20 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineeringgreen2 sentences2026See Pasquale, 166 Ill. 2d at 368 (“Section 2(c) [of the Act] reflects the long-recognized principle in Illinois that a plaintiff shall have only one satisfaction for an injury.”). 1996We also recognize that section 2(c) of the Contribution Act, addressing settlement and setoff, condemns a double recovery and "reflects the long-recognized principle in Illinois that a plaintiff shall have only one satisfaction for an injury.” Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337, 368 (1995). | 2 | 2 |
Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grovegreen2 sentences1999A proper analysis of section 2 should begin with the long-recognized principle that the meaning of any given constitutional provision depends on the common understanding of the citizens who, by ratifying the Constitution, "gave it life." Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill.2d 483, 492 , 83 Ill.Dec. 308 , 470 N.E.2d 266 (1984). 1999A proper analysis of section 2 should begin with the long-recognized principle that the meaning of any given constitutional provision depends on the common understanding of the citizens who, by ratifying the Constitution, “gave it life.” Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 492 (1984). | 2 | 2 |
Horton v. Californiagreen2 sentences2019We disagree with defendant’s assumption. ¶ 13 In Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990), the Supreme Court officially adopted a long-recognized standard that, for police to properly seize evidence in plain view, -3- its “incriminating character” must be immediately apparent. 2018We disagree with defendant's assumption. ¶ 13 In Horton v. California , 496 U.S. 128 , 136-37, 110 S.Ct. 2301 , 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990), the Supreme Court officially adopted a long-recognized standard that, for police to properly seize evidence in plain view, its "incriminating character" must be immediately apparent. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Hobleygreen1 sentence2026The reason for requiring such stringent and precise evidence is because there exists a long-recognized principle of law “that a jury verdict is not subject to impeachment by the testimony of a juror.” Williams, 209 Ill. 2d at 239 (citing People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 457 (1998)). | 1 | 1 |
Lard v. AM/FM Ohio, Inc.green1 sentence2020Lard v. AM/FM Ohio, Inc., 387 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Kelly v. Brigham & Women's Hospitalgreen1 sentence2016De- partment of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1095-96 (La. 1990) (stating Louisiana has permitted deviations from the general rule against emotional damages for merely negligent con- duct in cases involving the mishandling of a corpse); Contreraz v. Michelotti-Sawyers, 896 P.2d 1118, 1120-21 (Mont. 1995) (recognizing the right to damages for negligent infliction of emo- tional distress resulting from the mishandling of a corpse where serious or severe emotional dis- tress to the plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligent act or omission); Lauer v | 1 | 1 |
Contreraz v. Michelotti-Sawyersgreen1 sentence2016De- partment of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1095-96 (La. 1990) (stating Louisiana has permitted deviations from the general rule against emotional damages for merely negligent con- duct in cases involving the mishandling of a corpse); Contreraz v. Michelotti-Sawyers, 896 P.2d 1118, 1120-21 (Mont. 1995) (recognizing the right to damages for negligent infliction of emo- tional distress resulting from the mishandling of a corpse where serious or severe emotional dis- tress to the plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligent act or omission); Lauer v | 1 | 1 |
Guth v. Freelandgreen1 sentence2016De- partment of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1095-96 (La. 1990) (stating Louisiana has permitted deviations from the general rule against emotional damages for merely negligent con- duct in cases involving the mishandling of a corpse); Contreraz v. Michelotti-Sawyers, 896 P.2d 1118, 1120-21 (Mont. 1995) (recognizing the right to damages for negligent infliction of emo- tional distress resulting from the mishandling of a corpse where serious or severe emotional dis- tress to the plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligent act or omission); Lauer v | 1 | 1 |
Del Core v. Mohican Historic Housing Associatesgreen1 sentence2016De- partment of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1095-96 (La. 1990) (stating Louisiana has permitted deviations from the general rule against emotional damages for merely negligent con- duct in cases involving the mishandling of a corpse); Contreraz v. Michelotti-Sawyers, 896 P.2d 1118, 1120-21 (Mont. 1995) (recognizing the right to damages for negligent infliction of emo- tional distress resulting from the mishandling of a corpse where serious or severe emotional dis- tress to the plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligent act or omission); Lauer v | 1 | 1 |
Lauer v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2016De- partment of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1095-96 (La. 1990) (stating Louisiana has permitted deviations from the general rule against emotional damages for merely negligent con- duct in cases involving the mishandling of a corpse); Contreraz v. Michelotti-Sawyers, 896 P.2d 1118, 1120-21 (Mont. 1995) (recognizing the right to damages for negligent infliction of emo- tional distress resulting from the mishandling of a corpse where serious or severe emotional dis- tress to the plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligent act or omission); Lauer v | 1 | 1 |
