11 California opinions name it 1 courts 1955–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Boardgreen2 sentences1998The court may limit or prohibit public admission to hearings.” 3 Moreover, “[t]he Legislature may not give to courts a jurisdiction beyond that conferred by the Constitution.” (Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 335, 347 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 595 P.2d 579 ].) Any legislation conferring a plenary hearing of right in original proceedings before appellate courts risks conflict with article VI, section 10, of the California Constitution. ([Joyce G. v. Superior Court, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1513-1514.) 4 Petitioner told authorities she was an “ill 1998The court may limit or prohibit public admission to hearings.” 3 Moreover, “[t]he Legislature may not give to courts a jurisdiction beyond that conferred by the Constitution.” (Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 335, 347 [ 156 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 595 P.2d 579 ].) Any legislation conferring a plenary hearing of right in original proceedings before appellate courts risks conflict with article VI, section 10, of the California Constitution. ([Joyce G. v. Superior Court, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1513-1514.) 4 Petitioner told authorities she was an “ill | 1 | 2 |
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. L.L.green1 sentence2014See also In re Angel L., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1139 [“[e]ven though emergency jurisdiction ordinarily is intended to be short term and limited, [the court] may continue to exercise its authority as long as the risk of harm creating the emergency is ongoing”].) In this case, we conclude as an initial matter upon review of the relevant record the juvenile court properly invoked temporary emergency jurisdiction at the commencement of the California proceedings because minor came within the statutory definition of “abandoned,” meaning she had been “left without provision for reasonable and | 1 | 1 |
In Re Joseph D.green2 sentences2001(Id. at p. 691, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 574 .) Therefore, while the court properly exercised jurisdiction when it conducted a plenary hearing to determine whether an emergency existed, an emergency is not necessarily coextensive with the dependency. 2001(Id. at p. 692, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 574 .) We agree that emergency jurisdiction is short-term and limited. | 1 | 1 |
Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. California Development Co.green2 sentences1972(Title Insurance and Trust Co. v. California Development Co. (1915) 171 Cal. 173, 218 [ 152 P. 542 ], and cases there cited.) Development, incorporated in Texas but with its principal office in California, contends we should avoid the issue of the constitutionality of subdivision 2 as applied to it by redefining the phrase “not residing in this state” to exclude foreign corporations whose principal place of business is located in California, and thereby uphold the order quashing the attachment. 1972(Title Insurance and Trust Co. v. California Development Co. (1915) 171 Cal. 173, 218 [ 152 P. 542 ], and cases there cited.) Development, incorporated in Texas but with its principal office in California, contends we should avoid the issue of the constitutionality of subdivision 2 as applied to it by redefining the phrase “not residing in this state” to exclude foreign corporations whose principal place of business is located in California, and thereby uphold the order quashing the attachment. | 1 | 1 |
San Juan Gold Co. v. San Juan Ridge Mutual Water Ass'ngreen2 sentences1955Water Assn., 34 Cal.App.2d 159, 174 [ 93 P.2d 582 ] : “the evidence plays no part in determining the corectness of a ruling on a demurrer.” It is appellant’s contention that the ruling in the instant case, sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, resulting in a dismissal as to the respondent RKO, determines as a matter of law, issues of fact which should only be decided after a plenary hearing on the merits. 1955Water Assn., 34 Cal.App.2d 159, 174 [ 93 P.2d 582 ] : “the evidence plays no part in determining the corectness of a ruling on a demurrer.” It is appellant’s contention that the ruling in the instant case, sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, resulting in a dismissal as to the respondent RKO, determines as a matter of law, issues of fact which should only be decided after a plenary hearing on the merits. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Stephanie M.
