charitable immunity in New York

1982New York Hospital argues that it cannot be charged with liability for events occurring in July-August, 1953, because of the doctrine of charitable immunity, which, although subsequently abolished in 1957 by Bing v Thunig ( 2 NY2d 656 ), was then alive and well (see, e.g., Mrachek v Sunshine Biscuit, 308 NY 116 ).

1982New York Hospital argues that it cannot be charged with liability for events occurring in July-August, 1953, because of the doctrine of charitable immunity, which, although subsequently abolished in 1957 by Bing v Thunig ( 2 NY2d 656 ), was then alive and well (see, e.g., Mrachek v Sunshine Biscuit, 308 NY 116 ).

2025Thus, the doctrine of charitable immunity does not warrant dismissal of this action ( see generally Brown & Brown, Inc. v Johnson , 25 NY3d 364 [2015]; Kilberg v Northeast Airlines , 9 NY2d 34 [1961]).

2025Thus, the doctrine of charitable immunity does not warrant dismissal of this action ( see generally Brown & Brown, Inc. v Johnson , 25 NY3d 364 [2015]; Kilberg v Northeast Airlines , 9 NY2d 34 [1961]).

2006Realty, 151 AD2d 1044 [1989]; see Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac ¶ 327.02.) Here defendants, Fair Lawn and HIC, argue that the application of the doctrine of charitable immunity, pursuant to New Jersey Statutes Annotated §§ 2A:53A-7 — 2A:53A-11, provides an alternate basis for dismissal of this action.

2005We also note the Second Circuit’s reliance on the benefits that Gilbert realized by attending a school in New Jersey, in particular, a lower tuition due to the charitable immunity law ( 332 F3d at 109-110 ), and the higher tuition that plaintiffs here were required to pay the school as out-of-state residents.

1985(See, e.g., Clark v Clark, 107 NH 351, 355, 222 A2d 205, 209 ; Conklin v Horner, 38 Wis 2d 468, 484-485 , 157 NW2d 579, 587 ; see also, Tiernan v Westext Transp., 295 F Supp 1256 ; Skahill v Capital Airlines, 234 F Supp 906, 907 ; Schneider v Nichols, 280 Minn 139, 158 NW2d 254 ; Mitchell v Craft, 211 So 2d 509 [Miss]; Arnett v Thompson, 433 SW2d 109 [Ky].) As this court has already held, the charitable immunity law is one which is anachronistic, obsolete and senseless, and it appears that there is virtual judicial unanimity among the States that this is so.

1985Defendants contend New Jersey law governs this litigation and that its courts have already determined that plaintiffs’ claims are barred in a separate action against the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark (see, Schultz v Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 95 NJ 530, 472 A2d 531 ).

1985Defendants contend New Jersey law governs this litigation and that its courts have already determined that plaintiffs’ claims are barred in a separate action against the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark (see, Schultz v Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 95 NJ 530, 472 A2d 531 ).

1985(See, e.g., Clark v Clark, 107 NH 351, 355, 222 A2d 205, 209 ; Conklin v Horner, 38 Wis 2d 468, 484-485 , 157 NW2d 579, 587 ; see also, Tiernan v Westext Transp., 295 F Supp 1256 ; Skahill v Capital Airlines, 234 F Supp 906, 907 ; Schneider v Nichols, 280 Minn 139, 158 NW2d 254 ; Mitchell v Craft, 211 So 2d 509 [Miss]; Arnett v Thompson, 433 SW2d 109 [Ky].) As this court has already held, the charitable immunity law is one which is anachronistic, obsolete and senseless, and it appears that there is virtual judicial unanimity among the States that this is so.

1985Its change of domicile after the commission of the wrongs from New Jersey to Texas, which no longer recognizes the doctrine of charitable immunity (see, Howle v Camp Amon Carter, 470 SW2d 629 [Tex 1971]), provides New York with no greater interest in this action than it would have without the change.

1985Its change of domicile after the commission of the wrongs from New Jersey to Texas, which no longer recognizes the doctrine of charitable immunity (see, Howle v Camp Amon Carter, 470 SW2d 629 [Tex 1971]), provides New York with no greater interest in this action than it would have without the change.

