Council hearing in California

2025Code, § 211). 6 6 Interpreting a substantively identical provision of the former Family Law Act, our Supreme Court observed: “The practical effect of [former Civil Code] section 4001 . . . is to remove any restraints of statutory consistency on the Judicial Council’s rules of practice and procedure under the Family Law Act.” (In re Marriage of McKim (1972) 6 Cal.3d 673, 678, fn. 4 ; accord, In re Marriage of Fink (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 357, 365 ; In re Marriage of Lusk (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 228, 232-233 .) Courts have interpreted Family Code section 211 in the same manner.

1980(See In re Marriage of McKim (1972) 6 Cal.3d 673, 678, fn. 4 [ 100 Cal.Rptr. 140 , 493 P.2d 868 ], so holding with regard to a similar statutory grant in the Family Law Act (Civ.

2020We reject the contention that the remaining issues raised in the Council’s brief should be considered because there are “unresolved questions” regarding attorney fees. 22 (See Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 134 [“[i]t is settled that an appeal will not be retained solely to decide the question of liability for costs”] (Paul).) Finally, we must determine the proper disposition of the moot issues.

2020We reject the contention that the remaining issues raised in the Council’s brief should be considered because there are “unresolved questions” regarding attorney fees.22 (See Paul v. Milk Depots, Inc. (1964) 62 Cal.2d 129, 134 [“[i]t is settled that an appeal will not be retained solely to decide the question of liability for costs”] (Paul).) Finally, we must determine the proper disposition of the moot issues.

2025Code, § 211). 6 6 Interpreting a substantively identical provision of the former Family Law Act, our Supreme Court observed: “The practical effect of [former Civil Code] section 4001 . . . is to remove any restraints of statutory consistency on the Judicial Council’s rules of practice and procedure under the Family Law Act.” (In re Marriage of McKim (1972) 6 Cal.3d 673, 678, fn. 4 ; accord, In re Marriage of Fink (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 357, 365 ; In re Marriage of Lusk (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 228, 232-233 .) Courts have interpreted Family Code section 211 in the same manner.

2023(Cf. Tichinin v. City of Morgan Hill (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1061 [“investigative reports by the Council’s surveillance subcommittee reports, the Council’s hearing, and subsequent resolution adopted by Council” are “acts by the City that would qualify for protection under the anti-SLAPP statute”].) 9 Even if the internal investigation and Skelly meeting are considered separate proceedings, the letter and notice still qualify as protected under section 425.16.

2009Probability of Success “In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim [citation], a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must ‘ “state . . . and substantiateQ a legally sufficient claim.” ’ [Citation.] Put another way, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ [Citations.]” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 19 , 50 P.3d 733 ].) In determini

2009Probability of Success “In order to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim [citation], a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must ‘ “state . . . and substantiateQ a legally sufficient claim.” ’ [Citation.] Put another way, the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ [Citations.]” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 19 , 50 P.3d 733 ].) In determini

2007(See Horneff v. City & County of San Francisco (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 814, 820, fn. 4 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 79 ] (Horneff).) 21 (See, e.g., Silfen, How Will California’s Funding of Stem Cell Research Impact Innovation? (2005) 18 Harv.

2007(See Horneff v. City & County of San Francisco (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 814, 820, fn. 4 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 79 ] (Horneff).) 21 (See, e.g., Silfen, How Will California’s Funding of Stem Cell Research Impact Innovation? (2005) 18 Harv.

1996(See Committee for a Rickel Alternative v. City of Linden (1988) 111 N.J. 192, 196-203 [ 543 A.2d 943, 945-949 ] [where affirmative vote of majority of city council was required to reverse, remand, or affirm decision of board of adjustment, and council heard matter de novo with burden of proof on applicant, tie vote resulted in denial of use variance].) In any event, without deciding whether a tie vote would have denied the conditional use permit, we conclude that it would not have affirmed the planning commission’s decision in that respect. 25 Although the Council is supposed to announce its

1996(See Committee for a Rickel Alternative v. City of Linden (1988) 111 N.J. 192, 196-203 [ 543 A.2d 943, 945-949 ] [where affirmative vote of majority of city council was required to reverse, remand, or affirm decision of board of adjustment, and council heard matter de novo with burden of proof on applicant, tie vote resulted in denial of use variance].) In any event, without deciding whether a tie vote would have denied the conditional use permit, we conclude that it would not have affirmed the planning commission’s decision in that respect. 25 Although the Council is supposed to announce its

1983(Ibid.) The Council’s hearing procedure did not violate Ferreira’s and Milgen’s due process rights. 5 C Validity of Council’s Resolution An administrative decision which “substantially affects fundamental vested rights” (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 144 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]) invokes judicial review under the independent judgment rule of section 1094.5.

