plenary hearing in Texas

2015Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex.1992) (explaining a plenary hearing is a hearing at which witnesses present sworn testimony in person or by deposition rather than by affidavit).

2011“Ordinarily, contested issues are decided after a plenary hearing, that is, a hearing at which witnesses present sworn testimony in person or by deposition rather than by affidavit.” Id.

2010See Gardner , 306 S.W.3d at 305–06 (holding that appellant did not present motion for new trial because there was “no indication in the record that the motion for new trial was, in fact, hand-delivered to the trial judge [or] that the trial judge ever saw the motion” and that document titled “Order for a Setting” did not “suffice as a request to hold a hearing on the motion”); Rozell , 176 S.W.3d at 231 (holding record did not show the trial court had actual notice of request for hearing when proposed order included “options of having a hearing or ruling on the motion without a hearing”); Burr

2010See Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 305–06 (holding that appellant did not present motion for new trial because there was “no indication in the record that the motion for new trial was, in fact, hand-delivered to the trial judge [or] that the trial judge ever saw the motion” and that document titled “Order for a Setting” did not “suffice as a request to hold a hearing on the motion”); Rozell, 176 S.W.3d at 231 (holding record did not show the trial court had actual notice of request for hearing when proposed order included “options of having a hearing or ruling on the motion without a hearing”); Burrus

2010See Gardner , 306 S.W.3d at 305–06 (holding that appellant did not present motion for new trial because there was “no indication in the record that the motion for new trial was, in fact, hand-delivered to the trial judge [or] that the trial judge ever saw the motion” and that document titled “Order for a Setting” did not “suffice as a request to hold a hearing on the motion”); Rozell , 176 S.W.3d at 231 (holding record did not show the trial court had actual notice of request for hearing when proposed order included “options of having a hearing or ruling on the motion without a hearing”); Burr

2010See Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 305–06 (holding that appellant did not present motion for new trial because there was “no indication in the record that the motion for new trial was, in fact, hand-delivered to the trial judge [or] that the trial judge ever saw the motion” and that document titled “Order for a Setting” did not “suffice as a request to hold a hearing on the motion”); Rozell, 176 S.W.3d at 231 (holding record did not show the trial court had actual notice of request for hearing when proposed order included “options of having a hearing or ruling on the motion without a hearing”); Burrus

2010See Gardner , 306 S.W.3d at 305–06 (holding that appellant did not present motion for new trial because there was “no indication in the record that the motion for new trial was, in fact, hand-delivered to the trial judge [or] that the trial judge ever saw the motion” and that document titled “Order for a Setting” did not “suffice as a request to hold a hearing on the motion”); Rozell , 176 S.W.3d at 231 (holding record did not show the trial court had actual notice of request for hearing when proposed order included “options of having a hearing or ruling on the motion without a hearing”); Burr

2010See Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 305–06 (holding that appellant did not present motion for new trial because there was “no indication in the record that the motion for new trial was, in fact, hand-delivered to the trial judge [or] that the trial judge ever saw the motion” and that document titled “Order for a Setting” did not “suffice as a request to hold a hearing on the motion”); Rozell, 176 S.W.3d at 231 (holding record did not show the trial court had actual notice of request for hearing when proposed order included “options of having a hearing or ruling on the motion without a hearing”); Burrus

2010See Gardner , 306 S.W.3d at 305–06 (holding that appellant did not present motion for new trial because there was “no indication in the record that the motion for new trial was, in fact, hand-delivered to the trial judge [or] that the trial judge ever saw the motion” and that document titled “Order for a Setting” did not “suffice as a request to hold a hearing on the motion”); Rozell , 176 S.W.3d at 231 (holding record did not show the trial court had actual notice of request for hearing when proposed order included “options of having a hearing or ruling on the motion without a hearing”); Burr

2010See Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 305–06 (holding that appellant did not present motion for new trial because there was “no indication in the record that the motion for new trial was, in fact, hand-delivered to the trial judge [or] that the trial judge ever saw the motion” and that document titled “Order for a Setting” did not “suffice as a request to hold a hearing on the motion”); Rozell, 176 S.W.3d at 231 (holding record did not show the trial court had actual notice of request for hearing when proposed order included “options of having a hearing or ruling on the motion without a hearing”); Burrus

2009Therefore, “[g]iven the heightened responsibility of the trial court in approving [the award of attorney’s fees under Texas Labor Code section 408.221], . . . a plenary hearing, with the opportunity for questioning by the court and vigorous cross-examination by counsel . . . should be -7- Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 04-08-00757-CV the general rule.” Id.

