Church standard in Texas

2022“The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prohibits civil courts from delving into matters of ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.’” Id. at 508–09 (quoting Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 714 (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 733 )).

2019Applicable Law The United States Supreme Court has held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment forbids civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over “a matter which concerns theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.” Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713–14; see also Thiagarajan, 430 S.W.3d at 594 .

2025Justice Alito recently summarized the substance and scope of the Court’s church-autonomy precedents: As early as 1872, our church-autonomy cases explained that “civil courts exercise no jurisdiction” over matters involving “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.” Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 733 (1872).

2022“The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prohibits civil courts from delving into matters of ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.’” Id. at 508–09 (quoting Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 714 (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 733 )).

2022Id. (internal citations omitted). 12We observe that the Austin Court of Appeals in Patton stated that: “The ‘ecclesiastical abstention doctrine’ provides a broader analysis that encompasses the ‘ministerial exception.’” Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied) (“The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.”).

2019Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 , 713–14 (1976); see also Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541 , 547–48 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied) (ecclesiastical abstention doctrine “prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required’”) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1871)).

2013Applicable Law The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine “prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required.’ ” Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541, 547-48 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 , 13 Wall. 679 , 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872)); see Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 397-98 ; In re Godwin, 293 S.W.3d 742, 747-48 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2009, orig. proceeding); Williams v.

2011The Doctrine "prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of 'theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required.'" Patton v. Jones , 212 S.W.3d 541, 547-48 (Tex. App.--Austin 2006, pet. denied) (quoting Watson v. Jones , 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1872)); see Westbrook , 231 S.W.3d at 397-98 ; In re Godwin , 293 S.W.3d 742, 747-48 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2009, orig. proceeding); Williams v. Gleason , 26 S.W.3d 54, 58 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 200

2018“The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine stands for the proposition that the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over matters concerning theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of a church to the standard of morals required of them.” Id. at 665 ; accord Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 605–06 (“Courts do not have jurisdiction to decide questions of an ecclesiastical or inherently religious nature, so as to those questions they must defer to decisions of appropriate ecclesiastical decision makers”); see also

2016“Accordingly, the autonomy of a church in managing its affairs and deciding matters of ‘church discipline ... or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them’ has long been afforded broad constitutional protection.” Id. at 397 .

2025“The clause severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes by prohibiting civil courts from inquiring into matters concerning theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of a church to the standard of morals required of them.” Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 601 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

2025Subject Matter Jurisdiction Like the court of appeals, we begin by considering whether we have jurisdiction over the Conference’s claims, as the First Amendment “prohibit[s] civil courts from inquiring into matters concerning ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of a church to the standard of morals required of them.’” Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 601 (quoting Serbian E.

2019The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment thus “precludes civil courts from delving into matters focused on ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of a church to the standard of morals required of them.’” Thiagarajan v. Tadepalli, 430 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (quoting Serbian E.

2019Applicable Law The United States Supreme Court has held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment forbids civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over “a matter which concerns theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.” Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713–14; see also Thiagarajan, 430 S.W.3d at 594 .

2013Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713-14 , 96 S.Ct. 2372 , 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976); see also Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541, 547-48 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied) (ecclesiastical abstention doctrine “prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required” ’) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 , 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872)); Dean v. Alford, 994 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex.App.Fort

2013Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713-14 , 96 S.Ct. 2372 , 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976); see also Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541, 547-48 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied) (ecclesiastical abstention doctrine “prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required” ’) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 , 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872)); Dean v. Alford, 994 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex.App.Fort

2013Applicable Law The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine “prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required.’ ” Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541, 547-48 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 , 13 Wall. 679 , 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872)); see Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 397-98 ; In re Godwin, 293 S.W.3d 742, 747-48 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2009, orig. proceeding); Williams v.

2011The Doctrine "prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of 'theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required.'" Patton v. Jones , 212 S.W.3d 541, 547-48 (Tex. App.--Austin 2006, pet. denied) (quoting Watson v. Jones , 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1872)); see Westbrook , 231 S.W.3d at 397-98 ; In re Godwin , 293 S.W.3d 742, 747-48 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2009, orig. proceeding); Williams v. Gleason , 26 S.W.3d 54, 58 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 200

2016“Courts have no jurisdiction to ‘revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline’ and ‘cannot decide who ought to be members of the church, nor whether the excommunicated have been justly or unjustly, regularly or irregularly cut off from the body of the church.’ ” Id. at 399 (quoting Minton v. Leavell, 297 S.W. 615, 621-22 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1927, writ ref'd)).

2007Id, at 733. 6 This Court, too, has long recognized a structural restraint on the constitu *398 tional power of civil courts to regulate matters of religion in general, Brown v. Clark, 102 Tex. 323 , 116 S.W. 360, 363 (Tex.1909), and of church discipline in particular, Minton v. Leavell, 297 S.W. 615, 621-22 (Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1927, writ ref'd).

2015See TPLP Office Park, 218 S.W.3d at 66; Burris, 266 S.W.3d at 24 ; see also DuPuy v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Tex. 1965) (explaining landowner entitled to compensation if public improvement destroys “all reasonable access” to property, however, no compensable taking exists where landowner has reasonable access to property after construction of public improvement); State v. Momin Props., Inc., 409 S.W.3d 1 , 9 17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding closure of access road at railroad tracks not compensable because closure merely required traffic to travel more ci

2015See TPLP Office Park, 218 S.W.3d at 66 ; Burris, 266 S.W.3d at 24 ; see also DuPuy v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Tex. 1965) (explaining landowner entitled to compensation if public improvement destroys “all reasonable access” to property, however, no compensable taking exists where landowner has reasonable access to property after construction of public improvement); State v. Momin Props., Inc., 409 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding closure of access road at railroad tracks not compensable because closure merely required traffic to travel 17 more ci

2014Mellon v. Guzman, 390 S.W.3d 593 , 597–98 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (there must be something in record showing trial court made substantive ruling on any legal issues court of appeals is being asked to decide); Gulley v. State Farm Lloyds, 350 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2011, no pet.) (trial court must first make substantive ruling on controlling legal issue being appealed).

