charitable immunity in Georgia

2019Auth., 256 Ga. 833, 835 (2) ( 353 SE2d 515 ) (1987) (“A liability insurance policy is a non-charitable asset which is not covered by the charitable immunity doctrine.”). 9 Cox, 104 Ga. App. at 672 (1). 9 extent of any liability insurance which it carries.”10 Any liability that exceeds the policy limits, however, is barred by charitable immunity, unless that liability is premised on a claim to which charitable immunity does not apply.11 Here, there is no dispute that Post 111 is a charitable organization12 and that it is entitled to charitable immunity.

2019Auth., 256 Ga. 833, 835 (2) ( 353 SE2d 515 ) (1987) (“A liability insurance policy is a non-charitable asset which is not covered by the charitable immunity doctrine.”). 9 Cox, 104 Ga. App. at 672 (1). 9 extent of any liability insurance which it carries.”10 Any liability that exceeds the policy limits, however, is barred by charitable immunity, unless that liability is premised on a claim to which charitable immunity does not apply.11 Here, there is no dispute that Post 111 is a charitable organization12 and that it is entitled to charitable immunity.

2017The trial court based its grant of summary judgment on its conclusion that Lewis was not a “paying patient” because the payment was made by her attorney Importantly, it was in the first instance Grady Memorial’s burden to produce evidence that it extended its charity to Lewis; only then did the burden shift to Lewis to produce evidence showing that she came within the exception to the charitable immunity doctrine as a “paying patient.” See Fanning, supra at 559 (1); Cults, supra at 518-519 (1).

2017Where “the hospital produce[s] evidence that it had extended its charity to the patient, “the burden shift[s] to [the patient] to produce evidence showing that the patient came within the exception to the charitable immunity doctrine and that [s]he was a ‘paying patient’ with a secondary source for paying the [charges].” Id. at 559 .

1995In Cutts , we held that the protection of the doctrine did not extend to employees of the charitable hospital because individual professionals have a duty to exercise a reasonable degree of care and skill when providing medical treatment and that “[i]nsulating them from liability for breaching this duty simply because they were employed by a charitable hospital would not further the purpose of the charitable immunity doctrine. ‘By design the charitable immunity doctrine protects the funds of the charitable institution from depletion in order that these funds may be (preserved) to carry out the

1992The rationale is that "[t]o extend the doctrine of charitable immunity to physicians who are employed by charitable hospitals would only serve to insulate the resources of those physicians from the claims of patients who were injured as a result of alleged medical malpractice." Id. at 519 .

2019The general purpose of the charitable immunity doctrine is that a qualifying organization’s charitable assets should not be depleted by subjection to liability for negligence and that it would be against public policy, as well as against the settled principles of law, to allow any judgment to be rendered against it because of the negligence 5 See Court of Appeals Rule 25 (c) (2) (“Any enumeration of error that is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument may be deemed abandoned.”). 6 See Cotton v. Smith, 310 Ga. App. 428, 429 (1) ( 714 SE2d 55 ) (2011) (Because the appell

2019The general purpose of the charitable immunity doctrine is that a qualifying organization’s charitable assets should not be depleted by subjection to liability for negligence and that it would be against public policy, as well as against the settled principles of law, to allow any judgment to be rendered against it because of the negligence 5 See Court of Appeals Rule 25 (c) (2) (“Any enumeration of error that is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument may be deemed abandoned.”). 6 See Cotton v. Smith, 310 Ga. App. 428, 429 (1) ( 714 SE2d 55 ) (2011) (Because the appell

1990Auth., 196 Ga. App. 52 ( 395 SE2d 343 ). “[T]he doctrine of charitable immunity . . . does not extend to the corporate or original negligence of the charitable entity in the employment or retention of incompetent employees. . . .” Y.M.C.A. &c. v. Bailey, 107 Ga. App. 417, 420 ( 130 SE2d 242 ).

1990Auth., 196 Ga. App. 52 ( 395 SE2d 343 ). “[T]he doctrine of charitable immunity . . . does not extend to the corporate or original negligence of the charitable entity in the employment or retention of incompetent employees. . . .” Y.M.C.A. &c. v. Bailey, 107 Ga. App. 417, 420 ( 130 SE2d 242 ).

1961The doctrine of charitable immunity from tort liability exists in Georgia, at least in part; thus “the general rule is that charity trust funds are not to be depleted by subjection to liability for negligence . . . and that it would be against public policy, as well as against the settled principles of law, to allow any judgment to be rendered against it because of the negligence of any of its employees or agents, except where it failed to exercise ordinary care in selecting and retaining its employees and servants.” Butler v. Berry School, 27 Ga. App. 560, 563 ( 109 SE 544 ).

1961The doctrine of charitable immunity from tort liability exists in Georgia, at least in part; thus “the general rule is that charity trust funds are not to be depleted by subjection to liability for negligence . . . and that it would be against public policy, as well as against the settled principles of law, to allow any judgment to be rendered against it because of the negligence of any of its employees or agents, except where it failed to exercise ordinary care in selecting and retaining its employees and servants.” Butler v. Berry School, 27 Ga. App. 560, 563 ( 109 SE 544 ).

