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20 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1979–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Kozecgreen2 sentences2012See Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 517-518 (1987). 2004See Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 520 (1987); Commonwealth v. Fredette, supra at 264 . | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Shelleygreen2 sentences1985See also Commonwealth v. Shelley, 374 Mass. 466, 470-471 (1978); Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. 583, 591 (1983). 2. 1985See also Commonwealth v. Shelley, 374 Mass. 466, 470-471 (1978); Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. 583, 591 (1983). 2. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Spencergreen1 sentence2024It is hardly unusual for judges other than the trial judge to make pretrial rulings that govern what evidence will be admissible at trial, and this poses no challenges to the efficient administration of justice, as pretrial rulings are open to reconsideration by the trial judge. 13 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 410, 415-416 (2014) (trial judge may revisit motion judge's denial of motion to suppress); Commonwealth v. Spencer, 465 Mass. 32, 43 (2013) ("rulings on . . . motions in limine are preliminary and can be revisited as the evidence unfolds at trial"). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Camachogreen1 sentence2024In addition, the judge instructed the jury that they may not decide the case based "on sympathy for any party, or witness, or anyone else." See Camacho, 472 Mass. at 609 (no substantial likelihood of miscarriage of justice where judge instructed jury "not to be swayed by . . . sympathy" and "jury have the ability to discount hyperbole and other improper statements" [citation omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Gonzalezgreen1 sentence2024It is hardly unusual for judges other than the trial judge to make pretrial rulings that govern what evidence will be admissible at trial, and this poses no challenges to the efficient administration of justice, as pretrial rulings are open to reconsideration by the trial judge. 13 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 410, 415-416 (2014) (trial judge may revisit motion judge's denial of motion to suppress); Commonwealth v. Spencer, 465 Mass. 32, 43 (2013) ("rulings on . . . motions in limine are preliminary and can be revisited as the evidence unfolds at trial"). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Foremangreen1 sentence2015As the Commonwealth acknowledges, this “evidence related to the principal issue at trial.” “The judicial imprimatur on the [clerk-magistrate’s probable cause rulings] lends [them] significant weight.” Commonwealth v. Foreman, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 510, 515 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Greinedergreen1 sentence2014See Commonwealth v. Greineder, 464 Mass. 580, 601-602 , cert, denied, 134 S. Ct. 166 (2013) (precluding testimony on direct examination about hearsay underlying expert opinion). 11 Finally, the prosecutor forcefully and repeatedly argued in closing argument that the trooper’s testimony regarding causation put to rest any suggestion that the issues identified in the recall *454 notice played a role in the crash. 12 Because the testimony went to the heart of the defense that the collision may have been caused by a malfunction of the computer-assisted power steering system, it cannot be said that | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Flebottegreen1 sentence2014See Commonwealth v. Greineder, 464 Mass. 580, 601-602 , cert, denied, 134 S. Ct. 166 (2013) (precluding testimony on direct examination about hearsay underlying expert opinion). 11 Finally, the prosecutor forcefully and repeatedly argued in closing argument that the trooper’s testimony regarding causation put to rest any suggestion that the issues identified in the recall *454 notice played a role in the crash. 12 Because the testimony went to the heart of the defense that the collision may have been caused by a malfunction of the computer-assisted power steering system, it cannot be said that | 1 | 1 |
Grenning v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2014See Commonwealth v. Greineder, 464 Mass. 580, 601-602 , cert, denied, 134 S. Ct. 166 (2013) (precluding testimony on direct examination about hearsay underlying expert opinion). 11 Finally, the prosecutor forcefully and repeatedly argued in closing argument that the trooper’s testimony regarding causation put to rest any suggestion that the issues identified in the recall *454 notice played a role in the crash. 12 Because the testimony went to the heart of the defense that the collision may have been caused by a malfunction of the computer-assisted power steering system, it cannot be said that | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Grimshawgreen1 sentence2010See generally Commonwealth v. Semedo, 456 Mass. 1, 12 (2010), quoting from Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 412 Mass. 505, 508-509 (1992) (error is prejudicial where it “had, or might have had, an effect on the jury and [where] the error contributed or might have contributed to the verdicts”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Semedogreen1 sentence2010See generally Commonwealth v. Semedo, 456 Mass. 1, 12 (2010), quoting from Commonwealth v. Grimshaw, 412 Mass. 505, 508-509 (1992) (error is prejudicial where it “had, or might have had, an effect on the jury and [where] the error contributed or might have contributed to the verdicts”). | 1 | 1 |
Karen Romano v. U-Haul International, U-Haul Company of Maine, Inc.green1 sentence2006Romano v. U-Haul Int’l, 233 F.3d 655, 664-66 (1st Cir. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2003We have no such assurance here, where the error struck at the heart of the defense (the credibility of the defendant’s “innocent” explanation for being involved in the situation); where the case against him was not overwhelming (the defendant himself being unknown to the police and never having been observed dealing or handling drugs or money) 6 ; and where the judge’s inexplicable overruling of defense counsel’s objection may have been seen by the jury as judicial endorsement of the improper questioning and innuendo, see Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 373 , enhancing the “act | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Buigreen1 sentence2001See Commonwealth v. Tam Bui, supra at 401 . | 1 | 1 |
