21 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Powell v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2001The court noted that “[t]he apparent difference between the procedures provided for certified employees in discharges!, as opposed to] layoffs!,] is the right to a plenary hearing and to counsel, witnesses, confrontation and cross-examination prior to [an employee’s] discharge for cause.” Powell, 56 Ill. 2d at 81 . 2001The court then found that pre-layoff hearings were not constitutionally required and stated that “[i]t would be virtually impossible for State government to function without substantial confusion, delay and uncertainty if each certified employee were entitled to receive a plenary hearing prior to a layoff.” Powell, 56 Ill. 2d at 82 . | 1 | 5 |
Vance v. Joynergreen1 sentence2024See Vance v. Joyner, 2019 IL App (4th) 190136, ¶ 82 (“[A] party’s factual assertions in an appellate brief cannot serve as a substitute for a proper record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Brantgreen1 sentence2022See -9- No. 1-21-0962 People v. Brant, 394 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
in re: Tamesha T.green1 sentence2022See In re Tamesha T., 2014 IL App (1st) 132986, ¶ 21 (reviewing the lower court’s questioning of the witness for an abuse of discretion). | 1 | 1 |
Boone v. Boonegreen1 sentence1977As stated in Boone v. Boone, 150 F.2d 153, 154-55 (D. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Francis J. Demonte, a Witness Before the Special September 1981 Grand Jury. Francis J. Demonte, Witness-Appellant v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1983Ed. 2d 158 , 95 S. Ct. 199 (grand jury witness not entitled to a plenary hearing to test the legality of surveillance).) The Seventh Circuit found that “[djelay in grand jury proceedings will not be appreciably increased” ( 667 F.2d 590, 599 ) and noted there is an inherent delay in the contempt hearing itself ( 667 F.2d 590 , 599 n.23). 1983Ed. 2d 158 , 95 S. Ct. 199 (grand jury witness not entitled to a plenary hearing to test the legality of surveillance).) The Seventh Circuit found that “[djelay in grand jury proceedings will not be appreciably increased” ( 667 F.2d 590, 599 ) and noted there is an inherent delay in the contempt hearing itself ( 667 F.2d 590 , 599 n.23). | 1 | 2 |
Persico v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1983But cf. In re Persico (2d Cir.1974), 491 F.2d 1156 , cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 924 , 42 L.Ed.2d 158 , 95 S.Ct. 199 (grand jury witness not entitled to a plenary hearing to test the legality of surveillance).) The Seventh Circuit found that "[d]elay in grand jury proceedings will not be appreciably increased" ( 667 F.2d 590, 599 ) and noted there is an inherent delay in the contempt hearing itself ( 667 F.2d 590 , 599 n. 23). 1983Ed. 2d 158 , 95 S. Ct. 199 (grand jury witness not entitled to a plenary hearing to test the legality of surveillance).) The Seventh Circuit found that “[djelay in grand jury proceedings will not be appreciably increased” ( 667 F.2d 590, 599 ) and noted there is an inherent delay in the contempt hearing itself ( 667 F.2d 590 , 599 n.23). | 1 | 2 |
Johnson v. Ohiogreen1 sentence1983But cf. In re Persico (2d Cir.1974), 491 F.2d 1156 , cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 924 , 42 L.Ed.2d 158 , 95 S.Ct. 199 (grand jury witness not entitled to a plenary hearing to test the legality of surveillance).) The Seventh Circuit found that "[d]elay in grand jury proceedings will not be appreciably increased" ( 667 F.2d 590, 599 ) and noted there is an inherent delay in the contempt hearing itself ( 667 F.2d 590 , 599 n. 23). | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Alphonse Persicogreen1 sentence1983But cf. In re Persico (2d Cir.1974), 491 F.2d 1156 , cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 924 , 42 L.Ed.2d 158 , 95 S.Ct. 199 (grand jury witness not entitled to a plenary hearing to test the legality of surveillance).) The Seventh Circuit found that "[d]elay in grand jury proceedings will not be appreciably increased" ( 667 F.2d 590, 599 ) and noted there is an inherent delay in the contempt hearing itself ( 667 F.2d 590 , 599 n. 23). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ciucci v. THE PEOPLE
green
2 sentences1968(People v. Ashley; People v. Armes, 37 Ill.2d 457 ; People v. Hamby, 32 Ill.2d 291 ; Ciucci v. People, 21 Ill.2d 81 ; People v. Dolgin, 6 Ill.2d 109 .) As to petitioner’s contention that the State has suppressed evidence favorable to his defense, we note that not only did he fail to raise this issue on previous appeal but his allegation is unsupported by affidavit or other proof outside of his conclusionary statement, as required by section 122 — 2 of the Act, and is therefore insufficient to require a plenary hearing as to this contention. 1967Under our rules this dismissal will be res judicata as to future efforts in State courts for it has been consistently held that where there has been a review by writ of error, including the presentation of a bill of exceptions, any claim which might have been raised, but was not, is considered waived. ( People v. Doherty, 36 Ill.2d 286, 291 ; Ciucci v. People, 21 Ill.2d 81, 85 ; People v. Dolgin, 6 Ill.2d 109, 111 .) And our statutory requirement of supporting material or adequate explanation of its absence is an independent and adequate State ground for dismissal of defendant's petition which | 2 | 1967–1968 |
People v. Dolgin
neutral
2 sentences1968(People v. Ashley; People v. Armes, 37 Ill.2d 457 ; People v. Hamby, 32 Ill.2d 291 ; Ciucci v. People, 21 Ill.2d 81 ; People v. Dolgin, 6 Ill.2d 109 .) As to petitioner’s contention that the State has suppressed evidence favorable to his defense, we note that not only did he fail to raise this issue on previous appeal but his allegation is unsupported by affidavit or other proof outside of his conclusionary statement, as required by section 122 — 2 of the Act, and is therefore insufficient to require a plenary hearing as to this contention. 1967Under our rules this dismissal will be res judicata as to future efforts in State courts for it has been consistently held that where there has been a review by writ of error, including the presentation of a bill of exceptions, any claim which might have been raised, but was not, is considered waived. ( People v. Doherty, 36 Ill.2d 286, 291 ; Ciucci v. People, 21 Ill.2d 81, 85 ; People v. Dolgin, 6 Ill.2d 109, 111 .) And our statutory requirement of supporting material or adequate explanation of its absence is an independent and adequate State ground for dismissal of defendant's petition which | 2 | 1967–1968 |
Hartz Construction v. Village of Western Springs
green
1 sentence2026Hartz Construction Co. v. Village of Western Springs, 2012 IL App (1st) 103108, ¶ 50 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Piester v. Escobar
green
1 sentence2026Piester, 2015 IL App (3d) 140457 , ¶ 13. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp.
