25 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1959–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Colby v. Carney Hospitalgreen2 sentences2004The Legislature enacted the cap after the Supreme Judicial Court announced its intention, in Colby v. Carney Hospital 356 Mass. 527, 528 , (1969), to abolish the doctrine of charitable immunity. 2004The Legislature enacted the cap after the Supreme Judicial Court announced its intention, in Colby v. Carney Hospital 356 Mass. 527, 528 , (1969), to abolish the doctrine of charitable immunity. | 6 | 10 |
Ricker v. Northeastern Universitygreen2 sentences1975In Ricker v. Northeastern Univ., supra, 170-171, we said, speaking of the Colby case, “This language does not by itself abolish the doctrine of charitable immunity as of December 23, 1969 . . . [the language] makes it clear that no change of the doctrine was then being made.” The Legislature chose to act subsequent to the Colby decision. 1975In Ricker v. Northeastern Univ., supra, 170-171, we said, speaking of the Colby case, “This language does not by itself abolish the doctrine of charitable immunity as of December 23, 1969 . . . [the language] makes it clear that no change of the doctrine was then being made.” The Legislature chose to act subsequent to the Colby decision. | 3 | 3 |
English v. New England Medical Center, Inc.green2 sentences2003The Legislature thus pursued “the legitimate objective of preserving charitable assets,” id. at 430 , while evincing an intent to “confine narrowly the doctrine of charitable immunity.” Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 63-64 (1983). 2003The Legislature thus pursued “the legitimate objective of preserving charitable assets,” id. at 430 , while evincing an intent to “confine narrowly the doctrine of charitable immunity.” Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 63-64 (1983). | 2 | 3 |
McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospitalgreen2 sentences2000The doctrine of charitable immunity was adopted in Massachusetts in the case of McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432, 434-36 (1876). 1967Even if we assume that the defendant was negligent (which we do not so find), still the defendant would not be liable under the doctrine of charitable immunity first enunciated in 1876 in the case of McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 which rule has been followed in recent decisions of Bearse v. New England Deaconess Hospital, 321 Mass. 750 , Mastroangelo v. Maverick Dispensary, 330 Mass. 708 , Boxer v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 342 Mass. 537 and Harrigan v. Cape Cod Hospital, 349 Mass. 765 . | 1 | 3 |
Mullins v. Pine Manor Collegegreen2 sentences2003The Legislature thus pursued “the legitimate objective of preserving charitable assets,” id. at 430 , while evincing an intent to “confine narrowly the doctrine of charitable immunity.” Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 63-64 (1983). 2003The Legislature thus pursued “the legitimate objective of preserving charitable assets,” id. at 430 , while evincing an intent to “confine narrowly the doctrine of charitable immunity.” Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 63-64 (1983). | 1 | 2 |
Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospitalgreen2 sentences1988See, e.g., Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. at 147 ; Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hosp., 235 Mass. 66 (1920); Reavey v. *667 Guild of St. 1986Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hosp., 235 Mass. 66, 75-76 (1920). | 1 | 2 |
Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1979Compare our opinions concerning governmental immunity, where our power to act to abrogate the doctrine was recognized (Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 209-210 [1977]; Hannigan v. New *809 Gamma-Delta Chapter of Kappa Sigma Fraternity, Inc., supra at 659; Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 624 [1973]), and this court’s opinion concerning its intention to abolish the doctrine of charitable immunity (Colby v. Carney Hosp., 356 Mass. 527, 528 [1969]). 1979Compare our opinions concerning governmental immunity, where our power to act to abrogate the doctrine was recognized (Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 209-210 [1977]; Hannigan v. New *809 Gamma-Delta Chapter of Kappa Sigma Fraternity, Inc., supra at 659; Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 624 [1973]), and this court’s opinion concerning its intention to abolish the doctrine of charitable immunity (Colby v. Carney Hosp., 356 Mass. 527, 528 [1969]). | 1 | 2 |
Birbiglia v. Saint Vincent Hospital, Inc.green1 sentence2026Cf. Birbiglia, 427 Mass. at 88 (noting that costs are "expressly not subject to the $20,000 limit"); G. | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Kelleygreen1 sentence2015See Martin v. Kelley, 18 Mass. L. | 1 | 1 |
Town of Bedford v. AFSCME Council 93, Local 1703green1 sentence2009See note 1, supra. On appeal, the union contends that it was entitled to plead the charitable immunity cap on damages provided by G. | 1 | 1 |
Conners v. Northeast Hospital Corp.green1 sentence2005See Conners v. Northeast Hospital Corp., 439 Mass. 469 (2003). | 1 | 1 |
Gos v. Brownsteingreen1 sentence2003See Gos v. Brownstein, 403 Mass. 252, 255-256 (1988) (sanctions need not be based on a wilful failure to comply with discovery order). | 1 | 1 |
