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11 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mallory v. Statered2 sentences2013The State responds that Carter was “anything but silent,” “willingly answered the investigator’s questions,” and simply gave “inconsistent answers and conflicting versions of events.” Former OCGA § 24-3-36 of the old Evidence Code provided that “[acquiescence or silence, when the circumstances require an answer, a denial, or other conduct, may amount to an admission.” 2 In Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625, 630 (5) ( 409 SE2d 839 ) (1991), overruled on other grounds sub nom. 2013The State responds that Carter was “anything but silent,” “willingly answered the investigator’s questions,” and simply gave “inconsistent answers and conflicting versions of events.” Former OCGA § 24-3-36 of the old Evidence Code provided that “[acquiescence or silence, when the circumstances require an answer, a denial, or other conduct, may amount to an admission.” 2 In Mallory v. State, 261 Ga. 625, 630 (5) ( 409 SE2d 839 ) (1991), overruled on other grounds sub nom. | 2 | 2 |
United States of America, Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Kevin Manfre, Appellant/cross-Appelleegreen1 sentence2022Cir. 2009).4 4 OCGA § 24-8-803 (1) was enacted in 2011 as part of the new Evidence Code, much of which was borrowed from the Federal Rules of Evidence. “[W]here the new Georgia rules mirror their federal counterparts, it is clear that the General Assembly 7 Here, although the victim’s statement to the 911 operator was made while the victim “was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter,” her later statement given to the responding officer was not sufficiently contemporaneous with the event to come within the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule.5 See United | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Greengreen1 sentence2022Indeed, “[t]he idea of immediacy lies at the heart of the exception, thus, the time requirement underlying the exception is strict because it is the factor that assures trustworthiness.” (Emphasis in original; citations and punctuation omitted.) U.S. v. Green, 556 F.3d 151, 155-56 (3d. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Titus Batesgreen1 sentence2022Cir. 2009).4 4 OCGA § 24-8-803 (1) was enacted in 2011 as part of the new Evidence Code, much of which was borrowed from the Federal Rules of Evidence. “[W]here the new Georgia rules mirror their federal counterparts, it is clear that the General Assembly 7 Here, although the victim’s statement to the 911 operator was made while the victim “was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter,” her later statement given to the responding officer was not sufficiently contemporaneous with the event to come within the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule.5 See United | 1 | 1 |
BLAZI v. Richgreen2 sentences2012(Citations and footnotes omitted.) Ligon v. Lumpkin County, 261 Ga. App. 435 ( 582 SE2d 504 ) (2003); see also Blazi v. Rich, 306 Ga. App. 529, 530-531 (2) ( 702 SE2d 768 ) (2010) (“Our review is impossible if the appellant omits the very evidence at the heart of our inquiry.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 2012(Citations and footnotes omitted.) Ligon v. Lumpkin County, 261 Ga. App. 435 ( 582 SE2d 504 ) (2003); see also Blazi v. Rich, 306 Ga. App. 529, 530-531 (2) ( 702 SE2d 768 ) (2010) (“Our review is impossible if the appellant omits the very evidence at the heart of our inquiry.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Hardeman v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Compare Hardeman v. State, 280 Ga. App. 168, 171 (4) ( 633 SE2d 595 ) (2006) (testimony of deceased witness “material” and “went to the heart of the defense”). 2007Compare Hardeman v. State, 280 Ga. App. 168, 171 (4) ( 633 SE2d 595 ) (2006) (testimony of deceased witness “material” and “went to the heart of the defense”). | 1 | 1 |
Griffin v. Travelers Insurancegreen2 sentences1999Co., 230 Ga. App. 665, 666 ( 497 SE2d 257 ) (1998). 1 Case No. A98A2161 With regard to Moody’s cross-appeal, to properly determine whether Moody fraudulently induced Carter to enter into the agreement, it is necessary to review the omitted depositions, as indicated by Moody’s own motion for summary judgment. 1999Co., 230 Ga. App. 665, 666 ( 497 SE2d 257 ) (1998). 1 Case No. A98A2161 With regard to Moody’s cross-appeal, to properly determine whether Moody fraudulently induced Carter to enter into the agreement, it is necessary to review the omitted depositions, as indicated by Moody’s own motion for summary judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Dennogreen1 sentence1982See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 376-77 (84 SC 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ligon v. Lumpkin County
green
2 sentences2012(Citations and footnotes omitted.) Ligon v. Lumpkin County, 261 Ga. App. 435 ( 582 SE2d 504 ) (2003); see also Blazi v. Rich, 306 Ga. App. 529, 530-531 (2) ( 702 SE2d 768 ) (2010) (“Our review is impossible if the appellant omits the very evidence at the heart of our inquiry.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). 2012(Citations and footnotes omitted.) Ligon v. Lumpkin County, 261 Ga. App. 435 ( 582 SE2d 504 ) (2003); see also Blazi v. Rich, 306 Ga. App. 529, 530-531 (2) ( 702 SE2d 768 ) (2010) (“Our review is impossible if the appellant omits the very evidence at the heart of our inquiry.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Hodges v. State
green
2 sentences2006“Evidence of mere presence at the scene of the crime, and nothing more to show participation of a defendant in the illegal act, is insufficient to support a conviction.” (Citations omitted.) Hodges v. State, 277 Ga. App. 174 ( 626 SE2d 133 ) (2006). 2006“Evidence of mere presence at the scene of the crime, and nothing more to show participation of a defendant in the illegal act, is insufficient to support a conviction.” (Citations omitted.) Hodges v. State, 277 Ga. App. 174 ( 626 SE2d 133 ) (2006). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Coulborn v. Joseph
green
1 sentence1990Contrary to defendant’s assertion, plaintiff’s evidence sufficiently establishes that West Germany recognizes and enforces foreign judgments, including those modifying child support payments, subject to conditions substantially similar to those we impose under Coulborn v. Joseph, 195 Ga. 723 , supra. We find no merit in defendant’s suggestion that plaintiff’s evidence is deficient because it refers to foreign judgments (in relation to West Germany) in general and fails to specifically state that judgments of Georgia or the United States would be enforced in West Germany. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Irby v. Brooks
red
2 sentences1988Chrysler Motors Corp., supra. See also the relevant Federal Rules of Evidence, as footnoted in Irby v. Brooks, supra at 796 , which grant a degree of discretion to the trial judge. 1988Chrysler Motors Corp., supra. See also the relevant Federal Rules of Evidence, as footnoted in Irby v. Brooks, supra at 796 , which grant a degree of discretion to the trial judge. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION v. Davis
green
2 sentences1988Chrysler Motors Corp., supra. See also the relevant Federal Rules of Evidence, as footnoted in Irby v. Brooks, supra at 796 , which grant a degree of discretion to the trial judge. 1988Chrysler Motors Corp., supra. See also the relevant Federal Rules of Evidence, as footnoted in Irby v. Brooks, supra at 796 , which grant a degree of discretion to the trial judge. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Caban v. Mohammed
green
1 sentence1987When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by ‘com(ing) forward to participate in the rearing of his child,’ Caban, 441 U. S., at 392 , his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.