mere fact instruction in Missouri

1995Dickerson expressly acknowledged that FELA cases adjudicated in state courts are generally subject to state procedural rules, (citing Dickerson, 470 U.S. at 411 , 105 S.Ct. at 1348 ).

1995Dickerson expressly acknowledged that FELA cases adjudicated in state courts are generally subject to state procedural rules, (citing Dickerson, 470 U.S. at 411 , 105 S.Ct. at 1348 ).

1962We, in passing, were looking at an instruction, ‘No. 8,’ in Stumpf v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 354 Mo. 208 , 189 S.W.2d 223, 229 , and said the instruction was argumentative and ‘the cautionary “mere fact” unnecessary.’ By this we certainly were intending to say a cautionary ‘mere fact’ is unnecessary in fairly and simply submitting the controverted factual issues of a negligence case.” Let us now look at the case of Goldblatt v. St.

1962We, in passing, were looking at an instruction, ‘No. 8,’ in Stumpf v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 354 Mo. 208 , 189 S.W.2d 223, 229 , and said the instruction was argumentative and ‘the cautionary “mere fact” unnecessary.’ By this we certainly were intending to say a cautionary ‘mere fact’ is unnecessary in fairly and simply submitting the controverted factual issues of a negligence case.” Let us now look at the case of Goldblatt v. St.

1962Note the case of Rittershouse v. City of Springfield, Mo., 319 S.W.2d 518, 1 . c. 521, where a number of cases dealing with this subject were reviewed and this court (Division One) said: “ * * * but the decisions we have considered in our review of Instruction No. 6 manifest the hazard of error in giving any kind of a mere fact instruction in any kind of a negligence case.

1959Referring again to Rittershouse v. City of Springfield, supra, it was also-said at page 521, of 319 S.W.2d that the decisions there reviewed “manifest the hazard of error in giving any kind of a mere fact instruction in any kind of a negligence-case.” It would be well for counsel contemplating the use of such an instruction te-heed the advice given in Citizens Bank of Festus v. Missouri Natural Gas Company, supra, 314 S.W.2d at page 715 , where appropriate language for such an instruction is. set forth.

1950In State v. Jordan, 306 Mo. 3 , 268 S. W. 64 , l. c. 70 (3), this court en banc said: “The mere fact that the instruction deals with flight does not make it a comment on the evidence as that word is used in the statute.” See also 23 C.

1950In State v. Jordan, 306 Mo. 3 , 268 S. W. 64 , l. c. 70 (3), this court en banc said: “The mere fact that the instruction deals with flight does not make it a comment on the evidence as that word is used in the statute.” See also 23 C.

2016Frye, 440 S.W.3d at 415 .

1978That the court felt such alternatives workable and important is made clear in Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787-88 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , where it rejects making representation by counsel a universal requirement of a revocation hearing partly because *419 to do so would make the hearing more akin to a trial and thus “the hearing body may be less tolerant of marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to reincarcerate than to continue nonpunitive rehabilitation.” Gagnon at 788 , 93 S.Ct. at 1762 .

1978That the court felt such alternatives workable and important is made clear in Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 787-88 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , where it rejects making representation by counsel a universal requirement of a revocation hearing partly because *419 to do so would make the hearing more akin to a trial and thus “the hearing body may be less tolerant of marginal deviant behavior and feel more pressure to reincarcerate than to continue nonpunitive rehabilitation.” Gagnon at 788 , 93 S.Ct. at 1762 .

1963Nicholson v. Franciscus, 328 Mo. 96 , 40 S.W.2d 623, 625 .

1963Nicholson v. Franciscus, 328 Mo. 96 , 40 S.W.2d 623, 625 .

1959Referring again to Rittershouse v. City of Springfield, supra, it was also-said at page 521, of 319 S.W.2d that the decisions there reviewed “manifest the hazard of error in giving any kind of a mere fact instruction in any kind of a negligence-case.” It would be well for counsel contemplating the use of such an instruction te-heed the advice given in Citizens Bank of Festus v. Missouri Natural Gas Company, supra, 314 S.W.2d at page 715 , where appropriate language for such an instruction is. set forth.

1929The mere fact that an instruction is abstract does not constitute reversible error. [Hemphill v. Kansas City, supra; Brown v. Railroad, 227 S.W. 1069 ; Cool v. Peterson, 189 Mo. App. 717 , 175 S.W. 244 .] The main instruction herein given for plaintiff fully covered the facts, and, in construing the instruction complained of in that connection, we do not find reversible error. [Lammert v. Wells, 282 S.W. 487 .] It is urged against instruction No. 2 that it ignores issues raised by the answer; that it assumes as proved certain facts, that it purports to cover the entire care and directs a verdi

1929The mere fact that an instruction is abstract does not constitute reversible error. [Hemphill v. Kansas City, supra; Brown v. Railroad, 227 S.W. 1069 ; Cool v. Peterson, 189 Mo. App. 717 , 175 S.W. 244 .] The main instruction herein given for plaintiff fully covered the facts, and, in construing the instruction complained of in that connection, we do not find reversible error. [Lammert v. Wells, 282 S.W. 487 .] It is urged against instruction No. 2 that it ignores issues raised by the answer; that it assumes as proved certain facts, that it purports to cover the entire care and directs a verdi

1893Louis Drayage Co., 40 Mo. App. 339 ); but we have also decided that error is presumed to be prejudicial, and that to justify an appellate court in affirming a judgment where error has intervened in the trial, the burden is upon the party claiming the benefit of the judgment to satisfy the appellate court that the error was not prejudicial.