Union claim in Pennsylvania

1991On March 6, 1990, the PLRB issued a final order in which it sustained the exceptions of the city and the union to the hearing examiner’s reliance on the balancing test set forth in Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. State College Area School District, 461 Pa. 494 , 337 A.2d 262 (1975). 6 However, the PLRB affirmed the PDO in all other respects.

1991On March 6, 1990, the PLRB issued a final order in which it sustained the exceptions of the city and the union to the hearing examiner’s reliance on the balancing test set forth in Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. State College Area School District, 461 Pa. 494 , 337 A.2d 262 (1975). 6 However, the PLRB affirmed the PDO in all other respects.

2026City of Philadelphia v. Kenny, 369 A.2d 1343, 1347 (Pa.Cmwlth.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977). 3 sustained the Union’s objection, id., and later declined to apply any resulting adverse inference against the Union because of Grievant’s refusal to testify.3 Id. at 45-46.

2026City of Philadelphia v. Kenny, 369 A.2d 1343, 1347 (Pa.Cmwlth.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977). 3 sustained the Union’s objection, id., and later declined to apply any resulting adverse inference against the Union because of Grievant’s refusal to testify.3 Id. at 45-46.

2026Jefferson County Court Appointed Employees Association v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 985 A.2d 697 (Pa. 2009). 8 The PLRB is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction by Section 1301 of the PERA, which provides: The [PLRB] is empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair practice listed in Article XII [(Section 1201)] of this act.

2015The Union argues that the Commonwealth Court decision in this case was also contrary to City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5, 132 Pa.Cmwlth. 631 , 574 A.2d 123 (1990).

2015The Union argues that the Commonwealth Court decision in this case was also contrary to City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5, 132 Pa.Cmwlth. 631 , 574 A.2d 123 (1990).

2015Local 690 was not objecting to Worth’s failure to abide by “the union standard for wages, conditions, and benefits.” Id.

2014In enforcing the NLRB’s order, the Ninth Circuit recognized a union’s right to discipline its members; however, it also reiterated that “[w]hen application of a union rule is found to run contrary to national labor policy, ‘the disciplinary action is regarded as coercive within the meaning of section 8(b)(1)(A).’” Id. at 91 (quoting National Labor Relations Board v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 1179, Retail Clerks International Association, AFL-CIO, 526 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir.1975)).

2014Id.

2004Co., 328 Pa.Super. 119 , 476 A.2d 919 (1984), “even though the action is brought in state court.” Dale v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.

2004Co., 328 Pa.Super. 119 , 476 A.2d 919 (1984), “even though the action is brought in state court.” Dale v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.

2000Here, Article 9 of the CBA permits YCTA to terminate its employees only for "just cause;” however, by failing to further limit or define the term, the parties have agreed in the CBA to have the arbitrator interpret that provision and decide what constitutes "just cause." Township of Penn v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, District Council No. 89, 713 A.2d 1218 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1998); School District of Springfield Township v. Springfield Township Educational Support Personnel Association, 711 A.2d 602 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998); Upper St.

1998Chichester Area School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 53 Pa.Cmwlth. 74 , 415 A.2d 997 (1980) (stating that the adoption of a de minimis rule would undermine the clarity and relative predictability of the Vrotney/Philco test).

1998Chichester Area School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 53 Pa.Cmwlth. 74 , 415 A.2d 997 (1980) (stating that the adoption of a de minimis rule would undermine the clarity and relative predictability of the Vrotney/Philco test).

1991The PLRB applied the rational relationship test set forth in City of Clairton v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 107 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 561, 564, 528 A.2d 1048, 1049-50 (1987) (citing International Association of Firefighters v. City of Scranton, 59 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 235, 429 A.2d 779 (1981)) and found that the union failed to establish a rational relationship between implementation of the first responder program and fire fighters safety.

1984The rule is that “a union waiver of the right to bargain on mandatory subjects [of bargaining] during the term of an .agreement will not be found in a boiler plate waiver clause alone. ’ ’ Id. at 11 , 459 A.2d at 457 .

1984The rule is that “a union waiver of the right to bargain on mandatory subjects [of bargaining] during the term of an .agreement will not be found in a boiler plate waiver clause alone. ’ ’ Id. at 11 , 459 A.2d at 457 .

1979It must be agreed that an employer who leaves his gates open so that employees may present themselves is entitled to know how steadily their services would be available, at least in the case of industries requiring some assurance of continued services, such as basic steel, for example, or the service industry in Lerch Unemployment Compensation Case, 400 Pa. 446 , 163 A.2d 535 (1960).

1966In my view, the. preemption issue in the instant case is governed by International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 , 78 S. Ct. 923 (1958); In that case, a union member claimed that he had béenexpelled from membership in the union in violation of the union’s constitution and by-laws.

