mere fact defense in New York

1996Under the totality of the circumstances presented here, defense counsel provided meaningful representation (see, People v Ellis, 81 NY2d 854 ; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137).

1986The mere fact that defense counsel’s tactics and strategy ultimately proved unsuccessful cannot be equated with ineffective assistance of counsel (see, People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137 ).

2012Because defense counsel had an “opportunity to review” the annotated verdict sheet well before it was submitted to the jury and did not object to it, we conclude that the court properly determined that defendant impliedly consented to its submission to the jury (Knight, 280 AD2d at 940 ; see Highsmith, 248 AD2d at 962 ; cf. People v Gerstner, 270 AD2d 837 [2000]).

2012Because defense counsel had an “opportunity to review” the annotated verdict sheet well before it was submitted to the jury and did not object to it, we conclude that the court properly determined that defendant impliedly consented to its submission to the jury (Knight, 280 AD2d at 940 ; see Highsmith, 248 AD2d at 962 ; cf. People v Gerstner, 270 AD2d 837 [2000]).

2012Because defense counsel had an “opportunity to review” the annotated verdict sheet well before it was submitted to the jury and did not object to it, we conclude that the court properly determined that defendant impliedly consented to its submission to the jury (Knight, 280 AD2d at 940 ; see Highsmith, 248 AD2d at 962 ; cf. People v Gerstner, 270 AD2d 837 [2000]).

2012Because defense counsel had an “opportunity to review” the annotated verdict sheet well before it was submitted to the jury and did not object to it, we conclude that the court properly determined that defendant impliedly consented to its submission to the jury (Knight, 280 AD2d at 940 ; see Highsmith, 248 AD2d at 962 ; cf. People v Gerstner, 270 AD2d 837 [2000]).

1994The mere fact that a defense was unsuccessful does not establish that the defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and it is " 'not for [the] court to second-guess whether a course chosen by the defendant’s counsel was the best trial strategy, or even a good one, so long as defendant was afforded meaningful representation’ ” (People v Hinton, 140 AD2d 712 , quoting People v Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796, 799-800 ).

1988The mere fact that the defense was unsuccessful does not establish that the defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel (People v Santillana, 118 AD2d 669 , lv denied 67 NY2d 950 ), and it is "not for [the] court to second-guess whether a course chosen by the defendant’s counsel was the best trial strategy, or even a good one, so long as defendant was afforded meaningful representation” (People v Satterfield, 66 NY2d 796, 799-800 ).

2007The record establishes that the hearing was conducted fairly, and the mere fact that the hearing officer ruled against the petitioner does not establish bias (see Matter of Rincon v Selsky, supra; Matter of Pabon v Phillips, 16 AD3d 589 [2005]; Matter of Martinez v Scully, 194 AD2d 679 [1993]).

2006The record establishes that the hearing was conducted fairly, and the mere fact that the hearing officer ruled against the petitioner does not establish bias (see Matter of Martinez v Scully, 194 AD2d 679 [1993]).

1986Under the totality of the circumstances presented in this record, we cannot say that the defendant was denied meaningful representation at trial (see, People v Lane, 60 NY2d 748 ; People v Baldi, supra; People v Dudley, 110 AD2d 652 ).

1986Under the totality of the circumstances presented in this record, we cannot conclude that the defendant was denied meaningful representation (see, People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137 ; People v Dudley, 110 AD2d 652 ).

2022"The mere fact that defense counsel may have advised the defendant as to the risks of trial," including the possibility of a higher sentence "if he were to be convicted, is insufficient to establish coercion" ( People v Bush , 132 AD3d 691, 691-692 ; cf. People v Oquendo , 155 AD3d 894, 896 ).

2022"The mere fact that defense counsel may have advised the defendant as to the risks of trial," including the possibility of a higher sentence "if he were to be convicted, is insufficient to establish coercion" ( People v Bush , 132 AD3d 691, 691-692 ; cf. People v Oquendo , 155 AD3d 894, 896 ).

2022"The law does not require litigants to make repeated pointless protests after the court has made its position clear" ( People v Mezon , 80 NY2d 155, 161 ).

2020"The mere fact that defense counsel may have advised [the defendant] as to the risks of trial, including the possible maximum sentence if he was convicted, is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel or coercion" ( People v Mann , 32 AD3d 865 , 866; see People v Smith , 123 AD3d 950 , 951).

