24 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1940–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Waters v. Churchillgreen2 sentences2015See generally 696 F.3d at 458-67 . 65 is rooted firmly in a series of cases (sometimes termed the Pickering209-Connick210-Garcetti line of cases) that derives from a long-recognized principle that “a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”211 Pickering and its progeny represent a particularized application of that principle to the termination, discipline, or other adverse actions imposed by governmental employers against their employees based on the employees’ expression.212 Accordingly, th 2015See generally 696 F.3d at 458-67 . 65 is rooted firmly in a series of cases (sometimes termed the Pickering209-Connick210-Garcetti line of cases) that derives from a long-recognized principle that “a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”211 Pickering and its progeny represent a particularized application of that principle to the termination, discipline, or other adverse actions imposed by governmental employers against their employees based on the employees’ expression.212 Accordingly, th | 4 | 4 |
Garcetti v. Ceballosgreen2 sentences2015See generally 696 F.3d at 458-67 . 65 is rooted firmly in a series of cases (sometimes termed the Pickering209-Connick210-Garcetti line of cases) that derives from a long-recognized principle that “a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”211 Pickering and its progeny represent a particularized application of that principle to the termination, discipline, or other adverse actions imposed by governmental employers against their employees based on the employees’ expression.212 Accordingly, th 2015See generally 696 F.3d at 458-67 . 65 is rooted firmly in a series of cases (sometimes termed the Pickering209-Connick210-Garcetti line of cases) that derives from a long-recognized principle that “a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”211 Pickering and its progeny represent a particularized application of that principle to the termination, discipline, or other adverse actions imposed by governmental employers against their employees based on the employees’ expression.212 Accordingly, th | 4 | 4 |
Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty.green2 sentences2015See generally 696 F.3d at 458-67 . 65 is rooted firmly in a series of cases (sometimes termed the Pickering209-Connick210-Garcetti line of cases) that derives from a long-recognized principle that “a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”211 Pickering and its progeny represent a particularized application of that principle to the termination, discipline, or other adverse actions imposed by governmental employers against their employees based on the employees’ expression.212 Accordingly, th 2015See generally 696 F.3d at 458-67 . 65 is rooted firmly in a series of cases (sometimes termed the Pickering209-Connick210-Garcetti line of cases) that derives from a long-recognized principle that “a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”211 Pickering and its progeny represent a particularized application of that principle to the termination, discipline, or other adverse actions imposed by governmental employers against their employees based on the employees’ expression.212 Accordingly, th | 4 | 4 |
Perry v. Sindermanngreen2 sentences2015See generally 696 F.3d at 458-67 . 65 is rooted firmly in a series of cases (sometimes termed the Pickering209-Connick210-Garcetti line of cases) that derives from a long-recognized principle that “a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”211 Pickering and its progeny represent a particularized application of that principle to the termination, discipline, or other adverse actions imposed by governmental employers against their employees based on the employees’ expression.212 Accordingly, th 2015See generally 696 F.3d at 458-67 . 65 is rooted firmly in a series of cases (sometimes termed the Pickering209-Connick210-Garcetti line of cases) that derives from a long-recognized principle that “a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”211 Pickering and its progeny represent a particularized application of that principle to the termination, discipline, or other adverse actions imposed by governmental employers against their employees based on the employees’ expression.212 Accordingly, th | 4 | 4 |
