charitable immunity in Indiana

1983The doctrine of charitable immunity has been abolished in Indiana Harris v. YWCA of Terre Haute, (1968) 250 Ind. 491 , 237 N.E.2d 242 .

1983The doctrine of charitable immunity has been abolished in Indiana Harris v. YWCA of Terre Haute, (1968) 250 Ind. 491 , 237 N.E.2d 242 .

1980Vincent’s Hospital v. Stine (1924), 195 Ind. 350 , 144 N.E. 537 , and Harris v. YWCA (1968), 250 Ind. 491 , 237 N.E.2d 242 where the charitable immunity doctrine was overruled.

1980Vincent’s Hospital v. Stine (1924), 195 Ind. 350 , 144 N.E. 537 , and Harris v. YWCA (1968), 250 Ind. 491 , 237 N.E.2d 242 where the charitable immunity doctrine was overruled.

1976With respect to the “anti-collusion” purpose, the Ohio Court invoked a combination equal protection and due process argument used successfully in Vlandis v. Kline, (1973) 412 U.S. 441 , 93 S.Ct. 2230 , 37 L.Ed.2d 63 .

1976With respect to the “anti-collusion” purpose, the Ohio Court invoked a combination equal protection and due process argument used successfully in Vlandis v. Kline, (1973) 412 U.S. 441 , 93 S.Ct. 2230 , 37 L.Ed.2d 63 .

1969In Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, 141 Ind. App. 662 , 231 N. E. 2d 169 (1967), (rehearing and transfer denied), this court overruled previous precedents, including cases decided by our Supreme Court, in regard to the doctrine of municipal immunity.

1969In Brinkman v. City of Indianapolis, 141 Ind. App. 662 , 231 N. E. 2d 169 (1967), (rehearing and transfer denied), this court overruled previous precedents, including cases decided by our Supreme Court, in regard to the doctrine of municipal immunity.

1968Appellant further contends that appellee is not entitled to the doctrine of charitable immunity under the decision of Ball Memorial Hospital v. Freeman (1964), 245 Ind. 71 , 196 N. E. 2d 274 , because the injury was caused by the institution itself in its corporate capacity and not by any negligence on the part of its employees.

1968Appellant further contends that appellee is not entitled to the doctrine of charitable immunity under the decision of Ball Memorial Hospital v. Freeman (1964), 245 Ind. 71 , 196 N. E. 2d 274 , because the injury was caused by the institution itself in its corporate capacity and not by any negligence on the part of its employees.

1968In commenting on this apparent misinterpretation of the English law, Justice Musmanno, speaking for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, said: . . until 1888, in the case of Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa. 624 . . . .

1968Likewise, Indiana apparently followed Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and other states, in adopting the doctrine of charitable immunity or “qualified charitable immunity.” In 1942 in President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810 , Justice Rutledge wrote extensively on the doctrine of charitable immunity and pointed out certain factual and legal fallacies in the doctrine.

1968Likewise, Indiana apparently followed Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and other states, in adopting the doctrine of charitable immunity or “qualified charitable immunity.” In 1942 in President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810 , Justice Rutledge wrote extensively on the doctrine of charitable immunity and pointed out certain factual and legal fallacies in the doctrine.

1968Mary’s Hospital (1963), 135 Ind. App. 1 , 191 N. E. 2d 337 , for the reason that Sudie Harris was not a beneficiary of the alleged charity.

1968Mary’s Hospital (1963), 135 Ind. App. 1 , 191 N. E. 2d 337 , for the reason that Sudie Harris was not a beneficiary of the alleged charity.

1963Vincent’s Hospital v. Stine (1924), 195 Ind. 350 , 144 N. E. 537 , said: “(A) charitable institution or corporation is.' not liable to a beneficiary for an injury caused by the negligence of its employees, if it has used due care in selecting such employees, but that this exemption from liability does not extend to outsiders or third persons ...” “The fact that the injured person was a pay patient is universally held not to render the institution liable.” The doctrine of charitable immunity was again asserted as a defense to a tort action against a charitable institution in Old Folks and Orpha

1963Vincent’s Hospital v. Stine (1924), 195 Ind. 350 , 144 N. E. 537 , said: “(A) charitable institution or corporation is.' not liable to a beneficiary for an injury caused by the negligence of its employees, if it has used due care in selecting such employees, but that this exemption from liability does not extend to outsiders or third persons ...” “The fact that the injured person was a pay patient is universally held not to render the institution liable.” The doctrine of charitable immunity was again asserted as a defense to a tort action against a charitable institution in Old Folks and Orpha