heart inquiry in Maryland

1996As set out in Croyle : “The very heart of the doctrine of estoppel, through laches, is that the defendant’s alleged change of position for the worse must have been induced by, or resulted from, the conduct, misrepresentation or silence of the plaintiff.” 184 Md. at 136 , 40 A.2d at 379 .

1996As set out in Croyle : “The very heart of the doctrine of estoppel, through laches, is that the defendant’s alleged change of position for the worse must have been induced by, or resulted from, the conduct, misrepresentation or silence of the plaintiff.” 184 Md. at 136 , 40 A.2d at 379 .

1979As we said in Duncan and Smith v. State, supra , "the expectation of privacy ... is at the heart of the test for abandonment." 281 Md. at 262 .

1979Venner v. State, supra. As we said in Duncan and Smith v. State, supra, “the expectation of privacy ... is at the heart of the test for abandonment.” 281 Md. at 262 .

1995It is the expectation of privacy which is at the heart of the test for abandonment. " ‘The proper test ... is not whether all formal property rights have been relinquished, but whether the complaining party retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the articles alleged to be abandoned.’ ” Venner v. State, 279 Md. 47, 53 [ 367 A.2d 949 ] (1977), quoting United States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901 (9th Cir.1972), ce rt. denied, 414 U.S. 868 [ 94 S.Ct. 176 , 38 L.Ed.2d 116 ] (1973).

1977It is the expectation of privacy which is at the heart of the test for abandonment. “ ‘The proper test for abandonment is not whether all formal property rights have been relinquished, but whether the complaining party retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the articles alleged to be abandoned.’ ” Venner v. State, 279 Md. 47, 53 , 367 A. 2d 949 (1977), quoting United States v. Wilson, 472 F. 2d 901 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 868 (1973).

1995It is the expectation of privacy which is at the heart of the test for abandonment. " ‘The proper test ... is not whether all formal property rights have been relinquished, but whether the complaining party retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the articles alleged to be abandoned.’ ” Venner v. State, 279 Md. 47, 53 [ 367 A.2d 949 ] (1977), quoting United States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901 (9th Cir.1972), ce rt. denied, 414 U.S. 868 [ 94 S.Ct. 176 , 38 L.Ed.2d 116 ] (1973).

1977It is the expectation of privacy which is at the heart of the test for abandonment. “ ‘The proper test for abandonment is not whether all formal property rights have been relinquished, but whether the complaining party retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the articles alleged to be abandoned.’ ” Venner v. State, 279 Md. 47, 53 , 367 A. 2d 949 (1977), quoting United States v. Wilson, 472 F. 2d 901 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 868 (1973).

1976The heart of that doctrine was expressed by Justice Holmes in the very case that gave birth to the doctrine, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392 , 40 S. Ct. 182 , 64 L.

1976The heart of that doctrine was expressed by Justice Holmes in the very case that gave birth to the doctrine, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 392 , 40 S. Ct. 182 , 64 L.

1970In view of this, the doctrine of laches is frequently invoked to bar the questioning of a divorce decree after any considerable period of time by one who has knowledge thereof but who failed to act with reasonable promptitude.’ ” “In Croyle v. Croyle, supra, Judge Melvin, speaking for the Court defined laches as follows: “ ‘The very heart of the doctrine of estoppel, through laches, is that the defendant’s alleged change of position for the worse must have been induced by, or resulted from, the conduct, misrepresentation or silence of the plaintiff.’ (Page 136 of 184 Md.; page 379 of 40 A. 2d)

1970In view of this, the doctrine of laches is frequently invoked to bar the questioning of a divorce decree after any considerable period of time by one who has knowledge thereof but who failed to act with reasonable promptitude.’ ” “In Croyle v. Croyle, supra, Judge Melvin, speaking for the Court defined laches as follows: “ ‘The very heart of the doctrine of estoppel, through laches, is that the defendant’s alleged change of position for the worse must have been induced by, or resulted from, the conduct, misrepresentation or silence of the plaintiff.’ (Page 136 of 184 Md.; page 379 of 40 A. 2d)

2011The Court’s focus was on “whether the use of the term ‘convict’ in the heart of the inquiry, rendered the question untenable[.]” Id. at 736 , 997 A.2d 154 .

2011The Court’s focus was on “whether the use of the term ‘convict’ in the heart of the inquiry, rendered the question untenable[.]” Id. at 736 , 997 A.2d 154 .

2010Because we have had occasion to consider similar language in jury instructions, it is useful to consider our reasoning in State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198 , 411 A.2d 1035 (1980), in which we addressed, in a rape prosecution, whether the trial judge committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury that it could return a “not guilty” verdict.

2010Because we have had occasion to consider similar language in jury instructions, it is useful to consider our reasoning in State v. Hutchinson, 287 Md. 198 , 411 A.2d 1035 (1980), in which we addressed, in a rape prosecution, whether the trial judge committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury that it could return a “not guilty” verdict.