Connick Ex Rel. Parish of Orleans v. Myersgreen2 sentences2015See generally 696 F.3d at 458-67 . 65 is rooted firmly in a series of cases (sometimes termed the Pickering209-Connick210-Garcetti line of cases) that derives from a long-recognized principle that “a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”211 Pickering and its progeny represent a particularized application of that principle to the termination, discipline, or other adverse actions imposed by governmental employers against their employees based on the employees’ expression.212 Accordingly, th 2015See generally 696 F.3d at 458-67 . 65 is rooted firmly in a series of cases (sometimes termed the Pickering209-Connick210-Garcetti line of cases) that derives from a long-recognized principle that “a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”211 Pickering and its progeny represent a particularized application of that principle to the termination, discipline, or other adverse actions imposed by governmental employers against their employees based on the employees’ expression.212 Accordingly, th | 4 | 4 |
Lane v. Franksgreen2 sentences2015See generally 696 F.3d at 458-67 . 65 is rooted firmly in a series of cases (sometimes termed the Pickering209-Connick210-Garcetti line of cases) that derives from a long-recognized principle that “a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”211 Pickering and its progeny represent a particularized application of that principle to the termination, discipline, or other adverse actions imposed by governmental employers against their employees based on the employees’ expression.212 Accordingly, th 2015See generally 696 F.3d at 458-67 . 65 is rooted firmly in a series of cases (sometimes termed the Pickering209-Connick210-Garcetti line of cases) that derives from a long-recognized principle that “a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”211 Pickering and its progeny represent a particularized application of that principle to the termination, discipline, or other adverse actions imposed by governmental employers against their employees based on the employees’ expression.212 Accordingly, th | 4 | 4 |
Asgeirsson v. Texas Attorney Generalgreen2 sentences2015See generally 696 F.3d at 458-67 . 65 is rooted firmly in a series of cases (sometimes termed the Pickering209-Connick210-Garcetti line of cases) that derives from a long-recognized principle that “a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”211 Pickering and its progeny represent a particularized application of that principle to the termination, discipline, or other adverse actions imposed by governmental employers against their employees based on the employees’ expression.212 Accordingly, th 2015See generally 696 F.3d at 458-67 . 65 is rooted firmly in a series of cases (sometimes termed the Pickering209-Connick210-Garcetti line of cases) that derives from a long-recognized principle that “a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.”211 Pickering and its progeny represent a particularized application of that principle to the termination, discipline, or other adverse actions imposed by governmental employers against their employees based on the employees’ expression.212 Accordingly, th | 4 | 4 |
Federal Sign v. Texas Southern Universityred2 sentences2003Federal Sign v. Texas Southern University, 951 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex. 1997). 2003Federal Sign v. Texas Southern University, 951 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex.1997). | 2 | 2 |
Texas West Oaks Hospital, LP v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2018Oaks Hosp., LP v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171, 196 (Tex. 2012) (noting “the long- recognized principle that a physician who exercises ordinary care . . . is not liable to a patient for a bad outcome”); Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 880 (stating breach of standard of care cannot be inferred from existence of injury alone because doctrine of res ipsa 11 loquitor does not generally apply in medical malpractice cases). 2018Oaks Hosp., LP v. Williams , 371 S.W.3d 171 , 197 (Tex. 2012) (noting "the long-recognized principle that a physician who exercises ordinary care ... is not liable to a patient for a bad outcome"). 8 That is, he does not opine that Futrell was negligent merely because the cataract surgery was unsuccessful or because Baty suffered permanent nerve damage or vision loss. | 1 | 2 |
American Transitional Care Centers of Texas, Inc. v. Palaciosgreen1 sentence2018Oaks Hosp., LP v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171, 196 (Tex. 2012) (noting “the long- recognized principle that a physician who exercises ordinary care . . . is not liable to a patient for a bad outcome”); Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 880 (stating breach of standard of care cannot be inferred from existence of injury alone because doctrine of res ipsa 11 loquitor does not generally apply in medical malpractice cases). | 1 | 1 |
Sharma Tadepalli v. the Sri Meenakshi Temple Societygreen1 sentence2016See, e.g., Thia-garajan, 430 S.W.3d at 594 . | 1 | 1 |
