20 Maryland opinions name it 1 courts 1991–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bd. of Education v. Sandersgreen2 sentences2021The Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court erred in denying Respondents’ motion to dismiss because the Commission has broad discretion to summarily deny a request to reopen under LE § 9-736(b) “and such a denial is not subject to judicial review.” Id. at __, 248 A.3d at 1113 (bolding omitted). 2021The Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court erred in denying Respondents’ “motion to dismiss because the Commission has broad discretion to summarily deny a request to reopen and In a memorandum opinion issued on November 25, 2019, the circuit court denied the motion to alter or amend, declining to disturb its earlier ruling denying Respondents’ motion to dismiss. -9- such a denial is not subject to judicial review.” Id. at 94 , 248 A.3d at 1113 (bolding omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Gill v. Ripleygreen2 sentences2017Accordingly, the circuit court erred in finding that Petitioners had waived their executive privilege in granting Respondents’ sixth motion for sanctions. 16 Petitioners, in their response to Respondents’ motion to dismiss, rely on Gill v. Ripley as evidence that this Court has recognized that absolute quasi-judicial privilege applies to Executive Branch officials engaged in quasi-judicial acts “because their judgments are ‘functional[ly] comparab[le]’ to those of judges– that is, because they, too ‘exercise a discretionary judgment’ as part of their function.” 352 Md. 754, 762 , 724 A.2d 88, 2017Accordingly, the circuit court erred in finding that Petitioners had waived their executive privilege in granting Respondents’ sixth motion for sanctions. 16 Petitioners, in their response to Respondents’ motion to dismiss, rely on Gill v. Ripley as evidence that this Court has recognized that absolute quasi-judicial privilege applies to Executive Branch officials engaged in quasi-judicial acts “because their judgments are ‘functional[ly] comparab[le]’ to those of judges– that is, because they, too ‘exercise a discretionary judgment’ as part of their function.” 352 Md. 754, 762 , 724 A.2d 88, | 1 | 1 |
Rosenberg v. Helinskigreen2 sentences2012See Rosenberg, 328 Md. at 683-84 , 616 A.2d at 875-76 . 2012See Rosenberg, 328 Md. at 683-84 , 616 A.2d at 875-76 . | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Robinson v. State, 354 Md. 287, 313-14 , 730 A.2d 181 , 195 *417 (1999) (“In a jury trial, judging the credibility of witnesses is entrusted solely to the jury, the trier of fact; only the jury determines whether to believe any witnesses, and which witnesses to believe.”). 2011Robinson v. State, 354 Md. 287, 313-14 , 730 A.2d 181 , 195 *417 (1999) (“In a jury trial, judging the credibility of witnesses is entrusted solely to the jury, the trier of fact; only the jury determines whether to believe any witnesses, and which witnesses to believe.”). | 1 | 1 |
Case Handyman and Remodeling Services, LLC v. Schuelegreen2 sentences2010Case Handyman & Remodeling Servs., LLC v. Schuele, 183 Md.App. 44, 49 , 959 A.2d 833, 836 (2008). 2010Case Handyman & Remodeling Servs., LLC v. Schuele, 183 Md.App. 44, 49 , 959 A.2d 833, 836 (2008). | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Stategreen2 sentences2010The Collateral Order Doctrine “This Court has made clear ... that the collateral order doctrine in Maryland is very limited.” Walker v. State, 392 Md. 1, 15 , 895 A.2d 1024, 1033 (2006). 2010The Collateral Order Doctrine “This Court has made clear ... that the collateral order doctrine in Maryland is very limited.” Walker v. State, 392 Md. 1, 15 , 895 A.2d 1024, 1033 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Board of Child Care of the Baltimore Annual Conference of the Methodist Church, Inc. v. Harkergreen2 sentences2007In Board of Child Care of the Baltimore Annual Conference of the Methodist Church, Inc. v. Harker, we extended this rule to include in the exemption the “State’s agencies and instrumentalities.” 316 Md. 683, 693 , 561 A.2d 219, 224 (1989) (“That the exemption from county zoning regulations accorded to the State under our holding in City of Baltimore v. State ... extends to the State’s agencies and instrumentalities is entirely manifest.”). *710 Turning to Glascock v. Baltimore County, the basis of Respondents’ claim that the SWM facility would not be, in any event, subject to the BCZR, we were 2007In Board of Child Care of the Baltimore Annual Conference of the Methodist Church, Inc. v. Harker, we extended this rule to include in the exemption the “State’s agencies and instrumentalities.” 316 Md. 683, 693 , 561 A.2d 219, 224 (1989) (“That the exemption from county zoning regulations accorded to the State under our holding in City of Baltimore v. State ... extends to the State’s agencies and instrumentalities is entirely manifest.”). *710 Turning to Glascock v. Baltimore County, the basis of Respondents’ claim that the SWM facility would not be, in any event, subject to the BCZR, we were | 1 | 1 |
