heart defense in California

2025Co. of America 38 (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1281 , 1326; see JRS Products, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 168, 178 (JRS Products) [“fairness is at the heart of a waiver claim”]; Ernst v. Searle (1933) 218 Cal. 233 , 240–241 [allowing a party to advance a new theory on appeal “would not only be unfair to the trial court, but manifestly unjust to the opposing litigant”].) Moreover, allowing parties to raise new theories or issues on appeal would “wreak[] havoc on a judicial system too burdened to retry cases on theories that could have been raised earlier.” (JRS

2023Basic fairness lies at the heart of this rule—we “are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider.” (JRS Products, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 168, 178 .) Even if we considered this argument, intervention in this matter could not affect the Second Federal Action as that case no longer exists; it was dismissed and the dismissal affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.

2007Appeals Bd. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1167 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 ].) “[F]aimess is at the heart of a waiver claim.

2007Appeals Bd. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1167 [ 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 540 ].) “[F]aimess is at the heart of a waiver claim.

2026(See People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18, 71 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 879 ; see also People v. Cooper (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 500, 522 [“‘The double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial after a reversal based on the erroneous admission of evidence if the erroneously admitted evidence supported the conviction.’”].) This is true even when the admitted evidence is rendered inadmissible by subsequent decisional law.

2026(See People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18, 71 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 879 ; see also People v. Cooper (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 500, 522 [“‘The double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial after a reversal based on the erroneous admission of evidence if the erroneously admitted evidence supported the conviction.’”].) This is true even when the admitted evidence is rendered inadmissible by subsequent decisional law.

2018The failure to instruct on a lesser-included offense is more likely to be prejudicial where it strikes at the heart of the defense. ( People v. Neidinger (2006) 40 Cal.4th 67 , 79, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 45 , 146 P.3d 502 ; see People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351 , 376, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236 , 690 P.2d 709 ["An error that impairs the jury's determination of an issue that is both critical and closely balanced will rarely be harmless."].) Here, counsel structured the entire defense around one element: malice.

2018The failure to instruct on a lesser-included offense is more likely to be prejudicial where it strikes at the heart of the defense. ( People v. Neidinger (2006) 40 Cal.4th 67 , 79, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 45 , 146 P.3d 502 ; see People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351 , 376, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236 , 690 P.2d 709 ["An error that impairs the jury's determination of an issue that is both critical and closely balanced will rarely be harmless."].) Here, counsel structured the entire defense around one element: malice.

2013Defendant argues that, because the error struck at the heart of her defense, it warrants reversal of her conviction under the standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).

1994(People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 492 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582 , 853 P.2d 1037 ]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Appellant’s sight and hearing impairments and the conformance of his conduct to that of a reasonable person with the same physical disabilities was the heart of the defense case.

2007At a minimum equitable indemnity ‘requires a determination of fault on the part of the alleged indemnitor . . . .’ (Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1378 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 673 ], italics added.)” (City of Huntington Beach v. City of Westminster (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 220, 224-225 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 826 ].) Thus, to state a cause of action for equitable indemnity, Heritage Oaks had to allege that it was jointly and severally liable with First American to the Peppertree Owners. “[O]ne point stands clear: there can be no indemnity without liability.

2007At a minimum equitable indemnity ‘requires a determination of fault on the part of the alleged indemnitor . . . .’ (Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1378 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 673 ], italics added.)” (City of Huntington Beach v. City of Westminster (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 220, 224-225 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 826 ].) Thus, to state a cause of action for equitable indemnity, Heritage Oaks had to allege that it was jointly and severally liable with First American to the Peppertree Owners. “[O]ne point stands clear: there can be no indemnity without liability.