green
2 sentences2023Fourth, Nicholas argues the court erred by reserving the issue of his parenting time after granting the plenary order of protection. ¶ 26 Because Chelsea has not filed an appellee’s brief in this case, we proceed in accordance with the principles set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128 , 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976). 2023Fourth, Nicholas argues the court erred by reserving the issue of his parenting time after granting the plenary order of protection. ¶ 26 Because Chelsea has not filed an appellee’s brief in this case, we proceed in accordance with the principles set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128 , 345 N.E.2d 493 (1976). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Felicia W.
green
1 sentence2020In re Jaber -4- W., 344 Ill. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Gakuba v. Kurtz
green
1 sentence2015Respondent argued that, because the -2- 2015 IL App (2d) 140252 court found, at the emergency hearing on the petition, that no course of conduct had been alleged or demonstrated, the matter should be dismissed. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Coleman
green
1 sentence1999People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366 (1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Wendl v. Moline Police Pension Board
green
1 sentence1987App. 3d 482 , 421 N.E.2d 584 .) Although plaintiff here may not be entitled to a plenary hearing before his benefits are terminated in circumstances such as here, it is clear that the board should have afforded Moore notice, some opportunity to be heard, and/or consideration of any request for reconsideration before the administrative proceedings were concluded. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Perry v. Sindermann
green
1 sentence1980Ed. 2d 570 , 92 S. Ct. 2694 , and Board of Regents v. Roth, and concluded that in the case of layoffs, as distinguished from discharges, a plenary hearing was not required. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Hinton v. Searles
green
1 sentence1979(Hinton v. Searles (1977), 53 Ill. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Goss v. Lopez
green
2 sentences1979The Muscare court placed great reliance upon Goss v. Lopez (1975), 419 U.S. 565 , 42 L. 1979The Muscare court placed great reliance upon Goss v. Lopez (1975), 419 U.S. 565 , 42 L. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
The PEOPLE v. Armes
neutral
1 sentence1968(People v. Ashley; People v. Armes, 37 Ill.2d 457 ; People v. Hamby, 32 Ill.2d 291 ; Ciucci v. People, 21 Ill.2d 81 ; People v. Dolgin, 6 Ill.2d 109 .) As to petitioner’s contention that the State has suppressed evidence favorable to his defense, we note that not only did he fail to raise this issue on previous appeal but his allegation is unsupported by affidavit or other proof outside of his conclusionary statement, as required by section 122 — 2 of the Act, and is therefore insufficient to require a plenary hearing as to this contention. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
The PEOPLE v. McGuire
green
1 sentence1968We specifically directed the trial court, if it found the confession inadmissible, to grant a new trial or, if it found it to be admissible, to enter a new judgment of conviction. 35 Ill.2d at 234 - Upon remandment, the trial court, following a plenary hearing where additional testimony was introduced, ruled the confession admissible and entered a new judgment of conviction. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
The PEOPLE v. Hamby
green
1 sentence1968(People v. Ashley; People v. Armes, 37 Ill.2d 457 ; People v. Hamby, 32 Ill.2d 291 ; Ciucci v. People, 21 Ill.2d 81 ; People v. Dolgin, 6 Ill.2d 109 .) As to petitioner’s contention that the State has suppressed evidence favorable to his defense, we note that not only did he fail to raise this issue on previous appeal but his allegation is unsupported by affidavit or other proof outside of his conclusionary statement, as required by section 122 — 2 of the Act, and is therefore insufficient to require a plenary hearing as to this contention. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
People v. Reeves
green
1 sentence1968People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555 ; see also People v. Ashley. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
The PEOPLE v. Doherty
green
1 sentence1967Under our rules this dismissal will be res judicata as to future efforts in State courts for it has been consistently held that where there has been a review by writ of error, including the presentation of a bill of exceptions, any claim which might have been raised, but was not, is considered waived. ( People v. Doherty, 36 Ill.2d 286, 291 ; Ciucci v. People, 21 Ill.2d 81, 85 ; People v. Dolgin, 6 Ill.2d 109, 111 .) And our statutory requirement of supporting material or adequate explanation of its absence is an independent and adequate State ground for dismissal of defendant's petition which | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.