2010In Valiton , the intermediate appellate court stated that it did “not see how the failure to tell appellant that the court did not comply with the timing of Rule 4-246 affects [a knowing and voluntary waiver], which are at the heart of the rule.” 119 Md.App. at 150 , 704 A.2d at 483 .

2010In Valiton , the intermediate appellate court stated that it did “not see how the failure to tell appellant that the court did not comply with the timing of Rule 4-246 affects [a knowing and voluntary waiver], which are at the heart of the rule.” 119 Md.App. at 150 , 704 A.2d at 483 .

2006The Washington Homes opinion went to great length to analyze a three-three split on the Court of Appeals in Palladi Realty Co. v. Ohlinger, 190 Md. 303 , 58 A.2d 125 (1948), and to speculate on how that tie vote might probably have come out differently, had the modality of cashing the tendered check been different.

2006The Washington Homes opinion went to great length to analyze a three-three split on the Court of Appeals in Palladi Realty Co. v. Ohlinger, 190 Md. 303 , 58 A.2d 125 (1948), and to speculate on how that tie vote might probably have come out differently, had the modality of cashing the tendered check been different.

2003As always, “[t]he search for legislative intent begins with an examination of the statute itself and if the language is of clear import, the inquiry ends.” Crawley v. General Motors Corp., 70 Md.App. 100, 105 , 519 A.2d 1348 , cert. denied, 310 Md. 147 , 528 A.2d 473 (1987).

2003As always, “[t]he search for legislative intent begins with an examination of the statute itself and if the language is of clear import, the inquiry ends.” Crawley v. General Motors Corp., 70 Md.App. 100, 105 , 519 A.2d 1348 , cert. denied, 310 Md. 147 , 528 A.2d 473 (1987).

2003Principles Of Statutory Interpretation Because this case hinges on our interpretation of the legislation affording Prince George’s County deputy sheriffs the benefit of the heart presumption, we shall briefly set forth the well established principles governing statutory construction. “[T]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423 (1995).

2003Principles Of Statutory Interpretation Because this case hinges on our interpretation of the legislation affording Prince George’s County deputy sheriffs the benefit of the heart presumption, we shall briefly set forth the well established principles governing statutory construction. “[T]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35 , 660 A.2d 423 (1995).

2002As stated in Van Ness, 27 U.S. at 146 , 7 L.Ed. at 377 , “[t]he sole question is, whether it is designed for purposes of trade or not.” Id, Appellant clearly was motivated by a single factor in installing the pipeline system: to operate its business for profit.

2002As stated in Van Ness, 27 U.S. at 146 , 7 L.Ed. at 377 , “[t]he sole question is, whether it is designed for purposes of trade or not.” Id, Appellant clearly was motivated by a single factor in installing the pipeline system: to operate its business for profit.

2002The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that “the Innis definition of interrogation is not so broad as to capture within Miranda’s reach all declaratory statements by police officers concerning the nature of the charges against the suspect and the evidence relating to those charges.” Payne, 954 F.2d at 202 ; see Tucker v. Warden, 175 F.Supp.2d 999, 1002-03 (S.D.Ohio 2001) (stating that “to determine whether a suspect has been ‘interrogated,’ the heart of the inquiry focuses on police coercion, and whether the suspect has been compelled to speak by that coercion”) (quoting State v. Tucker, 81

2002The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that "the Innis definition of interrogation is not so broad as to capture within Miranda 's reach all declaratory statements by police officers concerning the nature of the charges against the suspect and the evidence relating to those charges." Payne, 954 F.2d at 202 ; see Tucker v. Warden, 175 F.Supp.2d 999, 1002-03 (S.D.Ohio 2001) (stating that "to determine whether a suspect has been `interrogated,' the heart of the inquiry focuses on police coercion, and whether the suspect has been compelled to speak by that coercion") (quoting State v. Tucker, 8

2002The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that “the Innis definition of interrogation is not so broad as to capture within Miranda’s reach all declaratory statements by police officers concerning the nature of the charges against the suspect and the evidence relating to those charges.” Payne, 954 F.2d at 202 ; see Tucker v. Warden, 175 F.Supp.2d 999, 1002-03 (S.D.Ohio 2001) (stating that “to determine whether a suspect has been ‘interrogated,’ the heart of the inquiry focuses on police coercion, and whether the suspect has been compelled to speak by that coercion”) (quoting State v. Tucker, 81

2002The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that "the Innis definition of interrogation is not so broad as to capture within Miranda 's reach all declaratory statements by police officers concerning the nature of the charges against the suspect and the evidence relating to those charges." Payne, 954 F.2d at 202 ; see Tucker v. Warden, 175 F.Supp.2d 999, 1002-03 (S.D.Ohio 2001) (stating that "to determine whether a suspect has been `interrogated,' the heart of the inquiry focuses on police coercion, and whether the suspect has been compelled to speak by that coercion") (quoting State v. Tucker, 8

2002While it is true that a direct question need not be posed to a criminal defendant in order to constitute the functional equivalent of an interrogation, see Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 , 100 S.Ct. at 1689-91 , 64 L.Ed.2d at 308 , I believe that Corporal Whaley’s direct factual statement that the items would be processed for fingerprinting does not rise to the level of coercion or compulsion contemplated in Innis as being the functional equivalent of an interrogation.