Glascock v. Baltimore Countygreen2 sentences2007In Board of Child Care of the Baltimore Annual Conference of the Methodist Church, Inc. v. Harker, we extended this rule to include in the exemption the “State’s agencies and instrumentalities.” 316 Md. 683, 693 , 561 A.2d 219, 224 (1989) (“That the exemption from county zoning regulations accorded to the State under our holding in City of Baltimore v. State ... extends to the State’s agencies and instrumentalities is entirely manifest.”). *710 Turning to Glascock v. Baltimore County, the basis of Respondents’ claim that the SWM facility would not be, in any event, subject to the BCZR, we were 2007In Board of Child Care of the Baltimore Annual Conference of the Methodist Church, Inc. v. Harker, we extended this rule to include in the exemption the “State’s agencies and instrumentalities.” 316 Md. 683, 693 , 561 A.2d 219, 224 (1989) (“That the exemption from county zoning regulations accorded to the State under our holding in City of Baltimore v. State ... extends to the State’s agencies and instrumentalities is entirely manifest.”). *710 Turning to Glascock v. Baltimore County, the basis of Respondents’ claim that the SWM facility would not be, in any event, subject to the BCZR, we were | 1 | 1 |
Maddran v. Mullendoregreen2 sentences2003We said in Maddran v. Mullendore, 206 Md. 291, 297 , 111 A.2d 608, 610 (1955), that “it is axiomatic that the owner of a servient tenement cannot close or obstruct the easement against those who are entitled to its use in such manner as to prevent or interfere with their reasonable enjoyment.” See also Klein v. Dove, 205 Md. 285 , 107 A.2d 82 (1954) (affirming decision of trial judge to grant an injunction requiring the defendants to remove obstructions from the right-of-way and restraining them from interfering with the plaintiffs right-of-way) Respondents’ brief in this Court adopted the Cou 2003We said in Maddran v. Mullendore, 206 Md. 291, 297 , 111 A.2d 608, 610 (1955), that “it is axiomatic that the owner of a servient tenement cannot close or obstruct the easement against those who are entitled to its use in such manner as to prevent or interfere with their reasonable enjoyment.” See also Klein v. Dove, 205 Md. 285 , 107 A.2d 82 (1954) (affirming decision of trial judge to grant an injunction requiring the defendants to remove obstructions from the right-of-way and restraining them from interfering with the plaintiffs right-of-way) Respondents’ brief in this Court adopted the Cou | 1 | 1 |
Fried v. Archergreen2 sentences2002Fried argued that "`Archer and Terrell did owe a legal duty of care to [Tiffany] based on the fact that [Tiffany] was an individual and a member of the class of persons who are the subjects of 911 or emergency calls, ... and injury to her from failing to give correct location information was readily foreseeable.'" Fried, 139 Md.App. at 243 , 775 A.2d at 438 (some alterations in original). 2002Fried argued that "`Archer and Terrell did owe a legal duty of care to [Tiffany] based on the fact that [Tiffany] was an individual and a member of the class of persons who are the subjects of 911 or emergency calls, ... and injury to her from failing to give correct location information was readily foreseeable.'" Fried, 139 Md.App. at 243 , 775 A.2d at 438 (some alterations in original). | 1 | 1 |
Legg v. Mayor of Annapolisgreen1 sentence1995See Legg v. Mayor, Counsellor & Aldermen of City of Annapolis, 42 Md. 203, 221 (1875) (“whenever a question arises in a court of law as to the existence of a statute, or as to the time when it took effect, or as to its precise terms, the judges who are called upon to decide such question, have a right to resort to any source of information which in its nature is capable of conveying to the judicial mind a clear and satisfactory answer to such question; the best and most satisfactory evidence in all cases being required.”) | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Klein v. Dove
green