Tomasits v. Cochise Memory Gardens, Inc.green1 sentence2016Va. 1985) (“A cause of action for negligent or intentional mishandling of a dead body does not require a showing of physical injury or pecuniary loss.”); Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass’n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing a cause of action for negligent interference with a dead body without an accompanying physical injury); Tomasits v. Cochise Memory Gardens, Inc., 721 P.2d 1166, 1167 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (electing to follow section 868 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Me- morial Hospital, 538 A.2d 346, 353 (N.J. 1988) (finding the plain | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Fergusongreen1 sentence2016Va. 1985) (“A cause of action for negligent or intentional mishandling of a dead body does not require a showing of physical injury or pecuniary loss.”); Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass’n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing a cause of action for negligent interference with a dead body without an accompanying physical injury); Tomasits v. Cochise Memory Gardens, Inc., 721 P.2d 1166, 1167 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (electing to follow section 868 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Me- morial Hospital, 538 A.2d 346, 353 (N.J. 1988) (finding the plain | 1 | 1 |
Quesada v. Oak Hill Improvement Co.green1 sentence2016Va. 1985) (“A cause of action for negligent or intentional mishandling of a dead body does not require a showing of physical injury or pecuniary loss.”); Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass’n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing a cause of action for negligent interference with a dead body without an accompanying physical injury); Tomasits v. Cochise Memory Gardens, Inc., 721 P.2d 1166, 1167 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (electing to follow section 868 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Me- morial Hospital, 538 A.2d 346, 353 (N.J. 1988) (finding the plain | 1 | 1 |
Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospitalgreen1 sentence2016Va. 1985) (“A cause of action for negligent or intentional mishandling of a dead body does not require a showing of physical injury or pecuniary loss.”); Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass’n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing a cause of action for negligent interference with a dead body without an accompanying physical injury); Tomasits v. Cochise Memory Gardens, Inc., 721 P.2d 1166, 1167 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (electing to follow section 868 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Me- morial Hospital, 538 A.2d 346, 353 (N.J. 1988) (finding the plain | 1 | 1 |
Moresi v. State, Dept. of Wildlife & Fisheriesgreen1 sentence2016De- partment of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1095-96 (La. 1990) (stating Louisiana has permitted deviations from the general rule against emotional damages for merely negligent con- duct in cases involving the mishandling of a corpse); Contreraz v. Michelotti-Sawyers, 896 P.2d 1118, 1120-21 (Mont. 1995) (recognizing the right to damages for negligent infliction of emo- tional distress resulting from the mishandling of a corpse where serious or severe emotional dis- tress to the plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligent act or omission); Lauer v | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc.green1 sentence2016Va. 1985) (“A cause of action for negligent or intentional mishandling of a dead body does not require a showing of physical injury or pecuniary loss.”); Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass’n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing a cause of action for negligent interference with a dead body without an accompanying physical injury); Tomasits v. Cochise Memory Gardens, Inc., 721 P.2d 1166, 1167 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (electing to follow section 868 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Me- morial Hospital, 538 A.2d 346, 353 (N.J. 1988) (finding the plain | 1 | 1 |
Blackwell v. Dykes Funeral Homes, Inc.green1 sentence2016De- partment of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1095-96 (La. 1990) (stating Louisiana has permitted deviations from the general rule against emotional damages for merely negligent con- duct in cases involving the mishandling of a corpse); Contreraz v. Michelotti-Sawyers, 896 P.2d 1118, 1120-21 (Mont. 1995) (recognizing the right to damages for negligent infliction of emo- tional distress resulting from the mishandling of a corpse where serious or severe emotional dis- tress to the plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligent act or omission); Lauer v | 1 | 1 |
Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Assn.green1 sentence2016Va. 1985) (“A cause of action for negligent or intentional mishandling of a dead body does not require a showing of physical injury or pecuniary loss.”); Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass’n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing a cause of action for negligent interference with a dead body without an accompanying physical injury); Tomasits v. Cochise Memory Gardens, Inc., 721 P.2d 1166, 1167 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (electing to follow section 868 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Me- morial Hospital, 538 A.2d 346, 353 (N.J. 1988) (finding the plain | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2026The reason for requiring such stringent and precise evidence is because there exists a long-recognized principle of law “that a jury verdict is not subject to impeachment by the testimony of a juror.” Williams, 209 Ill. 2d at 239 (citing People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 457 (1998)). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Clankie
green
1 sentence2010Clankie, 180 Ill. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Dial v. City of O'Fallon
green
