charitable immunity in Louisiana

1974Respondents here rely upon the case of Grant v. Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204 , 223 So.2d 148 (1969) for support in urging the applicability of the charitable immunity doctrine which was the basis for the sustaining of the exception of no cause of action.

1974Respondents here rely upon the case of Grant v. Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204 , 223 So.2d 148 (1969) for support in urging the applicability of the charitable immunity doctrine which was the basis for the sustaining of the exception of no cause of action.

2002Co. 388 So.2d 365, 367 (La.1980) (“ ‘[T]he decisions of a court of last resort are not the law, but only the evidence of what the court thinks is the law.’ ” (quoting Norton, 150 So. at 858 )); Jackson v. Doe, 296 So.2d 323, 323 (La.1974) (“Prospective [only] application of judicial decisions is the exception rather than the general rule of law.” (rejecting argument that Garglington v. Kingsley, 289 So.2d 88 (La.1974), overruling doctrine of charitable immunity, should operate prospectively only.)); Charles v. United States, 15 F.3d 400 , 402 n. 4 (5th Cir.1994) (“ ‘Generally, [under Louisiana

1993We note that the Louisiana Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of charitable immunity as a defense to tort liability in Garlington v. Kingsley, 289 So.2d 88 (La.1974).

1969This Court in D’Antoni v. Sara Mayo Hospital, La.App., 144 So.2d 643 , and the Supreme Court in Grant v. Touro Infirmary supm expressly found the acts complained of to be “administrative” but nevertheless found the doctrine of charitable immunity to be applicable, precluding the rendition of a judgment against the charitable hospital.

1968We feel, however, that if that doctrine, which has been recognized in Louisiana for so long, is to be abandoned, that action must be taken either by legislative enactment or by our Supreme Court which, in the latest case in which it was held that the charitable immunity exists, that is, D’Antoni v. Sara Mayo Hospital, La.App., 144 So.2d 643 , refused to grant a writ of certiorari.

2002Co. 388 So.2d 365, 367 (La.1980) (“ ‘[T]he decisions of a court of last resort are not the law, but only the evidence of what the court thinks is the law.’ ” (quoting Norton, 150 So. at 858 )); Jackson v. Doe, 296 So.2d 323, 323 (La.1974) (“Prospective [only] application of judicial decisions is the exception rather than the general rule of law.” (rejecting argument that Garglington v. Kingsley, 289 So.2d 88 (La.1974), overruling doctrine of charitable immunity, should operate prospectively only.)); Charles v. United States, 15 F.3d 400 , 402 n. 4 (5th Cir.1994) (“ ‘Generally, [under Louisiana

2002Co. 388 So.2d 365, 367 (La.1980) (“ ‘[T]he decisions of a court of last resort are not the law, but only the evidence of what the court thinks is the law.’ ” (quoting Norton, 150 So. at 858 )); Jackson v. Doe, 296 So.2d 323, 323 (La.1974) (“Prospective [only] application of judicial decisions is the exception rather than the general rule of law.” (rejecting argument that Garglington v. Kingsley, 289 So.2d 88 (La.1974), overruling doctrine of charitable immunity, should operate prospectively only.)); Charles v. United States, 15 F.3d 400 , 402 n. 4 (5th Cir.1994) (“ ‘Generally, [under Louisiana

2002Co. 388 So.2d 365, 367 (La.1980) (“ ‘[T]he decisions of a court of last resort are not the law, but only the evidence of what the court thinks is the law.’ ” (quoting Norton, 150 So. at 858 )); Jackson v. Doe, 296 So.2d 323, 323 (La.1974) (“Prospective [only] application of judicial decisions is the exception rather than the general rule of law.” (rejecting argument that Garglington v. Kingsley, 289 So.2d 88 (La.1974), overruling doctrine of charitable immunity, should operate prospectively only.)); Charles v. United States, 15 F.3d 400 , 402 n. 4 (5th Cir.1994) (“ ‘Generally, [under Louisiana

2002Co. 388 So.2d 365, 367 (La.1980) (“ ‘[T]he decisions of a court of last resort are not the law, but only the evidence of what the court thinks is the law.’ ” (quoting Norton, 150 So. at 858 )); Jackson v. Doe, 296 So.2d 323, 323 (La.1974) (“Prospective [only] application of judicial decisions is the exception rather than the general rule of law.” (rejecting argument that Garglington v. Kingsley, 289 So.2d 88 (La.1974), overruling doctrine of charitable immunity, should operate prospectively only.)); Charles v. United States, 15 F.3d 400 , 402 n. 4 (5th Cir.1994) (“ ‘Generally, [under Louisiana

1993The effect of this conclusion would be to reinstate the doctrine of charitable immunity, contrary to the Supreme Court's dictates in Garlington, 289 So.2d at 93 . [8] As recognized in Schroeder v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 591 So.2d 342, 347 (La.1992), the prevailing meaning of the term "borrow" in the context of automobile lending requires that the borrower acquire substantial possession, dominion, control, or the right to direct the use of the vehicle, and not merely that the use of the vehicle by another person was for the benefit of a purported borrower. [9] Plain

