plenary hearing in New York

2026Thus, "custody determinations should '[g]enerally' be made 'only after a full and plenary hearing and inquiry'" ( id. , quoting Obey v Degling , 37 NY2d 768, 770 ; see Matter of Dysko v Dysko , 213 AD3d 847 , 848).

2026"Although the Court of Appeals has 'decline[d] . . . to fashion a "one size fits all" rule mandating a hearing in every custody case statewide,' it has cautioned that a court 'opting to forgo a plenary hearing must take care to clearly articulate which factors were—or were not—material to its determination, and the evidence supporting its decision'" ( Matter of Corcoran v Liebowitz , 189 AD3d 1579, 1580-1581 , quoting S.L. v J.R. , 27 NY3d at 564 ).

2026Thus, "custody determinations should '[g]enerally' be made 'only after a full and plenary hearing and inquiry'" ( id. , quoting Obey v Degling , 37 NY2d 768, 770 ; see Matter of Dysko v Dysko , 213 AD3d 847 , 848).

2024Accordingly, "custody determinations should '[g]enerally' be made 'only after a full and plenary hearing and inquiry' " ( id. at 563 , 36 N.Y.S.3d 411 , 56 N.E.3d 193 , quoting Obey v. Degling, 37 NY2d 768, 770 , 375 N.Y.S.2d 91 , 337 N.E.2d 601 ; see Matter of Randall v. Diaz, 208 AD3d 1330, 1331 , 174 N.Y.S.3d 605 ).

2023Custody and parental access determinations should "[g]enerally be made only after a full and plenary hearing and inquiry" ( S.L. v J.R. , 27 NY3d 558, 563 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Fouyalle v Jackson , 187 AD3d 907 ).

2021Parental access determinations should "[g]enerally be made only after a full and plenary hearing and inquiry" ( S.L. v J.R. , 27 NY3d 558, 563 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Fouyalle v Jackson , 187 AD3d 907 ).

2024Accordingly, "custody determinations should '[g]enerally' be made 'only after a full and plenary hearing and inquiry' " ( id. at 563 , 36 N.Y.S.3d 411 , 56 N.E.3d 193 , quoting Obey v. Degling, 37 NY2d 768, 770 , 375 N.Y.S.2d 91 , 337 N.E.2d 601 ; see Matter of Randall v. Diaz, 208 AD3d 1330, 1331 , 174 N.Y.S.3d 605 ).

2024Accordingly, "custody determinations should '[g]enerally' be made 'only after a full and plenary hearing and inquiry' " ( id. at 563 , 36 N.Y.S.3d 411 , 56 N.E.3d 193 , quoting Obey v. Degling, 37 NY2d 768, 770 , 375 N.Y.S.2d 91 , 337 N.E.2d 601 ; see Matter of Randall v. Diaz, 208 AD3d 1330, 1331 , 174 N.Y.S.3d 605 ).

2023Turning to the modification issue, it is well settled that " 'an order entered on consent, without a plenary hearing, is entitled to less weight' " ( Matter of Virginia OO. v Alan PP. , 214 AD3d 1045 , 1046 [3d Dept 2023], quoting Matter of Whitcomb v Seward , 86 AD3d 741, 742 [3d Dept 2011]). " '[A] parent seeking to modify an existing custody order bears the burden of demonstrating a sufficient change in circumstances since the entry of the prior order to warrant modification thereof in the child's best interests' " ( Vanita UU. v Mahender VV. , 130 AD3d 1161, 1163 [3d Dept 2015], lv dismiss

2023Turning to the modification issue, it is well settled that " 'an order entered on consent, without a plenary hearing, is entitled to less weight' " ( Matter of Virginia OO. v Alan PP. , 214 AD3d 1045 , 1046 [3d Dept 2023], quoting Matter of Whitcomb v Seward , 86 AD3d 741, 742 [3d Dept 2011]). " '[A] parent seeking to modify an existing custody order bears the burden of demonstrating a sufficient change in circumstances since the entry of the prior order to warrant modification thereof in the child's best interests' " ( Vanita UU. v Mahender VV. , 130 AD3d 1161, 1163 [3d Dept 2015], lv dismiss

2018We first note that it was unnecessary for Supreme Court to consider whether a change in circumstances had occurred because the temporary custody order was issued without the benefit of a full plenary hearing ( see S.L. v J.R. , 27 NY3d 558, 563-564 [2016]; Matter of Bessette v Pelton , 29 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2006]) and, further, did not address holiday and vacation schedules.

