long-recognized rule (Wyoming) · Go Syfert
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long-recognized rule in Wyoming

7 Wyoming opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Wyoming courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
Pinker v. Stategreen
wyo · 2008 · cited in 3 Wyoming opinions naming this issue, 2013–2020
2 sentences

2020“A long-recognized rule of this Court is that where there is conflict between the sentence as articulated at sentencing, and the written sentence, the oral sentence prevails.” Pinker v. State, 2008 WY 86, ¶ 7 , 188 P.3d 571, 574 (Wyo. 2008); Medina v. State, 2013 WY 119 , 309 P.3d 1247 (Wyo. 2013).

2020“A long-recognized rule of this Court is that where there is conflict between the sentence as articulated at sentencing, and the written sentence, the oral sentence prevails.” Pinker v. State, 2008 WY 86, ¶ 7 , 188 P.3d 571, 574 (Wyo. 2008); Medina v. State, 2013 WY 119 , 309 P.3d 1247 (Wyo. 2013).

33
Coffinberry v. Town of Thermopolisgreen
wyo · 2008 · cited in 1 Wyoming opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016In rejecting the property owner’s argument, we recognized that “the powers of a municipality are not necessarily limited to those expressly conferred but that a municipality may also exercise powers fairly and necessarily implied from the grant contained in the statute or constitutional provision.” Id. at ¶ 7, 183 P.3d at 1139 (emphasis omitted) (citing Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888, 894-95 (Wyo. 1983)). [¶14] The City asks us to conclude, as we did in Cojfinberry, that “the long-recognized principle that statutory authority granted to cities and towns carries with it necessarily im

2016In rejecting the property owner’s argument, we recognized that “the powers of a municipality are not necessarily limited to those expressly conferred but that a municipality may also exercise powers fairly and necessarily implied from the grant contained in the statute or constitutional provision.” Id. at ¶ 7, 183 P.3d at 1139 (emphasis omitted) (citing Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888, 894-95 (Wyo. 1983)). [¶14] The City asks us to conclude, as we did in Cojfinberry, that “the long-recognized principle that statutory authority granted to cities and towns carries with it necessarily im

11
Coulter v. City of Rawlinsgreen
wyo · 1983 · cited in 1 Wyoming opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016In rejecting the property owner’s argument, we recognized that “the powers of a municipality are not necessarily limited to those expressly conferred but that a municipality may also exercise powers fairly and necessarily implied from the grant contained in the statute or constitutional provision.” Id. at ¶ 7, 183 P.3d at 1139 (emphasis omitted) (citing Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888, 894-95 (Wyo. 1983)). [¶14] The City asks us to conclude, as we did in Cojfinberry, that “the long-recognized principle that statutory authority granted to cities and towns carries with it necessarily im

11
McKenzie v. Neale Construction Co.green
wyo · 1956 · cited in 1 Wyoming opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000McKenzie v. Neale Const. Co., Inc., 75 Wyo. 175, 186 , 294 P.2d 355, 359 (1956).

2000McKenzie v. Neale Const. Co., Inc., 75 Wyo. 175, 186 , 294 P.2d 355, 359 (1956).

11
Davis v. Schiessgreen
wyo · 1966 · cited in 1 Wyoming opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
1 sentence

1987As stated in Davis v. Schiess, Wyo., 417 P.2d 19, 22 (1966): “In the absence of * * * matters being urged by appellants on appeal, we will not discuss them.” Although the question as postulated in this case may be properly before us in the future, to render an opinion here would be to issue an advisory opinion.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wyoming. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
James Edwin Medina v. The State of Wyoming neutral
wyo · 2013
2 sentences

2020“A long-recognized rule of this Court is that where there is conflict between the sentence as articulated at sentencing, and the written sentence, the oral sentence prevails.” Pinker v. State, 2008 WY 86, ¶ 7 , 188 P.3d 571, 574 (Wyo. 2008); Medina v. State, 2013 WY 119 , 309 P.3d 1247 (Wyo. 2013).

2020“A long-recognized rule of this Court is that where there is conflict between the sentence as articulated at sentencing, and the written sentence, the oral sentence prevails.” Pinker v. State, 2008 WY 86, ¶ 7 , 188 P.3d 571, 574 (Wyo. 2008); Medina v. State, 2013 WY 119 , 309 P.3d 1247 (Wyo. 2013).

12020–2020
Diaz v. United States green
scotus · 1912
2 sentences

2008The State concedes that Mr. Daniel's battery conviction is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault and battery and that his second conviction would ordinarily be barredA 4 Nevertheless, the State contends that the second prosecution is permissible because of a long-recognized exception to the double jeopardy rule. [19] In Diag v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a defendant previously convicted of misdemeanor assault and battery could be charged with homicide when the victim later died from the injuries inflict, ed during the assault. 223 U.S. 442, 448-49 , 82 S.Ct. 250 , 251

2008The State concedes that Mr. Daniel's battery conviction is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault and battery and that his second conviction would ordinarily be barredA 4 Nevertheless, the State contends that the second prosecution is permissible because of a long-recognized exception to the double jeopardy rule. [19] In Diag v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a defendant previously convicted of misdemeanor assault and battery could be charged with homicide when the victim later died from the injuries inflict, ed during the assault. 223 U.S. 442, 448-49 , 82 S.Ct. 250 , 251

12008–2008
Ashe v. Swenson green
scotus · 1970
2 sentences

2008Many years later, Justice Brennan remarked in a concurring opinion that a separate prosecution should be permitted "where a crime is not completed or not discovered, despite dili-genee on the part of the police, until after the commencement of a prosecution for other crimes arising from the same transaction." Ashe v. Swenson, 8397 U.S. 486 , 458 n. 7, 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 1199 n. 7, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).

2008Many years later, Justice Brennan remarked in a concurring opinion that a separate prosecution should be permitted "where a crime is not completed or not discovered, despite dili-genee on the part of the police, until after the commencement of a prosecution for other crimes arising from the same transaction." Ashe v. Swenson, 8397 U.S. 486 , 458 n. 7, 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 1199 n. 7, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).

12008–2008

Where else courts name it

NY 51 (1878–2026) OH 46 (1996–2025) CA 27 (1942–2024) TX 24 (1940–2018) IL 20 (1957–2026) PA 19 (1944–2022) IN 13 (1935–2019) AR 13 (1999–2026) CT 12 (1930–2010) TN 11 (1976–2012) GA 11 (1975–2025) NM 10 (1974–2013) MD 10 (1964–2020) FL 10 (1981–2026) WA 9 (1988–2025) NJ 8 (1942–2020) IA 8 (1944–2025) OK 8 (1959–2023) LA 8 (1983–2013) WY 7 (1987–2020) AL 7 (1929–2010) RI 7 (1987–2023) CO 7 (1977–1992) MA 7 (1994–2024) MI 7 (1933–2013) HI 5 (1992–2014) NC 5 (1897–2012) NE 5 (1961–2021) MO 5 (1955–1999) DC 4 (1982–2008) KS 4 (1979–2021) KY 4 (1980–2025) MS 3 (2002–2018) VA 3 (1971–2026) SC 3 (1999–2019) ME 2 (1971–1986) WV 2 (2003–2007) WI 2 (2006–2020) AZ 2 (2012–2012)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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