Malik v. Stategreen1 sentence2003See Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240 . *787 Appellant claims the allegation was not surplusage because under a long recognized exception to the surplusage rule, the State must prove all circumstances of the description when a person, place, or thing necessary to be mentioned in the indictment is described with unnecessary particularity. | 1 | 1 |
Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clarkgreen1 sentence1990Ass’n v. Taylor, 544 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.1976), the supreme court acknowledged the long recognized rule of this state that “one who voluntarily undertakes an affirmative course of action for the benefit of another has a duty to exercise reasonable care that the other’s person or property will not be injured thereby.” Id. at 119 ; see also Otis Eng’g Cory. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex.1983). | 1 | 1 |
Texas Catastrophe Property Insurance Ass'n v. Council of Co-Owners of Saida II Towers Condominium Ass'ngreen1 sentence1989See Texas Catastrophe Property Insurance Association v. Counsel of Co-owers of Saida II Towers Condominium Association, 706 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex.1986). | 1 | 1 |
Ace Sales Co. v. CERVECERIA MODELO, SAgreen1 sentence1989Recently in Ace Sales Co. v. Cerveceria Modelo, S.A. de C.V., 739 S.W.2d 442, 447 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ de *480 nied), we applied to BIFDL the long recognized rule that, if a cause of action and remedy for its enforcement are derived not from the common law but from a statute, the statutory provisions are mandatory and exclusive, and must be complied with in all respects or the action is not maintainable. | 1 | 1 |
Thornton v. Stategreen1 sentence1984See Thornton v. State, 601 S.W.2d 340 , 344 n. 3 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). | 1 | 1 |
Vardas v. Stategreen1 sentence1984It is still somewhat unclear as to whether the attachment of jeopardy in a bench trial is controlled by federal procedure or this State’s long recognized rule that "[¡jeopardy does not attach until a defendant pleads to the indictment.” Vardas v. State, 518 S.W.2d 826, 827 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar International Transportation Corp.
red
2 sentences2011But the primary means by which the Real Parties have attempted to avoid the general rule is by invoking a long-recognized exception that applies when a contract is said to "rel[y] on the personal trust, confidence, skill, character or credit of the parties." See Crim Truck Tractor Co. , 823 S.W.2d at 596 . 2011But the primary means by which the Real Parties have attempted to avoid the general rule is by invoking a long-recognized exception that applies when a contract is said to “rel[y] on the personal trust, confidence, skill, character or credit of the parties.” See Crim Truck & Tractor Co., 823 S.W.2d at 596 . | 3 | 2011–2011 |
Burrell v. State
red
2 sentences2003Burrell, 526 S.W.2d at 802 . 2003Burrell , 526 S.W.2d at 802 . | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Fleetwood v. Med Center Bank
green
2 sentences1993And as we explained in Fleetwood I, the very removal of the “protection” of owning the more senior lien should be a cognizable prejudice to the junior lienholder, even before the junior lien is actually threatened by foreclosure of the senior lien. 786 S.W.2d at 555-56 . 1993And as we explained in Fleetwood I, the very removal of the "protection" of owning the more senior lien should be a cognizable prejudice to the junior lienholder, even before the junior lien is actually threatened by foreclosure of the senior lien. 786 S.W.2d at 555-56 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Albrecht v. State
green
1 sentence1991Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Colonial Savings Ass'n v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1990Ass’n v. Taylor, 544 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.1976), the supreme court acknowledged the long recognized rule of this state that “one who voluntarily undertakes an affirmative course of action for the benefit of another has a duty to exercise reasonable care that the other’s person or property will not be injured thereby.” Id. at 119 ; see also Otis Eng’g Cory. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex.1983). 1990Ass’n v. Taylor, 544 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.1976), the supreme court acknowledged the long recognized rule of this state that “one who voluntarily undertakes an affirmative course of action for the benefit of another has a duty to exercise reasonable care that the other’s person or property will not be injured thereby.” Id. at 119 ; see also Otis Eng’g Cory. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex.1983). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Houston News Co. v. Shavers
green
