 , 543 S.E.2d 823, 827 (2001) (quotation omitted

2009“The rule in Miranda applies only when a defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation.” State v. Hipps, 348 N.C. 377, 396 , 501 S.E.2d 625, 637 (1998) (citing State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 661 , 483 S.E.2d 396, 404 (1997)). “[I]n determining whether a suspect is in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 338 , 543 S.E.2d 823, 827 (2001) (quotation omitted

11
State v. Golphingreen
nc · 2000 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009Accordingly, ... we review the trial court's conclusions of law for legal accuracy and to ensure that those conclusions `reflect[] a correct application of [law] to the facts found.' In doing so, this Court must look first to the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and second to the effect those circumstances would have on a reasonable person." State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 391 , 597 S.E.2d 724, 733 (2004) (quoting State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 409 , 533 S.E.2d 168, 201 (2000)) and citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383, 394 (1995) (internal q

2009Accordingly, ... we review the trial court's conclusions of law for legal accuracy and to ensure that those conclusions `reflect[] a correct application of [law] to the facts found.' In doing so, this Court must look first to the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and second to the effect those circumstances would have on a reasonable person." State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 391 , 597 S.E.2d 724, 733 (2004) (quoting State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 409 , 533 S.E.2d 168, 201 (2000)) and citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457 , 133 L.Ed.2d 383, 394 (1995) (internal q

11
State v. Brewingtongreen
nc · 2000 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001Ed. 2d 177 (1997); see also Brewington, 352 N.C. at 499 , 532 S.E.2d at 502 (definitive inquiry is whether there was a “formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest”); State v. McNeill, 349 N.C. 634, 644 , 509 S.E.2d 415, 421 (1998) (definitive inquiry is whether there was a “formal arrest or *339 a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 838 , 145 L.

2001Ed. 2d 177 (1997); see also Brewington, 352 N.C. at 499 , 532 S.E.2d at 502 (definitive inquiry is whether there was a “formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest”); State v. McNeill, 349 N.C. 634, 644 , 509 S.E.2d 415, 421 (1998) (definitive inquiry is whether there was a “formal arrest or *339 a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 838 , 145 L.

11
State v. McNeillgreen
· 1998 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
2 sentences

2001Ed. 2d 177 (1997); see also Brewington, 352 N.C. at 499 , 532 S.E.2d at 502 (definitive inquiry is whether there was a “formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest”); State v. McNeill, 349 N.C. 634, 644 , 509 S.E.2d 415, 421 (1998) (definitive inquiry is whether there was a “formal arrest or *339 a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 838 , 145 L.

2001Ed. 2d 177 (1997); see also Brewington, 352 N.C. at 499 , 532 S.E.2d at 502 (definitive inquiry is whether there was a “formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest”); State v. McNeill, 349 N.C. 634, 644 , 509 S.E.2d 415, 421 (1998) (definitive inquiry is whether there was a “formal arrest or *339 a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 838 , 145 L.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
King v. Bureau of Indian Affairs green
scotus · 1997
2 sentences

2022Ed. 2d 383, 394 (1995). ¶ 12 This State’s Supreme Court summarized the application of Miranda in custodial interrogations as such: “in determining whether a suspect [is] in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662 , 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900 , 139 L.

2022Ed. 2d 383, 394 (1995). ¶ 12 This State’s Supreme Court summarized the application of Miranda in custodial interrogations as such: “in determining whether a suspect [is] in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662 , 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900 , 139 L.

131998–2022
Gaines v. North Carolina green
scotus · 1997
2 sentences

2022Ed. 2d 383, 394 (1995). ¶ 12 This State’s Supreme Court summarized the application of Miranda in custodial interrogations as such: “in determining whether a suspect [is] in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662 , 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900 , 139 L.

2022Ed. 2d 383, 394 (1995). ¶ 12 This State’s Supreme Court summarized the application of Miranda in custodial interrogations as such: “in determining whether a suspect [is] in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662 , 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900 , 139 L.

112001–2022
Holmes v. United States green
scotus · 1997
2 sentences

2009The protections of Miranda and section 7B-2101(a) apply only to custodial interrogations by law enforcement. "`[I]n determining whether a suspect [is] in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'" Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338 , 543 S.E.2d at 827 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662 , 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900 , 118 S.Ct. 248 , 139 L.Ed.2

2009The protections of Miranda and section 7B-2101(a) apply only to custodial interrogations by law enforcement. “ ‘[I]n determining whether a suspect [is] in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.’ ” Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338 , 543 S.E.2d at 827 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662 , 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 , cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900 , 118 S. Ct. 248 , 139 L.