2 sentences2003We said in Maddran v. Mullendore, 206 Md. 291, 297 , 111 A.2d 608, 610 (1955), that “it is axiomatic that the owner of a servient tenement cannot close or obstruct the easement against those who are entitled to its use in such manner as to prevent or interfere with their reasonable enjoyment.” See also Klein v. Dove, 205 Md. 285 , 107 A.2d 82 (1954) (affirming decision of trial judge to grant an injunction requiring the defendants to remove obstructions from the right-of-way and restraining them from interfering with the plaintiffs right-of-way) Respondents’ brief in this Court adopted the Cou 2003We said in Maddran v. Mullendore, 206 Md. 291, 297 , 111 A.2d 608, 610 (1955), that “it is axiomatic that the owner of a servient tenement cannot close or obstruct the easement against those who are entitled to its use in such manner as to prevent or interfere with their reasonable enjoyment.” See also Klein v. Dove, 205 Md. 285 , 107 A.2d 82 (1954) (affirming decision of trial judge to grant an injunction requiring the defendants to remove obstructions from the right-of-way and restraining them from interfering with the plaintiffs right-of-way) Respondents’ brief in this Court adopted the Cou | 2 | 1999–2003 |
Blevins v. Baltimore County
green
2 sentences2021Under the guidelines we set forth in Blevins, 352 Md. at 633-34 , 724 A.2d at 28 , for determining whether the Commission’s decision denying a petition to reopen or modify is a new order or a summary denial, it is eminently clear in this case that the Commission’s January 4, 2019 decision denying Sanders’s second request for modification was a - 38 - summary denial for which no right to judicial review exists, and that the circuit court erred in denying Respondents’ motion to dismiss and cross-motion for summary judgment. 2021Under the guidelines we set forth in Blevins, 352 Md. at 633-34 , 724 A.2d at 28 , for determining whether the Commission’s decision denying a petition to reopen or modify is a new order or a summary denial, it is eminently clear in this case that the Commission’s January 4, 2019 decision denying Sanders’s second request for modification was a - 38 - summary denial for which no right to judicial review exists, and that the circuit court erred in denying Respondents’ motion to dismiss and cross-motion for summary judgment. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. Phillips
green
2 sentences2018DISCUSSION In Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. Phillips , 413 Md. 606 , 994 A.2d 411 (2010), we outlined the sound principles of statutory interpretation: The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the real and actual intent of the Legislature. 2018DISCUSSION In Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. Phillips , 413 Md. 606 , 994 A.2d 411 (2010), we outlined the sound principles of statutory interpretation: The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the real and actual intent of the Legislature. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Leake v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2015Subsequently, in light of the Court of Special Appeals’s opinion in Leake v. Johnson, 204 Md.App. 387 , 40 A.3d 1127 (2012), the Circuit Court further reduced the judgment entered against the County to $405,000 following Respondents’ motion for reconsideration and a full hearing on the matter. 2015Subsequently, in light of the Court of Special Appeals’s opinion in Leake v. Johnson, 204 Md.App. 387 , 40 A.3d 1127 (2012), the Circuit Court further reduced the judgment entered against the County to $405,000 following Respondents’ motion for reconsideration and a full hearing on the matter. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Anne Arundel County v. Bell
green
2 sentences2015“Where one party has standing, we do not inquire typically as to whether another party on the same side also has standing.’’ Bell, 442 Md. at 583 , 113 A.3d 639 ; see State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. 2015“Where one party has standing, we do not inquire typically as to whether another party on the same side also has standing.’’ Bell, 442 Md. at 583 , 113 A.3d 639 ; see State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Baker v. Montgomery County
green
2 sentences2012Baker v. Montgomery Cnty., 201 Md.App. 642, 30 A.3d 267 (2011). 2012Baker v. Montgomery Cnty., 201 Md.App. 642, 30 A.3d 267 (2011). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
C & M Builders, LLC v. Strub
green
2 sentences2011C & M Builders, 420 Md. at 291 , 22 A.3d at 880 . 2011C & M Builders, 420 Md. at 291 , 22 A.3d at 880 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Planning Board v. Mortimer