2009Therefore, “[g]iven the heightened responsibility of the trial court in approving [the award of attorney’s fees under Texas Labor Code section 408.221], ... a plenary hearing, with the opportunity for questioning by the court and vigorous cross-examination by counsel ... should be the general rule.” Id.

2021See 391 S.W.2d 723 , 724– 25 (Tex. 1965); In re K.M.S., 68 S.W.3d 61, 66 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001), pet. denied, 91 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. 2002). “[W]hen a court order purports to declare that the parental rights to a child have terminated and the parent is not cited, such parent is entitled thereafter to a plenary hearing to determine whether or not such parental rights have in fact been lost . . . .” Gunn, 391 S.W.2d at 724 .

2021See 391 S.W.2d 723 , 724– 25 (Tex. 1965); In re K.M.S., 68 S.W.3d 61, 66 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001), pet. denied, 91 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. 2002). “[W]hen a court order purports to declare that the parental rights to a child have terminated and the parent is not cited, such parent is entitled thereafter to a plenary hearing to determine whether or not such parental rights have in fact been lost . . . .” Gunn, 391 S.W.2d at 724 .

2021See 391 S.W.2d 723 , 724– 25 (Tex. 1965); In re K.M.S., 68 S.W.3d 61, 66 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001), pet. denied, 91 S.W.3d 331 (Tex. 2002). “[W]hen a court order purports to declare that the parental rights to a child have terminated and the parent is not cited, such parent is entitled thereafter to a plenary hearing to determine whether or not such parental rights have in fact been lost . . . .” Gunn, 391 S.W.2d at 724 .

1996See In re General Motors Corp., 55 F.3d at 795-96 (holding that findings regarding the fairness of the settlement cannot serve as “a surrogate for” certification findings because “the settlement approval inquiry is far different from the certification inquiry”); 2 Newberg & Conte, § 11.27, at 11-50 (noting that the trial court must still make certification findings in the settlement class action context).

1993In re Estate of Hillje, 830 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1992, no writ).

1986See Keystone Life Insurance, 687 S.W.2d at 93 .

1985Irving Bank & Trust Co. v. Second Land Corp., 544 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r. e.).

1985Irving Bank & Trust Co. v. Second Land Corp., 544 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1976, writ ref’d n.r. e.).

1984See Dayan v. McDonald’s Corporation, 78 Ill.App.8d 194, 33 Ill.Dec. 768, 772 , 397 N.E.2d 101, 105 (1979); Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 45 Ill.App.3d 849 , 4 Ill.Dec. 450, 453 , 360 N.E.2d 386, 389 (1977); Hager v. Hager, 1 Ill.App.3d 1047 , 274 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ill.App.1971); Biel v. Boehm, 94 Misc.2d 946 , 406 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1978). 2 In accordance with these decisions, as well as our reading of the Act, we hold that a plenary suit must be filed and a plenary hearing held in a Texas court before a foreign country judgment is entitled to recognition and enforcement.

1984See Dayan v. McDonald’s Corporation, 78 Ill.App.8d 194, 33 Ill.Dec. 768, 772 , 397 N.E.2d 101, 105 (1979); Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 45 Ill.App.3d 849 , 4 Ill.Dec. 450, 453 , 360 N.E.2d 386, 389 (1977); Hager v. Hager, 1 Ill.App.3d 1047 , 274 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ill.App.1971); Biel v. Boehm, 94 Misc.2d 946 , 406 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1978). 2 In accordance with these decisions, as well as our reading of the Act, we hold that a plenary suit must be filed and a plenary hearing held in a Texas court before a foreign country judgment is entitled to recognition and enforcement.