Farrigan v. Peveargreen1 sentence1988See, e.g., Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. at 147 ; Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hosp., 235 Mass. 66 (1920); Reavey v. *667 Guild of St. | 1 | 1 |
Gallant v. Worcestergreen1 sentence1986See generally Gallant v. Worcester, 383 Mass. 707, 712-715 (1981). 14 We also note that when the charitable immunity doctrine was still in full force, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the policy reasons denying recovery for common law actions applied also to preclude actions under the wrongful death statute. | 1 | 1 |
Whitney v. City of Worcestergreen2 sentences1979Compare our opinions concerning governmental immunity, where our power to act to abrogate the doctrine was recognized (Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 209-210 [1977]; Hannigan v. New *809 Gamma-Delta Chapter of Kappa Sigma Fraternity, Inc., supra at 659; Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 624 [1973]), and this court’s opinion concerning its intention to abolish the doctrine of charitable immunity (Colby v. Carney Hosp., 356 Mass. 527, 528 [1969]). 1979Compare our opinions concerning governmental immunity, where our power to act to abrogate the doctrine was recognized (Whitney v. Worcester, 373 Mass. 208, 209-210 [1977]; Hannigan v. New *809 Gamma-Delta Chapter of Kappa Sigma Fraternity, Inc., supra at 659; Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 624 [1973]), and this court’s opinion concerning its intention to abolish the doctrine of charitable immunity (Colby v. Carney Hosp., 356 Mass. 527, 528 [1969]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Barrett v. Brooks Hospital, Inc.
green
2 sentences1961Inc. 338 Mass. 754, 756 ) and matters of defence are not open on demurrer. 1959Inc. 338 Mass. 754, 755-756 , and cases cited) inapplicable, which we do not intimate, not having reached that point. | 2 | 1959–1961 |
Attorney General v. Weymouth Agricultural & Industrial Society
green
1 sentence1997Soc., 400 Mass. 475 , All n.3 (1987) (citing cases holding that Boston Symphony Orchestra is subject to local property tax but is entitled to the charitable immunity). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Higgins v. Emerson Hospital
green
2 sentences1995Because the abolitionary statute is not retrospective in effect, Higgins v. Emerson Hospital, 367 Mass. 714 (1975), and because the Supreme Judicial Court has ruled that the doctrine of charitable immunity retains its protective function with respect to injuries occurring after the date of the Colby decision, but before the date of the statute abolishing charitable immunity, Higgins, supra, tortious acts occurring prior to Colby (December 23, 1969) and between Colby and the abolition (1971) will continue to enjoy the sheltering effect of charitable immunity. 1995Because the abolitionary statute is not retrospective in effect, Higgins v. Emerson Hospital, 367 Mass. 714 (1975), and because the Supreme Judicial Court has ruled that the doctrine of charitable immunity retains its protective function with respect to injuries occurring after the date of the Colby decision, but before the date of the statute abolishing charitable immunity, Higgins, supra, tortious acts occurring prior to Colby (December 23, 1969) and between Colby and the abolition (1971) will continue to enjoy the sheltering effect of charitable immunity. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Schoenfield v. County of Humboldt
green
1 sentence1995In that early decision, “[t]he court reasoned that the hospital held its funds in trust for the benefit of the public, and that it would be an unlawful diversion of those funds to apply them to the satisfaction of a judgment based on the negligence of hospital agents.” English v. New England Medical Center, 405 Mass. 423, 425 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Brune v. Belinkoff
green
2 sentences1973Inc. 340 Mass. 633 (1960) (right of action for prenatal injuries); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 (1968) (enlarging physicians’ duty of care); Colby v. Carney Hosp. 356 Mass. 527 (1969) (forecasting abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity); George v. Jordan Marsh Co. 359 Mass. 244 (1971) (right of action for intentionally caused mental distress resulting in bodily harm); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60 (1972) (limitations period in wrongful death action); Knowles v. Gilchrist Co. 362 Mass. 642 (1972) (shift of a burden of proof from bailor to bailee-for-hire); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. 1973Inc. 340 Mass. 633 (1960) (right of action for prenatal injuries); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 (1968) (enlarging physicians’ duty of care); Colby v. Carney Hosp. 356 Mass. 527 (1969) (forecasting abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity); George v. Jordan Marsh Co. 359 Mass. 244 (1971) (right of action for intentionally caused mental distress resulting in bodily harm); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60 (1972) (limitations period in wrongful death action); Knowles v. Gilchrist Co. 362 Mass. 642 (1972) (shift of a burden of proof from bailor to bailee-for-hire); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Keyes v. Construction Service, Inc.