1993The effect of this conclusion would be to reinstate the doctrine of charitable immunity, contrary to the Supreme Court's dictates in Garlington, 289 So.2d at 93 . [8] As recognized in Schroeder v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 591 So.2d 342, 347 (La.1992), the prevailing meaning of the term "borrow" in the context of automobile lending requires that the borrower acquire substantial possession, dominion, control, or the right to direct the use of the vehicle, and not merely that the use of the vehicle by another person was for the benefit of a purported borrower. [9] Plain

1993The effect of this conclusion would be to reinstate the doctrine of charitable immunity, contrary to the Supreme Court's dictates in Garlington, 289 So.2d at 93 . [8] As recognized in Schroeder v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 591 So.2d 342, 347 (La.1992), the prevailing meaning of the term "borrow" in the context of automobile lending requires that the borrower acquire substantial possession, dominion, control, or the right to direct the use of the vehicle, and not merely that the use of the vehicle by another person was for the benefit of a purported borrower. [9] Plain

1993The effect of this conclusion would be to reinstate the doctrine of charitable immunity, contrary to the Supreme Court's dictates in Garlington, 289 So.2d at 93 . [8] As recognized in Schroeder v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 591 So.2d 342, 347 (La.1992), the prevailing meaning of the term "borrow" in the context of automobile lending requires that the borrower acquire substantial possession, dominion, control, or the right to direct the use of the vehicle, and not merely that the use of the vehicle by another person was for the benefit of a purported borrower. [9] Plain

1974We granted certiorari ( 279 So.2d 693 ) to consider the issue of the continued viability vel non of the much criticized doctrine of charitable immunity.

1969See Thibodaux v. Sisters of Charity of Incarnate Word, 11 La.App. 423 , 123 So. 466 ; Jordan v. Touro Infirmary, supra; Messina v. Societe Francaise de Bienfaissance, La.App., 170 So. 801 ; Jurjevich v. Hotel Dieu, La.App., 11 So.2d 632 ; D’Antoni v. Sara Mayo Hospital, La.App., 144 So.2d 643 ; Humphreys v. McComiskey, La.

1969See Thibodaux v. Sisters of Charity of Incarnate Word, 11 La.App. 423 , 123 So. 466 ; Jordan v. Touro Infirmary, supra; Messina v. Societe Francaise de Bienfaissance, La.App., 170 So. 801 ; Jurjevich v. Hotel Dieu, La.App., 11 So.2d 632 ; D'Antoni v. Sara Mayo Hospital, La.App., 144 So.2d 643 ; Humphreys v. McComiskey, La.

1969It has been held to apply only to beneficiaries of the charity (which includes paying patients), but not to a third-party stranger (see Bougon v. Volunteers of America, 151 So. 797 , La.App.Orl.1934) ; it does not apply when corporate negligence can be proven, that is, if it is shown that the institution was negligent in the selection of its employees (see authorities above cited and also 15 Am.Jur. 2d, Charities, Sec. 160, p. 171); and the immunity may not be urged as a defense by the liability insurer of the charity, such defense being personal to the charity itself (Idem).

1969It has been held to apply only to beneficiaries of the charity (which includes paying patients), but not to a third-party stranger (see Bougon v. Volunteers of America, 151 So. 797 , La.

1969Plaintiff also contends that the acts complained of were “administrative” rather than “medical” acts and that the doctrine of charitable immunity does not apply to “administrative” acts, citing Danks v. Maher, La.App., 177 So.2d 412 .

1969Plaintiff also contends that the acts complained of were “administrative” rather than “medical” acts and that the doctrine of charitable immunity does not apply to “administrative” acts, citing Danks v. Maher, La.App., 177 So.2d 412 .

1969See Thibodaux v. Sisters of Charity of Incarnate Word, 11 La.App. 423 , 123 So. 466 ; Jordan v. Touro Infirmary, supra; Messina v. Societe Francaise de Bienfaissance, La.App., 170 So. 801 ; Jurjevich v. Hotel Dieu, La.App., 11 So.2d 632 ; D’Antoni v. Sara Mayo Hospital, La.App., 144 So.2d 643 ; Humphreys v. McComiskey, La.

1969See Thibodaux v. Sisters of Charity of Incarnate Word, 11 La.App. 423 , 123 So. 466 ; Jordan v. Touro Infirmary, supra; Messina v. Societe Francaise de Bienfaissance, La.App., 170 So. 801 ; Jurjevich v. Hotel Dieu, La.App., 11 So.2d 632 ; D'Antoni v. Sara Mayo Hospital, La.App., 144 So.2d 643 ; Humphreys v. McComiskey, La.