21 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1900–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dillenbeck v. Hessgreen2 sentences2019App.3d 214, 217 (1979)], (‘[i]mplicit in every testimonial privilege is the assumption that the privileged matter may indeed be highly probative of the issues in dispute’).” In Dillenbeck v. Hess, 536 N.E.2d 1126, 1133 (N.Y. 1989), the New York Court of Appeals stated: “Moreover, the mere fact that the privilege presents an obstacle to plaintiffs’ discovery of legally pertinent information that would assist them in proving their claim is not, as the dissent seems to suggest, evidence that the privilege is not properly recognized in this case. 2019In Dillenbeck v. Hess, 536 N.E.2d 1126, 1133 (N.Y. 1989), the New York Court of Appeals stated: - 16 - “Moreover, the mere fact that the privilege presents an obstacle to plaintiffs’ discovery of legally pertinent information that would assist them in proving their claim is not, as the dissent seems to suggest, evidence that the privilege is not properly recognized in this case. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Donohogreen2 sentences2019People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 170 (2003). 2018People v. Donoho , 204 Ill. 2d 159 , 170, 273 Ill.Dec. 116 , 788 N.E.2d 707 (2003). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Vincentgreen1 sentence2025People v. Vincent, 165 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ressagreen2 sentences2024See People v. Ressa, 2019 IL App (2d) 170439, ¶ 25 , 125 N.E.3d 487 (“[T]he record here does not reveal whether counsel investigated the issue. 2024See People v. Ressa, 2019 IL App (2d) 170439, ¶ 25 , 125 N.E.3d 487 (“[T]he record here does not reveal whether counsel investigated the issue. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Faulknergreen1 sentence2023A strategy must be more than unsuccessful to support a Strickland claim, and “must appear irrational and unreasonable in light of the circumstances that defense counsel confronted at the time.” People v. Faulkner, 292 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Murphy v. Cuesta, Rey & Co.green1 sentence1978The mere fact that the hearing officer acted as the representative of the Department does not in itself constitute a constitutional deprivation of due process particularly since the finding of the Department’s representative can be no more than a recommendation and does not amount to a finding until it is passed upon by the director of the department or the court judicially reviewing the case See Murphy v. Cuesta, Rey & Co., 381 Ill. 162, 166-67 (1942). | 1 | 1 |
Withrow v. Larkingreen2 sentences1978See also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 57-58 , 43 L. 1978See also Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 57-58 , 43 L. | 1 | 1 |
Pepper v. Littongreen2 sentences1974All these cases have followed Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305, 306 , 84 L.Ed. 281, 288 , 60 S.Ct. 238, 244 , wherein the Supreme Court said: “Hence, this Court has held that a bankruptcy court has full power to inquire into the validity of any claim L.Ed. 288 asserted against the estate. * * * And the mere fact that a claim has been reduced to judgment does not prevent such an inquiry. 1974All these cases have followed Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 305, 306 , 84 L.Ed. 281, 288 , 60 S.Ct. 238, 244 , wherein the Supreme Court said: “Hence, this Court has held that a bankruptcy court has full power to inquire into the validity of any claim L.Ed. 288 asserted against the estate. * * * And the mere fact that a claim has been reduced to judgment does not prevent such an inquiry. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Gacy
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 136 . ¶ 108 Although we recognized that an attorney’s acquisition of a financial stake in the litigation directly adverse to the client’s interests would give rise to a per se conflict, we held that the mere fact that defense counsel was offered but declined a book deal was an insufficient basis on which to find such a conflict. 2018Id. at 136 . ¶ 108 Although we recognized that an attorney’s acquisition of a financial stake in the litigation directly adverse to the client’s interests would give rise to a per se conflict, we held that the mere fact that defense counsel was offered but declined a book deal was an insufficient basis on which to find such a conflict. | 3 | 2017–2018 |