1982There can be no question that the injuries sustained by Ms. Block were clearly foreseeable and in fact foreseen by Mr. Beam.” Plaintiff relies upon cases which place foreseeability as the “key component necessary to establish liability.” (Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 46 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 539 P.2d 36 ]; see also J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 806 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 , 83 A.L.R.3d 1166 ].) Plaintiff’s theory of liability places Beam’s comm

1982There can be no question that the injuries sustained by Ms. Block were clearly foreseeable and in fact foreseen by Mr. Beam.” Plaintiff relies upon cases which place foreseeability as the “key component necessary to establish liability.” (Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 46 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 539 P.2d 36 ]; see also J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 806 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 , 83 A.L.R.3d 1166 ].) Plaintiff’s theory of liability places Beam’s comm

1982There can be no question that the injuries sustained by Ms. Block were clearly foreseeable and in fact foreseen by Mr. Beam.” Plaintiff relies upon cases which place foreseeability as the “key component necessary to establish liability.” (Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 46 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 539 P.2d 36 ]; see also J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 806 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 , 83 A.L.R.3d 1166 ].) Plaintiff’s theory of liability places Beam’s comm

1982There can be no question that the injuries sustained by Ms. Block were clearly foreseeable and in fact foreseen by Mr. Beam.” Plaintiff relies upon cases which place foreseeability as the “key component necessary to establish liability.” (Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 46 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 539 P.2d 36 ]; see also J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory (1979) 24 Cal.3d 799, 806 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 407 , 598 P.2d 60 ]; Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 551 P.2d 334 , 83 A.L.R.3d 1166 ].) Plaintiff’s theory of liability places Beam’s comm

2021Considerations of basic fairness accordingly “may require disclosure of otherwise privileged information or communications where [a party] has placed in issue a 17 PEOPLE v. SUPERIOR COURT (JONES) Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. communication which goes to the heart of the claim in controversy.” (Mitchell, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 604 .)10 Courts have found implied waiver in a variety of litigation contexts.

2016(Century Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 922, 956 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 468 ] [failure to cite supporting evidence in record forfeits claim].) *675 Finally, Pham contends Obarr waived the privilege by “putting] matters at issue that are contained in allegedly privileged documents.” Although fundamental fairness may require disclosure of privileged information when a plaintiff places in issue a communication that “goes to the heart of the claim in controversy” (Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 591, 604 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 886 , 691 P.2d 642 ]), Pham made no showing and provided n

2025Productions, Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 466, 473 (Animal Film).) “A case-by-case examination of the parties, their dispute, and the relationship of each to the state of California is the heart of the required analysis.” (NFL, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 921 .) “The defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of proof on a motion based on forum non conveniens.” (NFL, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 918 .) There is some uncertainty whether the de novo or substantial evidence standard of review applies to a trial court’s ruling regarding the availability of a suitable alternative forum.

2025Productions, Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 466, 473 (Animal Film).) “A case-by-case examination of the parties, their dispute, and the relationship of each to the state of California is the heart of the required analysis.” (NFL, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 921 .) “The defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of proof on a motion based on forum non conveniens.” (NFL, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 918 .) There is some uncertainty whether the de novo or substantial evidence standard of review applies to a trial court’s ruling regarding the availability of a suitable alternative forum.

2024(O’Mary v. Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 576 .) 11 DISPOSITION 3 The judgment is reversed.

2013Finally, and most importantly, the excluded footage bore directly on one of the main issues in dispute at trial, namely, the nature of Samarkos's injuries and the limitations they place on her everyday activities. " 'Presentation of evidence at the heart of the defense would not have represented an "undue" consumption of time.' " (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1070 ; accord, O'Mary v. Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 563, 576 (O'Mary).) There also was no likelihood that showing the jury more than four minutes of the video surveillance would have "create[d]

2024However, it is well established in other contexts that “[w]here privileged information goes to the heart of the claim, fundamental fairness requires that it be disclosed for the litigation to proceed.” (Steiny & Co. v. California Electric Supply Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285 , 289–292 [affirming trial court order excluding evidence of damages where litigant invoked trade secret privilege to prevent discovery of detailed information supporting damage claim]; Xebec Development Partners, Ltd. v. National Union Fire Ins.

2004(Mitchell, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 604 ; Wellpoint, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.) “Where privileged information goes to the heart of the claim, fundamental fairness requires that it be disclosed for the litigation to proceed.” (Steiny & Co. v. California Electric Supply Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 292 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 920 ].) The scope of an implied waiver must be “narrowly defined and the information required to be disclosed must fit strictly within the confines of the waiver.” (Transamerica Title Ins.

