18 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1930–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.green2 sentences2014The respondents appealed, and - 19 - this Court reversed “reasoning that to enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a contract challenged as unlawful ‘could breathe life into a contract that not only violates state law, but also is criminal in nature.’ ” Id. at 443 (quoting Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860, 870 (Fla. 2005) rev’d, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), and opinion withdrawn, 930 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2006)). 2014The respondents appealed, and this Court reversed “reasoning that to enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a contract challenged as unlawful ‘could breathe life into a contract that not only violates state law, but also is criminal in nature.’ ” Id. at 443 , 126 S.Ct. 1204 (quoting Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So.2d 860, 870 (Fla. 2005) rev’d, 546 U.S. 440 , 126 S.Ct. 1204 , 163 L.Ed.2d 4038 (2006), and opinion withdrawn, 930 So.2d 610 (Fla.2006)). | 2 | 2 |
TRG Desert Inn Venture, Ltd. v. Berezovskygreen2 sentences2018TRG Desert Inn Venture, Ltd. v. Berezovsky , 194 So.3d 516 , 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). 2018TRG Desert Inn Venture, Ltd. v. Berezovsky, 194 So. 3d 516, 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). | 1 | 2 |
Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Florida, Inc.green1 sentence2019Analysis To invoke certiorari, a petitioner must demonstrate “(1) a departure from the essential requirements of the law, (2) resulting in material injury for the remainder of the case (3) that cannot be corrected on postjudgment appeal.” Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So. 2d 812, 822 (Fla. 2004) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Donaldsongreen1 sentence2010Specifically, the Respondents claim that the “breath test results are admissible if evidence of the following is provided by the Department: (1) the breath test was performed substantially in accordance with [FDLE] rules, with an approved machine and by a qualified technician; and (2) the machine has been inspected in accordance with [FDLE] rules to assures it accuracy.” State v. Donaldson, 579 So.2d 728, 729 (Fla.1991). | 1 | 1 |
NAT. CAR RENTAL SYS. v. Kosakowskigreen1 sentence2002Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(3) permits the discovery of documents prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial only where the requesting party shows a need for "the materials in the preparation of the case and is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." However, as FFB notes, "`inconsistencies in testimony and discrepancies are not a basis to compel production' of work product materials." Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Kosakowski, 659 So.2d 455, 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (quoting Healthtrust, Inc. v. Saunders, 651 So | 1 | 1 |
Healthtrust, Inc. v. Saundersgreen1 sentence2002Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(3) permits the discovery of documents prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial only where the requesting party shows a need for "the materials in the preparation of the case and is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." However, as FFB notes, "`inconsistencies in testimony and discrepancies are not a basis to compel production' of work product materials." Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Kosakowski, 659 So.2d 455, 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (quoting Healthtrust, Inc. v. Saunders, 651 So | 1 | 1 |
Hackney v. McKennygreen1 sentence1988A tax assessment which is made in good faith but is merely irregular or unfair is voidable rather than per se void. 151 So. at 528; 262 So.2d at 4 . [5] The respondents do not challenge the constitutionality of § 194.171(6). [6] It appears that Ch. 83-204, § 7, Laws of Fla. was the legislature's response to a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, Cape Cave Corp. v. Lowe, 411 So.2d 887 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1982), wherein the Second District held, as we did in Miller , that § 194.171(2) was a statute of limitations, the benefit of which the tax assessor m | 1 | 1 |
Marks v. State Road Departmentgreen1 sentence1987See Marks v. State Road Dept., 69 So.2d 771 (Fla.1954); Clark v. Merritt, 480 So.2d 649 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), rev. den. 488 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1986); Kirkland v. Robbins, 385 So.2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), rev. den. 397 So.2d 779 (Fla.1981); National Indemnity Co. v. Andrews, 354 So.2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. den. 359 So.2d 1210 (Fla.1978); Brassell v. Brethauer, 305 So.2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). | 1 | 1 |
State Road Department v. Mutillogreen1 sentence1964See State Road Department v. Mutillo, Fla.App.1963, 155 So.2d 179 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bush v. Holmes
green