2020The mere fact that the hearing officer refused to accept the petitioner's post-hearing memorandum of law does not, without more, constitute a violation of its due process rights ( see Matter of Cooney v Town of Wilmington Zoning Bd. of Appeals , 140 AD3d 1350 , 1352-1353).

2019The defendant's valid waiver of his right to appeal precludes appellate review of any contention that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel except to the extent that the alleged ineffective assistance affected the voluntariness of his plea ( see People v Dancy , 156 AD3d 717 ; People v Upson , 134 AD3d 1058 ).

2019The defendant's valid waiver of his right to appeal precludes appellate review of any contention that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel except to the extent that the alleged ineffective assistance affected the voluntariness of his plea ( see People v Dancy , 156 AD3d 717 ; People v Upson , 134 AD3d 1058 ).

2019Moreover, the mere fact that defense counsel may have advised the defendant as to the risks of trial, including the possibility of consecutive sentences upon [*2]conviction, is insufficient to establish coercion ( see People v Gomez , 137 AD3d 1161 ; People v Holcombe , 116 AD3d 1063 ).

2019Moreover, the mere fact that defense counsel may have advised the defendant as to the risks of trial, including the possibility of consecutive sentences upon [*2]conviction, is insufficient to establish coercion ( see People v Gomez , 137 AD3d 1161 ; People v Holcombe , 116 AD3d 1063 ).

2017Contrary to the petitioner’s contention, the misbehavior reports underlying the subject determinations were sufficiently specific to provide him with notice of the alleged incidents of misbehavior involved (see 7 NYCRR 251-3.1 [c] [1]; Matter of Browne v Capra, 137 AD3d 1274, 1275 [2016], citing Matter of Anekwe v Ercole, 74 AD3d 1335 [2010]). *1250 The petitioner’s remaining contentions are without merit.

2017The mere fact that the hearing officer ruled against the petitioner does not establish bias (see Matter of De La Cruz v Selsky, 36 AD3d 907 [2007]; Matter of Goncalves v Donnelly, 9 AD3d 721, 722 [2004]).

2007The record establishes that the hearing was conducted fairly, and the mere fact that the hearing officer ruled against the petitioner does not establish bias (see Matter of Rincon v Selsky, supra; Matter of Pabon v Phillips, 16 AD3d 589 [2005]; Matter of Martinez v Scully, 194 AD2d 679 [1993]).

2006The defendant’s bare assertions of innocence are also insufficient to withdraw a guilty plea (see People v Moore, 71 NY2d 1002 [1988]; People v Lowrance, 41 NY2d 303 , 304-305 [1977]; People v Evans, 204 AD2d 346 [1994]; People v Chestnut, 188 AD2d 480 [1992]).

2006The defendant’s bare assertions of innocence are also insufficient to withdraw a guilty plea (see People v Moore, 71 NY2d 1002 [1988]; People v Lowrance, 41 NY2d 303 , 304-305 [1977]; People v Evans, 204 AD2d 346 [1994]; People v Chestnut, 188 AD2d 480 [1992]).

2006The mere fact that defense counsel may have advised him as to the risks of trial, including the possible maximum sentence if he was convicted, is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel or coercion (see People v Jones, 232 AD2d 505 [1996]; People v Spinks, 227 AD2d 310 [1996]; People v Samuel, 208 AD2d 776 [1994]).

2006The mere fact that defense counsel may have advised him as to the risks of trial, including the possible maximum sentence if he was convicted, is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel or coercion (see People v Jones, 232 AD2d 505 [1996]; People v Spinks, 227 AD2d 310 [1996]; People v Samuel, 208 AD2d 776 [1994]).

2006The mere fact that defense counsel may have advised him as to the risks of trial, including the possible maximum sentence if he was convicted, is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel or coercion (see People v Jones, 232 AD2d 505 [1996]; People v Spinks, 227 AD2d 310 [1996]; People v Samuel, 208 AD2d 776 [1994]).

2006The defendant’s bare assertions of innocence are also insufficient to withdraw a guilty plea (see People v Moore, 71 NY2d 1002 [1988]; People v Lowrance, 41 NY2d 303 , 304-305 [1977]; People v Evans, 204 AD2d 346 [1994]; People v Chestnut, 188 AD2d 480 [1992]).

2005Concerned that Elstad could be interpreted as holding that the mere fact that warnings were uttered would be sufficient to justify the admission of subsequent statements, this Court held in People v Bethea ( 67 NY2d 364 [1986]) that more was required under article I, § 6 of the New York Constitution.