2002While it is true that a direct question need not be posed to a criminal defendant in order to constitute the functional equivalent of an interrogation, see Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 , 100 S.Ct. at 1689-91 , 64 L.Ed.2d at 308 , I believe that Corporal Whaley’s direct factual statement that the items would be processed for fingerprinting does not rise to the level of coercion or compulsion contemplated in Innis as being the functional equivalent of an interrogation.

2001In Kosmas , the Court of Appeals held that the inadmissible lie detector testimony “cut to the heart of the defense” because the defendant testified and “adamantly denied the truth of those allegations.” Id. at 597 , 560 A.2d 1137 .

2001In Kosmas , the Court of Appeals held that the inadmissible lie detector testimony “cut to the heart of the defense” because the defendant testified and “adamantly denied the truth of those allegations.” Id. at 597 , 560 A.2d 1137 .

1997Therefore, we must determine if the fact witnesses, who already testified extensively to what they actually observed, were entitled to offer their personal opinions about whether appellant had reason to fear imminent bodily harm — an element that was at the heart of his claim of self-defense. “ ‘The rule in Maryland is that a lay witness is not qualified to express an opinion about matters which are either *508 within the scope of common knowledge and experience of the jury or which are peculiarly within the specialized knowledge of experts.’ ” Goren v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 113 Md

1997Therefore, we must determine if the fact witnesses, who already testified extensively to what they actually observed, were entitled to offer their personal opinions about whether appellant had reason to fear imminent bodily harm — an element that was at the heart of his claim of self-defense. “ ‘The rule in Maryland is that a lay witness is not qualified to express an opinion about matters which are either *508 within the scope of common knowledge and experience of the jury or which are peculiarly within the specialized knowledge of experts.’ ” Goren v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 113 Md

1997Moreover, pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-701, the opinion of a non-expert must be “rationally based on the perception of the witness” and “helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” See Wyatt v. Johnson, 103 Md.App. 250, 268 , 653 A.2d 496 (1995); Waddell v. State, 85 Md.App. 54, 66 , 582 A.2d 260 (1990); Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence, §§ 602.1, 701.1 (1987).

1997Moreover, pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-701, the opinion of a non-expert must be “rationally based on the perception of the witness” and “helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” See Wyatt v. Johnson, 103 Md.App. 250, 268 , 653 A.2d 496 (1995); Waddell v. State, 85 Md.App. 54, 66 , 582 A.2d 260 (1990); Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence, §§ 602.1, 701.1 (1987).

1997Moreover, pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-701, the opinion of a non-expert must be “rationally based on the perception of the witness” and “helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” See Wyatt v. Johnson, 103 Md.App. 250, 268 , 653 A.2d 496 (1995); Waddell v. State, 85 Md.App. 54, 66 , 582 A.2d 260 (1990); Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence, §§ 602.1, 701.1 (1987).

1997Moreover, pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-701, the opinion of a non-expert must be “rationally based on the perception of the witness” and “helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.” See Wyatt v. Johnson, 103 Md.App. 250, 268 , 653 A.2d 496 (1995); Waddell v. State, 85 Md.App. 54, 66 , 582 A.2d 260 (1990); Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence, §§ 602.1, 701.1 (1987).

1995Treece, 313 Md. at 674 , 547 A.2d 1054 ; The trial court apparently concluded that the areas of dispute between Grandison and his appointed counsel were within the realm of trial strategy and tactics, telling Grandison, “[I]f you’re going to be represented by counsel then I think counsel will have to conduct the trial.” Grandison, however, maintains that the differences involved more than strategy and trial tactics, that they went to the heart of his defense—-the essential facts of the case—and therefore the decision was his to make.

1995Treece, 313 Md. at 674 , 547 A.2d 1054 ; The trial court apparently concluded that the areas of dispute between Grandison and his appointed counsel were within the realm of trial strategy and tactics, telling Grandison, “[I]f you’re going to be represented by counsel then I think counsel will have to conduct the trial.” Grandison, however, maintains that the differences involved more than strategy and trial tactics, that they went to the heart of his defense—-the essential facts of the case—and therefore the decision was his to make.

1995It is the expectation of privacy which is at the heart of the test for abandonment. " ‘The proper test ... is not whether all formal property rights have been relinquished, but whether the complaining party retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in the articles alleged to be abandoned.’ ” Venner v. State, 279 Md. 47, 53 [ 367 A.2d 949 ] (1977), quoting United States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901 (9th Cir.1972), ce rt. denied, 414 U.S. 868 [ 94 S.Ct. 176 , 38 L.Ed.2d 116 ] (1973).