1985(See, e.g., Clark v Clark, 107 NH 351, 355, 222 A2d 205, 209 ; Conklin v Horner, 38 Wis 2d 468, 484-485 , 157 NW2d 579, 587 ; see also, Tiernan v Westext Transp., 295 F Supp 1256 ; Skahill v Capital Airlines, 234 F Supp 906, 907 ; Schneider v Nichols, 280 Minn 139, 158 NW2d 254 ; Mitchell v Craft, 211 So 2d 509 [Miss]; Arnett v Thompson, 433 SW2d 109 [Ky].) As this court has already held, the charitable immunity law is one which is anachronistic, obsolete and senseless, and it appears that there is virtual judicial unanimity among the States that this is so.

1985(See, e.g., Clark v Clark, 107 NH 351, 355, 222 A2d 205, 209 ; Conklin v Horner, 38 Wis 2d 468, 484-485 , 157 NW2d 579, 587 ; see also, Tiernan v Westext Transp., 295 F Supp 1256 ; Skahill v Capital Airlines, 234 F Supp 906, 907 ; Schneider v Nichols, 280 Minn 139, 158 NW2d 254 ; Mitchell v Craft, 211 So 2d 509 [Miss]; Arnett v Thompson, 433 SW2d 109 [Ky].) As this court has already held, the charitable immunity law is one which is anachronistic, obsolete and senseless, and it appears that there is virtual judicial unanimity among the States that this is so.

1985(See, e.g., Clark v Clark, 107 NH 351, 355, 222 A2d 205, 209 ; Conklin v Horner, 38 Wis 2d 468, 484-485 , 157 NW2d 579, 587 ; see also, Tiernan v Westext Transp., 295 F Supp 1256 ; Skahill v Capital Airlines, 234 F Supp 906, 907 ; Schneider v Nichols, 280 Minn 139, 158 NW2d 254 ; Mitchell v Craft, 211 So 2d 509 [Miss]; Arnett v Thompson, 433 SW2d 109 [Ky].) As this court has already held, the charitable immunity law is one which is anachronistic, obsolete and senseless, and it appears that there is virtual judicial unanimity among the States that this is so.

1985(See, e.g., Clark v Clark, 107 NH 351, 355, 222 A2d 205, 209 ; Conklin v Horner, 38 Wis 2d 468, 484-485 , 157 NW2d 579, 587 ; see also, Tiernan v Westext Transp., 295 F Supp 1256 ; Skahill v Capital Airlines, 234 F Supp 906, 907 ; Schneider v Nichols, 280 Minn 139, 158 NW2d 254 ; Mitchell v Craft, 211 So 2d 509 [Miss]; Arnett v Thompson, 433 SW2d 109 [Ky].) As this court has already held, the charitable immunity law is one which is anachronistic, obsolete and senseless, and it appears that there is virtual judicial unanimity among the States that this is so.

1985Our decision recognizing a postaccident change in domicile in Miller v Miller ( 22 NY2d 12 ) is distinguishable because in that case the defendant’s domicile was changed to New York, which was the forum and also the plaintiff’s domicile.

1985Our decision recognizing a postaccident change in domicile in Miller v Miller ( 22 NY2d 12 ) is distinguishable because in that case the defendant’s domicile was changed to New York, which was the forum and also the plaintiff’s domicile.

1985Plaintiffs are correct that collateral estoppel would not apply if we applied New York law or refused to enforce the New Jersey statute on public policy grounds (see, State v Gonzalez, supra, at pp 188-192, at pp 1132-1133; Schwartz v Public Administrator, 24 NY2d 65, 72 ; Restatement [Second] of Judgments § 29 [7]).

1983We add only that the rule of Bing v Thunig ( 2 NY2d 656 ) which abrogated the doctrine of charitable immunity, was correctly retroactively applied (Keane v Sloan Kettering Inst. for Cancer Research, 68 AD2d 901 ; see, also, Toth v Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 22 NY2d 255 ; Burton v Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 88 AD2d 217 ; O’Neill v Montefiore Hosp., 11 AD2d 132 ) without impairment of defendant’s due process rights (see Gurnee v Aetna Life & Cas.