51998–2010
In re the Appeal of Colonial Pipeline green
nc · 1986
2 sentences

2021Cf. In re Colonial Pipeline Co., 318 N.C. 224, 229 , 233–235 (1986) (finding no error in Commission’s approval of the Department of Revenue’s refusal to deduct from valuation opinion for true value an amount attributable to economic obsolescence where taxpayer’s expert adjusted valuation by 25.36% on the grounds that investors were demanding a rate of return in the market of 14% for similar investments but taxpayer’s rate of return was limited to 10.45% by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission). ¶ 62 Accordingly, the Commission’s conclusion to this effect, while supported by the County’s expert

2021Cf. In re Colonial Pipeline Co., 318 N.C. 224, 229 , 233–235 (1986) (finding no error in Commission’s approval of the Department of Revenue’s refusal to deduct from valuation opinion for true value an amount attributable to economic obsolescence where taxpayer’s expert adjusted valuation by 25.36% on the grounds that investors were demanding a rate of return in the market of 14% for similar investments but taxpayer’s rate of return was limited to 10.45% by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission). ¶ 62 Accordingly, the Commission’s conclusion to this effect, while supported by the County’s expert

22021–2021
State v. Portillo neutral
nc · 2016
1 sentence

2017App. ----, ----, 787 S.E.2d 822 , 828, appeal dismissed , --- N.C. ----, 792 S.E.2d 785 (2016) (citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

12017–2017
State v. Ward green
nc · 2010
2 sentences

2012In challenging the admission of Special Agent Bayler’s testimony that the substance seized from his residence was cocaine, Defendant asserts, in reliance upon State v. Ward, 364 N.C. 133 , 694 S.E.2d 738 (2010), in which the Supreme Court held that prescription medications could not be identified as controlled substances based solely on a visual examination, and State v. James, _N.C.

2012In challenging the admission of Special Agent Bayler’s testimony that the substance seized from his residence was cocaine, Defendant asserts, in reliance upon State v. Ward, 364 N.C. 133 , 694 S.E.2d 738 (2010), in which the Supreme Court held that prescription medications could not be identified as controlled substances based solely on a visual examination, and State v. James, _N.C.

12012–2012
State v. Jones green
ncctapp · 2002
1 sentence

2009“This is an objective test, based upon a reasonable person standard, and is to be applied on a case-by-case basis considering all the facts and circumstances.” State v. Jones, 153 N.C.

12009–2009
State v. Buchanan green
nc · 2002
2 sentences

2009“The rule in Miranda applies only when a defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation.” State v. Hipps, 348 N.C. 377, 396 , 501 S.E.2d 625, 637 (1998) (citing State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 661 , 483 S.E.2d 396, 404 (1997)). “[I]n determining whether a suspect is in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 338 , 543 S.E.2d 823, 827 (2001) (quotation omitted

2009“The rule in Miranda applies only when a defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation.” State v. Hipps, 348 N.C. 377, 396 , 501 S.E.2d 625, 637 (1998) (citing State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 661 , 483 S.E.2d 396, 404 (1997)). “[I]n determining whether a suspect is in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 338 , 543 S.E.2d 823, 827 (2001) (quotation omitted

12009–2009
Muniz-Herrera v. United States green
scotus · 1999
1 sentence

2001Ed. 2d 177 (1997); see also Brewington, 352 N.C. at 499 , 532 S.E.2d at 502 (definitive inquiry is whether there was a “formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest”); State v. McNeill, 349 N.C. 634, 644 , 509 S.E.2d 415, 421 (1998) (definitive inquiry is whether there was a “formal arrest or *339 a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 838 , 145 L.

12001–2001
Robbins v. Johnson green
scotus · 1999
1 sentence

2001Ed. 2d 177 (1997); see also Brewington, 352 N.C. at 499 , 532 S.E.2d at 502 (definitive inquiry is whether there was a “formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest”); State v. McNeill, 349 N.C. 634, 644 , 509 S.E.2d 415, 421 (1998) (definitive inquiry is whether there was a “formal arrest or *339 a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest”), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 838 , 145 L.

12001–2001

Statutes the citing opinions construe

NC § N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2101 (6) NC § N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443 (5) NC § N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1 (4) NC § N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-30 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 58 (1965–2025) NC 32 (1997–2022) IL 21 (1975–2021) TX 21 (1993–2025) PA 18 (1984–2024) MD 17 (1978–2025) MI 15 (1959–2008) FL 14 (1959–2025) WA 11 (1940–2013) OH 10 (1994–2025) AZ 9 (2002–2025) MN 8 (1970–2019) LA 8 (1954–2018) MO 8 (1947–2004) NY 8 (1965–2014) WY 7 (1979–2015) MA 7 (1987–2025) GA 7 (1974–2024) NM 7 (1963–2016) NJ 6 (1956–2025) KS 6 (1976–2024) RI 6 (1986–2022) IA 6 (1974–2017) AL 6 (1957–2023) OR 6 (1970–2013) CO 4 (1994–2020) VT 4 (1995–2016) ID 4 (1956–1967) WI 4 (1986–2014) HI 4 (1946–1996) ND 3 (2011–2022) KY 3 (1955–2022) TN 3 (2013–2015) MT 3 (1973–2018) IN 3 (1977–2010) DE 3 (1979–2015) AK 3 (1990–1999) MS 3 (1979–2019) DC 3 (1985–2024) SD 2 (1996–2023) SC 2 (1991–2009) NE 2 (1956–1995) ME 2 (1996–2013)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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