1984See Dayan v. McDonald’s Corporation, 78 Ill.App.8d 194, 33 Ill.Dec. 768, 772 , 397 N.E.2d 101, 105 (1979); Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 45 Ill.App.3d 849 , 4 Ill.Dec. 450, 453 , 360 N.E.2d 386, 389 (1977); Hager v. Hager, 1 Ill.App.3d 1047 , 274 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ill.App.1971); Biel v. Boehm, 94 Misc.2d 946 , 406 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1978). 2 In accordance with these decisions, as well as our reading of the Act, we hold that a plenary suit must be filed and a plenary hearing held in a Texas court before a foreign country judgment is entitled to recognition and enforcement.

1984See Dayan v. McDonald’s Corporation, 78 Ill.App.8d 194, 33 Ill.Dec. 768, 772 , 397 N.E.2d 101, 105 (1979); Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 45 Ill.App.3d 849 , 4 Ill.Dec. 450, 453 , 360 N.E.2d 386, 389 (1977); Hager v. Hager, 1 Ill.App.3d 1047 , 274 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ill.App.1971); Biel v. Boehm, 94 Misc.2d 946 , 406 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1978). 2 In accordance with these decisions, as well as our reading of the Act, we hold that a plenary suit must be filed and a plenary hearing held in a Texas court before a foreign country judgment is entitled to recognition and enforcement.

1984See Dayan v. McDonald’s Corporation, 78 Ill.App.8d 194, 33 Ill.Dec. 768, 772 , 397 N.E.2d 101, 105 (1979); Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 45 Ill.App.3d 849 , 4 Ill.Dec. 450, 453 , 360 N.E.2d 386, 389 (1977); Hager v. Hager, 1 Ill.App.3d 1047 , 274 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ill.App.1971); Biel v. Boehm, 94 Misc.2d 946 , 406 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1978). 2 In accordance with these decisions, as well as our reading of the Act, we hold that a plenary suit must be filed and a plenary hearing held in a Texas court before a foreign country judgment is entitled to recognition and enforcement.

1984See Dayan v. McDonald’s Corporation, 78 Ill.App.8d 194, 33 Ill.Dec. 768, 772 , 397 N.E.2d 101, 105 (1979); Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 45 Ill.App.3d 849 , 4 Ill.Dec. 450, 453 , 360 N.E.2d 386, 389 (1977); Hager v. Hager, 1 Ill.App.3d 1047 , 274 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ill.App.1971); Biel v. Boehm, 94 Misc.2d 946 , 406 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1978). 2 In accordance with these decisions, as well as our reading of the Act, we hold that a plenary suit must be filed and a plenary hearing held in a Texas court before a foreign country judgment is entitled to recognition and enforcement.

1984See Dayan v. McDonald’s Corporation, 78 Ill.App.8d 194, 33 Ill.Dec. 768, 772 , 397 N.E.2d 101, 105 (1979); Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 45 Ill.App.3d 849 , 4 Ill.Dec. 450, 453 , 360 N.E.2d 386, 389 (1977); Hager v. Hager, 1 Ill.App.3d 1047 , 274 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ill.App.1971); Biel v. Boehm, 94 Misc.2d 946 , 406 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1978). 2 In accordance with these decisions, as well as our reading of the Act, we hold that a plenary suit must be filed and a plenary hearing held in a Texas court before a foreign country judgment is entitled to recognition and enforcement.

1984See Dayan v. McDonald’s Corporation, 78 Ill.App.8d 194, 33 Ill.Dec. 768, 772 , 397 N.E.2d 101, 105 (1979); Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 45 Ill.App.3d 849 , 4 Ill.Dec. 450, 453 , 360 N.E.2d 386, 389 (1977); Hager v. Hager, 1 Ill.App.3d 1047 , 274 N.E.2d 157, 160 (Ill.App.1971); Biel v. Boehm, 94 Misc.2d 946 , 406 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1978). 2 In accordance with these decisions, as well as our reading of the Act, we hold that a plenary suit must be filed and a plenary hearing held in a Texas court before a foreign country judgment is entitled to recognition and enforcement.