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12 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1918–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2016In Robinson, the Court observed that “the term ‘illegal sentence’ is a term of art that our Courts apply narrowly, to a relatively small class of cases[,]” and “the mere fact that a rule or statute may govern or limit the trial court’s exercise of discretion in sentencing does not necessarily convert the claim into one involving the legality of the sentence.” Id. at 21 (citation omitted). 2014Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15, 21 (Pa. Super. 2007). | 3 | 3 |
Brown v. Pa. Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2019See 42 Pa.C.S. ____________________________________________ 3 To the extent that Appellant has argued that, if the court were to allow him to access the Commonwealth’s files, including police notes and reports, he would be able to find exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected a similar request for discovery of the Commonwealth’s files and other notes during collateral review in Commonwealth v. Williams, 86 A.3d 771, 788-89 (Pa. 2014) (“A defendant’s right to discover exculpatory evidence does not include the unsupervised autho 2017But, the mere fact that a claim sounds in Brady does not, on its own, create a special right to PCRA discovery. 86 A.3d at 788 -89 (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59-60 (1987)); see Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one”). | 1 | 2 |
Brady v. Marylandgreen1 sentence2019See 42 Pa.C.S. ____________________________________________ 3 To the extent that Appellant has argued that, if the court were to allow him to access the Commonwealth’s files, including police notes and reports, he would be able to find exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected a similar request for discovery of the Commonwealth’s files and other notes during collateral review in Commonwealth v. Williams, 86 A.3d 771, 788-89 (Pa. 2014) (“A defendant’s right to discover exculpatory evidence does not include the unsupervised autho | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Pollardgreen1 sentence2019See 42 Pa.C.S. ____________________________________________ 3 To the extent that Appellant has argued that, if the court were to allow him to access the Commonwealth’s files, including police notes and reports, he would be able to find exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected a similar request for discovery of the Commonwealth’s files and other notes during collateral review in Commonwealth v. Williams, 86 A.3d 771, 788-89 (Pa. 2014) (“A defendant’s right to discover exculpatory evidence does not include the unsupervised autho | 1 | 1 |
Weatherford v. Burseygreen1 sentence2017But, the mere fact that a claim sounds in Brady does not, on its own, create a special right to PCRA discovery. 86 A.3d at 788 -89 (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59-60 (1987)); see Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one”). | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania v. Ritchiegreen1 sentence2017But, the mere fact that a claim sounds in Brady does not, on its own, create a special right to PCRA discovery. 86 A.3d at 788 -89 (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59-60 (1987)); see Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Tappgreen1 sentence2016The Robinson Court held that a claim of judicial vindictiveness under Pearce is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of the sentence, 7 See Commonwealth v. Milhomme, 35 A.3d 1219, 1221 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that a challenge to the legality of sentence is non-waivable). -7- J-S48034-16 and not a non-waivable challenge to the legality of sentence.8 Id. at 22; see also Tapp, 997 A.2d at 1202-03 (stating that “challenges to the length of the sentence following retrial citing judicial vindictiveness implicate a discretionary aspect of the sentencing process.”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Milhommegreen1 sentence2016The Robinson Court held that a claim of judicial vindictiveness under Pearce is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of the sentence, 7 See Commonwealth v. Milhomme, 35 A.3d 1219, 1221 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that a challenge to the legality of sentence is non-waivable). -7- J-S48034-16 and not a non-waivable challenge to the legality of sentence.8 Id. at 22; see also Tapp, 997 A.2d at 1202-03 (stating that “challenges to the length of the sentence following retrial citing judicial vindictiveness implicate a discretionary aspect of the sentencing process.”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2012Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15, 21 (Pa.Super.2007) (en banc) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 787 A.2d 1085, 1087 (Pa.Super.2001) (“[A] claim that a court relied on an unconstitutional statute when it sentenced a defendant is a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing.”), appeal denied, 569 Pa. 693 , 803 A.2d 735 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Kovalchick Salvage Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Boardgreen1 sentence1994See, e.g., Kovalchick Salvage Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Williams), 102 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 562, 519 A.2d 543 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Browngreen2 sentences1983Commonwealth v. Brown, 489 Pa. 285, 306 , 414 A.2d 70, 80 (1980). 1983Commonwealth v. Brown, 489 Pa. 285, 306 , 414 A.2d 70, 80 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Curry
green
1 sentence2010Id.; Jacobs, 900 A.2d at 373-374 .[Footnote 5] Moreover, the mere fact that a rule or statute may govern or limit the trial court's exercise of discretion in sentencing does not necessarily convert the claim into one involving the legality of the sentence. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Commonwealth v. Jacobs
green
2 sentences2007Id.; Jacobs, 900 A.2d at 373-374 . [5] Moreover, the mere fact that a rule or statute may govern or limit the trial court's exercise of discretion in sentencing does not necessarily convert the claim into one involving the legality of the sentence. 2007Id.; Jacobs, 900 A.2d at 373-374 . 5 Moreover, the mere fact that a rule or statute may govern or limit the trial court’s exercise of discretion in sen-fencing does not necessarily convert the claim into one involving the legality of the sentence. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Commonwealth v. Gregg
green
2 sentences1983Commonwealth v. Gregg, 470 Pa. 323 , 368 A.2d 651 (1977). 1983Commonwealth v. Gregg, 470 Pa. 323 , 368 A.2d 651 (1977). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
National Metal Edge Box Co. v. American Metal Edge Box Co.
neutral
1 sentence1968In National Metal Edge Box Company v. American Metal Edge Box Company, 246 Pa. 78 , page 82, it was held that: “The mere fact that the claim which is the basis upon which the present suit was brought, may be incidentally raised in another action in another court, is no reason why the present case should not proceed to judgment, in its regular course”. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Foote v. American Product Co.
neutral
1 sentence1918The mere fact of the violation of the ordinance is not sufficient to establish negligence: Ubelmann v. American Ice Co., 209 Pa. 398 ; Foote v. American Product Co., 195 Pa. 190 . | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Ubelmann v. American Ice Co.
neutral
1 sentence1918The mere fact of the violation of the ordinance is not sufficient to establish negligence: Ubelmann v. American Ice Co., 209 Pa. 398 ; Foote v. American Product Co., 195 Pa. 190 . | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.