2013See Gulley, 350 S.W.3d at 207–08; see also Colonial County Mut.

2013The test for legal sufficiency is “whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.2005).

2013The test for legal sufficiency is “whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.2005).

2013Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713-14 , 96 S.Ct. 2372 , 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976); see also Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541, 547-48 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied) (ecclesiastical abstention doctrine “prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required” ’) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 , 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872)); Dean v. Alford, 994 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex.App.Fort

2006Partners, 160 S.W.3d 657, 671-73 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.); Dean v. Alford, 994 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.). 6 discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required.” Watson, 80 U.S. at 733 .6 In cases relying on the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, courts consider the substance and nature of the plaintiff’s claims to determine whether the First Amendment prevents subject matter jurisdiction.

2010See Silk v. Terrill , 898 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (appellate court has broad discretion to allow supplementation of record).

2010See Silk v. Terrill, 35 898 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (appellate court has broad discretion to allow supplementation of record).

2006See , e.g. , Starkman v. Evans , 198 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1999); Green v. United Pentecostal Church Int'l , 899 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, pet. denied). (5) The "ecclesiastical abstention doctrine" provides a broader analysis that encompasses the "ministerial exception." The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of "theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required." Watson , 80 U.S. at 73

2006See, e.g., Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1999); Green v. United Pentecostal Church Int’l, 899 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, pet. denied).5 The “ecclesiastical abstention doctrine” provides a broader analysis that encompasses the “ministerial exception.” The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required.” Watson, 80 U.S. at 733 .6 In c

2006See , e.g. , Starkman v. Evans , 198 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1999); Green v. United Pentecostal Church Int'l , 899 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, pet. denied). (5) The "ecclesiastical abstention doctrine" provides a broader analysis that encompasses the "ministerial exception." The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of "theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required." Watson , 80 U.S. at 73

2006See, e.g., Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1999); Green v. United Pentecostal Church Int’l, 899 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, pet. denied).5 The “ecclesiastical abstention doctrine” provides a broader analysis that encompasses the “ministerial exception.” The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine prevents secular courts from reviewing many types of disputes that would require an analysis of “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required.” Watson, 80 U.S. at 733 .6 In c

2021Nor can they decide whether a church’s actions “depart substantially from prior doctrine,” Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 5 450, resolve a “theological controversy,” or determine the “conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them,” Watson, 80 U.S. at 734 .9 9 Courts have often treated this “ecclesiastical abstention” or “religious autonomy” doctrine as a constitutional bar to the courts’ jurisdiction, as the Court does in this case today.

2013The clause “severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes,” Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 , 89 S.Ct. 601 , 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969), by prohibiting civil courts from inquiring into matters concerning “ ‘theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of a church to the standard of morals required of them.’ ” Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713-14 , 96 S.Ct. 2372 (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 , 13 Wall. 679 , 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872)).

2018“The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine stands for the proposition that the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over matters concerning theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of a church to the standard of morals required of them.” Id. at 665 ; accord Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 605–06 (“Courts do not have jurisdiction to decide questions of an ecclesiastical or inherently religious nature, so as to those questions they must defer to decisions of appropriate ecclesiastical decision makers”); see also

2015The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine arises from the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and provides that the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over matters concerning “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.” Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 3 This doctrine has variously been referred to as one of “deference,” “ecclesiastical abstention,” or “ecclesiastical exemption.” Jennison v. Prasifka, 391 S.W.3d 660 , 661 n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 20

2016“To enforce this constitutional provision, Texas courts have utilized the ‘ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.’” Shannon, 476 S.W.3d at 621 ; see also Masterson, 422 S.W.3d at 601 .

2016The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine arises from the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and provides that the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over matters concerning “theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or. the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them.” Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713-14 , 96 S.Ct. 2372 ; see also Shannon, 476 S.W.3d at 621-22 .

2015See TPLP Office Park, 218 S.W.3d at 66; Burris, 266 S.W.3d at 24 ; see also DuPuy v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Tex. 1965) (explaining landowner entitled to compensation if public improvement destroys “all reasonable access” to property, however, no compensable taking exists where landowner has reasonable access to property after construction of public improvement); State v. Momin Props., Inc., 409 S.W.3d 1 , 9 17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding closure of access road at railroad tracks not compensable because closure merely required traffic to travel more ci

2015See TPLP Office Park, 218 S.W.3d at 66 ; Burris, 266 S.W.3d at 24 ; see also DuPuy v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Tex. 1965) (explaining landowner entitled to compensation if public improvement destroys “all reasonable access” to property, however, no compensable taking exists where landowner has reasonable access to property after construction of public improvement); State v. Momin Props., Inc., 409 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding closure of access road at railroad tracks not compensable because closure merely required traffic to travel 17 more ci

2025That is so because the Constitution protects religious organizations “from secular control or manipulation.” Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).

2023See State v. Rotello, 671 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Tex. 1984).

2023In its first issue, the Church argues the Homeowners failed to prove that the Church’s property is “subject to the purported deed restriction.” In support of this argument, the Church cites only one case, Country Community Timberlake Village., L.P. v. HMW Special Utility District, 438 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied), for the proposition that, in order to enforce a deed restriction, the proponent must first prove that he or she owns property that is subject to or affected by the deed restriction.

2022Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714 (1976); see Peloquin, 399 S.W.3d at 695 .