2012Initially, Family Court correctly determined that because the custody arrangement ordered by Supreme Court in the divorce action followed from a plenary hearing and “reflects a considered and experienced judgment concerning all of the factors involved” (Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer, 55 NY2d 89, 94 [1982]; see Matter of Bessette v Felton, 29 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2006]; Matter of Bruce BB. v Debra CC., 307 AD2d 408, 409 [2003]), these proceedings should be evaluated under the standard applicable to a modification of custody.

2012Initially, Family Court correctly determined that because the custody arrangement ordered by Supreme Court in the divorce action followed from a plenary hearing and “reflects a considered and experienced judgment concerning all of the factors involved” (Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer, 55 NY2d 89, 94 [1982]; see Matter of Bessette v Felton, 29 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2006]; Matter of Bruce BB. v Debra CC., 307 AD2d 408, 409 [2003]), these proceedings should be evaluated under the standard applicable to a modification of custody.

2012Initially, Family Court correctly determined that because the custody arrangement ordered by Supreme Court in the divorce action followed from a plenary hearing and “reflects a considered and experienced judgment concerning all of the factors involved” (Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer, 55 NY2d 89, 94 [1982]; see Matter of Bessette v Felton, 29 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2006]; Matter of Bruce BB. v Debra CC., 307 AD2d 408, 409 [2003]), these proceedings should be evaluated under the standard applicable to a modification of custody.

2012Initially, Family Court correctly determined that because the custody arrangement ordered by Supreme Court in the divorce action followed from a plenary hearing and “reflects a considered and experienced judgment concerning all of the factors involved” (Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer, 55 NY2d 89, 94 [1982]; see Matter of Bessette v Felton, 29 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2006]; Matter of Bruce BB. v Debra CC., 307 AD2d 408, 409 [2003]), these proceedings should be evaluated under the standard applicable to a modification of custody.

2012Initially, Family Court correctly determined that because the custody arrangement ordered by Supreme Court in the divorce action followed from a plenary hearing and “reflects a considered and experienced judgment concerning all of the factors involved” (Friederwitzer v Friederwitzer, 55 NY2d 89, 94 [1982]; see Matter of Bessette v Felton, 29 AD3d 1085, 1087 [2006]; Matter of Bruce BB. v Debra CC., 307 AD2d 408, 409 [2003]), these proceedings should be evaluated under the standard applicable to a modification of custody.

2013Partially based on the erroneous assumption that the custody order in Family Court was made after a plenary hearing, rather than on consent, the court suggested it was giving res judicata effect to Family Court’s custody “decision” that Kevin’s best interests lie in living with the father, and required the mother to “establish a change in circumstances reflecting a real need for change in order to insure the continued best interest of the child” (Matter of Dobies v Brefka, 83 AD3d 1148, 1149 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Anthony MM. v Jacquelyn NN., 91

2013Partially based on the erroneous assumption that the custody order in Family Court was made after a plenary hearing, rather than on consent, the court suggested it was giving res judicata effect to Family Court’s custody “decision” that Kevin’s best interests lie in living with the father, and required the mother to “establish a change in circumstances reflecting a real need for change in order to insure the continued best interest of the child” (Matter of Dobies v Brefka, 83 AD3d 1148, 1149 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Anthony MM. v Jacquelyn NN., 91

2012The fact that the prior order arose out of a stipulation between the parties, and a plenary hearing has yet to be held on the issue of custody, also weighs in favor of a full hearing (see Matter of Giovanni v Hall, 86 AD3d at 677 ; see generally Matter of Prefario v Gladhill, 90 AD3d 1351, 1352 [2011]; Matter of Eunice G. v Michael G., 85 AD3d 1339, 1340 [2011]). * Accordingly, we remit the matter to Family Court for a full evidentiary hearing to resolve the issues of change in circumstances and best interests of the child.