1983We add only that the rule of Bing v Thunig ( 2 NY2d 656 ) which abrogated the doctrine of charitable immunity, was correctly retroactively applied (Keane v Sloan Kettering Inst. for Cancer Research, 68 AD2d 901 ; see, also, Toth v Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 22 NY2d 255 ; Burton v Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 88 AD2d 217 ; O’Neill v Montefiore Hosp., 11 AD2d 132 ) without impairment of defendant’s due process rights (see Gurnee v Aetna Life & Cas.

1983We add only that the rule of Bing v Thunig ( 2 NY2d 656 ) which abrogated the doctrine of charitable immunity, was correctly retroactively applied (Keane v Sloan Kettering Inst. for Cancer Research, 68 AD2d 901 ; see, also, Toth v Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 22 NY2d 255 ; Burton v Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 88 AD2d 217 ; O’Neill v Montefiore Hosp., 11 AD2d 132 ) without impairment of defendant’s due process rights (see Gurnee v Aetna Life & Cas.

1983We add only that the rule of Bing v Thunig ( 2 NY2d 656 ) which abrogated the doctrine of charitable immunity, was correctly retroactively applied (Keane v Sloan Kettering Inst. for Cancer Research, 68 AD2d 901 ; see, also, Toth v Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 22 NY2d 255 ; Burton v Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 88 AD2d 217 ; O’Neill v Montefiore Hosp., 11 AD2d 132 ) without impairment of defendant’s due process rights (see Gurnee v Aetna Life & Cas.

1983We add only that the rule of Bing v Thunig ( 2 NY2d 656 ) which abrogated the doctrine of charitable immunity, was correctly retroactively applied (Keane v Sloan Kettering Inst. for Cancer Research, 68 AD2d 901 ; see, also, Toth v Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 22 NY2d 255 ; Burton v Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 88 AD2d 217 ; O’Neill v Montefiore Hosp., 11 AD2d 132 ) without impairment of defendant’s due process rights (see Gurnee v Aetna Life & Cas.

1983We add only that the rule of Bing v Thunig ( 2 NY2d 656 ) which abrogated the doctrine of charitable immunity, was correctly retroactively applied (Keane v Sloan Kettering Inst. for Cancer Research, 68 AD2d 901 ; see, also, Toth v Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 22 NY2d 255 ; Burton v Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 88 AD2d 217 ; O’Neill v Montefiore Hosp., 11 AD2d 132 ) without impairment of defendant’s due process rights (see Gurnee v Aetna Life & Cas.

1983Co., 55 NY2d 184 ).

1983Co., 55 NY2d 184 ).

1980In Blum v American Youth Hostels ( 21 AD2d 683, 684 ), in affirming an order dismissing a similar affirmative defense of immunity from liability for tort, this court held: "Since Oregon has overruled its earlier decisions which conferred upon charitable institutions immunity from liability for the torts of their servants (Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium & Benevolent Assn., 384 P. 2d 1009 [Ore., 1963]; Wicklander v. Salem Memorial Hosp., 385 P. 2d 617 [Ore., 1963]), the rule as to the immunity of a charitable institution from liability for acts of negligence committed by it in Oregon, as enun

1980In Blum v American Youth Hostels ( 21 AD2d 683, 684 ), in affirming an order dismissing a similar affirmative defense of immunity from liability for tort, this court held: "Since Oregon has overruled its earlier decisions which conferred upon charitable institutions immunity from liability for the torts of their servants (Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium & Benevolent Assn., 384 P. 2d 1009 [Ore., 1963]; Wicklander v. Salem Memorial Hosp., 385 P. 2d 617 [Ore., 1963]), the rule as to the immunity of a charitable institution from liability for acts of negligence committed by it in Oregon, as enun

1980Hosp. ( 64 AD2d 851, 852 ) and Domino v Mercurio ( 17 AD2d 342, 349 ). .