green
2 sentences1973Inc. 340 Mass. 633 (1960) (right of action for prenatal injuries); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 (1968) (enlarging physicians’ duty of care); Colby v. Carney Hosp. 356 Mass. 527 (1969) (forecasting abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity); George v. Jordan Marsh Co. 359 Mass. 244 (1971) (right of action for intentionally caused mental distress resulting in bodily harm); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60 (1972) (limitations period in wrongful death action); Knowles v. Gilchrist Co. 362 Mass. 642 (1972) (shift of a burden of proof from bailor to bailee-for-hire); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. 1973Inc. 340 Mass. 633 (1960) (right of action for prenatal injuries); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 (1968) (enlarging physicians’ duty of care); Colby v. Carney Hosp. 356 Mass. 527 (1969) (forecasting abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity); George v. Jordan Marsh Co. 359 Mass. 244 (1971) (right of action for intentionally caused mental distress resulting in bodily harm); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60 (1972) (limitations period in wrongful death action); Knowles v. Gilchrist Co. 362 Mass. 642 (1972) (shift of a burden of proof from bailor to bailee-for-hire); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Gaudette v. Webb
green
2 sentences1973Inc. 340 Mass. 633 (1960) (right of action for prenatal injuries); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 (1968) (enlarging physicians’ duty of care); Colby v. Carney Hosp. 356 Mass. 527 (1969) (forecasting abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity); George v. Jordan Marsh Co. 359 Mass. 244 (1971) (right of action for intentionally caused mental distress resulting in bodily harm); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60 (1972) (limitations period in wrongful death action); Knowles v. Gilchrist Co. 362 Mass. 642 (1972) (shift of a burden of proof from bailor to bailee-for-hire); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. 1973Inc. 340 Mass. 633 (1960) (right of action for prenatal injuries); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 (1968) (enlarging physicians’ duty of care); Colby v. Carney Hosp. 356 Mass. 527 (1969) (forecasting abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity); George v. Jordan Marsh Co. 359 Mass. 244 (1971) (right of action for intentionally caused mental distress resulting in bodily harm); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60 (1972) (limitations period in wrongful death action); Knowles v. Gilchrist Co. 362 Mass. 642 (1972) (shift of a burden of proof from bailor to bailee-for-hire); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Gildea v. Ellershaw
green
2 sentences1973Inc. 340 Mass. 633 (1960) (right of action for prenatal injuries); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 (1968) (enlarging physicians’ duty of care); Colby v. Carney Hosp. 356 Mass. 527 (1969) (forecasting abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity); George v. Jordan Marsh Co. 359 Mass. 244 (1971) (right of action for intentionally caused mental distress resulting in bodily harm); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60 (1972) (limitations period in wrongful death action); Knowles v. Gilchrist Co. 362 Mass. 642 (1972) (shift of a burden of proof from bailor to bailee-for-hire); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. 1973Inc. 340 Mass. 633 (1960) (right of action for prenatal injuries); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 (1968) (enlarging physicians’ duty of care); Colby v. Carney Hosp. 356 Mass. 527 (1969) (forecasting abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity); George v. Jordan Marsh Co. 359 Mass. 244 (1971) (right of action for intentionally caused mental distress resulting in bodily harm); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60 (1972) (limitations period in wrongful death action); Knowles v. Gilchrist Co. 362 Mass. 642 (1972) (shift of a burden of proof from bailor to bailee-for-hire); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
George v. Jordan Marsh Company
green
2 sentences1973Inc. 340 Mass. 633 (1960) (right of action for prenatal injuries); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 (1968) (enlarging physicians’ duty of care); Colby v. Carney Hosp. 356 Mass. 527 (1969) (forecasting abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity); George v. Jordan Marsh Co. 359 Mass. 244 (1971) (right of action for intentionally caused mental distress resulting in bodily harm); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60 (1972) (limitations period in wrongful death action); Knowles v. Gilchrist Co. 362 Mass. 642 (1972) (shift of a burden of proof from bailor to bailee-for-hire); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. 1973Inc. 340 Mass. 633 (1960) (right of action for prenatal injuries); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 (1968) (enlarging physicians’ duty of care); Colby v. Carney Hosp. 356 Mass. 527 (1969) (forecasting abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity); George v. Jordan Marsh Co. 359 Mass. 244 (1971) (right of action for intentionally caused mental distress resulting in bodily harm); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60 (1972) (limitations period in wrongful death action); Knowles v. Gilchrist Co. 362 Mass. 642 (1972) (shift of a burden of proof from bailor to bailee-for-hire); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Mounsey v. Ellard