green
2 sentences2001In In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th 295 , 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 595 , 867 P.2d 706 , our Supreme Court found that the juvenile court had continuing jurisdiction over the minor pursuant to the Family Code section providing for emergency jurisdiction. 2001In In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th 295 , our Supreme Court found that the juvenile court had continuing jurisdiction over the minor pursuant to the Family Code section providing for emergency jurisdiction. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Cole v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1993A court’s determination of its jurisdiction “should not be made ‘in a rush to judgment’ but rather ‘after a full and fair evidentiary hearing.’ ” ( Beach, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d 955, 963 , quoting Cole, supra, 173 Cal.App.3d 265, 272 .) II As we understand Mark’s alternative argument, Mark contends that even if an emergency existed and invocation of emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Act was warranted, the case should have been returned to Pennsylvania after the jurisdictional hearing was completed. 1993A court's determination of its jurisdiction "should not be made `in a rush to judgment' but rather `after a full and fair evidentiary hearing.'" ( Beach, supra, 194 Cal. App.3d 955, 963 , quoting Cole, supra, 173 Cal. App.3d 265, 272 .) II (3) As we understand Mark's alternative argument, Mark contends that even if an emergency existed and invocation of emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Act was warranted, the case should have been returned to Pennsylvania after the jurisdictional hearing was completed. | 2 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Beach
green
2 sentences1993A court’s determination of its jurisdiction “should not be made ‘in a rush to judgment’ but rather ‘after a full and fair evidentiary hearing.’ ” ( Beach, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d 955, 963 , quoting Cole, supra, 173 Cal.App.3d 265, 272 .) II As we understand Mark’s alternative argument, Mark contends that even if an emergency existed and invocation of emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Act was warranted, the case should have been returned to Pennsylvania after the jurisdictional hearing was completed. 1993A court's determination of its jurisdiction "should not be made `in a rush to judgment' but rather `after a full and fair evidentiary hearing.'" ( Beach, supra, 194 Cal. App.3d 955, 963 , quoting Cole, supra, 173 Cal. App.3d 265, 272 .) II (3) As we understand Mark's alternative argument, Mark contends that even if an emergency existed and invocation of emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Act was warranted, the case should have been returned to Pennsylvania after the jurisdictional hearing was completed. | 2 | 1993–1993 |
State Ex Rel. D.S.K. v. Kasper
green
2 sentences1993“New Jersey must not abdicate it [sz'c] parens patriae duty to these children.” (Id. at p. 728; but compare State in Interest of D.S.K. (1990) 133 Utah 14 [ 792 P.2d 118, 127 ] [“temporary order should continue only as long as necessary to contact the decree state and determine which court is the correct forum to handle the emergency abuse or neglect claim and to litigate the modification issue”].) Given the circumstances presented here, we find it was proper for the juvenile court to conduct a plenary hearing to determine if an emergency existed. 1993"New Jersey must not abdicate it [ sic ] parens patriae duty to these children." ( Id. at p. 728; but compare State in Interest of D.S.K. (1990) 133 Utah 14 [ 792 P.2d 118, 127 ] ["temporary order should continue only as long as necessary to contact the decree state and determine which court is the correct forum to handle the emergency abuse or neglect claim and to litigate the modification issue"].) Given the circumstances presented here, we find it was proper for the juvenile court to conduct a plenary hearing to determine if an emergency existed. | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Marcrum v. Marcrum
green
2 sentences1993(See Donigan, Child Custody Jurisdiction: New Legislation Reflects Public Policy Against Parental Abduction (1983-84) 19 Gonzaga L.Rev. 1, 57-59.) The court in Marcrum v. Marcrum (1981) 181 N.J.Super. 361 [ 437 A.2d 725, 727-728 ], held a plenary hearing should be conducted to weigh all the evidence bearing on the alleged mistreatment or abuse of the children. 1993(See Donigan, Child Custody Jurisdiction: New Legislation Reflects Public Policy Against Parental Abduction (1983-84) 19 Gonzaga L.Rev. 1, 57-59.) The court in Marcrum v. Marcrum (1981) 181 N.J.Super. 361 [ 437 A.2d 725, 727-728 ], held a plenary hearing should be conducted to weigh all the evidence bearing on the alleged mistreatment or abuse of the children. | 2 | 1993–1993 |
In Re Nada R.
