Church defendant in California

2025(Cf. Huntsman, supra, 127 F.4th at p. 792 [fraud claim regarding the church’s use of tithing funds did not require the court to “delve[] into matters of Church doctrine or policy” and therefore “does not run afoul of the church autonomy doctrine”].) Indeed, Lorenzo is only seeking the amount of wages for her work in furtherance of the Center’s commercial activities that the Legislature has deemed minimally necessary for her to subsist.

2025(See Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, 952 [“The basic objective of wage[- ]and[-]hour legislation and wage orders is to ensure that such workers are provided at least the minimal wages and working conditions that are necessary to enable them to obtain a subsistence standard of living and to protect the workers’ health and welfare”].) We do not see why the Center’s refusal to pay this subsistence wage should always be deemed a purely ecclesiastical matter and should therefore be subject to the ministerial exception.

2023Additionally, unlike California Concrete Co., the evidence at issue had already been admitted at trial, apparently without objection by Sohn, by the time Sohn opposed the Church’s motion to amend its answer to conform to proof. 16 in fact fully tried and the evidence is already before the court, it is difficult for the opposing party to claim prejudice.”].) While the Church’s failure to raise section 1632 as an affirmative defense prior to trial may have supported the trial court’s ruling had it denied the Church leave to amend (see, e.g., Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc. (2001) 89

2020(McConnell v. Innovative Artists Talent & Literary Agency, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 169, 176-177 [conduct in transferring employees does not constitute “protected activity”]; Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 896 [conduct in making “staffing decision[s]” typically not “protected activity”]; cf. Wilson, at p. 898 [conduct in terminating employee may constitute “protected activity” when employer is a news agency and termination was designed to affect the employer’s reputation with respect to the content it publishes].) Although the Church defendants offer no argument regarding why the inter-chur

2020(McConnell v. Innovative Artists Talent & Literary Agency, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 169, 176-177 [conduct in transferring employees does not constitute “protected activity”]; Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 896 [conduct in making “staffing decision[s]” typically not “protected activity”]; cf. Wilson, at p. 898 [conduct in terminating employee may constitute “protected activity” when employer is a news agency and termination was designed to affect the employer’s reputation with respect to the content it publishes].) Although the Church defendants offer no argument regarding why the inter-chur

2020We decline to consider plaintiff’s arguments for reversal because he did not appeal; as such, his arguments are not properly before us.7 (Estate of Powell (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439 [party 7 Those arguments—which fall into three broad categories— lack merit in any event.

2020What is more, a person’s conduct in making affirmative misrepresentations or in concealing facts (that is, by not speaking) each constitutes “protected activity.” (E.g., Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Database Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 941, 947 (Kronemyer) [“the right of free speech” and “the right not to speak” is protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute]; Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 464 [false statements and defamation constitute protected activity under anti-SLAPP statute].) Second, plaintiff urges that his public nuisance and c

2020First, they assert that their refusal to report sexual abuse 15 to the authorities falls within their constitutionally protected “right not to speak.” (Kronemyer, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 947 .) This assertion ignores that even constitutionally protected speech (or silence) is unprotected where, as here, it is concededly or conclusively illegal.

2020For support, they cite Roberts v. Los Angeles County Bar Assn. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 604, 615-616 (Roberts), Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635, 641-642 (Thomas), Manchel v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 501 (Manchel), and Horacek v. Smith (1948) 33 Cal.2d 186 (Horacek).

2020For support, they cite Roberts v. Los Angeles County Bar Assn. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 604, 615-616 (Roberts), Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635, 641-642 (Thomas), Manchel v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 501 (Manchel), and Horacek v. Smith (1948) 33 Cal.2d 186 (Horacek).

2020What is more, a person’s conduct in making affirmative misrepresentations or in concealing facts (that is, by not speaking) each constitutes “protected activity.” (E.g., Kronemyer v. Internet Movie Database Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 941, 947 (Kronemyer) [“the right of free speech” and “the right not to speak” is protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute]; Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 464 [false statements and defamation constitute protected activity under anti-SLAPP statute].) Second, plaintiff urges that his public nuisance and c

2020Although the distinction plaintiff draws between the conduct a claim is “based upon” and the conduct that “provide[s] evidentiary support for [a] claim” is a valid distinction ( Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1063-1064; Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884 ; Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621 (Rand Resources)), it is irrelevant here because (1) the conduct a claim is “based upon” is the conduct that causes injury (Park, at p. 1063; Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 698 (Mission Beverage)), and (2) plaintiff has alleged that the

2020Although the distinction plaintiff draws between the conduct a claim is “based upon” and the conduct that “provide[s] evidentiary support for [a] claim” is a valid distinction ( Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1063-1064; Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884 ; Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621 (Rand Resources)), it is irrelevant here because (1) the conduct a claim is “based upon” is the conduct that causes injury (Park, at p. 1063; Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 698 (Mission Beverage)), and (2) plaintiff has alleged that the