1966In my view, the. preemption issue in the instant case is governed by International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 , 78 S. Ct. 923 (1958); In that case, a union member claimed that he had béenexpelled from membership in the union in violation of the union’s constitution and by-laws.

1958Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America, 383 Pa. 297 , 118 A. 2d 180 ; Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.O., 369 Pa. 359 , 85 A. 2d 851 . 6 Furthermore, not only must picketing be conducted in a peaceful manner, but the object which it seeks to attain must be legitimate and lawful: Sansom House Enterprises, Inc. v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, Local 301, AFL, 382 Pa. 476 , 115 A. 2d 746 ; Anchorage, Inc. v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, 383 Pa. 547 , 119 A. 2d 199 . 7 Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the mass

1958Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America, 383 Pa. 297 , 118 A. 2d 180 ; Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.O., 369 Pa. 359 , 85 A. 2d 851 . 6 Furthermore, not only must picketing be conducted in a peaceful manner, but the object which it seeks to attain must be legitimate and lawful: Sansom House Enterprises, Inc. v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, Local 301, AFL, 382 Pa. 476 , 115 A. 2d 746 ; Anchorage, Inc. v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, 383 Pa. 547 , 119 A. 2d 199 . 7 Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the mass

1958Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America, 383 Pa. 297 , 118 A. 2d 180 ; Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.O., 369 Pa. 359 , 85 A. 2d 851 . 6 Furthermore, not only must picketing be conducted in a peaceful manner, but the object which it seeks to attain must be legitimate and lawful: Sansom House Enterprises, Inc. v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, Local 301, AFL, 382 Pa. 476 , 115 A. 2d 746 ; Anchorage, Inc. v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, 383 Pa. 547 , 119 A. 2d 199 . 7 Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the mass

1958Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America, 383 Pa. 297 , 118 A. 2d 180 ; Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.O., 369 Pa. 359 , 85 A. 2d 851 . 6 Furthermore, not only must picketing be conducted in a peaceful manner, but the object which it seeks to attain must be legitimate and lawful: Sansom House Enterprises, Inc. v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, Local 301, AFL, 382 Pa. 476 , 115 A. 2d 746 ; Anchorage, Inc. v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, 383 Pa. 547 , 119 A. 2d 199 . 7 Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the mass

1958Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America, 383 Pa. 297 , 118 A. 2d 180 ; Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.O., 369 Pa. 359 , 85 A. 2d 851 . 6 Furthermore, not only must picketing be conducted in a peaceful manner, but the object which it seeks to attain must be legitimate and lawful: Sansom House Enterprises, Inc. v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, Local 301, AFL, 382 Pa. 476 , 115 A. 2d 746 ; Anchorage, Inc. v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, 383 Pa. 547 , 119 A. 2d 199 . 7 Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the mass

1958Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America, 383 Pa. 297 , 118 A. 2d 180 ; Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.O., 369 Pa. 359 , 85 A. 2d 851 . 6 Furthermore, not only must picketing be conducted in a peaceful manner, but the object which it seeks to attain must be legitimate and lawful: Sansom House Enterprises, Inc. v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, Local 301, AFL, 382 Pa. 476 , 115 A. 2d 746 ; Anchorage, Inc. v. Waiters & Waitresses Union, 383 Pa. 547 , 119 A. 2d 199 . 7 Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the mass

1953The Commonwealth also points out, not unimportantly, that Bessemer was allowed a deduction in its capital stock tax report to the extent of the value of its almost total (viz., 99.662%) ownership of Union stock which represented the asset value of Union’s Consolidation stock and argues accordingly that to ascribe to Bessemer a majority ownership of such stock, based partly upon Union’s holding, would be to accord to Bessemer, to the extent of the value of Union’s ownership of Consolidation stock, a double exemption which is no more *458 permissible under the rule of construction applicable to

1953The Commonwealth also points out, not unimportantly, that Bessemer was allowed a deduction in its capital stock tax report to the extent of the value of its almost total (viz., 99.662%) ownership of Union stock which represented the asset value of Union’s Consolidation stock and argues accordingly that to ascribe to Bessemer a majority ownership of such stock, based partly upon Union’s holding, would be to accord to Bessemer, to the extent of the value of Union’s ownership of Consolidation stock, a double exemption which is no more *458 permissible under the rule of construction applicable to

1868This has been' more than once solemnly determined by the Supreme Court of the Union to be the rule of their decision, whenever the construction of the Constitution of the United States, treaties or Acts of Congress does not come in question: Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361 ; United States v. Morrison, 4 Pet. 124 ; Green v. Neal, 6 Id. 291; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black 599 .

1868This has been' more than once solemnly determined by the Supreme Court of the Union to be the rule of their decision, whenever the construction of the Constitution of the United States, treaties or Acts of Congress does not come in question: Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361 ; United States v. Morrison, 4 Pet. 124 ; Green v. Neal, 6 Id. 291; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black 599 .