green
2 sentences2014(In re Jorge G. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 125, 131-132 ; In re C.T., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 108-109.) Further, “[a]ssumption of emergency jurisdiction is an assumption of temporary jurisdiction only. [Citation.] Therefore, while the court [may] properly exercise[] jurisdiction when . . . conduct[ing] a plenary hearing to determine whether an emergency existed, an emergency is not necessarily coextensive with the dependency.” (In re Nada R., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1175 .) As explained by our appellate colleagues in the Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, “emergency jurisdiction 2014(In re Jorge G. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 125, 131-132 ; In re C.T., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 108-109.) Further, “[a]ssumption of emergency jurisdiction is an assumption of temporary jurisdiction only. [Citation.] Therefore, while the court [may] properly exercise[] jurisdiction when . . . conduct[ing] a plenary hearing to determine whether an emergency existed, an emergency is not necessarily coextensive with the dependency.” (In re Nada R., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1175 .) As explained by our appellate colleagues in the Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, “emergency jurisdiction | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Jorge G.
green
1 sentence2014(In re Jorge G. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 125, 131-132 ; In re C.T., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 108-109.) Further, “[a]ssumption of emergency jurisdiction is an assumption of temporary jurisdiction only. [Citation.] Therefore, while the court [may] properly exercise[] jurisdiction when . . . conduct[ing] a plenary hearing to determine whether an emergency existed, an emergency is not necessarily coextensive with the dependency.” (In re Nada R., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1175 .) As explained by our appellate colleagues in the Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, “emergency jurisdiction | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re CT
green
1 sentence2014(In re Jorge G. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 125, 131-132 ; In re C.T., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 108-109.) Further, “[a]ssumption of emergency jurisdiction is an assumption of temporary jurisdiction only. [Citation.] Therefore, while the court [may] properly exercise[] jurisdiction when . . . conduct[ing] a plenary hearing to determine whether an emergency existed, an emergency is not necessarily coextensive with the dependency.” (In re Nada R., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at p. 1175 .) As explained by our appellate colleagues in the Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, “emergency jurisdiction | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Beckett v. Kaynar Manufacturing Co.
green
1 sentence1985Co., supra, 49 Cal.2d 695, 699 .) Rules 10 and 901 of the Los Angeles Superior Court Manual of Policy and Procedure for Writs and Receivers matters, cited by appellants, are consistent with the above authorities, in that they allow the court in its discretion to grant a plenary hearing on charging orders. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick
green
1 sentence1972In Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick (D.Conn. 1971) 323 F. Supp. 100 , the district court upheld the constitutionality of Connecticut’s foreign attachment statute, holding that the subsequent plenary hearing in the main action satisfied the requirement of due process of law for pre-judgment attachment of real property. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
In Re Barents
green
2 sentences1960As stated in In re Barents, supra, 99 Cal.App.2d 748 , at page 750: “The state ... is of course charged with a continuing interest in the welfare of children within its borders and our state has surrounded the matter of their custody and care, including their adoption, with many protective statutory laws. ’ ’ The order denying the motion of appellant to vacate and set aside the decree of adoption and the order granting the *149 motion of respondent for entry of the decree of adoption nunc pro tunc as of October 1,. 1958, are reversed. 1960As stated in In re Barents, supra, 99 Cal.App.2d 748 , at page 750: “The state ... is of course charged with a continuing interest in the welfare of children within its borders and our state has surrounded the matter of their custody and care, including their adoption, with many protective statutory laws. ’ ’ The order denying the motion of appellant to vacate and set aside the decree of adoption and the order granting the *149 motion of respondent for entry of the decree of adoption nunc pro tunc as of October 1,. 1958, are reversed. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.