2000(Wegner et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence (The Rutter Group 1999) ¶ 8:1930, p. 8E-21; Merritt v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 721, 730 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 337 ] [plaintiff whose claim depended on his attorney’s state of mind could not proceed and yet invoke the attorney-client privilege]; Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 554, 560 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 137 ] [court could order dismissal of suit against fire insurance company where plaintiff invoked Fifth Amendment privilege to preclude questioning as to whether he started fire].) These principles in

2000(Wegner et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence (The Rutter Group 1999) ¶ 8:1930, p. 8E-21; Merritt v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 721, 730 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 337 ] [plaintiff whose claim depended on his attorney’s state of mind could not proceed and yet invoke the attorney-client privilege]; Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 554, 560 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 137 ] [court could order dismissal of suit against fire insurance company where plaintiff invoked Fifth Amendment privilege to preclude questioning as to whether he started fire].) These principles in

2000(Wegner et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence (The Rutter Group 1999) ¶ 8:1930, p. 8E-21; Merritt v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 721, 730 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 337 ] [plaintiff whose claim depended on his attorney’s state of mind could not proceed and yet invoke the attorney-client privilege]; Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 554, 560 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 137 ] [court could order dismissal of suit against fire insurance company where plaintiff invoked Fifth Amendment privilege to preclude questioning as to whether he started fire].) These principles in

2000(Wegner et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence (The Rutter Group 1999) ¶ 8:1930, p. 8E-21; Merritt v. Superior Court (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 721, 730 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 337 ] [plaintiff whose claim depended on his attorney’s state of mind could not proceed and yet invoke the attorney-client privilege]; Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 554, 560 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 137 ] [court could order dismissal of suit against fire insurance company where plaintiff invoked Fifth Amendment privilege to preclude questioning as to whether he started fire].) These principles in

1997It presented no risk of undue time consumption or risk of prejudice. ( 13 Cal.4th at p. 1070 , quoting from People v. Wright, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 585 .) If it was an abuse of discretion to refuse the evidence in Minifie , it was an abuse of discretion to refuse it here.

1996There was no risk of prejudice associated with the evidence. ‘The prejudice referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against. . . [one party] . . . and which has very little effect on the issues.’ (People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 585 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 212 , 703 P.2d 1106 ] [internal quotation marks omitted].) Evidence bearing on [defendant’s] state of mind was highly probative, and had no ‘unique tendency’ to evoke any emotional bias against the prosecution.

1982There, the trial court improperly admitted a hearsay statement of the murder victim to a friend to the effect that “I know [defendant] is going to kill me” (Italics added, 70 Cal.2d at p. 528 .) We quite correctly ruled that this decisive testimony was prejudicial, enabling the jury to find premeditation and striking “at the heart of the defense.” (P. 532.) In contrast to Ireland , the victim Milner’s statement to her mother that she feared defendant might hit her or “beat her up” was considerably milder and added nothing of substance to the prosecution’s overwhelming evidence of premeditation

1969(See People v. Lew (1968) 68 Cal.2d 774, 779 [ 69 Cal. Rptr. 102 , 441 P.2d 942 ].) Berta's hearsay statement was the only evidence of the events of May 5 which made defendant out to be the aggressor. [11] Such evidence of aggression by defendant at a time proximate to Emily's death "strikes directly at the heart of the defense." ( People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 532 [ 75 Cal. Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 ].) Although, as the Attorney General contends, the court may have found that Emily was in fact the aggressor but nevertheless rejected defendant's claim of self-defense, there is a "reas

2026(People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 590 ; People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1252 [“As we have explained, a ruling on the admissibility of evidence as a declaration against interest is broadly reviewed for abuse of discretion: the heart of the exception is the basic trustworthiness of the declaration, and that question is entrusted to the trial court’s discretion.”].) Evidence Code section 1230 provides in relevant part that “[e]vidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable

2025Productions, Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 466, 473 (Animal Film).) “A case-by-case examination of the parties, their dispute, and the relationship of each to the state of California is the heart of the required analysis.” (NFL, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 921 .) “The defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of proof on a motion based on forum non conveniens.” (NFL, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 918 .) There is some uncertainty whether the de novo or substantial evidence standard of review applies to a trial court’s ruling regarding the availability of a suitable alternative forum.