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10 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1964–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clarksville Residents Against Mortuary Defense Fund, Inc. v. Donaldson Propertiesgreen1 sentence2020Moreover, given the Legislature’s incorporation of the specific prohibited conduct identified in the MCDCA into the general CPA statute which prohibits abusive, unfair and deceptive trade practices generally, we shall apply the long-recognized principle of statutory construction that a “specific statutory provision governs over a general one.” Clarksville Residents Against Mortuary Defense Fund, Inc. v. Donaldson Props., 453 Md. 516, 538 (2017) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Lumbermen’s Mut. | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Alternatively, the State argues that, even if generated, the modified instruction was not required because “the pattern jury instruction sufficiently covered the law under the circumstances.” “We review a trial judge’s decision whether to give a jury instruction under the abuse of discretion standard.” See Thompson v. State, 393 Md. 291, 311 , 901 A.2d 208, 220 (2006). 2011Alternatively, the State argues that, even if generated, the modified instruction was not required because “the pattern jury instruction sufficiently covered the law under the circumstances.” “We review a trial judge’s decision whether to give a jury instruction under the abuse of discretion standard.” See Thompson v. State, 393 Md. 291, 311 , 901 A.2d 208, 220 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. Stategreen2 sentences2008The majority today, however, says (Opinion at 257-58, 958 A.2d at 306 , emphasis added): "The [ Stevenson ] majority opinion highlighted, as an example, a then recent decision applying the long established principle that the jury serves only as a judge of the `law of the crime.' See Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 724 , 404 A.2d 1073, 1083 (1979) (holding that instructions on the voluntariness of confessions are binding, not merely advisory, on the jury, and the jury should be instructed as such)." The Lewis opinion never mentioned the phrase "law of the crime." The only "exception" recognized by 2008The majority today, however, says (Opinion at 257-58, 958 A.2d at 306 , emphasis added): "The [ Stevenson ] majority opinion highlighted, as an example, a then recent decision applying the long established principle that the jury serves only as a judge of the `law of the crime.' See Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 724 , 404 A.2d 1073, 1083 (1979) (holding that instructions on the voluntariness of confessions are binding, not merely advisory, on the jury, and the jury should be instructed as such)." The Lewis opinion never mentioned the phrase "law of the crime." The only "exception" recognized by | 1 | 1 |
Waltzinger v. Birsnergreen2 sentences1994See Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107 , 128 A.2d 617 (1957). 1994See Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107 , 128 A.2d 617 (1957). | 1 | 1 |
Finney v. Frevelgreen1 sentence1973App. 8 , 284 A. 2d 641 , at page 16: “It is axiomatic that the mere happening of an accident does not give rise to a presumption of negligence, Finney v. Frevel, 183 Md. 355, 362 (1944); Bohlen v. Glenn L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pope v. Secretary of Personnel
green
1 sentence2020This Court applied the long-recognized principle when considering an issue close to that presented here in Pope v. Secretary of Personnel, 46 Md. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
City of Bowie v. MIE, Properties, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014MIE Props., Inc., supra, 398 Md. at 679 , 922 A.2d 509 . 2014MIE Props., Inc., supra, 398 Md. at 679 , 922 A.2d 509 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Adams
green
1 sentence2008The majority today, however, says (Opinion at 257-58, 958 A.2d at 306 , emphasis added): "The [ Stevenson ] majority opinion highlighted, as an example, a then recent decision applying the long established principle that the jury serves only as a judge of the `law of the crime.' See Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 724 , 404 A.2d 1073, 1083 (1979) (holding that instructions on the voluntariness of confessions are binding, not merely advisory, on the jury, and the jury should be instructed as such)." The Lewis opinion never mentioned the phrase "law of the crime." The only "exception" recognized by | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Wheaton Triangle Lanes, Inc. v. Rinaldi
green
2 sentences2001“It is a long recognized rule that where a writing refers to another document, that other document is to be interpreted as part of the writing.” Rinaldi, 236 Md. at 531 , 204 A.2d 537 . 2001“It is a long recognized rule that where a writing refers to another document, that other document is to be interpreted as part of the writing.” Rinaldi, 236 Md. at 531 , 204 A.2d 537 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Katz v. United States
green
1 sentence1973That proposition is that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 357 ; Brown v. State, 15 Md.- App. 584, 586. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Little v. Duncan
green
2 sentences1973We restated a long recognized rule when we said in Little v. Duncan, 14 Md. 1973App. 8 , 284 A. 2d 641 , at page 16: “It is axiomatic that the mere happening of an accident does not give rise to a presumption of negligence, Finney v. Frevel, 183 Md. 355, 362 (1944); Bohlen v. Glenn L. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Ray v. Eurice
green
2 sentences1964Kirby & McGuire v. Board of Ed., 210 Md. 383 , 123 A. 2d 606 ; Lednum v. Barnes, 204 Md. 230 , 103 A. 2d 865 ; Ray v. Eurice, 201 Md. 115 , 93 A. 2d 272 . 1964Kirby & McGuire v. Board of Ed., 210 Md. 383 , 123 A. 2d 606 ; Lednum v. Barnes, 204 Md. 230 , 103 A. 2d 865 ; Ray v. Eurice, 201 Md. 115 , 93 A. 2d 272 . | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Kirby & McGuire v. Board of Ed.
green
2 sentences1964Kirby & McGuire v. Board of Ed., 210 Md. 383 , 123 A. 2d 606 ; Lednum v. Barnes, 204 Md. 230 , 103 A. 2d 865 ; Ray v. Eurice, 201 Md. 115 , 93 A. 2d 272 . 1964Kirby & McGuire v. Board of Ed., 210 Md. 383 , 123 A. 2d 606 ; Lednum v. Barnes, 204 Md. 230 , 103 A. 2d 865 ; Ray v. Eurice, 201 Md. 115 , 93 A. 2d 272 . | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Lednum v. Barnes
green
2 sentences1964Kirby & McGuire v. Board of Ed., 210 Md. 383 , 123 A. 2d 606 ; Lednum v. Barnes, 204 Md. 230 , 103 A. 2d 865 ; Ray v. Eurice, 201 Md. 115 , 93 A. 2d 272 . 1964Kirby & McGuire v. Board of Ed., 210 Md. 383 , 123 A. 2d 606 ; Lednum v. Barnes, 204 Md. 230 , 103 A. 2d 865 ; Ray v. Eurice, 201 Md. 115 , 93 A. 2d 272 . | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.