charitable immunity in New Jersey

2026Charitable immunity under the CIA is an affirmative defense for which “defendants bear the burden of persuasion.” Abdallah v. Occupational Ctr. of Hudson Cnty., 351 N.J.

2024A-2138-22 4 "Charitable immunity is an affirmative defense, as to which, like all affirmative defenses, defendants bear the burden of persuasion." Abdallah v. Occupational Ctr. of Hudson Cnty., Inc., 351 N.J.

2024"Entities that can prove they are organized exclusively for educational or religious purposes automatically satisfy the second prong of the charitable immunity standard"; that is, "no further financial analysis is required." Ryan, 175 N.J. at 346 ; see also O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 491 (2002).

2024Entities "organized exclusively for educational or religious purposes automatically satisfy the second prong of the charitable immunity standard." Id. at 117 (citing Ryan v. Holy Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 175 N.J. 333, 343 (2003)).

2001In a trilogy of cases that reconsidered the doctrine of charitable immunity from the perspective of the injured plaintiff, we reasoned: “Due care is to be expected of all, and when an organization’s negligent conduct injures another there should, in all justice and equity, be a basis for recovery without regard to whether the defendant is a private charity.” Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 39 , 141 A.2d 276 (1958); accord Dalton v. St.

2001In a trilogy of cases that reconsidered the doctrine of charitable immunity from the perspective of the injured plaintiff, we reasoned: “Due care is to be expected of all, and when an organization’s negligent conduct injures another there should, in all justice and equity, be a basis for recovery without regard to whether the defendant is a private charity.” Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 39 , 141 A.2d 276 (1958); accord Dalton v. St.

1987Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22 (1958), and Benton v. Y.M.C.A., 27 N.J. 67 (1958), abolished the doctrine of charitable immunity as a common law principle in New Jersey.

1962Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22 (1958); Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29 (1958); and Benton v. Y.M.C.A., 27 N.J. 67 (1958), repudiated the charitable immunity doctrine which had previously been the law of the State.

2024"Entities that can prove they are organized exclusively for educational or religious purposes automatically satisfy the second prong of the charitable immunity standard"; that is, "no further financial analysis is required." Ryan, 175 N.J. at 346 ; see also O'Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 491 (2002).

2004Finally, the Court examined public policy considerations, stating that "as a matter of public policy, State and private colleges should be treated in a like manner for purposes of entitlement to the charitable immunity defense." Id. at 499 , 795 A .2d at 866 .

2021The third prong of the charitable immunity test involves two inquiries: (1) whether the organization "was engaged in the performance of the . . . objectives it was organized to advance[;]" and (2) "whether 'the injured party [was] a direct recipient of those [charitable] works.'" Green, 237 N.J. at 531 (second alteration in original) (quoting Ryan v. Holy Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 175 N.J. 333, 350 (2003)).

2019In Green II, the Court explained that the third prong of the charitable immunity test involves two inquiries – whether the charity "was promoting objectives and purposes at the time of the injury to plaintiff who was then a beneficiary of the charitable works." 237 N.J. at 531 (citing Ryan v. Holy Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 175 N.J. 333, 350 (2003)).

2019Super. 457, 463 (App. Div. 1990) (immunizing "the defendant church from liability for injuries sustained by a nonmember who merely attended a wedding ceremony at the church" and holding that "beneficiary status does 'not depend upon a showing that the claimant personally received a benefit from the works of the charity[,]'" but "[r]ather the test is 'whether the institution pleading the A-0971-17T3 11 immunity, at the time in question[,] was engaged in the performance of the charitable objectives it was organized to advance'" (emphasis omitted) (quoting Anasiewicz v. Sacred Heart Church, 74 N.

1968Anasiewicz v. Sacred Heart *563 Church, 74 N.J.

2019Super. 67, 72 (App. Div. 1999))); Ryan v. Holy Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 175 N.J. 333, 346 (2003) (subscribing to the view that "[e]ntities that can prove they are organized exclusively for educational or religious purposes automatically satisfy the second prong of the charitable immunity standard"); Rupp v. Brookdale Baptist Church, 242 N.J.

2001That statute expired in 1959 and was reenacted at that time. 2 We also observed in Presbyterian Homes that charging a fee for services would "not necessarily deny a charitable purpose." Id. at 287 , 261 A.2d 143 ; see also Rupp v. Brookdale Baptist Church, 242 N.J.Super. 457, 465 , 577 A.2d 188 (App.Div.1990) (holding day camp operated by church for fee "was a charitable undertaking”); Casper v. The Cooper Hosp., 26 N.J.Super. 535, 540 , 98 A.2d 605 (App.Div.1953) (stating that doctrine of charitable immunity is "applicable even where the person injured has paid for the services rendered by th

2018Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 7 N.J. 533, 537 (1951).6 6 Over time, the Court recognized several additional rationales underlying the charitable immunity doctrine, including: (1) preservation of charitable organizations and their funds; (2) encouragement of private philanthropy; and (3) alleviation of the government's burden to provide "beneficent services." Tonelli v. 19 A-3060-15T3 In 1958, the Court abolished charitable immunity in a trilogy of cases that reconsidered the doctrine's merit from an injured plaintiff's perspective.

