13 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1935–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Aguilargreen2 sentences2015Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), a reviewing court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). [15] Appellate Rule 7(B) leaves much to the discretion of appellate courts, but it does not detract from the long-recognized principle that “sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should *336 receive considerable deference.” Parks v. State, 22 2015Although Appellate Rule 7(B) “leaves much to the discretion of appellate courts,” we are ever mindful of “the long-recognized principle that ‘sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should receive considerable deference.’” Parks v. State, 22 N.E.3d 552, 555 (Ind. 2014) Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 70A01-1409-CR-410 | May 13, 2015 Page 11 of 15 (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008)). | 5 | 5 |
Cardwell v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Although Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) leaves much to the discretion of appellate courts, it does not detract from the long-recognized principle that "sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference." Cardwell , 895 N.E.2d at 1222 . 2015Although Appellate Rule 7(B) “leaves much to the discretion of appellate courts,” we are ever mindful of “the long-recognized principle that ‘sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court’s judgment should receive considerable deference.’” Parks v. State, 22 N.E.3d 552, 555 (Ind. 2014) Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision | 70A01-1409-CR-410 | May 13, 2015 Page 11 of 15 (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008)). | 4 | 7 |
Buchanan v. Stategreen2 sentences2019In conducting review under this standard, our supreme court has acknowledged that "reasonable minds may differ" on the appropriateness of a sentence based on "our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given case." Buchanan v. State , 767 N.E.2d at 967, 970 (Ind. 2002). 2015In conducting review under this standard, our Supreme Court has acknowledged that “ ‘reasonable minds may differ’” on the appropriateness of a sentence based on their. “ ‘sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.’ ” Id. (quoting Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ind.2002); Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224 ). | 4 | 4 |
Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzigreen1 sentence2014This has been expressed as requiring a challenger to show in a facial challenge that "there are no set of cireumstances under which the statute can be constitutionally applied." Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzi, 837 N.E.2d 973, 981 (Ind.2005) (emphasis in Briszi) (quoting Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 337 (Ind.1999)). | 1 | 1 |
Baldwin v. Reagangreen1 sentence2014This has been expressed as requiring a challenger to show in a facial challenge that "there are no set of cireumstances under which the statute can be constitutionally applied." Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzi, 837 N.E.2d 973, 981 (Ind.2005) (emphasis in Briszi) (quoting Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 337 (Ind.1999)). | 1 | 1 |
Medical Disposal Services, Inc. v. Indiana Department of Environmental Managementgreen1 sentence2003Gingerich v. State, 228 Ind. 440, 445 , 93 N.E.2d 180, 182 (Ind.1950); Medical Disposal Services, Inc. v. Indiana Dept. of Environmental Management, 669 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), reh’g denied, trans. denied 683 N.E.2d 589 (Ind.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Gingerich v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Gingerich v. State, 228 Ind. 440, 445 , 93 N.E.2d 180, 182 (Ind.1950); Medical Disposal Services, Inc. v. Indiana Dept. of Environmental Management, 669 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), reh’g denied, trans. denied 683 N.E.2d 589 (Ind.1997). 2003Gingerich v. State, 228 Ind. 440, 445 , 93 N.E.2d 180, 182 (Ind.1950); Medical Disposal Services, Inc. v. Indiana Dept. of Environmental Management, 669 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), reh’g denied, trans. denied 683 N.E.2d 589 (Ind.1997). | 1 | 1 |
City of Beech Grove v. Schmithgreen2 sentences1981See also, City of Beech Grove v. Schmith, (1975) 164 Ind.App. 536 , 329 N.E.2d 605 . 1981See also, City of Beech Grove v. Schmith, (1975) 164 Ind.App. 536 , 329 N.E.2d 605 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Freidline v. Shelby Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 40 (citing Erie Ins. 2005Id. at 40 (citing Erie Ins. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Baker v. American States Insurance
green
1 sentence1992Kuker also claims that his allegation falls within a long-recognized exception to the "impact rule" allowed for invasions of legal rights which by their nature are likely to provoke an emotional disturbance, such as fraud, citing Baker v. American States Insurance Co. (1982), Ind.App., 428 N.E.2d 1342, 1349-1350 , trams. denied. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Johnson v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1981We think the Court of Appeals was resting its holding not only on Travelers, but also on the long recognized principle that, “[n]o party can take advantage of an error committed by a court except the one against whom it is offered.” Johnson, Adm. v. Johnson, (1901) 156 Ind. 592 , 60 N.E. 451, 452-453 . 1981We think the Court of Appeals was resting its holding not only on Travelers, but also on the long recognized principle that, “[n]o party can take advantage of an error committed by a court except the one against whom it is offered.” Johnson, Adm. v. Johnson, (1901) 156 Ind. 592 , 60 N.E. 451, 452-453 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Krutz v. Howard
green
1 sentence1935Peters v. Banta (1889), 120 Ind. 416 , 22 N. E. 95 ; Krutz v. Howard (1880), 70 Ind. 174 . | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Peters v. Banta
neutral
2 sentences1935Peters v. Banta (1889), 120 Ind. 416 , 22 N. E. 95 ; Krutz v. Howard (1880), 70 Ind. 174 . 1935Peters v. Banta (1889), 120 Ind. 416 , 22 N. E. 95 ; Krutz v. Howard (1880), 70 Ind. 174 . | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.