1980In Blum v American Youth Hostels ( 21 AD2d 683, 684 ), in affirming an order dismissing a similar affirmative defense of immunity from liability for tort, this court held: "Since Oregon has overruled its earlier decisions which conferred upon charitable institutions immunity from liability for the torts of their servants (Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium & Benevolent Assn., 384 P. 2d 1009 [Ore., 1963]; Wicklander v. Salem Memorial Hosp., 385 P. 2d 617 [Ore., 1963]), the rule as to the immunity of a charitable institution from liability for acts of negligence committed by it in Oregon, as enun

1980In Blum v American Youth Hostels ( 21 AD2d 683, 684 ), in affirming an order dismissing a similar affirmative defense of immunity from liability for tort, this court held: "Since Oregon has overruled its earlier decisions which conferred upon charitable institutions immunity from liability for the torts of their servants (Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium & Benevolent Assn., 384 P. 2d 1009 [Ore., 1963]; Wicklander v. Salem Memorial Hosp., 385 P. 2d 617 [Ore., 1963]), the rule as to the immunity of a charitable institution from liability for acts of negligence committed by it in Oregon, as enun

1980In Blum v American Youth Hostels ( 21 AD2d 683, 684 ), in affirming an order dismissing a similar affirmative defense of immunity from liability for tort, this court held: "Since Oregon has overruled its earlier decisions which conferred upon charitable institutions immunity from liability for the torts of their servants (Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium & Benevolent Assn., 384 P. 2d 1009 [Ore., 1963]; Wicklander v. Salem Memorial Hosp., 385 P. 2d 617 [Ore., 1963]), the rule as to the immunity of a charitable institution from liability for acts of negligence committed by it in Oregon, as enun

1980In Blum v American Youth Hostels ( 21 AD2d 683, 684 ), in affirming an order dismissing a similar affirmative defense of immunity from liability for tort, this court held: "Since Oregon has overruled its earlier decisions which conferred upon charitable institutions immunity from liability for the torts of their servants (Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium & Benevolent Assn., 384 P. 2d 1009 [Ore., 1963]; Wicklander v. Salem Memorial Hosp., 385 P. 2d 617 [Ore., 1963]), the rule as to the immunity of a charitable institution from liability for acts of negligence committed by it in Oregon, as enun

1980Hosp. ( 64 AD2d 851, 852 ) and Domino v Mercurio ( 17 AD2d 342, 349 ). .

1980In Blum v American Youth Hostels ( 21 AD2d 683, 684 ), in affirming an order dismissing a similar affirmative defense of immunity from liability for tort, this court held: "Since Oregon has overruled its earlier decisions which conferred upon charitable institutions immunity from liability for the torts of their servants (Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium & Benevolent Assn., 384 P. 2d 1009 [Ore., 1963]; Wicklander v. Salem Memorial Hosp., 385 P. 2d 617 [Ore., 1963]), the rule as to the immunity of a charitable institution from liability for acts of negligence committed by it in Oregon, as enun

1980In Blum v American Youth Hostels ( 21 AD2d 683, 684 ), in affirming an order dismissing a similar affirmative defense of immunity from liability for tort, this court held: "Since Oregon has overruled its earlier decisions which conferred upon charitable institutions immunity from liability for the torts of their servants (Hungerford v. Portland Sanitarium & Benevolent Assn., 384 P. 2d 1009 [Ore., 1963]; Wicklander v. Salem Memorial Hosp., 385 P. 2d 617 [Ore., 1963]), the rule as to the immunity of a charitable institution from liability for acts of negligence committed by it in Oregon, as enun

1980The court held as follows (pp 524-526): "No New York decision dealing with the charitable immunity doctrine of a foreign state has reached the choice of law question since the rejection of the rigid lex loci delicti approach by Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473 * * * (1963).

1980What faces me then, is a question not previously addressed by this court, the New York Court of Appeals or the Second Circuit. * * * "New York’s 'interest analysis’ approach to choice of law problems was first enunciated by Judge Fuld in Babcock v. Jackson, supra, which sounded the death knell of the rigid rule that the law of the place of the tort inevitably governs.