green
2 sentences2010Instead, we must examine whether the Circuit Court’s order denying Respondents’ motion to compel arbitration is, as the law requires, “final in the traditional sense.” Mortimer, 310 Md. at 651 , 530 A.2d at 1243 . 2010Instead, we must examine whether the Circuit Court’s order denying Respondents’ motion to compel arbitration is, as the law requires, “final in the traditional sense.” Mortimer, 310 Md. at 651 , 530 A.2d at 1243 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving
green
1 sentence2007Morris at 546 , 667 A.2d at 638 . [6] The respondents also contend that "[b]y excluding from the putative class `all persons who have suffered personal injury as a result of the rearward collapse of a Seat,'" (internal citation omitted), "and by failing to allege any injury to any property belonging to Plaintiffs, the TAC concedes that Plaintiffs suffered no `actual injury or loss' under the common law of torts." (Respondents' brief, at 10). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Wilson v. John Crane, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007Wilson, 385 Md. at 198-99 , 867 A.2d at 1084 . 2007Wilson, 385 Md. at 198-99 , 867 A.2d at 1084 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Skevofilax v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc.
green
2 sentences2007Skevofilax, 167 Md.App. at 20 , 891 A.2d at 427-28 . 2007Skevofilax, 167 Md.App. at 20 , 891 A.2d at 427-28 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Benjamin v. Union Carbide Corp.
green
1 sentence2006Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Jenness v. Fortson
green
2 sentences2003The Board asserts that the Green Party’s challenge is “virtually identical” to the challenge brought in Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 , 91 S.Ct. 1970 , 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971) (upholding a 5% signature requirement on a candidate-nominating petition), and that “the Green Party has cited no case disputing the essential holding in that case — that a state may constitutionally require ... [a] minor party candidate to demonstrate a significant modicum of public support, in the form of a nominating petition bearing signatures of 5% of the relevant electorate, before placing the candidate’s name on 2003The Board asserts that the Green Party’s challenge is “virtually identical” to the challenge brought in Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 , 91 S.Ct. 1970 , 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971) (upholding a 5% signature requirement on a candidate-nominating petition), and that “the Green Party has cited no case disputing the essential holding in that case — that a state may constitutionally require ... [a] minor party candidate to demonstrate a significant modicum of public support, in the form of a nominating petition bearing signatures of 5% of the relevant electorate, before placing the candidate’s name on | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Williams Realty Co. v. Robey
green
2 sentences1999The respondents claim that Lerch’s Point, as a waterfront community, is not within the general rule applied in the above-cited cases, but is, instead, within an exception to that rule under this Court’s previous holdings in Klein v. Dove, 205 Md. 285 , 107 A.2d 82 (1954), and Williams Realty Co. v. Robey, 175 Md. 532 , 2 A.2d 683 (1938). 1999The respondents claim that Lerch’s Point, as a waterfront community, is not within the general rule applied in the above-cited cases, but is, instead, within an exception to that rule under this Court’s previous holdings in Klein v. Dove, 205 Md. 285 , 107 A.2d 82 (1954), and Williams Realty Co. v. Robey, 175 Md. 532 , 2 A.2d 683 (1938). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Montgomery Cablevision Ltd. Partnership v. Beynon
green
2 sentences1998They contended, instead, inter alia, that the trial court “erred in failing to rule as a matter of law that there could be no recovery for ‘preimpact flight.’ ” Id. at 372-73 , 696 A.2d at 495 . 1998They contended, instead, inter alia, that the trial court “erred in failing to rule as a matter of law that there could be no recovery for ‘preimpact flight.’ ” Id. at 372-73 , 696 A.2d at 495 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Rounds, Admr. v. Phillips
green
2 sentences1991Rounds v. Phillips, supra, 166 Md. at 167 , 170 A. at 538 . 1991Rounds v. Phillips, supra, 166 Md. at 167 , 170 A. at 538 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.