2012The fact that the prior order arose out of a stipulation between the parties, and a plenary hearing has yet to be held on the issue of custody, also weighs in favor of a full hearing (see Matter of Giovanni v Hall, 86 AD3d at 677 ; see generally Matter of Prefario v Gladhill, 90 AD3d 1351, 1352 [2011]; Matter of Eunice G. v Michael G., 85 AD3d 1339, 1340 [2011]). * Accordingly, we remit the matter to Family Court for a full evidentiary hearing to resolve the issues of change in circumstances and best interests of the child.

2023Custody determinations should generally be made only after a full and plenary hearing ( see O'Mahoney v O'Mahoney , 206 AD3d 819, 820 ; Silla v Silla , 200 AD3d 1091, 1092 ; Trazzera v Trazzera , 199 AD3d 855, 858 ).

2021"Custody determinations should generally be made only after a full and plenary hearing" ( Palazzola v Palazzola , 188 AD3d 1081 , 1082; see Trazzera v Trazzera , ___ AD3d ___, ___, 2021 NY Slip Op 06208, *3 [2d Dept]; Matter of Poltorak v Poltorak , 167 AD3d 903 , 905).

2017The prior stipulated order is a relevant factor to consider when assessing whether a child’s best interests are served by modification, although it is entitled to less weight than an order entered following a plenary hearing (see Matter of Hrostowski v Micha, 132 AD3d 1103, 1105 [2015]; Matter of Crippen v Keator, 9 AD3d 535, 536 [2004]).

2007The parties’ 2001 custody arrangement to which they stipulated is a factor to be considered in this analysis, although it is entitled to less weight than a custody order that resulted from a plenary hearing (see Redder v Redder, 17 AD3d at 13 ; Matter of Crippen v Keator, 9 AD3d at 536 ).

2025"While [c]ustody determinations should generally be made only after a full and plenary hearing, [a] party seeking a change in . . . custody is not automatically entitled to a hearing, but must make an evidentiary showing sufficient to warrant a hearing" ( id. at 1173 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Dubouse v Narita , 214 AD3d at 799 ).

2025"While [c]ustody determinations should generally be made only after a full and plenary hearing, [a] party seeking a change in . . . custody is not automatically entitled to a hearing, but must make an evidentiary showing sufficient to warrant a hearing" ( id. at 1173 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Dubouse v Narita , 214 AD3d at 799 ).

2024The prior stipulated order is a relevant factor to consider when assessing whether a child's best interests are served by modification, although it is entitled to less weight than an order entered following a plenary hearing ( see Eschbach v Eschbach , 56 NY2d 167, 172 [1982]; Matter of Virginia OO. v Alan PP. , 214 AD3d 1045 , 1046 [3d Dept 2023]).

2020"This general rule furthers the substantial interest, shared by the State, the children, and the parents, in ensuring that custody proceedings generate a just and enduring result that, above all else, serves the best interest of a child" ( S.L. v J.R. , 27 NY3d at 563 ; see Eschbach v Eschbach , 56 NY2d 167, 171 ).

2026"While the general right to a hearing in custody and visitation cases is not absolute, where 'facts material to the best interest analysis, and the circumstances surrounding such facts, remain in dispute,' a hearing is required" (<i>Palazzola v Palazzola</i>, 188 AD3d 1081, 1082 , quoting <i>S.L. v J.R.</i>, 27 NY3d at 564 ). "'[A] court opting to forgo a plenary hearing must take care to clearly articulate which factors were—or were not—material to its determination, and the evidence supporting its decision'" (<i>Matter of Horoshko v Pasieshvili</i>, 238 AD3d at 1039, quoting <i>S.L. v J.R.</