1 sentence1990In Houston News Co. v. Shavers, 64 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ.App.—Waco 1933, writ ref d), the Court considered a scope of employment question in a case where a company employee driving a company owned vehicle was involved in a collision while on the way to buy groceries. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Cearley v. Cearley
green
2 sentences1977The instant case had been decided by the court of civil appeals before this court’s decision in Cearley, supra, and understandably, that court followed the long recognized rule that such benefits were not subject to division. 1977The instant case had been decided by the court of civil appeals before this court's decision in Cearley, supra, and understandably, that court followed the long recognized rule that such benefits were not subject to division. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Loeffler v. King
green
2 sentences1964See Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., supra. Plaintiffs rely on the cases of Railroad Commission v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., supra; Gulf Oil Corp. v. York, wr. dism., judg. corr., Tex.Civ.App., 134 S.W.2d 502 , and Loefiler v. King, Tex.Civ.App., 228 S.W.2d 201 ; rev’d. on other grounds 149 Tex. 626 , 236 S.W.2d 772 , as authority for their position that the subsurface deviations of Killingsworth No. 3 and Lathrop No. 6 are unreasonable as a matter of law. 1964See Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., supra. Plaintiffs rely on the cases of Railroad Commission v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., supra; Gulf Oil Corp. v. York, wr. dism., judg. corr., Tex.Civ.App., 134 S.W.2d 502 , and Loefiler v. King, Tex.Civ.App., 228 S.W.2d 201 ; rev’d. on other grounds 149 Tex. 626 , 236 S.W.2d 772 , as authority for their position that the subsurface deviations of Killingsworth No. 3 and Lathrop No. 6 are unreasonable as a matter of law. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Texas State Board of Pharmacy v. Bloom
neutral
2 sentences1964To hold otherwise would be contrary to the long-recognized principle that when the subject of administration is so vast, complex and complicated, an administrative agency should not be placed in an absolute straight jacket.” See Texas State Board of Pharmacy v. Bloom, 382 S.W.2d 496 , Dallas Civ.App., writ pending. . 1964To hold otherwise would be contrary to the long-recognized principle that when the subject of administration is so vast, complex and complicated, an administrative agency should not be placed in an absolute straight jacket." See Texas State Board of Pharmacy v. Bloom, 382 S.W.2d 496 , Dallas Civ. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Loeffler v. King
green
1 sentence1964See Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., supra. Plaintiffs rely on the cases of Railroad Commission v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., supra; Gulf Oil Corp. v. York, wr. dism., judg. corr., Tex.Civ.App., 134 S.W.2d 502 , and Loefiler v. King, Tex.Civ.App., 228 S.W.2d 201 ; rev’d. on other grounds 149 Tex. 626 , 236 S.W.2d 772 , as authority for their position that the subsurface deviations of Killingsworth No. 3 and Lathrop No. 6 are unreasonable as a matter of law. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Gulf Oil Corporation v. York
neutral
1 sentence1964See Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., supra. Plaintiffs rely on the cases of Railroad Commission v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., supra; Gulf Oil Corp. v. York, wr. dism., judg. corr., Tex.Civ.App., 134 S.W.2d 502 , and Loefiler v. King, Tex.Civ.App., 228 S.W.2d 201 ; rev’d. on other grounds 149 Tex. 626 , 236 S.W.2d 772 , as authority for their position that the subsurface deviations of Killingsworth No. 3 and Lathrop No. 6 are unreasonable as a matter of law. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
E. Eppstein & Co. v. Holmes & Crain
green
1 sentence1940“It is the policy of the Legislature and of the court's to construe liberally all provisions of the statute so as to secure the right of appeal.” Hamill v. Samuels, 104 Tex. 46 , 133 S.W. 419, 421 ; Eppstein & Co. v. Holmes & Crain, 64 Tex. 560 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Hamill v. Samuels
green
2 sentences1940“It is the policy of the Legislature and of the court's to construe liberally all provisions of the statute so as to secure the right of appeal.” Hamill v. Samuels, 104 Tex. 46 , 133 S.W. 419, 421 ; Eppstein & Co. v. Holmes & Crain, 64 Tex. 560 . 1940“It is the policy of the Legislature and of the court's to construe liberally all provisions of the statute so as to secure the right of appeal.” Hamill v. Samuels, 104 Tex. 46 , 133 S.W. 419, 421 ; Eppstein & Co. v. Holmes & Crain, 64 Tex. 560 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.