2 sentences1995(See Dial v. City of O’Fallon (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 548, 558 .) A double recovery is a result which is condemned and is exactly what section 2(c) of the Contribution Act was intended to prevent. 1995(See Dial v. City of O'Fallon (1980), 81 Ill.2d 548, 558 , 44 Ill.Dec. 248 , 411 N.E.2d 217 .) A double recovery is a result which is condemned and is exactly what section 2(c) of the Contribution Act was intended to prevent. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Wells Manufacturing Co. v. Pollution Control Board
green
2 sentences1990The majority repeatedly points to the long-recognized principle that an agency's specified reasons for its decision enable a court to fully and completely review the decision. ( Wells Manufacturing Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1978), 73 Ill.2d 226 , 383 N.E.2d 148 ; Mystik Tape v. Pollution Control Board (1975), 60 Ill.2d 330 , 328 N.E.2d 5 ; Illinois Power Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1985), 137 Ill. 1990The majority repeatedly points to the long-recognized principle that an agency's specified reasons for its decision enable a court to fully and completely review the decision. ( Wells Manufacturing Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1978), 73 Ill.2d 226 , 383 N.E.2d 148 ; Mystik Tape v. Pollution Control Board (1975), 60 Ill.2d 330 , 328 N.E.2d 5 ; Illinois Power Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1985), 137 Ill. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Mystik Tape v. Pollution Control Board
green
2 sentences1990The majority repeatedly points to the long-recognized principle that an agency's specified reasons for its decision enable a court to fully and completely review the decision. ( Wells Manufacturing Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1978), 73 Ill.2d 226 , 383 N.E.2d 148 ; Mystik Tape v. Pollution Control Board (1975), 60 Ill.2d 330 , 328 N.E.2d 5 ; Illinois Power Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1985), 137 Ill. 1990The majority repeatedly points to the long-recognized principle that an agency's specified reasons for its decision enable a court to fully and completely review the decision. ( Wells Manufacturing Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1978), 73 Ill.2d 226 , 383 N.E.2d 148 ; Mystik Tape v. Pollution Control Board (1975), 60 Ill.2d 330 , 328 N.E.2d 5 ; Illinois Power Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1985), 137 Ill. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Illinois Power Co. v. Pollution Control Board
green
2 sentences1990(Wells Manufacturing Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 226 , 383 N.E.2d 148 ; Mystik Tape v. Pollution Control Board (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 330 , 328 N.E.2d 5 ; Illinois Power Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1985), 137 Ill. 1990The majority repeatedly points to the long-recognized principle that an agency's specified reasons for its decision enable a court to fully and completely review the decision. ( Wells Manufacturing Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1978), 73 Ill.2d 226 , 383 N.E.2d 148 ; Mystik Tape v. Pollution Control Board (1975), 60 Ill.2d 330 , 328 N.E.2d 5 ; Illinois Power Co. v. Pollution Control Board (1985), 137 Ill. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Tepfer v. Deerfield Savings & Loan Ass'n
green
1 sentence1986App. 3d 77, 80 , 454 N.E.2d 676 , appeal denied (1984), 96 Ill. 2d 572 .) This long-recognized principle of contract law is applied by statute to negotiable instruments. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Thompson
green
1 sentence1982People v. Robinson; People v. Thompson (1977), 55 Ill. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Freeland v. Dickson
neutral
1 sentence1980App. 3d 13 , 379 N.E.2d 903 .) However, a long-recognized exception to this rule holds that a railroad company, in improving its right of way, may make reasonable alterations of the natural flow, provided it does not damage adjacent dominant tracts. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Magro v. Continental Toyota, Inc.
green
2 sentences1977App. 3d 1 , 344 N.E.2d 675 , redd (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 157 , 365 N.E.2d 328 . 1 In Levy, the right of recovery accruing to a purchaser who alleges a tax overcharge by a serviceman was summarized as follows: “Hagerty adhered to the long-recognized rule that, in the absence of statute, taxes paid voluntarily, though erroneously, cannot be recovered. 1977App. 3d 1 , 344 N.E.2d 675 , redd (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 157 , 365 N.E.2d 328 . 1 In Levy, the right of recovery accruing to a purchaser who alleges a tax overcharge by a serviceman was summarized as follows: “Hagerty adhered to the long-recognized rule that, in the absence of statute, taxes paid voluntarily, though erroneously, cannot be recovered. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Bingham v. Maxcy
neutral
1 sentence1977(Bingham v. Maxcy, 15 Ill. 295 ; England v. Clark, 5 Ill. 486 ; Bishop v. O’Conner, 69 Ill. 431 .) No warranty of title, quality, or quantity is implied in such sales. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Bishop v. O'Conner green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Magro v. Continental Toyota, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence1977App. 3d 1 , 344 N.E.2d 675 , redd (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 157 , 365 N.E.2d 328 . 1 In Levy, the right of recovery accruing to a purchaser who alleges a tax overcharge by a serviceman was summarized as follows: “Hagerty adhered to the long-recognized rule that, in the absence of statute, taxes paid voluntarily, though erroneously, cannot be recovered. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Commission green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Bonczkowski v. Kucharski green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Floberg v. Floberg neutral | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Smith v. Smith green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.