green
2 sentences1973Inc. 340 Mass. 633 (1960) (right of action for prenatal injuries); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 (1968) (enlarging physicians’ duty of care); Colby v. Carney Hosp. 356 Mass. 527 (1969) (forecasting abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity); George v. Jordan Marsh Co. 359 Mass. 244 (1971) (right of action for intentionally caused mental distress resulting in bodily harm); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60 (1972) (limitations period in wrongful death action); Knowles v. Gilchrist Co. 362 Mass. 642 (1972) (shift of a burden of proof from bailor to bailee-for-hire); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. 1973Inc. 340 Mass. 633 (1960) (right of action for prenatal injuries); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 (1968) (enlarging physicians’ duty of care); Colby v. Carney Hosp. 356 Mass. 527 (1969) (forecasting abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity); George v. Jordan Marsh Co. 359 Mass. 244 (1971) (right of action for intentionally caused mental distress resulting in bodily harm); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60 (1972) (limitations period in wrongful death action); Knowles v. Gilchrist Co. 362 Mass. 642 (1972) (shift of a burden of proof from bailor to bailee-for-hire); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Knowles v. Gilchrist Co.
green
2 sentences1973Inc. 340 Mass. 633 (1960) (right of action for prenatal injuries); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 (1968) (enlarging physicians’ duty of care); Colby v. Carney Hosp. 356 Mass. 527 (1969) (forecasting abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity); George v. Jordan Marsh Co. 359 Mass. 244 (1971) (right of action for intentionally caused mental distress resulting in bodily harm); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60 (1972) (limitations period in wrongful death action); Knowles v. Gilchrist Co. 362 Mass. 642 (1972) (shift of a burden of proof from bailor to bailee-for-hire); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. 1973Inc. 340 Mass. 633 (1960) (right of action for prenatal injuries); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 (1968) (enlarging physicians’ duty of care); Colby v. Carney Hosp. 356 Mass. 527 (1969) (forecasting abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity); George v. Jordan Marsh Co. 359 Mass. 244 (1971) (right of action for intentionally caused mental distress resulting in bodily harm); Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60 (1972) (limitations period in wrongful death action); Knowles v. Gilchrist Co. 362 Mass. 642 (1972) (shift of a burden of proof from bailor to bailee-for-hire); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Brunton v. O'Connell neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Berger v. Boston, Worcester & New York Street Railway Co.
neutral
1 sentence1967Even if we assume that the defendant was negligent (which we do not so find), still the defendant would not be liable under the doctrine of charitable immunity first enunciated in 1876 in the case of McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 which rule has been followed in recent decisions of Bearse v. New England Deaconess Hospital, 321 Mass. 750 , Mastroangelo v. Maverick Dispensary, 330 Mass. 708 , Boxer v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 342 Mass. 537 and Harrigan v. Cape Cod Hospital, 349 Mass. 765 . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Simpson v. Truesdale Hospital, Inc.
green
1 sentence1967See: Simpson v. Truesdale Hospital, 338 Mass. 787 . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Chernaik v. Crean
neutral
1 sentence1967Even if we assume that the defendant was negligent (which we do not so find), still the defendant would not be liable under the doctrine of charitable immunity first enunciated in 1876 in the case of McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 which rule has been followed in recent decisions of Bearse v. New England Deaconess Hospital, 321 Mass. 750 , Mastroangelo v. Maverick Dispensary, 330 Mass. 708 , Boxer v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 342 Mass. 537 and Harrigan v. Cape Cod Hospital, 349 Mass. 765 . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Boxer v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc.
green
1 sentence1967Even if we assume that the defendant was negligent (which we do not so find), still the defendant would not be liable under the doctrine of charitable immunity first enunciated in 1876 in the case of McDonald v. Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 which rule has been followed in recent decisions of Bearse v. New England Deaconess Hospital, 321 Mass. 750 , Mastroangelo v. Maverick Dispensary, 330 Mass. 708 , Boxer v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 342 Mass. 537 and Harrigan v. Cape Cod Hospital, 349 Mass. 765 . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Ray v. Tucson Medical Center green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.