2 sentences2019The trial court denied Respondents’ motion, distinguishing Coalition as “no longer binding authority” because the allegations there were less comprehensive and were “based on a prior and weaker version of the current Article IX, Section 1.” The trial court instead relied on this Court’s 2006 decision in Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006), -5- which interpreted the post-1998 article IX, section 1 in the context of a challenge to a voucher program. 2019The trial court denied Respondents' motion, distinguishing Coalition as "no longer binding authority" because the allegations there were less comprehensive and were "based on a prior and weaker version of the current Article IX, Section 1." The trial court instead relied on this Court's 2006 decision in Bush v. Holmes , 919 So.2d 392 (Fla. 2006), which interpreted the post-1998 article IX, section 1 in the context of a challenge to a voucher program. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna
green
2 sentences2014The respondents appealed, and - 19 - this Court reversed “reasoning that to enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a contract challenged as unlawful ‘could breathe life into a contract that not only violates state law, but also is criminal in nature.’ ” Id. at 443 (quoting Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860, 870 (Fla. 2005) rev’d, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), and opinion withdrawn, 930 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2006)). 2014The respondents appealed, and - 19 - this Court reversed “reasoning that to enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a contract challenged as unlawful ‘could breathe life into a contract that not only violates state law, but also is criminal in nature.’ ” Id. at 443 (quoting Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860, 870 (Fla. 2005) rev’d, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), and opinion withdrawn, 930 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2006)). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014The respondents appealed, and - 19 - this Court reversed “reasoning that to enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a contract challenged as unlawful ‘could breathe life into a contract that not only violates state law, but also is criminal in nature.’ ” Id. at 443 (quoting Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860, 870 (Fla. 2005) rev’d, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), and opinion withdrawn, 930 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2006)). 2014The respondents appealed, and this Court reversed “reasoning that to enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a contract challenged as unlawful ‘could breathe life into a contract that not only violates state law, but also is criminal in nature.’ ” Id. at 443 , 126 S.Ct. 1204 (quoting Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So.2d 860, 870 (Fla. 2005) rev’d, 546 U.S. 440 , 126 S.Ct. 1204 , 163 L.Ed.2d 4038 (2006), and opinion withdrawn, 930 So.2d 610 (Fla.2006)). | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Susan Haines v. Liggett Group Inc.
green
1 sentence1997The trial court followed Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir.1992), in determining that a prima facie showing had been made by the respondents that the exception had been established. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Lake Worth Towers, Inc. v. Gerstung
green
1 sentence1988A tax assessment which is made in good faith but is merely irregular or unfair is voidable rather than per se void. 151 So. at 528; 262 So.2d at 4 . [5] The respondents do not challenge the constitutionality of § 194.171(6). [6] It appears that Ch. 83-204, § 7, Laws of Fla. was the legislature's response to a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, Cape Cave Corp. v. Lowe, 411 So.2d 887 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1982), wherein the Second District held, as we did in Miller , that § 194.171(2) was a statute of limitations, the benefit of which the tax assessor m | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Cape Cave Corp. v. Lowe
green
1 sentence1988A tax assessment which is made in good faith but is merely irregular or unfair is voidable rather than per se void. 151 So. at 528; 262 So.2d at 4 . [5] The respondents do not challenge the constitutionality of § 194.171(6). [6] It appears that Ch. 83-204, § 7, Laws of Fla. was the legislature's response to a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal, Cape Cave Corp. v. Lowe, 411 So.2d 887 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1982), wherein the Second District held, as we did in Miller , that § 194.171(2) was a statute of limitations, the benefit of which the tax assessor m | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Brassell v. Brethauer
green
1 sentence1987See Marks v. State Road Dept., 69 So.2d 771 (Fla.1954); Clark v. Merritt, 480 So.2d 649 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), rev. den. 488 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1986); Kirkland v. Robbins, 385 So.2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), rev. den. 397 So.2d 779 (Fla.1981); National Indemnity Co. v. Andrews, 354 So.2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. den. 359 So.2d 1210 (Fla.1978); Brassell v. Brethauer, 305 So.2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Kirkland v. Robbins
green