Gifford v. Westwood Lodge Corp.green1 sentence1998The kind of fraud charged here is not the kind that prevented the plaintiff from presenting the merits of his case, Gifford v. Westwood Lodge Corp., 24 Mass.App.Ct. 920, 922 (1987), unless false testimony on a point not at the heart of the claim falls within the reach of the Rule. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Quegangreen1 sentence1995Contrast Commonwealth v. Cheek , 374 Mass, at 615; Commonwealth v. Quegan, 35 Mass. App. Ct. at 133 (no logical nexus for relevance of excluded evidence). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Perrotgreen1 sentence1994Our examination of the record leads us to conclude that exclusion of the evidence requires reversal of the defendant’s conviction. “ ‘The essential question is whether the error had, or might have had, an effect on the jury and whether the error contributed to or might have contributed to the verdict[].’ Commonwealth v. Perrot, 407 Mass. 539, 549 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Drewgreen1 sentence1991As explained in Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 Mass. 65, 73 (1986), quoting from United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1978), the tests are: “(1) the declarant’s testimony must be unavailable; (2) the statement must so far tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability ‘that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true’; and (3) the statement, if offered to exculpate the accused, must be corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness.” At least two of the requirements were not met. 3 The defendant’s exp | 1 | 1 |
Wingate v. Emery Air Freight Corp.green1 sentence1991Wingate v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 385 Mass. 402, 407 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Rowland Chester Thomasgreen1 sentence1991As explained in Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 Mass. 65, 73 (1986), quoting from United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1978), the tests are: “(1) the declarant’s testimony must be unavailable; (2) the statement must so far tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability ‘that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true’; and (3) the statement, if offered to exculpate the accused, must be corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness.” At least two of the requirements were not met. 3 The defendant’s exp | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Clarygreen2 sentences1985See also Commonwealth v. Shelley, 374 Mass. 466, 470-471 (1978); Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. 583, 591 (1983). 2. 1985See also Commonwealth v. Shelley, 374 Mass. 466, 470-471 (1978); Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. 583, 591 (1983). 2. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Polk
green
1 sentence2025In response, the prosecutor did not assert that the victim was credible at all, much less "because she appeared to testify in court." Polk, 462 Mass. at 39 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Niemic
green
1 sentence2019The prosecutor's repeated use of what had been admitted for a limited purpose as substantive evidence here, however, undermined the heart of the defense, "namely, the defendant's credibility as to who was the initial aggressor, who produced the knife, and whether the defendant acted in self-defense."26 Niemic I, 472 Mass. at 677 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2018A defendant's attempt to make the witness unavailable at another trial that did not involve the defendant does not warrant forfeiting the fundamental "bedrock procedural guarantee" of an accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him, see Crawford , 541 U.S. at 42 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , citing Pointer v. Texas , 380 U.S. 400 , 406, 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), because the defendant does not benefit from the unavailability of the witness at another person's trial. 2018A defendant's attempt to make the witness unavailable at another trial that did not involve the defendant does not warrant forfeiting the fundamental "bedrock procedural guarantee" of an accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him, see Crawford , 541 U.S. at 42 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , citing Pointer v. Texas , 380 U.S. 400 , 406, 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), because the defendant does not benefit from the unavailability of the witness at another person's trial. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Pointer v. Texas
green
2 sentences2018A defendant's attempt to make the witness unavailable at another trial that did not involve the defendant does not warrant forfeiting the fundamental "bedrock procedural guarantee" of an accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him, see Crawford , 541 U.S. at 42 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , citing Pointer v. Texas , 380 U.S. 400 , 406, 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), because the defendant does not benefit from the unavailability of the witness at another person's trial. 2018A defendant's attempt to make the witness unavailable at another trial that did not involve the defendant does not warrant forfeiting the fundamental "bedrock procedural guarantee" of an accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him, see Crawford , 541 U.S. at 42 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , citing Pointer v. Texas , 380 U.S. 400 , 406, 85 S.Ct. 1065 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), because the defendant does not benefit from the unavailability of the witness at another person's trial. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Fredette
green
1 sentence2004See Commonwealth v. Kozec, 399 Mass. 514, 520 (1987); Commonwealth v. Fredette, supra at 264 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Commonwealth v. Rodriquez
green
1 sentence2003We have no such assurance here, where the error struck at the heart of the defense (the credibility of the defendant’s “innocent” explanation for being involved in the situation); where the case against him was not overwhelming (the defendant himself being unknown to the police and never having been observed dealing or handling drugs or money) 6 ; and where the judge’s inexplicable overruling of defense counsel’s objection may have been seen by the jury as judicial endorsement of the improper questioning and innuendo, see Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 373 , enhancing the “act | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Commonwealth v. Villalobos
green
2 sentences1985The whole picture, however, persuades us that the trial was unfair since the unfair material struck at the heart of the defense. [8] See Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 905 (1979). 1985The whole picture, however, persuades us that the trial was unfair since the unfair material struck at the heart of the defense. 8 See Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 905 (1979). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.