Church standard in Illinois

2020Id. ¶ 44. ¶ 13 In People v. Newton, 2018 IL 122958 , our supreme court ruled in a similar manner that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the charged offense occurred within 1000 feet of a church in violation of section 407(b)(2) of the Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/407(b)(2) (West 2014)) where a detective with personal knowledge and familiarity testified that the First Christian Church was operating as a church at all relevant times.

2019Id. ¶ 44. ¶ 14 In People v. Newton, 2018 IL 122958 , our supreme court ruled in a similar manner that there was sufficient evidence to prove that the charged offense occurred within 1000 feet of a church in violation of section 401(d)(i) of the Controlled Substances Act (720 6 ILCS 570/401(d)(i) (West 2014)) where a detective with personal knowledge and familiarity testified that the First Christian Church was operating as a church at all relevant times.

2020Id. ¶ 27. ¶ 10 In People v. Cadena, 2013 IL App (2d) 120285 , the Second District similarly ruled that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to establish that the charged offense occurred within 1000 feet of a church in violation of section 407(b)(1) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (West 2008)).

2019Id. ¶ 27. ¶ 11 In People v. Cadena, 2013 IL App (2d) 120285 , the Second District similarly ruled that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to establish that the charged offense occurred within 1000 feet of a church in violation of section 407(b)(1) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (West 2008)).

2017This seems a roundabout way of saying she agrees with Pekin’s position, in count II, that as long as Country Mutual is defending the church, Pekin need not do so. ¶ 74 Ultimately, then, it seems that Farney, like the church, regards count II as moot, or as presenting no “actual controversy.” Id.

2017This seems a roundabout way of saying she agrees with Pekin’s position, in count II, that as long as Country Mutual is defending the church, Pekin need not do so. - 21 - ¶ 74 Ultimately, then, it seems that Farney, like the church, regards count II as moot, or as presenting no “actual controversy.” Id.

2021Id. ¶ 22 In coming to this conclusion, we reject the defendants’ argument that the neutral principles of law analysis requires us to solely look at the deed and not consider any of the church doctrine.

2015Rather, we are concerned only with whether the evidence regarding Sutter’s position with the First Baptist Church of Sycamore demonstrated that he was qualified as a “practitioner” who was “accredited” by the church such that the privilege would apply. ¶ 23 Relying on People v. Campobello, 348 Ill.

1992Section 2-1005 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provides that a party may move for summary judgment "with or without supporting affidavits." (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2-1005.) No affidavit is required for a court to grant summary judgment. ( Streams Club, Ltd. v. Thompson (1989), 180 Ill.App.3d 830, 835 , 129 Ill.Dec. 619 , 536 N.E.2d 459 .) Thus, the Church was entitled to seek summary judgment whether or not it had supporting affidavits attached to its motion.

1992Section 2-1005 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provides that a party may move for summary judgment "with or without supporting affidavits." (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2-1005.) No affidavit is required for a court to grant summary judgment. ( Streams Club, Ltd. v. Thompson (1989), 180 Ill.App.3d 830, 835 , 129 Ill.Dec. 619 , 536 N.E.2d 459 .) Thus, the Church was entitled to seek summary judgment whether or not it had supporting affidavits attached to its motion.

1992The determination of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists is to be predicated upon the pleadings, depositions, admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any. ( Anger v. Gottfried (1975), 29 Ill.App.3d 559 , 331 N.E.2d 576 .) After a review of the record we find nothing to support a contention that the trial court considered the verified complaint for an improper purpose. *1101 Sister Maria argues that the trial court erred in granting the Church's motion for summary judgment because defendant filed a general denial pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 181 and thus many gen

1992The determination of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists is to be predicated upon the pleadings, depositions, admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any. ( Anger v. Gottfried (1975), 29 Ill.App.3d 559 , 331 N.E.2d 576 .) After a review of the record we find nothing to support a contention that the trial court considered the verified complaint for an improper purpose. *1101 Sister Maria argues that the trial court erred in granting the Church's motion for summary judgment because defendant filed a general denial pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 181 and thus many gen

1992Admissions made by a party in open court in a prior case may be used as evidence against that party in a summary judgment proceeding in a subsequent case. ( Elsa Benson, Inc. v. Kalman Floor Co. (1989), 191 Ill.App.3d 1016, 1023 , 139 Ill.Dec. 100 , 548 N.E.2d 485 ; see also Riverton Area Fire Protection District v. Riverton Volunteer Fire Department (1991), 208 Ill.App.3d 944, 952 , 153 Ill.Dec. 165 , 566 N.E.2d 1015 (testimony received by witnesses under oath and in the record may be considered in support of a motion for summary judgment.) A transcript of Sister Maria's testimony in a prior

1992Admissions made by a party in open court in a prior case may be used as evidence against that party in a summary judgment proceeding in a subsequent case. ( Elsa Benson, Inc. v. Kalman Floor Co. (1989), 191 Ill.App.3d 1016, 1023 , 139 Ill.Dec. 100 , 548 N.E.2d 485 ; see also Riverton Area Fire Protection District v. Riverton Volunteer Fire Department (1991), 208 Ill.App.3d 944, 952 , 153 Ill.Dec. 165 , 566 N.E.2d 1015 (testimony received by witnesses under oath and in the record may be considered in support of a motion for summary judgment.) A transcript of Sister Maria's testimony in a prior

1990The appellate court reversed the trial court order that had granted the Farm’s motion for summary judgment and affirmed the trial court order that had denied the Church’s motion. ( 188 Ill.

1990Before proceeding with an examination of the issue, we must first point out, as did the appellate court, that we find both defendants are similarly situated so as to make the trial court’s alternative rulings on defendants’ motions inconsistent. ( 188 Ill.

1915(Swift v. People 162 Ill. 534 ; People v. Cregier, 138 id. 401.) In the case last cited the court said: “Again, the proximity of premises to a church, seminary, school house, hospital, cemetery or other public or private institution may undoubtedly be a good reason for including such premises in a district from which dram-shops are excluded.” We are of opinion the State had the power to prohibit, by law, a motion picture show being conducted within two hundred feet of a church and that by clause 41 it granted that power to cities, and the ordinance in question was not an unreasonable exercise

1895(Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. 114 ; Commonwealth v. Clark, 7 id. 127 ; Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 27 Pa. 444 ; Commonwealth v. Hartman, 17 id. 119.) The purpose, in effect, of section 4, when so construed, is not to prohibit changes in the confession of faith that are in the interest of clearness of expression or fullness of statement of the accepted doctrine of the church, but to prevent changes in the doctrine to which the church is committed.