People v. Paul
green
2 sentences2001Paul , 304 Ill. 2001Paul, 304 Ill. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Attaway
green
2 sentences1979App. 3d 837 , 354 N.E.2d 448 , appeal denied (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 596 .) The mere fact the defense has discovered a new argument is insufficient. 1978App. 3d 837 , 354 N.E.2d 448 , appeal denied (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 596 .) The mere fact the defense has discovered a new argument is insufficient. | 2 | 1978–1979 |
River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park
green
1 sentence2020However, the mere fact that a claim was not raised in the earlier litigation does not mean that a plaintiff has the ability to raise it later. “[S]eparate claims will be considered the same cause of action for purposes of res judicata if they arose from a single group of operative facts, regardless of whether they assert different theories of relief.” River Park, 184 Ill. 2d at 311 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Loferski
green
1 sentence2020Moreover, defendant’s reliance on People v. Loferski, 235 Ill. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Brown v. Hannagan
green
2 sentences1974As the merger of a claim into a judgment does not change its nature so far as provability is concerned, [citation], so the court may look behind the judgment to determine the essential nature of the liability for purposes of proof and allowance. [Citation.]” See also Brown v. Hannagan (1911), 210 Mass. 246 , 96 N.E. 714 ; Gibson v. Green's Adm’r (1893), 89 Va. 524 , 165 S.E. 661 ; Gilchrist v. Cotton (1925), 83 Ind. App. 415 , 148 N.E. 435 . 1974As the merger of a claim into a judgment does not change its nature so far as provability is concerned, [citation], so the court may look behind the judgment to determine the essential nature of the liability for purposes of proof and allowance. [Citation.]” See also Brown v. Hannagan (1911), 210 Mass. 246 , 96 N.E. 714 ; Gibson v. Green's Adm’r (1893), 89 Va. 524 , 165 S.E. 661 ; Gilchrist v. Cotton (1925), 83 Ind. App. 415 , 148 N.E. 435 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Gilchrist v. Cotton
neutral
2 sentences1974As the merger of a claim into a judgment does not change its nature so far as provability is concerned, [citation], so the court may look behind the judgment to determine the essential nature of the liability for purposes of proof and allowance. [Citation.]” See also Brown v. Hannagan (1911), 210 Mass. 246 , 96 N.E. 714 ; Gibson v. Green's Adm’r (1893), 89 Va. 524 , 165 S.E. 661 ; Gilchrist v. Cotton (1925), 83 Ind. App. 415 , 148 N.E. 435 . 1974As the merger of a claim into a judgment does not change its nature so far as provability is concerned, [citation], so the court may look behind the judgment to determine the essential nature of the liability for purposes of proof and allowance. [Citation.]” See also Brown v. Hannagan (1911), 210 Mass. 246 , 96 N.E. 714 ; Gibson v. Green's Adm’r (1893), 89 Va. 524 , 165 S.E. 661 ; Gilchrist v. Cotton (1925), 83 Ind. App. 415 , 148 N.E. 435 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Gibson v. Green's Adm'r
neutral
1 sentence1974As the merger of a claim into a judgment does not change its nature so far as provability is concerned, [citation], so the court may look behind the judgment to determine the essential nature of the liability for purposes of proof and allowance. [Citation.]” See also Brown v. Hannagan (1911), 210 Mass. 246 , 96 N.E. 714 ; Gibson v. Green's Adm’r (1893), 89 Va. 524 , 165 S.E. 661 ; Gilchrist v. Cotton (1925), 83 Ind. App. 415 , 148 N.E. 435 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Merchants Service Corp. v. Libby, McNeill & Libby
neutral
1 sentence1969Merchants Service Corp. v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 314 Ill App 121, 40 NE2d 835 (1942), is another case supporting our view that the court below erred in striking the federal antitrust defense on the pleadings. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Grier v. Cable
green
1 sentence1928(Grier v. Cable, 159 Ill. 29 .) The filing of a claim against an estate with the clerk of the county court within the limitation period is an exhibition of the claim within the meaning of the statute, so as to take it out of the limitation. | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Upstone v. People
green
1 sentence1900Upstone v. People, 109 Ill. 169 . | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.