2020Although the distinction plaintiff draws between the conduct a claim is “based upon” and the conduct that “provide[s] evidentiary support for [a] claim” is a valid distinction ( Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1063-1064; Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884 ; Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621 (Rand Resources)), it is irrelevant here because (1) the conduct a claim is “based upon” is the conduct that causes injury (Park, at p. 1063; Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 698 (Mission Beverage)), and (2) plaintiff has alleged that the

2020Although the distinction plaintiff draws between the conduct a claim is “based upon” and the conduct that “provide[s] evidentiary support for [a] claim” is a valid distinction ( Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1063-1064; Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884 ; Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621 (Rand Resources)), it is irrelevant here because (1) the conduct a claim is “based upon” is the conduct that causes injury (Park, at p. 1063; Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 698 (Mission Beverage)), and (2) plaintiff has alleged that the

2020Although the distinction plaintiff draws between the conduct a claim is “based upon” and the conduct that “provide[s] evidentiary support for [a] claim” is a valid distinction ( Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1063-1064; Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884 ; Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621 (Rand Resources)), it is irrelevant here because (1) the conduct a claim is “based upon” is the conduct that causes injury (Park, at p. 1063; Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 698 (Mission Beverage)), and (2) plaintiff has alleged that the

2020Although the distinction plaintiff draws between the conduct a claim is “based upon” and the conduct that “provide[s] evidentiary support for [a] claim” is a valid distinction ( Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1063-1064; Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884 ; Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621 (Rand Resources)), it is irrelevant here because (1) the conduct a claim is “based upon” is the conduct that causes injury (Park, at p. 1063; Mission Beverage Co. v. Pabst Brewing Co., LLC (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 686, 698 (Mission Beverage)), and (2) plaintiff has alleged that the

2020Exchange (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 960, 971 [“[l]eave to amend . . . is properly denied . . . if . . . the proposed amendment would not establish a basis for liability as a matter of law”]), the rules favoring liberal amendment of pleadings dictate a remand to give plaintiff the opportunity to so amend his complaint.

2013(See People v. Cruz, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1254, fn. 5 [noting that any waiver of section 1192.5 must be "obtained at the time of the trial court's initial acceptance of the plea" and must be "knowing and intelligent," and noting that the agreement itself must include a provision for an increased sentence in the event the defendant fails to appear for sentencing or otherwise violates a condition of his or her 18 plea].) Moreover, the record shows the trial court also erred when it did not permit Church to withdraw his plea after the court chose not to follow the terms of the parties' agreemen

2001The court rejected this argument as “too restrictive,” noting the statute “specifically applies to ‘[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition’ . . . .” (Church of Scientology, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 648 , italics omitted.) 30 Ericsson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at pages 1601-1603. 31 Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1118 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ], quoting from Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1048 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 ] (also construing t

2001The court rejected this argument as “too restrictive,” noting the statute “specifically applies to ‘[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition’ . . . .” (Church of Scientology, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 648 , italics omitted.) 30 Ericsson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at pages 1601-1603. 31 Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1118 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ], quoting from Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1048 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 ] (also construing t

2001The court rejected this argument as “too restrictive,” noting the statute “specifically applies to ‘[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition’ . . . .” (Church of Scientology, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 648 , italics omitted.) 30 Ericsson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at pages 1601-1603. 31 Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1118 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ], quoting from Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1048 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 ] (also construing t

2001The court rejected this argument as “too restrictive,” noting the statute “specifically applies to ‘[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition’ . . . .” (Church of Scientology, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 648 , italics omitted.) 30 Ericsson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at pages 1601-1603. 31 Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1118 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ], quoting from Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1048 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 ] (also construing t

2001The court rejected this argument as “too restrictive,” noting the statute “specifically applies to ‘[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition’ . . . .” (Church of Scientology, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 648 , italics omitted.) 30 Ericsson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at pages 1601-1603. 31 Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1118 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ], quoting from Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1048 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 ] (also construing t

2001The court rejected this argument as “too restrictive,” noting the statute “specifically applies to ‘[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition’ . . . .” (Church of Scientology, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 648 , italics omitted.) 30 Ericsson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at pages 1601-1603. 31 Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1118 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ], quoting from Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1048 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 ] (also construing t

2001The court rejected this argument as “too restrictive,” noting the statute “specifically applies to ‘[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition’ . . . .” (Church of Scientology, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 648 , italics omitted.) 30 Ericsson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at pages 1601-1603. 31 Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1118 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ], quoting from Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1048 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 ] (also construing t

2001The court rejected this argument as “too restrictive,” noting the statute “specifically applies to ‘[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition’ . . . .” (Church of Scientology, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 648 , italics omitted.) 30 Ericsson, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at pages 1601-1603. 31 Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1118 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471 , 969 P.2d 564 ], quoting from Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1048 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 58 ] (also construing t