1966Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 7 N.J. 533, 536-537 (1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 886 , 72 S.Ct. 175 , 96 L.Ed. 664 (1951).

1970See also Town of Milford v. Commissioners of Worcester County, 213 Mass. 162 , 100 N. E. 60 (1912), where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rugg, made the following comments in the course of its holding that the Oak Grove Cemetery was not entitled to a requested abatement of taxes: The cemetery is a great benefit to the public, and has been and is maintained solely for that purpose.

1970See also Town of Milford v. Commissioners of Worcester County, 213 Mass. 162 , 100 N. E. 60 (1912), where the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rugg, made the following comments in the course of its holding that the Oak Grove Cemetery was not entitled to a requested abatement of taxes: The cemetery is a great benefit to the public, and has been and is maintained solely for that purpose.

2018New Jersey first recognized the doctrine of charitable immunity in D'Amato v. Orange Mem'l Hosp., 101 N.J.L. 61 (E. & A. 1925).

2018New Jersey first recognized the doctrine of charitable immunity in D'Amato v. Orange Mem'l Hosp., 101 N.J.L. 61 (E. & A. 1925).

1987Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22 (1958), and Benton v. Y.M.C.A., 27 N.J. 67 (1958), abolished the doctrine of charitable immunity as a common law principle in New Jersey.

1962Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22 (1958); Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29 (1958); and Benton v. Y.M.C.A., 27 N.J. 67 (1958), repudiated the charitable immunity doctrine which had previously been the law of the State.

2024Super. 280, 288 (App. Div. 2002); see also F.K. v. Integrity House, Inc., 460 N.J.

2024"Charitable immunity is an affirmative defense, as to which . . . defendants bear the burden of persuasion." F.K., 460 N.J.

2024Super. 189, 194 (App. Div. 2004) (recognizing the "[defendant]'s purpose of teaching and promoting good citizenship and sportsmanship and assembling teams and groups for participation in sports qualifie[d] it as a non[]profit organization within the scope of the charitable immunity statute"); Auerbach v. Jersey Wahoos Swim Club, 368 N.J.

2004Of Hudson County, Inc., 351 N.J.Super. 280, 288 , 798 A. 2d 131 (App. Div.2002). "[A]n entity qualifies for charitable immunity when it `(1) was formed for non-profit purposes; (2) is organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes; and (3) was promoting such objectives and purposes at the time of the injury to plaintiff who was then a beneficiary of the charitable works.'" Bieker v. Community House of Moorestoum, 169 N.J. 167 , *274 175, 777 A. 2d 37 (2001) (citing Hamel v. State, 321 N.J.Super. 67, 72 , 728 A. 2d 264 (App.Div.1999)). [ Auerbach v. Jersey Wahoos Swim C

2018R. 4:5-4; Rendine v. Pantzer, 276 N.J.

2002See, e.g., Pagano v. United Jersey Bank, 276 N.J.Super. 489, 500 , 648 A. 2d 269 (App. Div.1994), aff'd, 143 N.J. 220 , 670 A. 2d 509 (1996); Rendine v. Pantzer, 276 N.J.Super. 398, 435 , 648 A. 2d 223 (App.Div. 1994), aff'd, 141 N.J. 292 , 661 A. 2d 1202 (1995).

2006The statute was designed simply to reimplant the common law doctrine. [ Id. at 543 , 472 A. 2d 531 .] In sum, when the Court abrogated the doctrine of charitable immunity in 1958, the Legislature responded by enacting the CIA.

2006The statute was designed simply to reimplant the common law doctrine. [ Id. at 543 , 472 A. 2d 531 .] In sum, when the Court abrogated the doctrine of charitable immunity in 1958, the Legislature responded by enacting the CIA.

1970In Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 N.J.L. 90 ( Sup. Ct. 1936), judgment in a tort action against the defendant cemetery was sustained in an opinion which expressly noted that the defense of charitable immunity had not been raised.

1969In Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 N.J.L. 90, 97 ( Sup. Ct. 1936), where a verdict against a cemetery was upheld, the court noted that "the question of the liability of the corporate administrator of a charitable use for the willful wrong of its servant in the discharge of duties assigned to him is not raised, and therefore need not be regarded." However, in Long v. Rosedale Cemetery, 84 F. 135 ( Cir. Ct. D.N.J. 1897) a complaint charging negligence on the part of a cemetery employee was sustained on demurrer as against the contention that defendant, organized under the predecessor to t

2008In Flagiello , the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania traced the history of charitable immunity and concluded that “[i]f there was any justification for the charitable immunity doctrine when it was first announced, it has lost that justification today.” Id. at 197.

2008In Flagiello , the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania traced the history of charitable immunity and concluded that "[i]f there was any justification for the charitable immunity doctrine when it was first announced, it has lost that justification today." Id. at 197.

2008Salt & Light Co., Inc. v. Township of Mount Holly, 15 N.J.Tax 274, 291-92 (Tax 1995) (holding that agency which receives substantial portion of income from public assistances payments and governmental grants for providing temporary shelter to homeless individuals entitled to charitable organization exemption under N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6 despite holding in Parker ); see also Southern Jersey Family Med.