2024"Although [a] parent seeking a change of custody is not automatically entitled to a hearing, custody determinations should [g]enerally be made only after a full and plenary hearing and inquiry" ( Matter of Merchant v Caldwell , 198 AD3d 782 , 783 [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Baez-Delgadillo v Moya , 215 AD3d 829, 830 ). "'This general rule furthers the substantial interest, shared by the State, the children, and the parents, in ensuring that custody proceedings generate a just and enduring result that, above all else, serves the best interest of a child'" ( Ma

2022Accordingly, "custody determinations should '[g]enerally' be made 'only after a full and plenary hearing and inquiry'" ( id. at 563 , quoting Obey v Degling , 37 NY2d 768, 770 ; see Brin v Shady , 179 AD3d 760, 761-762 ).

2020Although the Court of Appeals has "decline[d] . . . to fashion a 'one size fits all' rule mandating a hearing in every custody case statewide," it has cautioned that a court "opting to forgo a plenary hearing must take care to clearly articulate which factors were—or were not—material to its determination, and the evidence supporting its decision" ( S.L. v. J.R. , 27 NY3d at 564 ; see Brin v Shady , 179 AD3d 760, 762 ).

2021This general rule furthers the substantial interest, shared by the State, the children, and the parents, in ensuring that custody proceedings generate a just and enduring result that, above all else, serves the best interests of the child" ( Matter of Fraser v Fleary , 147 AD3d at 938 ; see S.L. v. J.R. , 27 NY3d at 563 ; Obey v Degling , 37 NY2d 768, 770 ). "[A] court opting to forgo a plenary hearing must take care to clearly articulate which factors were—or were not—material to its determination, and the evidence supporting its decision" ( S.L. v J.R. , 27 NY3d at 564 ; see Matter of Fraser

2021This general rule furthers the substantial interest, shared by the State, the children, and the parents, in ensuring that custody proceedings generate a just and enduring result that, above all else, serves the best interests of the child" ( Matter of Fraser v Fleary , 147 AD3d at 938 ; see S.L. v. J.R. , 27 NY3d at 563 ; Obey v Degling , 37 NY2d 768, 770 ). "[A] court opting to forgo a plenary hearing must take care to clearly articulate which factors were—or were not—material to its determination, and the evidence supporting its decision" ( S.L. v J.R. , 27 NY3d at 564 ; see Matter of Fraser

2011Under that test, an order entered on consent, without a plenary hearing, is entitled to less weight (see Redder v Redder, 17 AD3d 10, 13 [2005]).

2007The parties’ 2001 custody arrangement to which they stipulated is a factor to be considered in this analysis, although it is entitled to less weight than a custody order that resulted from a plenary hearing (see Redder v Redder, 17 AD3d at 13 ; Matter of Crippen v Keator, 9 AD3d at 536 ).

2011While a hearing “is constitutionally permissible where contemporaneous medical evidence, affording ‘a plenary inquiry into [the] defendant’s competency’ during the relevant proceeding, is available” (People v Galea, 54 AD3d 686 , 688 [2008], quoting People v Hudson, 19 NY2d 137, 140 [1967]; e.g.

2008Nonetheless, a reconstruction competency hearing is constitutionally permissible where contemporaneous medical evidence, affording “a plenary inquiry into [the] defendant’s competency” during the relevant proceeding, is available (People v Hudson, 19 NY2d 137, 140 [1967], cert denied 398 US 944 [1970]; see People v Arnold, 113 AD2d 101, 107 [1985]; People v McGill, 36 AD2d 827 , 828 [1971]).

2026Custody determinations should generally "be made only after a full and plenary hearing and inquiry, or, where a party failed to appear, after an inquest" ( Matter of Otero v Walker , 221 AD3d at 715 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Paez v Bambauer , 230 AD3d at 588).

2024"Generally, the court's determination should be made only after a full and plenary hearing and inquiry, or, where a party failed to appear, after an inquest" ( Matter of Otero v Walker , 221 AD3d 714, 715 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]).