1 sentence1987See Marks v. State Road Dept., 69 So.2d 771 (Fla.1954); Clark v. Merritt, 480 So.2d 649 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), rev. den. 488 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1986); Kirkland v. Robbins, 385 So.2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), rev. den. 397 So.2d 779 (Fla.1981); National Indemnity Co. v. Andrews, 354 So.2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. den. 359 So.2d 1210 (Fla.1978); Brassell v. Brethauer, 305 So.2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Clark v. Merritt
neutral
1 sentence1987See Marks v. State Road Dept., 69 So.2d 771 (Fla.1954); Clark v. Merritt, 480 So.2d 649 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), rev. den. 488 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1986); Kirkland v. Robbins, 385 So.2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), rev. den. 397 So.2d 779 (Fla.1981); National Indemnity Co. v. Andrews, 354 So.2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. den. 359 So.2d 1210 (Fla.1978); Brassell v. Brethauer, 305 So.2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
National Indem. Co. v. Andrews
green
1 sentence1987See Marks v. State Road Dept., 69 So.2d 771 (Fla.1954); Clark v. Merritt, 480 So.2d 649 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), rev. den. 488 So.2d 831 (Fla. 1986); Kirkland v. Robbins, 385 So.2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), rev. den. 397 So.2d 779 (Fla.1981); National Indemnity Co. v. Andrews, 354 So.2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. den. 359 So.2d 1210 (Fla.1978); Brassell v. Brethauer, 305 So.2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Raisen v. Raisen
green
1 sentence1985The First District affirmed, citing Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 , 101 S.Ct. 240 , 66 L.Ed.2d 111 (1980), but certified to this Court as a question of great public importance: Is the doctrine of interspousal immunity waived, to the extent of available liability insurance, when the action is for a negligent tort? | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Wilmot v. Walker
green
1 sentence1985The First District affirmed, citing Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 , 101 S.Ct. 240 , 66 L.Ed.2d 111 (1980), but certified to this Court as a question of great public importance: Is the doctrine of interspousal immunity waived, to the extent of available liability insurance, when the action is for a negligent tort? | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Raisen v. Raisen
green
1 sentence1985The First District affirmed, citing Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 , 101 S.Ct. 240 , 66 L.Ed.2d 111 (1980), but certified to this Court as a question of great public importance: Is the doctrine of interspousal immunity waived, to the extent of available liability insurance, when the action is for a negligent tort? | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Wainwright v. Scott
green
1 sentence1985The First District affirmed, citing Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886 , 101 S.Ct. 240 , 66 L.Ed.2d 111 (1980), but certified to this Court as a question of great public importance: Is the doctrine of interspousal immunity waived, to the extent of available liability insurance, when the action is for a negligent tort? | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Price v. State
neutral
1 sentence1972Colhoun v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., Fla.App. 1971, 253 So.2d 176 . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Shapleigh v. San Angelo
green
2 sentences1936Shapleigh v. City of San Angelo, 167 U. S. 646 , 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 957, 42 L. 1936Shapleigh v. City of San Angelo, 167 U. S. 646 , 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 957, 42 L. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
City of Palmetto v. Klemm
neutral
2 sentences1934This cause coming on for considera■tion upon the motion of relators for a peremptory writ of mandamus herein to ¿-equire the respondent officials. of DeSoto County to convene and revise the county budget for the fiscal year 1933-1934 so as to include therein an appropriation Sufficient to pay the past due interest and interest which will mature prior to October 1, Í934, upon the out *15 standing bonds described in the alternative writ and it appearing that no good cause has been presented by the respondents in bar or preclusion of the award of a peremptory writ in accordance with the terms of 1934This cause coming on for considera■tion upon the motion of relators for a peremptory writ of mandamus herein to ¿-equire the respondent officials. of DeSoto County to convene and revise the county budget for the fiscal year 1933-1934 so as to include therein an appropriation Sufficient to pay the past due interest and interest which will mature prior to October 1, Í934, upon the out *15 standing bonds described in the alternative writ and it appearing that no good cause has been presented by the respondents in bar or preclusion of the award of a peremptory writ in accordance with the terms of | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Elizabethport Cordage Co. v. Whitlock
green
1 sentence1930As to the question whether the court had jurisdiction of the property and the respondents in the rule to show cause, this Court held in the case of Elizabethport Cordage Co. v. Whitlock, 37 Fla. 190 , 20 So. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.