1983(Ibid.) The Council’s hearing procedure did not violate Ferreira’s and Milgen’s due process rights. 5 C Validity of Council’s Resolution An administrative decision which “substantially affects fundamental vested rights” (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 144 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ]) invokes judicial review under the independent judgment rule of section 1094.5.

1968(Yaeger v. City Council, supra, at p. 561 ; see also Jenner v. City Council, 164 Cal.App.2d 490, 497 [ 331 P.2d 176 ].) Petitioner introduced substantial evidence at the council hearing that there would be no special benefit to its property from the construction of new parking facilities.

1968(Yaeger v. City Council, supra, at p. 561 ; see also Jenner v. City Council, 164 Cal.App.2d 490, 497 [ 331 P.2d 176 ].) Petitioner introduced substantial evidence at the council hearing that there would be no special benefit to its property from the construction of new parking facilities.

1954Appellant’s theory is that there was no legal delivery of the deed to the city council because the deed was given to the mayor with instructions only to deliver it to the council if the council “approved . . . that this was only deeded for a city hall.” It is appellant’s position that the mayor’s action in giving the deed to the council without such official action by the council was in violation of these instructions and hence constituted no delivery, since “a delivery by the depositary contrary to the direction of the grantor does not pass title.” (Bilsland v. Kennedy, 72 Cal.App.2d 23, 24 [

1954Appellant’s theory is that there was no legal delivery of the deed to the city council because the deed was given to the mayor with instructions only to deliver it to the council if the council “approved . . . that this was only deeded for a city hall.” It is appellant’s position that the mayor’s action in giving the deed to the council without such official action by the council was in violation of these instructions and hence constituted no delivery, since “a delivery by the depositary contrary to the direction of the grantor does not pass title.” (Bilsland v. Kennedy, 72 Cal.App.2d 23, 24 [

1936(Bailey v. City of Hermosa Beach, 183 Cal. 757, 763 [ 192 Pac. 712 ]; Keller v. City of Los Angeles, 123 Cal. App. 99, 103 [ 11 Pac. (2d) 448 ].) In the case last cited it is said in that regard: “There is ample authority upholding the doctrine that the mere omission from the assessment of one or more lots front ing on the street does not of itself render the assessment void on its face. ’ ’ Numerous authorities are cited in support of that statement of law.

1936(Bailey v. City of Hermosa Beach, 183 Cal. 757, 763 [ 192 Pac. 712 ]; Keller v. City of Los Angeles, 123 Cal. App. 99, 103 [ 11 Pac. (2d) 448 ].) In the case last cited it is said in that regard: “There is ample authority upholding the doctrine that the mere omission from the assessment of one or more lots front ing on the street does not of itself render the assessment void on its face. ’ ’ Numerous authorities are cited in support of that statement of law.

1936(Bailey v. City of Hermosa Beach, 183 Cal. 757, 763 [ 192 Pac. 712 ]; Keller v. City of Los Angeles, 123 Cal. App. 99, 103 [ 11 Pac. (2d) 448 ].) In the case last cited it is said in that regard: “There is ample authority upholding the doctrine that the mere omission from the assessment of one or more lots front ing on the street does not of itself render the assessment void on its face. ’ ’ Numerous authorities are cited in support of that statement of law.

1936(Bailey v. City of Hermosa Beach, 183 Cal. 757, 763 [ 192 Pac. 712 ]; Keller v. City of Los Angeles, 123 Cal. App. 99, 103 [ 11 Pac. (2d) 448 ].) In the case last cited it is said in that regard: “There is ample authority upholding the doctrine that the mere omission from the assessment of one or more lots front ing on the street does not of itself render the assessment void on its face. ’ ’ Numerous authorities are cited in support of that statement of law.