2019Hosp., 197 Ga. App. 189, 191 (2) (b) ( 397 SE2d 746 ) (1990) (“[T]he doctrine of charitable immunity [did] not extend to any negligence of the appellee hospital . . . in failing to provide a sufficient number of competent and adequately instructed employees for its staff.”) (citations 12 Regardless whether the trial court erred in ruling that Post 111 was immune from liability on her claims for negligent entrustment, training, and/or supervision,16 however, Post 111 still would have been entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those claims for the reasons discussed in Division 1, supra. Con

2019Hosp., 197 Ga. App. 189, 191 (2) (b) ( 397 SE2d 746 ) (1990) (“[T]he doctrine of charitable immunity [did] not extend to any negligence of the appellee hospital . . . in failing to provide a sufficient number of competent and adequately instructed employees for its staff.”) (citations 12 Regardless whether the trial court erred in ruling that Post 111 was immune from liability on her claims for negligent entrustment, training, and/or supervision,16 however, Post 111 still would have been entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those claims for the reasons discussed in Division 1, supra. Con

2019The general purpose of the charitable immunity doctrine is that a qualifying organization’s charitable assets should not be depleted by subjection to liability for negligence and that it would be against public policy, as well as against the settled principles of law, to allow any judgment to be rendered against it because of the negligence 5 See Court of Appeals Rule 25 (c) (2) (“Any enumeration of error that is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument may be deemed abandoned.”). 6 See Cotton v. Smith, 310 Ga. App. 428, 429 (1) ( 714 SE2d 55 ) (2011) (Because the appell

2019The general purpose of the charitable immunity doctrine is that a qualifying organization’s charitable assets should not be depleted by subjection to liability for negligence and that it would be against public policy, as well as against the settled principles of law, to allow any judgment to be rendered against it because of the negligence 5 See Court of Appeals Rule 25 (c) (2) (“Any enumeration of error that is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument may be deemed abandoned.”). 6 See Cotton v. Smith, 310 Ga. App. 428, 429 (1) ( 714 SE2d 55 ) (2011) (Because the appell

1995Even if the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Grady was based only upon charitable immunity, this court had the power to affirm the judgment below on either of the two alternative grounds under the principle that a trial court's judgment right for any reason will be affirmed. [2] See Langford *99 v. Royal Indemnity Co., 208 Ga.App. 128, 134 (3)(e), 430 S.E.2d 98 (1993); Scott v. Hamilton Dorsey Alston Co., 206 Ga.App. 504, 505 (2), 426 S.E.2d 55 (1992).

1995Even if the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Grady was based only upon charitable immunity, this court had the power to affirm the judgment below on either of the two alternative grounds under the principle that a trial court's judgment right for any reason will be affirmed. [2] See Langford *99 v. Royal Indemnity Co., 208 Ga.App. 128, 134 (3)(e), 430 S.E.2d 98 (1993); Scott v. Hamilton Dorsey Alston Co., 206 Ga.App. 504, 505 (2), 426 S.E.2d 55 (1992).

1995A subsequent waiver is inapplicable to this action because a "waiver of sovereign immunity occurs at the time that the action arises." Donaldson v. Dept. of Transp., 262 Ga. 49, 53 (3), 414 S.E.2d 638 (1992).

1995A subsequent waiver is inapplicable to this action because a "waiver of sovereign immunity occurs at the time that the action arises." Donaldson v. Dept. of Transp., 262 Ga. 49, 53 (3), 414 S.E.2d 638 (1992).

1995Even if the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Grady was based only upon charitable immunity, this court had the power to affirm the judgment below on either of the two alternative grounds under the principle that a trial court's judgment right for any reason will be affirmed. [2] See Langford *99 v. Royal Indemnity Co., 208 Ga.App. 128, 134 (3)(e), 430 S.E.2d 98 (1993); Scott v. Hamilton Dorsey Alston Co., 206 Ga.App. 504, 505 (2), 426 S.E.2d 55 (1992).

1995Even if the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Grady was based only upon charitable immunity, this court had the power to affirm the judgment below on either of the two alternative grounds under the principle that a trial court's judgment right for any reason will be affirmed. [2] See Langford *99 v. Royal Indemnity Co., 208 Ga.App. 128, 134 (3)(e), 430 S.E.2d 98 (1993); Scott v. Hamilton Dorsey Alston Co., 206 Ga.App. 504, 505 (2), 426 S.E.2d 55 (1992).

1990See Y.M.C.A., supra; Hipp v. Hospital Auth., 104 Ga. App. 174, 177 (2) ( 121 SE2d 273 ).

1990Appellants averred, inter alia, in their complaint that appellee hospital “was at such time required to provide a staff adequately trained to exercise a reasonable dégree of medical care and skill in the delivery of health care,” that it “failed to provide staff who were qualified to adequately diagnose and to treat myocardial infarction,” and that it “failed to properly refer [deceased] to a facility capable of handling acute myocardial infarctions at a proper time.” Compare Hipp, supra. This pleading was sufficient to place appellee hospital on reasonable notice of an averment of inadequate

1989Swofford v. Cooper, 184 Ga. App. 50, 53 (2) ( 360 SE2d 624 ) (1987) aff'd 258 Ga. 143 ( 368 SE2d 518 ) (1988); Jackson v. Miller, 176 Ga. App. 220 (1) ( 335 SE2d 438 ) (1985).

1989Swofford v. Cooper, 184 Ga. App. 50, 53 (2) ( 360 SE2d 624 ) (1987) aff'd 258 Ga. 143 ( 368 SE2d 518 ) (1988); Jackson v. Miller, 176 Ga. App. 220 (1) ( 335 SE2d 438 ) (1985).

1961Again, “the general rule in Georgia is that such funds will not be depleted by subjection to liability for the negligence of a trustee.” Burgess v. James, 73 Ga. App. 857, 859 (38 SE2d *671 637); 9 A.L.R.2d 134 n.; 25 A.L.R.2d 46 n.